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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the policy and politics of the fight against organised crime in 
the process of the European Union’s enlargement to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 
It covers the period between the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the second Eastern 
enlargement in 2007 which saw the emergence of a new normative base for 
international relations and the expansion of the international security agenda 
focusing on ‘soft security’ issues and threats from weak rather than powerful states. 
The thesis explores this new ‘soft security’ thinking and investigates its practical 
application in EU’s policy of building member-states in the New Europe with a focus 
on the case study of the fight against organised crime in Bulgaria and its EU-guided 
criminal justice reform. The thesis looks at these developments from both internal 
and external perspective and focuses on the practicalities of the policy itself such as 
the development of legislative changes, institutional reform and direct transfer of 
Western European expertise to Bulgarian institutions. The main findings of the thesis 
have led to a conclusion which questions the quality and premises of these policies. 
The thesis argues that the Bulgarian state and the European Union institutions have 
subscribed to a highly problematic organised crime discourse and agenda which has 
negatively influenced the quality of their relationship with the Bulgarian electorate.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction and methodology 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of a new ‘soft security’ agenda in international 
politics and the way in which it was adopted and applied by the European Union in 
its attempt to deal with organised crime in the Balkans. The thesis uses the case study 
of the preparations of one Balkan country, Bulgaria, for joining the European Union 
and its policy in fighting organised crime developed under EU membership 
conditionality in order to analyse the application of such conditionality in the area of 
crime. The complexity of issues and approaches, which this topic entails, created the 
need for an inter-disciplinary analysis and the use of a combination of methods, the 
selection of which is the subject of this introductory chapter. The chapter’s aim is to 
explain in more detail the questions that led to the research design developed by the 
thesis, and the significance and purpose of the thesis itself. It discusses the existing 
approaches to the topic and justifies the choice of a particular approach in relation to 
its advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Today there is a widespread perception, enhanced by official, academic, fictional and 
semi-fictional and media accounts, that crime and especially entrepreneurial 
organised crime has been on the rise in both developing and developed countries, and 
it has acquired elaborate forms of existence and ways of extracting of profit on a 
local to a global scale. Even though, as this thesis will further discuss, official 
statistics do not, and are unable, to reflect this perception, the public assumes that 
there is a growing problem with organised criminality and the policy responses to 
this newly identified threat have been multiplying and broadening. They have ranged 
from attempts at defining and distinguishing organised crime from other social 
problems, determining the extent to which it poses a threat to society and even 
international security, the adoption of new forms of policing, and other forms of 
control and prevention, and the spread of these functionally to more policy areas and 
territoriality beyond the nation state.  
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One of the areas for the regulation of crime which has been recently prioritised is in 
the arena of international relations. What is so peculiar about the case of the 
international level of dealing with organised crime, which has developed since the 
1990s, is not so much that the issue became a part of the international agenda, 
criminal activities have always been part of inter-state relations, but the fact that it 
has attracted an unprecedented level of support as a problem to be urgently addressed 
by collaborative international policies and institutions. For example, the way the 
European Union has appropriated international policy on organised crime and begun 
establishing supranational policing institutions is indicative of new trends in 
international relations, criminal justice and politics in general. This enthusiasm for an 
international anti-crime regime and the increased export-import of anti-crime policies 
between the more experienced Western-European states and the Eastern states that 
are reforming their criminal justice systems is what this thesis sets out to investigate.  
 
The thesis aims to explain how this shift has occurred in international policy: the 
specific policy concepts at the level of the European Union and what the new 
international policies have achieved on the ground. Bulgaria provides an opportunity 
to ‘look closer’, or to use Hobbs’ phrase ‘go down the glocal’ of international 
organised crime regulation.1 Bulgaria allegedly acquired a serious crime problem 
during its transition from communism to a democratic and market economy and was 
perceived to need to ‘catch up’ with the West economically and politically for which 
it internalised the new anti-crime and anti-corruption agenda in its preparation for 
EU membership. Furthermore, it had to fulfil a number of requirements in order to 
become part of the Union’s ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. In Bulgaria’s case 
two aspects of policy making came into play – that of external compliance to EU 
requirements as a way into international recognition, and the need for the ruling 
elites to re-connect with the public while engaging in an unpopular structural reform. 
These circumstances make Bulgaria a useful case study of the politics of crime 
fighting which can be traced from the global to the local level.2  
                                                 
1 D. Hobbs, ‘Going Down the Glocal: The Local Context of Organised Crime’, The Howard Journal, 
vol. 37, no. 4, November 1998, pp. 407-422. 
2 Other organisations and institutions have also had a role in this such as the UN (which had a drugs 
programme in Bulgaria) , bilateral programmes between other EU member states (i.e. UK SOCA) and 
even the USAID. The thesis concentrates on the EU because of its major role and the fact that some of 
these programs were seen as assisting the EU agenda. 
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1.2. Background: organised crime, states and politics 
 
Organised crime is a subjective term, and whatever term is used to describe such 
crime it is certainly not a new phenomenon. Pre-planned crime, involving several 
persons, often as a full time occupation, has had many manifestations in history 
although they might not always be described as ‘organised crime’. Some of the 
historical precedents have occurred within states and many have acted across state 
boundaries – indeed organised crime pre-dates the concept of ‘state’ borders. What is 
common to all cases is both the uneasy relationship of crime and criminality with 
political and economic power but also the uneasy link between myth and reality. 
From today’s perspective one can define as organised crime the case of Robin Hood 
and his band, or the ancient and medieval pirates and smugglers, the nineteenth 
century semi-legitimate British and American traders-smugglers of opium into 
China, the many historical secret societies and heresies, the Templars, the Sicilian 
Mafia, the criminal businesses which flourished during the Prohibition in America, 
and many others.3  
 
The region of the Balkans has also had many historical precedents where ‘organised 
crime’ crossed with anti-establishment insurgency.4 In the period before the Ottoman 
conquest of the region, it had become infamous in Europe as a source of religious 
sects which emerged as an opposition to local states and clergy but ‘spread into’ 
Western Europe and were perceived as a threat to the Catholic church.5 Later the 
                                                 
3 The crusaders could be included in this category as well as armies –  the early methods of recruiting 
armies involved promises of ‘loot’ in exchange for taking up arms. Further back in ancient times, 
farmer communities were often held up by nomadic tribes: at first forcefully but later by consent when 
the nomads created (imposed) rules and provided protection of farmer from other predators. This was 
the mechanism of the establishment of primitive states. In the case of Bulgaria such extortion-to-rules 
relationship was established around 681 between the Bulgars, or proto-Bulgarians – nomad tribes 
moving West from the Asia, and the Slavs, which were the local farmer inhabitant in the Balkans, 
living in numerous local tribes.  
4 S. Xenakis, ‘The Challenge of Organised Crime to State Sovereignty in the Balkans: An Historical 
Approach’, Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East-central Europe, Harvard University, 2001 
[online] http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW3/Sappho_Xenakis.pdf accessed 20/03/2004. 
5 One of the most popular sects originated from Bulgaria. It was called Bogomilism, and was allegedly 
started by a priest Bogomil, and had emerged in Bulgaria between 927 and 970. It later spread in into 
Byzantine Empire, Russia, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Italy and France. The reports of the Bogomils by 
the Catholic church spread the fear of the sect throughout Europe, and especially the allegations that 
the Bogomils were practicing sodomy. Allegedly these have influenced the emergence of the name of 
a crime in England. The etymology of the word ‘bugger’ and ‘buggery’ is linked to the French 
‘bougre’ which originated from the word for Bulgarian ‘Bulgar’ which at the time was equated with 
the Bogomils, or sodomists. The word ‘Bulgarian’ has later evolved into a euphemism for sexual 
minorities, and particularly ‘gay’ people before accepting the specific terms used today. See K. Curtin, 
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decay of the Ottoman empire and its growing inability to control its vast territories, 
and especially the Christian dominated Balkans, also led to the spread of bandit 
gangs, called hajduks, in the mountainous regions which preyed on travellers, 
Ottoman representatives and local wealthy merchants.6 They were later turned into 
myths of the nation-building process of post-Ottoman independent republics in the 
Balkans, and the hajduks were seen not as criminals but part of an imagined large 
network of freedom fighters against ‘Ottoman yoke’ and an early sign of the 
existence of a national consciousness amongst the Christian population of the 
empire. But as Xenakis points out in her historical study of the organised crime threat 
in the Balkans: ‘The question of bias in historical writing becomes important when 
attempting to assess the legacies of competition for loyalty of populations between 
states and groups which one can identify as part of the tradition of organised crime.’7 
The Balkan bandits and hajduks, she argues, were often acting in cooperation with 
the Ottoman state and ‘were at times granted legal dispensation by the Ottoman state 
to continue with these activities’ but at other places and cases did evolve into 
revolutionary movements.8
 
                                                                                                                                          
We can always call them Bulgarians. The emergence of lesbian and gay men on the American stage, 
Alyson Publications, 1988.  
6 Eric J. Hobsbawm includes the hajduks in his study of historical cases of social banditry, which also 
covers the mafia in Sicily. His view of the ‘social bandits’ (such as Robin Hood) was based on the 
political aspect of banditry, i.e. ‘social bandits’ were men who gained fame and popular adulation as 
champions of the interests of the folk masses against elite oppression but also as a channel for upward 
social mobility. His view has been influential in criminological and sociological studies of crime and 
politics but also critiqued for basing its interpretation on myths and folklore, and not the social reality 
of crime. Other critiques point out the lack of hard data on many of the stories about the ‘social 
bandits’. E. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries, Manchester University Press, 1971; E. Hobsbawm, Bandits, London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1969; E. Hobsbawm, ‘Social Bandits: Reply’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, vol. 14, no. 4, Sep. 1972, pp. 503-505; R. Slatta, ‘Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Social Bandit: A 
Critique and Revision’ [online] http://www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente/spring_04/Slatta.pdf 
accessed 20/02/2009. 
7 S. Xenakis, 2001, op.cit. 
8 One of these cases is the link that Ottoman state established to exist between smugglers and the 
Macedonian independence movements and led to the establishment of visa regulated travel in the 
country by 1902. Ibid. The involvement of Macedonians in the illegal arms and drugs business was 
later a problem for the Bulgarian state, when some individuals immigrated to Bulgaria and continued 
their illegal practices largely due to lack of possibilities for upward social mobility for them in small-
landowning state of Bulgaria, and continued engagement with illegal markets in Macedonia. In fact all 
Balkan states faced the problem of how to treat the former bandits-turned-rebels after independence 
when many continued to be cause problems. The Greek state used them in its army which it employed 
to fight for territorial expansion. As Xenakis points out, it was bandits rather than regular Greek 
troops that were shipped out en masse by Greece to help the insurgents of Crete in the late 1860s’. 
Ibid. 
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The problematic link between the criminal and the political, and the question of what 
constitutes crime, what constitutes legitimate economic activity and, what is quasi-
political resistance to the established unjust order is one of the reasons why organised 
crime has been an uneasy issue in inter-state relations. In reality, the relationship 
between those who commit crime and the established order is not always adversarial. 
Moreover it may not involve the state as the ‘good’ against the criminal as the ‘bad’, 
‘crime’ may be competitive if can be seen to exist in competition with a rival 
kleptocratic government.9 Criminals have also been used by governments in pursue 
of political goals, or have been defended by governments, and in such cases the 
relationship is symbiotic.10 When existing without a direct relation to state power, 
organised crime could be interpreted as mirroring higher levels of conduct. Any 
established fact of organised crime could be interpreted as part of a hierarchical 
structure of criminal activities, which goes right to the top of the establishment, as 
pointed out by Tilly in his essay on ‘War Making and State Making as Organised 
Crime.’11  
 
In the area of international relations, anti-crime actions have sometimes resembled 
aggression and war, rather than cooperation against crime. Some examples include 
the mid-nineteenth century Opium Wars between the British Empire and China to 
defend free trade in drugs, the 1960s War on Drugs which the USA extended 
militarily into Latin America to stop free trade in drugs, or the more recent so-called 
‘War on Terror’ waged by the US military in Afghanistan backed also by NATO 
particularly Britain. Behind this open confrontation, there is a history of antagonisms 
between states caused by crime related issues.12 Apart from traditional smuggling or 
piracy supported by state governments (or sovereign monarchies), many of those 
antagonisms have been caused by the spread of the illegal drug trade since the 1960s, 
                                                 
9 H. Grossman, ‘Rival kleptocrats: the mafia versus the state’ in G. Fiorentini & S. Peltzman eds., The 
Economics of Organised Crime Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 143-161. Green and Ward also 
point out that ‘organised crime’ in such cases may offer a better redistribution of resources than the 
state. P. Green & T. Ward, State Crime. Governments, Violence and Corruption, Pluto Press, 2004. 
10 Gallant for example argues that organised crime has not developed in opposition to the state but has 
been instrumental in state development. T. W. Gallant, ‘Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-
Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World Systems Perspective’ in J.M.C.Heyman. ed., 
States and Illegal Practices, Berg: Oxford, 1999, p. 25-62. 
11 C. Tilly, ‘War making and state making as organised crime’ in P.B. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer & T. 
Skocpol eds., Bringing The State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
12 A. Burger, ‘Conundrum: Illicit narcotics and theoretical approaches in international politics’ in 
Conference proceedings: International Studies Association 40th Annual Convention, Washington, D. 
C., 16-20 February, 1999 [online] www.ciaonet.org/isa/ accessed 17/03/2002. 
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following on from the twentieth century criminalisation of the buying and selling and 
international movement of some drugs.13 A more recent example in this respect is the 
tension between the Netherlands and France due to the formers adoption of a more 
relaxed drug regime while opening borders with France.14 However, there has 
always been an unofficial cooperation between states’ law enforcement institutions 
and a history of problematic but nevertheless developing structures of criminal 
justice collaboration on an international level, which have had some formal 
arrangements such as an international system of extraditions, international 
institutions such as Interpol, and some agreements regulating the production and 
trade of narcotics, aircraft hijacking, piracy, and others.15  
 
In terms of legal regulation however, crime is still bounded by its territorial limits 
and the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system within which it had taken place. 
For example, if immigrants commit crimes in the host country, their country of origin 
is not usually held responsible for these acts.16 Crime happens in a context and the 
external origin of the perpetrator or the tool of crime can only play a role in a 
political framework when one country transfers responsibility to another for its crime 
                                                 
13 There is a century old history of international regulation of drugs – from regulation of the 
production of drugs for legal use through imposing quotas on opium production on the producer 
countries, to imposing regulation and criminalisation of the illegal production of drugs. The initiator 
of this regime building, USA, managed to convey the idea through the United Nations but some form 
of wide recognition was only achieved as late as the beginning of 1960s. Simultaneously, terrorism 
attained the consideration and 1963 saw the adoption of The Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft. The period since the adoption of those resolutions until the 
end of the Cold War was marked by limited and case-driven international actions dealing with 
international crimes: mostly legal (but not entirely legally binding) with the exception of the 
functional (mainly for information exchange) Interpol and the consultative Trevi Group within the EC. 
Prior to 1990s there was no mention in the priorities of the international community of actions against 
transnational organised crime.  
14 Some of these problems are described by the series of publications of the World’s Geopolitics of 
Drugs published by the Observatoire Geopolitique Des Drogues – Geopolitical Drug Watch. For 
example, Geopolitical Drug Watch, ‘A drug trade primer for the late 1990s’, Current History, April, 
1998, pp. 150-153. 
15 These regulations have some perverse consequences for the Balkans. The attempts to develop an 
international anti-drug regime, which began in the first decades of the twentieth century and was led 
by the rising power of the USA, led to the establishment of strict international regulation and quotas in 
the legal production of narcotics (and mainly opium). However, this regulation also boosted the 
development of an illegal production and in 1920-1930s Turkey became an ideal location for such 
production as the Western states had started to enforce an anti-drug regime but failed to control the 
increasing demand. The policy of the Turkish government to clamp down on the illegal trade resulted 
in the latter moving to Bulgaria in the 1930s. Subsequently the Balkan region was to become one of 
the main routes for land transportation of opium, and later morphine and opium. Xenakis, 2001, op.cit. 
16 Though there are examples of collective responsibility being applied such as 9/11 and the 
subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. 
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problem.17 This has further inhibited the development of cooperation between states 
in the criminal justice area. When it comes to the international level, crime 
transcends the area of state criminal justice, which defines it as crime, and moves to 
the political area of international legal equality, guaranteed by the concept of state 
sovereignty, and lack of binding international criminal law and a lack of crime 
thereof.18  
 
Given all these constraints, it is perhaps surprising that in the 1990s organised crime 
came to become so prominent in the international agenda and that this led to some 
remarkable developments in building a cooperative anti-crime regime and some 
viable international anti-crime institutions. However, an essential aspect of these 
policies was the way the problem was defined which facilitated international 
cooperation. Organised crime was defined as a common enemy of states rather than 
an enemy emanating from states.19 This new collective security vision was 
conditioned by the development of new theories which sought to expand the security 
agenda beyond the rigid military definition and thus opened up a possibility for more 
                                                 
17 One grey area of international crime is cybercrime as perpetrator and victim are often in different 
countries. 
18 However, there is an increasing ‘criminalisation’ of states and state officials in the international 
relations discourse and developing international legal arrangements (i.e. International Criminal Court). 
As Kissinger points out in relation to the concept of universal jurisdiction, the latter is relatively new 
term and the closest analogous concept before 1990 is hostes humani generis (‘enemies of the human 
race’). This term has been applied to outlaws whose crimes were committed outside the territory of a 
state such as pirates, hijackers, etc. In the 1990s, however, ‘the notion that heads of state and senior 
public officials should have the same standing as outlaws before the bar of justice’ is becoming 
increasingly popular. H. Kissinger, ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’, Foreign Affairs, 
July/August 2001, vol. 80, no. 4, pp.86-96. The first case of issuing an arrest warrant against a saving 
head of state, the Sudanese Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, was issued by the newly established International 
Criminal Court in 2009. Sudanese lawyers have declared the warrant illegal and against the 
international law – a position shared by many developing countries’ leaders. D. Howden, ‘Sudanese 
leader defies arrest warrant with trip to Eritrea. Pursued by International Criminal Court, Bashir tests 
support among Arab nations’, The Independent (UK) Tuesday, 24 March 2009 [online] 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sudanese-leader-defies-arrest-warrant-with-trip-to-
eritrea-1652608.html accessed 02/04/2009.
19 These new developments also made ‘transnational organised crime’ distinct from the existing UN 
crime prevention initiative within the United Nations Economic and Social Council, established in 
1992. It works on the basis of a social-economic definition of crime which puts an emphasis on: ‘the 
social, financial and other costs of various forms of crimes and/or crime control to the individual, the 
local, national and international community, and to the development process’, and also on ‘the need of 
developing or developed countries to have recourse to experts and other resources necessary for 
establishing and developing programmes for crime prevention and criminal justice that are appropriate 
at the national and local levels’. United Nations General Assembly, ‘Creation of an effective United 
Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme’, 77th plenary meeting, 18 December 1991 
[online] http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r152.htm accessed 11/04/2009. The focus on 
organised crime which developed later reflected a more ‘suppressive’ than ‘preventive’ idea of 
dealing with crime. 
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actors and states to participate in international policy making along with the big 
nuclear powers. It also, in turn, allowed governments and elites to strengthen their 
internal position by subscribing to an international policy, which was more relevant 
to their citizens’ concerns.20 And these concerns were changing along with the 
changes in the international political and economic system, which came to be known 
as a rapid process of ‘globalisation’ in the post-bipolar world.  
 
1.3.  Framework: New Europe, democracy, law and order 
  
The last decade of the twentieth century experienced a fin de siècle excitement 
coupled with new concerns after the end of the bipolar division in Europe and the 
world, exemplified by the ‘New World Order’, ‘End of History’ and ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ theses.21 International politics had lost its ‘balance of power’ which 
opened the possibility of re-defining the rules and concepts of international affairs. 
Renewed attention was given to the developing world where failures of governments 
were creating internal problems that threatened state and regional stability, which 
prompted the fear that it would spill over the ‘problem’ zone. The unexpected fall of 
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had partly triggered these new concerns 
with internal stability and security. In the period following the fall of the communist 
regimes and planned economy, the Western model of free market capitalism and 
economic integration were seen in the West as ‘the key remedy’ for the social and 
                                                 
20 However, the level of cooperation between states against organised crime should not be 
overestimated. The case of the UN Convention on Organised Crime, which entered into force on 29 
September 2003 demonstrates some continuing problems such as the need to establish a mechanism of 
resolving disputes between parties, the contested jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
especially in the case of human trafficking. Some states such as Ecuador made declarations against 
criminalisation of migration; others such as El Salvador expressed reservation regarding smuggled 
immigrants (‘that the return of smuggled migrants shall take place to the extent possible and within 
the means of the State’), and some like Saudi Arabia found the refugee status problematic; and most 
problems were encountered in negotiation a regime against illicit manufacturing and trafficking in 
firearms. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and accompanying 
protocols  
[online] http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf accessed 14/04/2004. 
21 These were three popular ideas of the 1990s. The idea of the ‘New World order’ was used both by 
presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush to define the post-Cold War era based on a 
great power cooperation, built by their respective governments. The ‘End of history’ thesis was 
proposed by the American academic Francis Fukuyama in an essay titled ‘End of History’ published 
in 1989 and developed in his book ‘End of History and the Last Man’. He argued that the end of the 
Cold War signalled the end of ideology and the triumph of liberal democracy. F. Fukuyama, End of 
History and the Last Man, Avon Books, 1992. The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis proposed by Samuel 
Huntington conveyed the opposite message that the future ideological clash will be that of 
civilisations defined along cultural and religious lines and not states. S. Huntington, The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
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political problems of post-communist Europe, given the example of the German 
economy being linked to the other Western European powers through the European 
integration after World War II, and also the fact that communism was perceived as 
inferior to the economic and political development which had occurred in the West. 
This was seen as an opportunity to build a New Europe of economic convergence 
and democratic equality. However, as Ezkenazi and Nikolov point out ‘the transition 
to market economy required substantial investment. This was unavailable in the 
reforming countries, nor could it be provided by a Western Europe itself suffering 
from recession accompanied by xenophobia and a natural reluctance of its public to 
support costly commitments abroad and the opening of markets.’22
 
The lack of financial commitment on the part of the West led to optimism about the 
future of Europe being overshadowed by a more pessimistic view reinforced by the 
difficulties of post-communist transition to market economy, the re-lapse into 
authoritarian rule in some Eastern European states. The violent intrastate conflicts in 
Yugoslavia and parts of the former USSR, and the perceived rise of internal conflicts 
in the Third World led to the discourse of ‘New World Disorder’. In the Western 
countries with a well established capitalist system, the spread of liberalising policies 
and increasing global competition also had some negative social consequences in 
terms of social cohesion. In these conditions a major concern in Europe in the 1990s 
was the emergence of a new feeling of insecurity, a sense of lack of control over 
political and economic forces, and fear of external factors such as immigrant labour, 
international crime or terrorism.23 These fears were not always evenly spread in what 
we can term as the ‘west’ as some of the capitalist European states and members of 
                                                 
22 I. Ezkenazi & K. Nikolov, ‘Relations with the European Union: Developments to date and 
prospects’ in I. Zloch-Kristy ed., Bulgaria in a Time of Change. Economic and Political Dimensions, 
Averbury Aldershot Publishing Limited, 1996, pp. 189-205, p. 189. 
23 However, in the period after establishing and intensifying their economic, political and social 
relations with the East after 1989, the EU member states suffered from no threat to their security either 
in the traditional military, ‘hard security’ sense, or in ‘soft security’ in the economic or political sense. 
Moreover, their prosperity seemed to be increasing rapidly and the political problems in Europe did 
not have a huge negative impact on the steady economic growth in the world (in net figures which do 
not represent its unequal distribution), which had started since the 1950s. The GNP per capita of the 
UK steadily grew from $8,396 in 1985 to $19,600 in 1996. France marked a continuous increase for 
the same period too: from $9,550 in 1985 to $28,870 in 1996, and Germany’s GNP per capita grew 
from $10,940 in 1985 (before the unification in 1989), and $22,360 in 1990 to roughly $28,866 in 
1996. In comparison, the GNP per capita of Bulgaria had dropped from $ 2,320 in 1990 to $1,136 in 
1996. M. Wyzan, ‘Bulgarian Economic Policy and Performance, 1991-1997’ in J. Bell ed., Bulgaria 
in Transition, Westview Press, 1998. 
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the EU were also seen as source of disorder and crime such as Italy, Spain, Portugal 
or Greece.  
 
The issue of organised crime was therefore re-defined in these new geopolitical 
conditions. It was re-discovered as a potential common problem for less powerful as 
well as more powerful states, a ‘new global challenge’, which the world had to 
urgently address through international cooperation and joint policies.24 In their work 
Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, Felia Allum and Renate Siebert 
state that: 
 
In reality, organized crime is very dangerous, but above all, in its most 
contemporary form, it has become practically invisible and all-pervasive. 
As white collar crime, it is fully integrated and immersed in our everyday 
lives, part of the socio-economic and political fabric of our society. 
Today, across the world, organized crime has come to threaten, for 
example, the lives of citizens in the USA, Nigeria, Belgium, Jamaica and 
Austria, the banking systems of the UK, Switzerland, Germany, 
Luxemburg or Liechtenstein and politics in Italy, Russia, Japan and the 
EU. Democracy is generally in danger.25
 
In less developed countries crime was defined as one of the underlining problems 
alongside economic inequality, which led to state failure, and eventually civil war. 
According to Mary Kaldor: 
 
A growing informal economy associated with increased inequalities, 
unemployment and rural-urban migration, combined with the loss of 
legitimacy, weakens the rule of law and may lead to the re-emergence of 
privatised forms of violence – organised crime and the substitution of 
‘protection’ for taxation, vigilantes, private security guards protecting 
                                                 
24 In the 1980s and the early 1990s when some European states suffered from cyclic economic 
problems, it was suggested that ‘the economic crisis on the Continent results in a flushing out of 
existing fraud, and that bad ties tempt corporate managers to conceal their business problems’. S. 
Froomkin, ‘The International Development of Economic Crime and its Control’ in J. Reuvid ed., 
Economic Crime Internationally, London: Kogan Page, 1995, p. xiii. 
25 F. Allum & R. Siebert, Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, London: Routledge, 
2003, p. 1.  
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economic facilities, especially international companies, paramilitary 
groups associated with particular political fractions.26
 
These dangers were not limited to Third World states but could be found in Europe, 
and particularly in the Balkans – seen as a traditional source of regional conflict with 
a potential of spilling over to the rest of Europe. The violent disintegration of the 
Balkan state of Yugoslavia in 1990s brought back images of the Balkan Wars of 
1912-1914, the First World War, and Balkan genocide though whether the real 
history of the Balkans justified the fears of what Kaplan called ‘Balkan ghosts’ is a 
different matter.27 The Balkans were again seen as a source of threat to the rest of the 
continent because of their instability which caused problems for the EU such as 
refugee flows, economic migrants and organised crime. The fears of spill-over of 
internal problems were linked to both the war-ridden Western Balkans, as well as the 
Balkan applicants, Bulgaria and Romania. This anxiety was expressed by the 
President of the Association of European Police Colleges, Albert Goedendrop: 
‘When these countries become members of the EU, they will form the Eastern 
borders of our Union and if they can’t settle their own problems that means that, in 
time, these will be exported to the member countries of the EU’.28 More recent 
research claims to establish a direct link between local organised crime and the 1990s 
wars in former Yugoslavia. According to a report published in December 2002 by 
the United States Institute for Peace, the ‘political economies of the region share a 
common, criminalized legacy’, and ‘failure to acknowledge the criminal threat 
earlier and develop the means to address it, has retarded peace building in Bosnia and 
Kosovo and is thwarting reform in Serbia’. The report further argued that, although 
the conflicts in the Balkans were defined in ethnic terms, ‘forces with roots in the 
criminal underworld played a leading role in this’.29  
                                                 
26 M. Kaldor, ‘Cosmopolitanism and organised violence’, Paper presented at Conference on 
‘Conceiving Cosmopolitanism’, Warwick, April 27-29 2000.  
27 R.Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, New York: Vintage, 1994. For a contrasting 
view see M. Mazower The Balkans: A Short History, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000 which 
argues that the Balkans is no more unstable historically than other areas. For the century-old tradition 
of vilifying the Balkans and defining the region as the ‘other’ Europe see M. Todorova, Imagining the 
Balkans, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
28 Cited in F. Gregory, ‘Good Cops’: Issues related to EU Enlargement and the ‘Police’ requirements 
of the JHA acquis’, Working paper. ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme, 2001 [online] 
http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/pdf/w24gregory.pdf accessed 15/10/2005. 
29 M. Dziedzi, L. Rozen & P. Williams, ‘Lawless Rule Versus Rule of the Law in the Balkans’, United 
States Institute for Pease, Special Report, 2002, no. 92 [online] 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr97.html accessed 23/09/2005. The same was said of the 
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 The export of anti-crime policies from the EU to the applicant states, and particularly 
the Balkans, has been both part of an internal ‘soft security’ agenda for the EU, and 
an external agenda of addressing ‘the implications of international change – 
including the rise in international crime and the expectations that the EU will assume 
more responsibilities for ensuring peace and security, especially in its periphery’.30 
The re-emerging Balkan fragmentation, civil war and potential infectious political 
problems brought in an international involvement of peace-keeping, peace-
enforcement, use of air power and finally establishing protectorate states in the 
conflict zones, while engaging in ‘soft’ transformation of the rest of the Balkan states 
through a system of rewards, financial aid, and EU conditionality for membership. 
All these efforts were united by the view that the Balkan problems are rooted in local 
conditions and linked to poor governance and weak states with unconsolidated 
democracies and lack of the rule of law.  
 
These problems re-defined European security as threatened by failed as opposed to 
powerful states. The Western Balkans became a ‘hard’ case of state building and 
democratisation, whereas the Eastern Balkans, and particularly Bulgaria and 
Romania, were managed from a distance in the hope of achieving ‘self-discipline’, in 
a Foucaultian fashion, through an EU guided process of ‘Europeanisation’. For the 
EU offering membership to the Balkan states was the way to stabilise the region after 
years of war in the 1990s but the states had to resolve their problem with organised 
crime. In a joint statement issued in 2003 the EU leaders explained ‘Organised crime 
and corruption is a real obstacle to democratic stability, the rule of law, economic 
development and development of civil society in the region and is a source of grave 
concern to the EU’.31 The EU-led policy of curbing organised crime in the states of 
the Balkan region was thus seen as part of establishing the EU as the agency of 
                                                                                                                                          
IRA and the Northern Ireland conflict during the 70s and 80s. The IRA was closely associated with 
the building industry and black taxi trade. Many commentators noted that the end of ‘the troubles’ 
would be costly for the military-commercial organisations which had developed, and thus there were 
strong interests in Northern Ireland for continuing the lack of normality, and the subsequent power 
base which the IRA enjoyed. In the 1990s there were allegations that the IRA was linked to organised 
crime in the Balkans from which they obtained illegal arms. 
30 K. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity, 2008, p. 53. 
31 BBC News, ‘EU Targets Balkans Crime’, BBC, Saturday, 21 June, 2003 [online] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3008888.stm accessed 30/03/2009. 
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international security, defined broadly as lack of (internal) threat to democracy, law 
and order.  
 
From this perspective, the main concern of this thesis is been the value of 
international crime regulation as applied from top-to-bottom in conditions of existing 
power inequality between states. The main question which the thesis asks is whether 
such an approach creates more problems than traditional criminal justice policies, 
and more importantly, whether an international ‘fight against crime’ might also pose 
a threat to democracy.32 The EU member states have the ability to impose some 
democratic control over the EU policies through the European parliament or state 
parliaments but if the policies are pursued inter-governmentally, there is very little 
control over the way policies are applied to extra-jurisdictional territories. Therefore 
the thesis engages with the issues of the practical application of the anti-crime 
policies in Bulgaria in conditions of membership conditionality and seeks to 
determine the value of policies on the ground and to what extent they have improved 
or damaged the condition of the Bulgarian state internally and externally.  
 
1.4. Research design and method 
 
The thesis approaches the topic of organised crime from an international relations 
perspective and focuses on the development and the effect of international regulation 
of crime rather than the issue of crime itself. By taking this perspective, the thesis 
does not attempt to define or explain the nature of organised crime in Europe, or its 
case study Bulgaria. It is primarily concerned with the political circumstances, in 
which organised crime came to be defined and addressed by governments and 
international actors since the 1990s.33 Some of the evidence used in the thesis 
pertains to what policy makers and/or law enforcers define as organised crime but the 
                                                 
32 Such a line of inquiry required a further identification of the conditions and definitions of 
democracy. The neo-liberal approach, which became popular in the 1990s and was proposed to and 
officially endorsed by the post-communist states, was based on the availability of strong institutions, 
the principle of check-and-balances, strong civil society, and legal protection of individual and 
minority rights.   
33 This point is made by Wright in relation to UN and EU definitions of organised crime, which he 
rightly observed ‘may be appropriate for the legal and political context that generate them [but] they 
do little to explain the deeper nature of organised crime’. A. Wright, Organised Crime, Willan 
Publishing, 2006, p.11. The approach adopted here takes the opposite direction to Wright’s analysis 
and that of other criminologists who study the nature of crime, and focuses on its regulatory context.  
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focus of the analysis is the development and application of the regulatory framework, 
and more specifically, the ‘pro-active’ fight against organised crime, taken up by the 
European Union, its members states and its members-to-be.  
 
The main question which has informed the line of enquiry is why organised crime, an 
issue traditionally treated as part of a state’s domestic affairs, became a key problem 
in the international agenda? The initial research of secondary literature on the issue 
of international/transnational organised crime published in the 1990s identified the 
problem as permanently present in the international space and quickly replacing part 
of the gap left by the previous major security concerns of communism and super-
power conflict. From this analysis it soon became evident that there was no clear 
theory which explains the link between international security and organised crime. 
This led to the initial hypothesis that addressing crime by international institutions 
was a top-down development rather than bottom-up identification of a need. 
According to the official view of the Council of Europe for example: ‘From the 
perspective of preventing organised crime and preventing people joining organised 
criminal groups or supporting the activities of such groups in any way, it may be 
very important to try to influence public opinion and to create and support anti-
organised-crime attitudes.’34 The initial research also identified that the European 
institutions were particularly active in presenting as organised what some legal 
systems would have interpreted as ordinary crime (or not crime at all). According to 
Europol: ‘illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and car theft and 
trafficking, have in themselves become less open to ‘ordinary’ crime and are 
increasingly attracting the interests of organised crime groups’.35 Additionally, the 
policy documents of Europol also attempt to redefine organised crime as 
encompassing all crime ‘from criminal collectives, initially organisations and later on 
criminal networks, to the individual ‘organised criminal’.36  
 
The thesis has used a set of methods, some of which were anticipated by the research 
design, and some of which emerged as possibilities during the development of the 
                                                 
34 Cited in K. Gachevska, ‘Goodfellas against Godfathers: the fictional character of European Policing 
and European Crime’ in European Studies Conference Proceedings. University of Rousse Press, 
2008.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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research. Since the thesis is mainly concerned with the development of international 
anti-crime policies and the way these have emerged within the pro-EU circles, it was 
originally intended to explore the development of the polices at the source, i.e. 
Brussels, the European Commission, Europol, and the associated agencies.37 
However, after initial observations at international meetings with high profile 
officials, it was concluded that this level of policy formation is not sufficient for 
explaining the gaps and contradictions identified in the preliminary research and 
theory. Therefore the majority of the fieldwork was undertaken ‘on the ground’, i.e. 
investigating national and local developments. The case study of the thesis is 
Bulgaria, and the research has focused on the impact that the international anti-crime 
regime has had on the country. The project devised two strategies: observing and 
analysing the development of the organised crime discourse and policy internally, 
and then linking these to the external influences and the role of the EU and its 
enlargement conditionality.  
 
These two strategies have informed the structure of the thesis. The first three 
chapters are largely concerned with analysing the development of the anti-crime 
regime internationally, with a focus on the EU. These chapters are primarily based on 
published and unpublished sources of a primary and secondary character. These 
include academic literature, articles, books, papers and commissioned reports; 
statistical data wherever it was possible to obtain; official documents, EU treaties, 
decisions, recommendations, reports, strategies, and other policy documents; media 
coverage and media statistics (i.e. rise of the number of articles on organised crime). 
The purpose of these chapters is to identify the aims and expectations of the new 
international anti-crime policy, the way it has developed within the EU and the way 
it has been influenced by different endogenous factors.38 The main question 
                                                 
37 The author gained access to a number of high-profile meetings where problems of Eastern European 
crime were discussed: Wilton Park Conference ‘The Justice and Home Affairs Agenda for South East 
Europe’, Winston House, Steyning, West Sussex, United Kingdom, 22-25 July 2002, Combating 
Terrorism and International Organised Crime in the European Union. International Seminar for 
Experts in the series Great Debates, organized by the Cicero Foundation, 14-15 December 2006, 
Paris, International Conference ‘Balkans and NATO: United Against Terror. Antiterrorism, 
Economics, Globalisation’, Sofia, Bulgaria, September, 2003; Round table Organized Crime in 
Bulgaria: Markets and Trends organised by Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria, 12 
December, 2007. 
38 While the method does not include elaborate models of analysis, it nevertheless takes into 
consideration the possibility that the development of events could be influenced by different variables, 
which the thesis does not test.  
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addressed in this part of the research was establishing whether the EU is developing 
a genuine EU-wide criminal law to counter the newly identified problem of 
organised crime. Both primary and secondary literature are quite ambiguous on the 
issue of whether the process is led by the EU or national governments, and whether it 
is caused by a genuine crime problem or a top-to-bottom policy aimed at the further 
deepening of European integration. Therefore this part of the research traces the 
conditions of the development of the policy in the 1990s, and the areas where it 
deepened, compared to areas where it did not develop at all, or did not develop much 
further.39 The sources used here were mainly of secondary character such as 
academic publications and watchdog reports (such as Statewatch) but these were 
compared to primary sources such as treaties and various type of binding and non-
binding EU legislation, as well as institutional reports. 
 
The second part of the thesis is designed to test the intentions of policy and the 
limitations of its practical development. This part of the research was based on 
published and unpublished primary sources, combined with secondary sources, and 
interviews. This second part addresses three issues. First, the research focuses on 
what the EU anti-crime policy is and how that policy was exported to its future 
member states. This discussion is based on an analysis of publicly available PHARE 
projects fiches. PHARE was a programme set up by the EU to channel financial and 
expert resources to Eastern Europe, and it was used, inter alia, to diffuse the new 
norms in criminal justice and crime-fighting. The programme covered all the Eastern 
European applicants (and first Poland and Hungary) which had to develop projects, 
under the guidance of EU agreed programmes designed to bring the country closer to 
accession, often together with Western European partners, to apply for funds under 
the key areas identified by PHARE and the enlargement agenda. The projects were 
presented in project fiches, which are available from the EU and national web sites 
(not archived but some were ongoing at the time they were analysed). The 
information contained in these sources is fundamental for sketching the nature of the 
policy, i.e. the export of equipment and know-how to the future member states. This 
                                                 
39 For example, the areas where the EU has been instrumental in developing policy is countering fraud 
against the interests of the EU (i.e. against EU funds) or a common policy on asylum, which became 
part of the supranational acquis compared to police and judicial cooperation which remained 
intergovernmental. Another example is the controversy over Europol and particularly the decision to 
not grant operational powers but in reality allowing such powers. 
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information was, however, corroborated by other primary and secondary sources 
such as official and unofficial reports on the development of the anti-crime policies 
prepared on the basis of fieldwork undertaken in Eastern Europe by other researchers 
or reporters.40  
 
Secondly, chapters six and seven the thesis focus on one of these recipients of 
accession aid in the Balkans, i.e. Bulgaria. The aim of this part of the research project 
was to explore, firstly, how the crime policy was endorsed by the country, and, 
secondly, to what extent it was been influenced by internal or external factors, i.e. 
EU conditionality and transfer of expertise. The use of case studies like that in 
‘Europeanisation’ literature usually tries to determine the role of these two factors. 
Rational choice theory suggests that states have agency in adopting such policies, 
and they make choices rationally.41 Therefore this part of the research attempts to 
discover how Bulgarian policy makers exercised agency. The research method used 
an examination of the local conditions of transition and the identification of old and 
new elite interests and old and new party politics. The sources of information were 
widened to include media, party-associated and commercial, official statistics on 
crime, criminal justice and national security legislation, autobiographical accounts of 
the developments, documentaries and books on the ‘Bulgarian mafia’, blog entries on 
                                                 
40 Direct contact was not established with those researchers (with the exception of the Centre for the 
Study of Democracy) and their reports were obtained online. They include: the output of a research 
project undertaken by a team of British academics under ESRC Award Scheme One Europe or 
Several, Crime, Borders and Law Enforcement: A European Dialogue for Improving Security: An 
analysis of the problems of transnational, specifically Russian, organised crime within and across the 
borders of the Baltic States [online]  
http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/cgi-bin/esrc/world/db.cgi/proj.htm?id=11 accessed 02/02/2009; Rule of 
Law Programme of the Bulgarian Centre for Liberal Strategies and particularly the reports of their 
Task Force on Organised Crime in Bulgaria [online] http://www.cls-sofia.org/en/projects/rule-of-law-
17.html accessed 02/02/2009; Reports on organised crime published by the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria, www.csd.org, accessed 02/02/2009; Klaus Jansen’s report on Justice and 
Home Affairs in Bulgaria, commissioned by the EU [online]  
http://www.cespolice.org/fra/docs/bulgarienbulgsachverstaendigenbericht.pdf accessed 10/02/2007.
41 ‘Europeanisation’ generally refers to the adoption and domestic implementation of EU norms by 
member states and candidates for membership. The term is closely related to the process of 
enlargement and its internal impact on the applicant states. Most empirical studies focus on this 
process in the post-communist candidates in Central and Eastern Europe (‘Europeanisation East’) and 
identify three models which help explain the adoption of the EU norms their governments. These are: 
the external incentives model, linked to membership conditionality (i.e. the adoption of the norms is 
driven by the need to comply to membership requirements); the social learning model whereby 
candidates evolve to understand the advantages of these rules and apply them accordingly; and, 
lesson-drawing model which explains Europeanisation as part of the reform policies developed by 
governments as a result of internal dissatisfaction. F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier eds., The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Cornell University Press (Cornhill 
Studies in Political Economy), 2005. 
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general web sites but particularly web forums for legal professionals, reports 
published by local and international NGOs, and lastly secondary literature and 
reports on Bulgaria by local and foreign authors.42  
 
Apart from constructing the internal representation of crime, and development of 
anti-crime policy by using a variety of sources, this part of the thesis also focuses on 
external factors, mainly the influence of the international experts, visiting officials 
and international media. However, the core of the analysis of external factors 
concentrates on the role of the EU, which has kept a close link with the policy on 
organised crime developed by Bulgaria through the process of conditionality and 
annual monitoring. The research uses data from the EU monitoring reports and 
official opinions of the European Commission, data from the PHARE fiches on 
crime for Bulgaria, unpublished reports of EU experts, interviews given by officials 
in Bulgarian and foreign media, and lastly results form fieldwork in one of the 
evaluated cities in Bulgaria, conducted via interviews of local, senior law 
enforcement officers and members of the judiciary.  
 
A cross-cultural method of observation from within and without was developed in 
order to give as comprehensive an account as extensive as possible of the whole 
process of development and application of the EU anti-crime policy. This type of 
analysis makes it easier to cross reference facts and sources to determine origin and 
vested interest of: the EU institutions, EU-funded agents, EU member states, foreign 
NGOs and NGO-funding bodies, researchers and reporters, Bulgarian state 
                                                 
42 Most valuable insight into the party politics and politicisation of corruption in Bulgaria is that of 
Ivan Krastev, currently Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria. See for 
example, I. Krastev, Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anti-corruption, Central 
European University Press, 2004, and I. Krastev, ‘Party Structure and Party Perspectives in Bulgaria’, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1997, pp.91-106. There 
is limited research into Bulgarian organised crime and the sources used are mainly police, NGOs and 
the media. The work of investigative journalist Jovo Nikolkov has been particularly useful and some 
of it has been published by academic journals. See J. Nikolov, ‘Crime and Corruption after 
Communism – Organized Crime in Bulgaria’, East European Constitutional Review, 1997, Vol. 6, 
No. 4. Marinova’s work on the Bulgarian Criminal Justice reform has been particularly valuable for 
clarifying the main aims and steps taken by the reform. G. Marinova, ‘Bulgarian Criminal Procedure: 
The New Philosophy and Issues of Approximation’, Review of Central and East European Law, 2006, 
Vol. 31, pp.45-79. In this respect the study by Transcrime on some of the policies developed in 
Bulgaria contained useful information and has been based on data from Bulgarian experts. See 
TRANSCRIME, The Contribution of Data Exchange Systems to the Fight Against Organised Crime 
in the SEE Countries, 2004 [online] http://www.stabilitypact.org/org-crime/data-exchange.doc 
accessed 20/03/2009. 
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institutions (police, security services, and judiciary), NGOs, media, and finally, the 
Bulgarian public, which was identified mainly as an observer of the events. 
 
1.5. Methodological issues 
 
Researching policies against organised crime is a task as complicated as researching 
organised crime itself. There is hardly any international or regional organisation 
today which does not include the problem of crime on its agenda. The number of 
international and regional organisations itself is also growing, and it is difficult to 
cover empirically all of their policies, as well as those of several states, which 
participate in the organisations and have developed their own anti-organised crime 
policy. In the case of the European Union there is, additionally, the complex 
distribution of political power between supranational and intergovernmental bodies 
which also added to the problem of locating the actors and sites of power when it 
came to EU’s anti-crime agenda. 
 
Access to information on policy against crime is not always open, and there is 
secrecy surrounding the work of the law enforcement bodies of any country. The 
problem with securing access to such information has been that it is subject to 
scrutiny and management of the information that the institution is allowed to 
release.43 Police data on crime, crime statistics and police activities are notoriously 
unreliable indicators of the level of criminality for any given society, and in the case 
study for this thesis the problem was exacerbated by the fact that some of the sources 
of quantitative and qualitative nature dated back to communist times and could be 
considered as inherently misleading.44 In the case of police and crime research 
projects there are often considerations of researcher’s exposure to intimidating 
circumstances.45
                                                 
43 The researcher was unable to interview the representative of the British Serious and Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) who was stationed in the British Embassy in Bulgaria. The representative 
cancelled two interviews while the researcher was doing fieldwork in Sofia. 
44 However, it can also be considered as no less reliable than post-communist data when the collection 
of statistics changed and the institutions were under many political and financial strains. 
45 For example, in one of the interviews with a police official, the researcher was told that her cup of 
coffee could turn up at a crime scene investigation. Whereas it was difficult to decide if this was a 
direct threat or a demonstration of power on behalf the police, it was nevertheless an indication for the 
potential problems the researcher could encounter. The same interview was arranged as informal and 
the researcher was told to submit a list of questions (a tactic also used by another police 
representative). The interviewee said at the end that he would send answers to the questions from an 
 19
 Using media coverage also entails difficulties. The media is an often used source for 
propaganda purposes, which was identified in one of the main media source used in 
the thesis – that of the Demokracia newspaper, which is the media platform for one 
of the major political parties in the country. Commercial media is no less influenced 
by other priorities that may be inconsistent with objectivity. It is concerned with 
sales and is likely to interpret events as ‘bad news’, which sells better than positive 
news. This is not limited to news about crime but also news, and investigative 
reports, about anti-crime policy. This was identified in the second major media 
source, the Bulgarian weekly analytical newspaper Capital. Most of its analytical 
materials which contained criticisms were not always properly researched and 
possibly designed to offer an outlet of its readers’ negative feelings towards the 
government. Much of Capital’s criticism of the anti-crime policy for example did not 
place this policy in a wider context of accession and EU demands but was seen as 
personal quests for power through centralisation without acknowledging that the 
police centralisation was the accepted EU norm for fighting organised crime.46
 
Similar caution has been taken when interpreting data from Bulgarian non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is 
the main NGO which has been very active in the anti-crime and corruption area but a 
review of its foreign funding and collaboration with the Bulgarian police raises 
questions about its objectivity.47 CSD’s reports on crime and illegal trafficking in 
                                                                                                                                          
anonymous e-mal, and the researcher was not supposed to reply to that e-mail because its address may 
no longer exist. This experience is comparable to similar problems that other researchers have 
encountered when interviewing representatives of organised crime in Eastern Europe. Therefore 
intimidation in such cases could be interpreted as cultural (such as constructing masculinities 
especially facing a female interviewer) as much as institutional. See for example, P. Rawlinson, ‘Look 
who’s talking: interviewing Russian Criminals’, Trends in Organized Crime, 2008, vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 
12-20. 
46 Such interpretations can be very misleading. The extensive research undertaken in this thesis 
demonstrates that its is a EU requirement for the Bulgarian policing structures to become more 
centralised and focused on organised crime, rather than the political or career ambitions of members 
of the Bulgarian government. There is a similar trend to over-criticise the judicial institutions and 
identify personal power ambitions instead of structural problems.  
47 According to CSD’s 2002 financial report, for example, the organisation received BGL 1,565,062 
for 2002, of which 928 144 (around 60%) were foreign financing for projects linked to crime and 
corruption. In 2003, CSD received BGL 2,548,136 for researching crime and corruption, which was 
80% of its external funding for projects Added to that, in 2003 and 2004, the CSD’s external funding 
was almost exclusively for projects linked to organised crime, and in 2005 they form a great part of 
the activity of the organisation. Some of the donors are: The German Marshall Fund for projects on 
Illegal Trafficking and Corruption in Southeast Europe; Royal Norwegian Embassy – Trafficking and 
Corruption Monitoring and Prevention; British Embassy – Trafficking and Corruption in Bulgaria, 
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Bulgaria and the region are very extensive but rely on secondary data and 
assumptions about criminal structures and networks, which are not based on 
fieldwork studies. Data published by CSD has been used in many other national and 
international sources, and especially the media, and these sources have not always 
acknowledged using CSD’s reports but often refer to it broadly as sources from the 
Bulgarian non-governmental sector. CSD’s data has even reached the British readers 
via Misha Glenny’s book McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal 
Underworld, in which he devotes a section on Bulgarian organised crime, based on 
CSD reports.48
 
Finally, the thesis encountered the tricky problem of using crime statistics. This 
problem had two sides. As mentioned above, criminal statistics are usually not a 
reliable source of the crime rate in any country because they conceal as much as they 
reveal about the level of unlawful activity within the given jurisdiction.49 At best 
crime statistics show the level of crime in sectors of social activity and perpetrated 
by a particular social groups (such as for example street crime or working class 
crime), and often these sectors are defined by police work.50 Secondly, crime 
statistics cannot show what percentage of crime falls in the category of organised 
crime. Legally, crime statistics cannot reflect organised crime as the criminalisation 
of membership in organised crime is not always present, and if it is, then it has an 
aggravating effect and does not constitute crime alone. Organised crime may also fall 
in the category of ‘victimless crime’ and those affected by it are less likely to report 
offences officially. Therefore the existence and extent of organised crime is partly 
determined by ‘estimates’ of the police. Furthermore, organised crime tends to be 
defined in accordance with political imperatives such focusing on people or drug 
trafficking from less to more developed countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Saferworld UK – Implementing and Enforcing Arms Export Controls and Combating Small Arms 
Proliferation in Bulgaria, European Commission –  The Informal Economy in the EU Accession 
Countries, and others The financial reports are available at the organisations web site www.csd.bg.  
48 M. Glenny, McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld, New York: Alfred 
A.Knopf, 2008. The book became better known in the UK because of a series of excerpts published in 
the UK Guardian newspaper in 2008.  
49 The crime statistics in the UK and USA for example have been criticised for under-reporting. Z. 
MacDonald, ‘Official Crime Statistics: Their Use and Interpretation’, The Economic Journal, vol. 
112, February, 2002. 
50 N. Gilbert, Researching Social Life, London Sage, 2001, p.16. 
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These problems with crime statistics are identified both in the research on crime in 
Europe, which is part of this thesis, and crime in Bulgaria. Furthermore, comparative 
use of statistics internationally is complicated by differences in crime definitions, 
crime recording, and crime classification. The crime recording methodology used in 
Bulgaria has experienced a few major alterations, which further mystify the real level 
of crime. Identifying the role of such changes, along with the role of social change 
over types of crimes, was one of the more intricate tasks of this thesis. Whereas it has 
been difficult to determine levels of crime in Bulgaria in comparative terms, the 
thesis has pointed at the paradox of developing of an anti-organised crime policy 
without proper organised crime statistics, which is a fact to be interpreted on its own.  
 
1.6. Case study and fieldwork  
 
The researcher is unusual in being a Bulgarian citizen but having worked for nearly a 
decade in the UK. She is originally from a border town in Bulgaria and had the 
opportunity to observe two aspects of the policy: the reform of internal criminal 
justice system, and the efforts in enhancing the state’s the border controls.51 The 
main research for this thesis was undertaken during three 3 research trips to Bulgaria 
but the process of observation has extended during personal visits in the country in 
the period of 7 years. Although most of the printed sources were collected on a 
national level and mainly in the capital Sofia, the direct fieldwork concentrated on a 
local case study of the border city of Rousse. This case study was observed in 
relation to the developments on the national level. 
 
The institutional changes in Bulgaria have entailed a transition from a communist 
and state-controlled structure of the police where conspiratorial types of crime, of 
which organised crime is a part, was originally investigated (before 1989) by the 
state’s secret services. After the transition, the regular police in Bulgaria had to take 
on increased investigative powers, and concentrate on fighting organised crime – a 
task it had not previously performed. Additionally judicial power during communism 
was associated with state government, the post-communist reform focused on the 
                                                 
51 This is the city of Rousse, whose case is discussed in the final part of the thesis. It is city situated on 
the border with Romania, which joined together with Bulgaria in 2007 and was therefore a subject of 
the same conditionality and monitoring. 
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separation judiciary and executive, and other complications such as the functional 
divisions of the criminal justice system (for example, the existence of military courts 
where police crimes were tried). The border guard subdivision was itself undergoing 
a reform aimed at demilitarising its ranks and transforming it into a border police 
with a civil outlook. All these processes were accompanied by an increased 
centralisation of the policing institutions under the control of the central government. 
It was expected that the observations and interviews with the police would be highly 
problematic given the tense atmosphere of reform and increased public and NGO 
demands of ‘policing the police.’  
 
These problems created two main considerations for interpreting the fieldwork 
results. Firstly, the need to take into account an anachronistic police culture of 
hierarchy and control, mixed with external pressures and increased internal 
regulation, which led to a defensive attitude in interviews, as well as a tendency to 
overestimate activities and results. Secondly, to consider the possibility that the 
police interpretation of the policy did not necessarily coincide with the original 
intentions of its makers. As Fielding notes: ‘A theme of police fieldwork is that ‘the 
ranks’ can so translate policies into practice that they lose their original character, 
sometimes producing the opposite of what was intended’.52 This is an observation 
which is sometimes noted by officials and experts when justifying policies or 
dismissing its malfunctions as ‘bureaucratic problems’.53 The thesis has tested the 
viability of such claims and some of the problems were found to originate in wrong 
conceptions or policy or resource limitations.  
 
The results of the observation and interviews were triangulated with other sources of 
information to ensure maximum validity. The data from the police was compared 
with data from the interviews with the judiciary, media coverage, official documents 
and reports prepared for external examination by the European Commission. This 
method encountered one major problem: since the relationship of the police and 
crime and Bulgaria-EU relations were highly publicised by the media, it was possible 
                                                 
52 N. Fielding, ‘Fieldwork and policework’ in D. Hobbs ed., The SAGE Handbook of Fieldwork, 
University of California Press, 2006, pp 277-306, p. 279. 
53 This was noted by the author at a meeting dedicated to the international crime and its policies held 
in Paris, where criticism of the way policies were applied was opposed by the argument that these 
were bureaucratic problems and they do not show that the policy itself was wrong. This statement was 
made by the US Ambassador in Paris. 
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that all sources of information would be influenced by the media coverage. One 
aspect of the transition in the former Soviet bloc has been a change in the nature of 
the media itself which has led to a much more Western style of reporting and 
presentation.54 Whereas before 1989 there was close state control of crime reporting, 
once the transition began a similar pattern of crime reporting began to emerge to that 
in the West. The role of the media therefore is crucial in interpreting the case of the 
anti-crime policy in Bulgaria. Media was used by institutions, by political parties, by 
NGOs and by external actors – both as a source of information, and a tool of 
presenting a particular image or transmitting a message to targeted audiences.55 
Therefore there is a danger that the data from interviews may not always be entirely 
uninfluenced by these public discourses. Clearly subjective statements made by the 
interviewee were interpreted as such rather than objective information. For example, 
in some of the interviews statements were made which were not supported by 
specific examples from the interviewee’s experience and were related to the work of 
others, or have been identified by the researcher as originating from mass media 
reports (such as statements made by the police about the judiciary, or vice versa, or 
statements made about corruption of politicians). Some of these statements were also 
observed in the media, or attitudes of the general public. Therefore the researcher has 
concluded that in some of those cases the opinions expressed have been externally 
influenced. In these cases the statements are used as evidence in themselves, i.e. as a 
sign of intra-institutional or intra-personal conflict, or attempt to demonstrate 
competence or avoid responsibility. This has been done with caution in order to 
avoid the problem of using evidence which matches theory rather than reading 
evidence in an unbiased way. Finally, all of these issues identified by the thesis have 
enhanced the final conclusion relating to the gap between policy expectations and 
policy outcomes because discussions of crime always reflect the interactions between 
policy initiatives, professional elements and ‘public discourses’ as well as the reality 
of crime itself. 
 
 
                                                 
54 See C. Sparks & A. Reading, Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media, London: Sage, 1998. 
55 On the dubious relationship between post-communism, media, politics and crime see V. Popov, The 
Relationship Between Mass Media and Organised Crime in Post-Soviet Russia: A Sociological 
Perspective. Unpublished PhD thesis. City University, 2005 and M. Łoś, ‘Post-communist fear of 
crime and the commercialization of security’, Theoretical Criminology, 2002, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 165–
188. 
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1.7. Conclusion and thesis structure 
 
This thesis embarked on a complicated task and relies upon the analysis of a large 
body of evidence and the need to distinguish between evidence and opinion. The 
most difficult part of the research was, however, the identification of the indirect 
responsibility for the local problems that the international anti-organised crime 
crusade had created. As with any piece of research, establishing links between 
variables and developing a theory out of such links is laborious process of excluding 
other possibilities, comparing with similar cases, identifying lowest common 
denominators. As discussed in this introductory chapter the choice of method and the 
selection of sources of data for this thesis are inter-disciplinary. Each method of 
collecting and interpreting data has been useful but has also given rise to some 
methodological concerns and limitations discussed above.  
 
The thesis contains eight chapters. Chapter two, which follows, sets the international 
scene in which organised crime made its re-appearance in 1990s. It is entitled ‘New 
Europe’ and the Emergence of Norm Making Accession and focuses on the new 
geopolitical conditions in Europe, which combined with increased economic and 
political pressures for de-regulation, led to strengthening the role of the European 
Union in Europe. The path of political development which the EU took in the 1990s 
parted with its previous pre-occupation with economic issues arising from various 
interests and concentrated on building a common identity based on norms, including 
non-military shared security and fighting against organised crime. 
 
Chapter three From Hard Security to Soft Security and the ‘Organised Crime Threat’ 
deals with the complexity of international relations and security theory which 
informed the developments in Europe. It seeks to challenge the view that organised 
crime is a threat to international security by engaging with the process of 
construction of this new threat as a part of a whole new agenda of ‘soft’ or non-
military security. The critique is built through a close review of those aspects of 
criminological theory which for decades have grappled with the issue of organised 
crime. It is argued that there is no secure basis for the claim that organised crime can 
pose a threat to states and international security. This chapter therefore identifies the 
major conceptual pitfalls of the anti-organised crime policy. 
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 Chapter four Organised Crime in Europe and the Emergence of EU’s Internal 
Security Governance traces the historical development of international criminal 
justice cooperation and seeks to identify whether the policy developed by the EU 
since the 1990s can be seen as a continuation of these initiatives, or a new 
development built on the basis of existing fragments of policy. The chapter 
concentrates on the rise of initiatives in the so-called Justice and Home Affairs area, 
and particularly on organised crime, and links these to common political interests, 
rather than an identifiable common organised crime threat.  
 
Chapter five Organised Crime and EU Enlargement looks at the external dimension 
of the EU anti-crime policy expressed through the EU’s interest in spreading its new 
norms outside of its borders. One of the instruments used is the process of 
enlargement and the use of membership conditionality. The chapter analyses this 
policy by looking the anti-crime projects funded by the EU in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
  
Chapter six Bulgaria: Post-communism and Organised Crime constructs the internal 
discourse of organised crime in the case study of Bulgaria by using a variety of 
sources. The anti-crime policy adopted by Bulgaria through its subscription to the 
new international norms was internally linked to building democracy, institutional 
reform and even economic re-structuring. The chapter traces these developments 
from within which it then links, in the next chapter, to the external factors 
influencing this policy from without. 
 
Chapter seven, Organised Crime and Bulgaria’s Accession to the EU analyses the 
problems encountered by Bulgaria through the prism of its external observation and 
monitoring from EU experts. Even though the role of these external observations is 
not directly associated to what happens on the ground in Bulgaria, the chapter claims 
that there is a direct effect of EU reports and suggestions upon Bulgarian anti-
organised crime policy, whose deficiencies the Bulgarian state was then required to 
account for. 
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Chapter eight presents the thesis’s final conclusion. It traces the development and 
main findings of the thesis, and links these to an overall conclusion about the nature 
of the European integration since the end of the Cold War, and what this tells us 
about the wider world. 
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Chapter 2. ‘New Europe’ and the Emergence of Norm Making Accession 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the geo-political background of the development 
of the European Union’s (EU) anti-crime regime in the 1990s. It rests on the premise 
that this regime needs to be seen as part of a wider set of developments in world 
politics, linked to pre 1990s conditions but also shaped by the changes which 
happened with the end of the bi-polar division of the Cold War. The first decade after 
the end of the Cold War in 1990-1991 was marked by a seemingly parallel process of 
continued integration amongst western European states through the structures of the 
European Communities, later transformed into a European Union, – whilst a process 
of fragmentation took place in some of the states in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE).1  
 
These political and social changes had a major impact on the conduct of international 
relations in the continent and the wider world. On one hand, the collapse of 
communism led to the optimism about the future of Europe as a post-ideological 
common space of peace and democracy, a single market, cooperation amongst 
politically equal member states. But on the other hand, there was no consensus on 
how this future would be built and the fall of the bi-polar constraints on world 
politics removed much of the impetus for political and economic concessions. This 
led to a widening gap between expectations and the stark realities of rising inequality 
between the two parts of Europe and the growing avalanche of political and social 
problems in the East. Therefore instead of swiftly accepting and incorporating the 
post-communist states as equal participants in the process of European integration, 
the process itself became a project of creating ‘equals’ through a renewed agenda of 
(re-)building the ‘New Europe’. The anti-crime policies undertaken by the European 
Union in the 1990s were part of a perceived need to create a ‘new’ type of security 
for the citizens of the Union, where the problems and sources of instability were 
                                                 
1 Germany, also considered a central European state, underwent the opposite process of a political 
unification of its two parts which had been separated in the post-Second World War settlement. 
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minimised through creating and diffusing new international norms, particularly to 
those perceived as lacking in capabilities such as the states in transition. 
 
There are more specific justifications behind this policy which can be found in 
multiple local conditions. The EU anti-crime policy has been linked to the increase 
of fear of crime in some West European societies during the period, to the 
compensatory measures taken by the EU in the process of removing internal border 
controls, or even to the move to more security and safety focused internal policies 
adopted by some European governments and their attempt to extend jurisdiction or 
secure extradition from other countries. But the internationalisation of anti-organised 
crime policy, seen in the broader context of the changes in Europe and the world 
during the 1990s, may help explain the fact that ‘there is no other example in the 
history of EC/EU integration process of an area of previous loose intergovernmental 
cooperation only having made its way so quickly to the top of the Union’s political 
and legislative agenda’.2  
 
Therefore, this chapter reflects a more complex understanding of the endorsement of 
the ‘fight against crime’ by the EU which incorporates more specific theories 
explaining the European integration, security and crime nexus but which focuses on 
its global structural conditions. The structure of the chapter itself attempts to 
reproduce this complexity and draws the attention to several key factors, namely the 
end of the Cold War and its ideologies, and the re-emergence of the idea of ‘New 
Europe’, the expansion of security thinking in Europe, and the development of the 
European Union as a normative/security structure in Europe. The discussion draws 
heavily on the historical development of the ideas and realities of Europe, and seeks 
to underline the continuity and change in contemporary European politics in order to 
enhance a deeper understanding of the development of the particular East-West 
relations in the fight against international crime in the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 J. Monar, ‘EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of Diversity 
and EU Instruments and Strategies’, C91 ZEI Discussion Paper, 2001, p. 3. 
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2.2. ‘New Europe’ 
 
The phrase ‘New Europe’ re-entered the political discourse in 1990s after the end of 
the Cold War and East-West ideological rivalry. The idea of ‘New Europe’ itself is 
not new, and it was first used in the nineteenth century to signify optimism for the 
future of the continent inspired by the achievements of the industrial revolution and 
its capacity for economic and social progress. A brief overview of the more recent 
‘New Europe’ literature shows the versatile use of the phrase in many projects, 
which sought to address political problems in the Old Continent. There are, for 
example: ‘The New Europe: revolution in East-West relations’ by Nils H. Wessell, 
discussing West Germany, NATO, Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact, 
Gorbachev, Czechoslovakia, perestroika, common European home; or The New 
Europe: Politics, Government and Economy Since 1945 by Jonathan Story, 
expanding the time-span of New Europe to post Second World War conditions; or 
The New Europe. Economy, Society & Environment edited by David Pinder, which 
focuses on the post-Cold War developments and includes the new environmental 
issues and politics; or Roger Brubaker’s use of the term in a shift of focus from the 
‘old ‘New Europe’’ to the ‘new ‘New Europe’’ in his Nationalism reframed: 
nationhood and the national question in the New Europe.3
 
For the proponents of the idea of ‘New Europe’ in the 1990s the term exemplified the 
new way of thinking about the world in the post-Cold War era, and the hope for a 
better future after the fall of communism and the perceived victory of Western 
capitalism. The end of the totalitarian regimes in most of the Eastern European 
countries by 1990, and the gradual opening of their economies and political 
organisation to the Western way, was seen as a new opportunity for Europe to correct 
the errors of the previous century’s uneven socio-economic development and the 
eventual ideological split in the continent after 1945.4 From a different perspective, 
however, others thought it displayed an ambition for remaking Europe along 
                                                 
3 N. Wessell ed., The New Europe: revolution in East-West relations, New York: Academy of 
Political Science, 1991; J. Story, The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy Since 1945, 
Blackwell Publishers, 1993; D. Pinder ed., The New Europe. Economy, Society & Environment. New 
York: John Wiley&Sons, 1998; R. Brubaker, Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national 
question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
4 D. Pinder, ‘New Europe or New Europes. East-West development dynamics in the twentieth 
century’ in D. Pinder ed., 1998, op cit.  
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redefined East-West divisions and the re-establishment of neo-colonial domination 
on behalf of the powerful Western states, sometimes also described as ‘New France’ 
or ‘New Germany’, or even Britain under ‘New Labour’. In the process of opening 
the dialogue between East and West in Europe, the relations between the two were 
increasingly shaped on the basis of the old ‘East’ accommodating to the ‘West’ in the 
form of the European Union and other ‘western’ organisations. This new aspiration 
in practice re-dressed the concept of ‘New Europe’, so that today it is more 
exclusively associated with the new post-communist democracies and their specific 
path of development towards political and economic convergence with Old Europe, 
or the West.5  
 
The idea of ‘New Europe’ reflected the perception of the existing difference and 
separation between the Eastern and Western part of the continent.6 This difference is 
often framed in historical economic and social terms. According to Pinder, the 
economic gap between Eastern and Western Europe has developed since the 
industrial revolution as ‘to a great extent eastern and central Europe remained 
essentially agrarian, while the west diversified and grew through industrialisation’.7 
Despite existing internal disparities in both East and West, such as more successful 
‘pockets’ (generally catholic, Austro-Hungarian territories) of heavy industry in 
some CEE, and struggling Western economies hit by global competition, the general 
conclusion was that the territory beyond the Iron Curtain had contained weaker and 
more backward economies and more impoverished and less protected populations – 
even long before the political divide in the post-war period. From this perspective, 
the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe after the war, following 
                                                 
5 The ‘Old Europe’ has its own recent re-emergence in the political vocabulary. The term was 
famously used by US Secretary of Defence in the Bush Administration Donald Rumsfeld in 2003, in 
connection with the pro-American position, which some Eastern European states took during the US 
led invasion of Iraq in the same year. This use of the term by Rumsfeld suggested that ‘New Europe’, 
i.e. Eastern Europe, was different and better because of its opposition to most of the Western 
European countries’ critique of the American invasion of Iraq. BBC News, ‘Outrage at 'old Europe' 
remarks’, BBC (UK) 2003 [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm accessed 
20/08/2008. In a visit to the US some years later British Prime Minister Gordon Brown pledged: 
‘There is no old Europe, no new Europe, there is only your friend Europe’. ‘Gordon Brown tells 
Congress: Work with your friend Europe’, Times Online (UK), 4 March 2009  
[online] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5844588.ece accessed 
05/04/2009.  
6 This has been interpreted as a way of establishing identity/agency in post Cold War world order. E. 
Kavalski, ‘The Balkans after Iraq, Iraq after the Balkans: Who's Next?’ in N. MacQueen and T. 
Flockhart eds, European Security after Iraq, Brill, 2006, pp. 135-59. 
7 D. Pinder, 1998, op. cit., p. 6.  
 31
the lead of the already communist USSR could be interpreted as an attempt to 
encourage industrial development and agricultural modernisation through better 
organisation of resources and mutual help within the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). However, although the communist system of planned economy 
had some remarkable results in the first decade after its establishment, it failed to 
maintain its economic progress despite initially achieving some economic 
convergence in 1950-60s (for Soviet Union this was in the 1930s).8 It collapsed at 
the turn of the 1990s only to reveal the continuation of the regional economic 
disparity in the continent, and a ‘general failure to catch up with the developments in 
Western Europe’.9  
 
This disparity is not observable only in terms of this East West divide. 
Disproportionate economic expansion exists amongst the countries of each side, as 
well as amongst regions within countries. Examples of non-communist economic 
laggards are Greece, Portugal, Spain and, before the 1990s, Ireland.10 But the north-
south division in Europe, although not without its issues, has not carried the same 
sense of historic divide as that inherent in the idea of a West-East division, which has 
developed and worsened over the last 200 years.11 Therefore ‘the variegated 
territorial characteristics of economic life in the New Europe are a major dimension 
of division in the continent as it enters the twenty-first century’.12 The reasons for 
this division remained more obscure than establishing the fact itself. Most commonly 
they would be linked to local conditions, and most recently, traced in the nature of 
the communist economy. The economic development of the post-communist states 
since the 1990s has created ever more divergence within and between these 
countries, and yet they are have been lumped together under the term Eastern Europe 
                                                 
8 A. Smith, A. Rainnie & M. Dunford , ‘Regional trajectories and uneven development in ‘the new’ 
Europe: rethinking territorial success and inequality’, in H. Wallace ed., Interlocking Dimensions of 
European Integration (One Europe or Several?), Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 
122-144.
9 M. Dunford & A. Smith, ‘Uneven development in Europe’ in D. Pinder ed. 1998, op.cit. 
10 In the case of these states it was also hoped that there would be some closure of the gap with the 
most developed EU countries after joining the Union and the benefit from the single market and more 
investment, but also from the additional intensive EU subsidies and financial aid. It is argued that the 
accession of these countries to the EU had political rather than economic rationalization. Some view 
the provision of financial assistance to the poorer states and regions within the union as a 
compensatory measure to correct the existing and potential inequalities due to the development of 
liberal market policies within the EU although they had limited success in achieving that aim. T. 
Cutler et. al., 1989, op.cit. 
11 A. Smith et. al., 2001, op. cit. 
12 Ibid.  
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(divided into three groups of more, medium and less developed Eastern European 
states), or New Europe, when compared to the core EU member states, or Western 
Europe.13  
 
The fall of communism in late 1980s and early 1990s was celebrated as a failure of 
centrally planned socialist economy and ‘victory’ for the model of Western market 
capitalism, though this overlooked the fact that the latter had not been successful in 
creating economic equality in its traditional geographic area of Western Europe. The 
greater relative failure in the former Soviet bloc, however, meant that the newly 
independent states of Eastern Europe were faced with the difficult choice of deciding 
their future path of development. Some of them, and particularly the Central 
European states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary immediately started 
applying Western-supported economic plans for price/market liberalisation, 
privatisation, budget constraints to cope with debt repayments.14 Others adopted 
these policies more selectively and later in the 1990s, such as the Balkan states of 
Bulgaria and Romania, and some of post-Soviet republics like Ukraine though in 
more limited form.15 Politically, the post-communist states established representative 
democracies and changed their governments through free elections although some 
had difficulties with safeguarding their newly established democratic processes. The 
dual process of transition to market economy and democracy was seen as the way 
towards economic convergence with Western Europe although in reality a number of 
post-communist states (those with closer ties with the Russia) were slower to arrive 
at the idea of participation in the Western structures of European integration and had 
to overcome a significant internal political resistance to such policies. 
 
                                                 
13 See S. Wagstyl , ‘How To Annoy Someone From Eastern Europe, Financial Times 27th Feb 2009 
[online] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5618118a-0507-11de-8166-000077b07658.html accessed 
05/04/2009. 
14 These reforms were funded externally. For example the PHARE programme was originally 
intended for Poland and Hungary and this is where it took its name from: Poland and Hungary 
Assistance for Restructuring Economies (later expanded to the other applicant countries). One reason 
is that these countries were physically adjacent to Austria and Germany and had stronger historical 
links and indeed had seen their territories either directly or through colonial means. Cites like Prague, 
Budapest and to a lesser extent Warsaw were very much part of ‘old Europe’ prior to the Second 
World War. They also provided an investment opportunity for German and Austrian capital in the 
1990s as well as in previous historical periods. 
15 Bulgaria for example was physically isolated too and the 1990 elections returned the socialist party 
who were reluctant to embrace the changes. Both Bulgaria and Romania lacked the connections to 
Western countries of the Central European states. 
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In the course of the 1990s the expansion of the Western model, and especially the 
closer integration to the economic and political structures of the European Union was 
defined as the only realistic and obtainable alternative for ‘New Europe’. The actual 
results of the policies prescribed by the EU and other Western bodies, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to the countries in transition were 
more ambiguous.16 The developments in Eastern Europe since the 1990 have been 
defined as a paradox of the transition and integration, inspired by the hope of closing 
the economic gap between East and Western Europe, which have instead brought an 
increasing divergence and ‘the various attempts to build and establish forms of 
capitalist and market relations in the former ‘communist’ world during the ‘second 
transition’ (since 1989) have […] had enormously uneven impacts at both national 
and subnational scales.’17 This was especially apparent, as table 2.1. shows, in the 
first years of transition. Yet, the alternatives were increasingly diminishing and the 
views (if not the economic conditions) of local elites in both East and West were 
converging towards support for integration. Romano Prodi, the President of the 
European Commission in 2003 summarised this: ‘[U]nification of the Continent is 
the only alternative for any of us…[T]hat all that battling for territory is a thing of 
the past ... The fact that the new applicants are coming to us with arms outstretched 
tells me that we Europeans really have learned something from the tragedies of the 
past after all.’18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See for example R. Portes, ‘Transformation Traps’, Economic Journal, vol. 104, no. 426, 
September 1994, pp. 1178-89. 
17 A. Smith et. al., 2001, op.cit. It is worth noting that the rise of inequality and poverty is not limited 
to Eastern Europe but has spread in Western Europe too during the same period of the 1990s and 
beyond.  
18 R. Prodi & T. Øra, ‘A New Europe. Romano Prodi talks to Truls Øra’, Eurozone, 2003 [online] 
www.eurozone.com accessed 20/04/2008. Paradoxically, there was a growing movement in the West 
against integration though the populations therein had no ways of expressing it. In the 2000s this was 
expressed by the ‘No’ vote to further integration in some national referendums.  
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Table 2.1. Selected Transition Economies: Cumulative Change in GNP, 1989-97 
(in percentage) 19
 
 1989-97 Peak decline since 1989 
(lowest level of GDP since the beginning of 
transition) 
Albania - 20.3 - 40 
Bulgaria - 36.8 - 37 
Czech Republic - 8.0 - 21 
Hungary - 9.6 - 18 
Poland 11 - 18 
Romania -19.3 - 26 
 
 
The idea of ‘New Europe’ coincided with the idea of the ‘New World Order’ and the 
‘End of History’ theses which were said to herald the disappearance of the non-
democratic and non-capitalist alternatives for development. However, just as in 
economic and political terms so in the wider realm of international relations, 
East/New Europe and West/Old Europe were in different positions in relation to each 
other despite their declared desire to unite. They had different roles and 
responsibilities in the development of a new framework of security and stability in a 
‘united’ Europe. In this framework, the presumed political equality between states 
based on their sovereignty lost priority in the face of the need for guidance for the 
new states’ transitions to democracy and the market economy and the adoption of the 
newly established European norms and conditions for EU membership.20 The EU on 
the other hand now acquired a central role in the project of (re-)building a ‘New 
Europe’. 
 
                                                 
19 Source: IMF Staff Country Report 99/26. Bulgaria: Recent Economic Developments and Statistical 
Appendix, 1999, p.121 [online] http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/imfimfscr/99_2f26.htm accessed 
04/05/2005. 
20 Despite the perception of a grand division between West and East, or EU and non-EU, there is a 
myriad of micro relations between the states of each side. The EU and the member states did not have 
a single joint position on external affairs, and the idea of a common foreign policy was embryonic 
throughout the 1990s. Even the civil wars in former Yugoslavia did not provoke an immediate and 
unified reaction but revealed a number of disagreements between the EU member states, with 
Germany leading a proactive Eastern policy and Britain and France demonstrating different views or 
interests. See for example, D. Chandler, ‘Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
1989-1999’ in E. S. Herman & P. Hammond eds, Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo 
Crisis, London: Pluto Press, 2000, pp.19-30. 
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2.3. The road to an expanded European Union  
 
The role of the European Union in Eastern Europe‘s re-alignment to Western values 
was not formulated until 1993 when the idea of EU enlargement came to the fore. 
Immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall there was no indication either Eastern or 
Western Europe had envisaged a united Europe together.21 Most of the Eastern 
European countries had problems of determining their future and surrendering their 
new-found sovereignty to the EU was not considered an obvious option. The EU 
itself was struggling to determine its current and future economic and political 
character and was torn between what were considered as the options of ‘widening or 
deepening’. According to Cutler et al. the major problem at the beginning of 1990s 
was ‘the political struggle to impose a liberal market definition on developing 
European institutions’ in the face of opposition from collectivist or socialist ideas 
about the future of the EU.22 The ‘deepening or widening’ debate on the other hand 
reflected the struggle for preserving sovereignty, i.e. not allowing further integration 
to undermine the power of national governments, and suggesting enlargement as an 
alternative.23
 
The dilemma of ‘deepening or widening’ has been a central issue since the 
conception of the EU in 1950s as the original European Communities.24 According 
to Haynes and Pinnock, ‘it seemed that European integration had reached a plateau in 
the mid-1960s and ‘Eurosclerosis’ set in as integration did not provide a sustainable 
basis for cohesion and growth.’25 However, the political will for expanding 
integration was maintained through the increase of member states starting in 1973, 
after some initial difficulties and not least French President De Gaulle’s opposition to 
the entry of the United Kingdom. By the end of the 1980s the members of the 
                                                 
21 W. Wallace, ’Enlarging the European Union – an overview’ in C. Ross, ed., Perspectives on the 
Enlargement of the European Union, Leiden: Brill, 2002. 
22 T. Cutler, C. Haslam,  J. Williams & K. Williams, 1992 – The Struggle for Europe. A Critical 
Evaluation of the European Community, Berg Publishers, 1989. 
23 Sovereignty can also be interpreted as anti-collectivist. T. Cutler et al.,1989, op.cit. p. 145. 
24 The so-called European Communities consisted of the European Coal and Steal Community, 
formed in 1951, European Economic Community (1957) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (1957). These are three of a few post-war regional organisations in Europe and initially 
included the small number of six member states, situated in the core of the continent, as opposed to 
other states in the periphery which opted for other organisations such as the European Free Trade 
Association or the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.  
25 M. Haynes & K. Pinnock, ‘Towards a Deeper and Wider Union?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
February 21, 1998, pp. 415-430. 
 36
European Communities had doubled from 6 to 12 via three enlargements (Table 
2.2.). The significance of the alternative forms of regional integration had started to 
lose out to the European Communities, which had begun to attract more members. 
 
At the same time the process of deepening of the integration followed a peculiar 
pattern. Despite being a predominantly political project, the first two decades of the 
development of the European Communities were driven by the idea that economic 
integration would lead to political integration (also known as a ‘spill over’ effect), 
which would both help keep peace in Europe.26 Initially set up as a merger of the  
 
Table 2.2. ‘Widening’ of the European Union 
 
Year Members 
increase to 
Countries 
1957 6 Original members (Treaty of Rome): Belgium, France, 
Germany, Holland, Italy, Luxemburg 
1973 9 Denmark, Ireland, UK (Norway rejected membership in a 
referendum) 
1981 10 
Greece 
1986 12 
Portugal, Spain 
1990 12 First Eastern European enlargement via unification: 
Former East Germany 
1995 15 
Austria, Finland, Sweden 
2004 25 First enlargement to include Eastern European states after 
negotiation; largest enlargement in terms of states, land 
and people: Cyprus, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
2007 27 First enlargement to the Balkans: Bulgaria, Romania 
 
coal and steel industries of France and Germany, the European Community deepened 
through the establishment of a customs union, monetary system, development of 
                                                 
26 There is no single theory which explains the drive towards integration in Europe and most European 
integration theories use a mix of political and economic reasons which pushed the states to integrate in 
order to readjust to the post-1945 period. A. Milward, ‘The Springs of Integration’ in P. Gowan & P. 
Anderson eds., The Question of Europe, London: Verso, 1997, pp.5-20, p. 6. 
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common policies (for example, the Common Agricultural Policy). From the 1980s, 
however, EEC functionaries started to expand the forms of integration to include 
more technical-political ones such as the Schengen Agreement (1985) for removal of 
border controls among some members, and the Single European Act (1987), which 
envisaged the incorporation of the European Political Cooperation into the European 
Treaties (Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3. ‘Deepening’ of the European Union 
 
Year Developments 
1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
1957 European Economic Community (EEC) – Treaty of Rome: establishing a 
customs union. 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom): cooperation in 
developing nuclear energy. 
1967 Merger Treaty (Brussels): establishment of European Communities out of 
the three above. 
1979 First elections for European Parliament. 
1985 Schengen Agreement: establishing open borders and removal of border 
control between its member states (UK and Ireland opted out).  
1987 Single European Act: establishing single European market and European 
Political Cooperation. Setting the aim for a Single Market by 1992. 
1993 Maastricht Treaty: created the European Union (EU) and the Euro; the 
Three Pillars of the EU: 1) European Communities pillar; 2) Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or Second Pillar; 3). Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA), the Third Pillar. 
1999 Amsterdam Treaty: focus on security, citizenship and rights, increasing 
democracy. Launch of the Eurozone. 
2003 Nice Treaty: amendment to Treaty of Rome and Maastricht Treaty – 
introducing amendments to the institutional structure. Some criticised the 
Treaty for deepening but not widening political power and creation of 
two-tier EU with more power to the original but not new Eastern 
European members. 
 
 
The reasons for the qualitative change in the development of European integration 
are complex. First, by the early 1980s the economic recession had had a negative 
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impact on the interest in further integration. But by late 1980s the Community had 
regained its appeal, which, according to some commentators, was caused by the 
initiative of the Commission for the removal of non-tariff barriers, i.e. border 
controls and technical regulations to trade, in 1985, which proved popular with 
national governments eager to find an outlet from economic problems. The European 
project became appealing again and this helped its institutions to gain more power 
and steer its further development: 
 
This was all unpromisingly technical rather than visionary. But the 
Commission had carefully chosen an issue (maybe the one issue), which 
did not divide member states…The significance and effects of these largely 
symbolic changes were hugely hyped, and the Commission successfully 
created the impression that it was building Europe. Once it had captured the 
political initiative, the Commission was determined not to let go.27
 
The period prior to the end of the communist regimes in eastern Europe was thus 
marked by a developing enthusiasm amongst European integrationist elites for 
seemingly ‘deepening’ the European Community, although this enthusiasm was 
lacking a precise vision as to what kind of deepening should be undertaken. There 
were a number of internal problems, mainly linked to the project for monetary union, 
which had provoked some political opposition in terms of it involving the promoting 
of a liberal market, which had the potential to increase inequality.28 The schemes for 
deepening involved many different scenarios such as developing Schengen, ideas for 
common foreign policy, a possible European army or incorporation of the Western 
European Union into the EC, expanding the powers of the Commission, ideas of 
‘social Europe’, and even a European constitution.29  
 
The development of European integration was led by Euroenthusiasts and the project 
was often out of touch with the mass of the population. Turnout in European 
elections was very low, and the member state Parliaments had little influence on EU 
                                                 
27 T. Cutler et. al., 1989, op.cit. p. 1-2. 
28 Ibid.  
29 These steps were taken with very differing views amongst the member states. For example, when 
Britain joined the ‘Common Market’ it had a referendum which people thought was about whether the 
country was about to enter a purely economic cooperation zone. 
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policy. These problems have led to accusations of the EU as a developing 
organisation which itself suffers from a recognisable ‘democratic deficit’. This 
democratic deficit is identified in terms of the institutional structure of the European 
Union, and not so much in the nature of the party system or government 
participation. However, it has haunted the development of the Union since its 
conception due to the fact that it was ‘driven by bureaucratic and policy objectives 
[and] the democratic representation and accountability followed rather than preceded 
these objectives’.30 Subsequent EU treaties (and particularly the Lisbon Treaty 
signed in December 2007) have in fact addressed some of the issues raised by the 
‘democratic deficit’ critiques of the EU, particularly the status of the institutions and 
the decision-making process. 
 
The fall of communism further complicated the European integration project. This 
enabled the problem to be thought of in the early 1990s as a dilemma over whether to 
deepen or widen the EU so that it would incorporate the newly independent states in 
Eastern Europe. For some there was also the possibility of deepening and widening 
at the same time. The third option was backtracking and widening, which it could be 
argued was what was to some extent chosen. According to some theories, ‘widening’ 
moved to the centre of the EU’s agenda in the 1990s at the expense of ‘deepening’ 
mainly because of geo-political changes, i.e. the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but also 
due to an early 1990s economic recession caused by the unification of Germany, 
which halted integration, and the pressure from the UK who used the idea of 
‘widening’ to prevent further integration against its interests.31 However, the option 
to widen towards Eastern Europe proved to be more complicated as this option 
created its own difficulties. 
 
2.4. Enlargement in the 1990s 
 
Initially, in the first years of the 1990s there was no consideration of widening 
towards ‘the underdeveloped, undemocratic, and in many parts, rather alien’ Eastern 
                                                 
30 D. McKay, Rush to union: understanding the European federal bargain. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996, p. 123. 
31 V. Linterner, ‘The economic implications of enlarging the European Union’ in N. Healey ed., The 
Economics of the New Europe. From Community to Union. London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 170-187. 
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Europe until a common interest in Eastern European enlargement emerged.32 There 
was the option to include the countries which already had the status of applicants: 
Turkey (1987), Malta (1990s), Cyprus (1991), Switzerland (1992 lapsed), of which 
Turkey and Cyprus had proved problematic due to internal political and economic 
problems notwithstanding the fact that the former had Islam as an official religion 
which created some political anxieties in Western Europe. On the other hand, not all 
Eastern European countries considered joining the EU at first and even throughout 
the 1990s sociological surveys show limited enthusiasm amongst the voters in some 
of them.33 According to Haynes and Pinnock, ‘only in Romania, Poland and 
Slovenia and Bulgaria did 50 per cent say they would straightforwardly vote to join 
the EU’.34 However, this ambiguous disposition was not limited to Eastern Europe as 
polls conducted in 1990 in Western Europe have indicated that the majority, around 
69%, of the population were favourable to integration ‘largely on the grounds that it 
is a ‘good thing’ for their own country’ but a much smaller percentage, 14%, actually 
feel ‘European’ – an ideal supported mainly by those working in the European 
institutions.35  
 
The decision for an East European enlargement (leaving aside those areas of former 
Yugoslavia and Albania which, for different reasons, were excluded from the 
considerations of enlargement at this time, despite being physically closer, or indeed 
adjacent to, existing Western member states) faced a number of problems, which 
increased in the course of the 1990s. First, there was the problem of which countries 
to accept in the Union and how far eastwards the border of the EU could extend. 
Was Russia ever going to be part of the EU or stay at its fringe, or is Turkey part of 
Europe? Along these ideological lines, Eastern Europe was seen as belonging to a 
different type of Orthodox-Christian or Slav civilisation, a mix of states which 
emerged from the fall of former Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empire, some with 
                                                 
32 W. Wallace, 2002, op. cit. 
33 The Central European countries showed immediate enthusiasm for joining the EU in comparison to 
the former Soviet Union and some of its satellites such as Bulgaria where in early 1990s there was no 
consensus for EU membership due to fear of loss of Soviet markets.  
34 M. Haynes & K. Pinnock, op. cit. 
35 R. Bellamy, & D. Castiglione, ‘Between Cosmopolis and Community: Three Models of rights and 
democracy in the European Union’ in D. Archibugi, D. Held & M. Kohler eds., Re-imagining 
Political Community. Oxford: Polity Press, 1998, p. 167. The support for the EU because it is a ‘good 
thing’ is one of the revealing aspects of the process of European integration, which may explain its 
constraints as well as the course of development. 
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more backward/agricultural economies, which, similarly to Russia developed 
capitalism later than the West.36 Eastern Europe was perceived as different and 
backward, lacking markets and democratic traditions, and strong institutions to 
develop such traditions because of their transitional status. Furthermore, the 
calculations for accepting the Eastern European applicants in 1996 showed that these 
countries would add approximately 105 million people, or 28% of the EU population 
but adding only between 3.4 % and 8.5% to EU GDP which would lead to the 
average EU per capita GDP dropping by around 15%.37 Apart from these economic 
considerations, some saw the Eastern enlargement as a difficult project in terms of 
restructuring institutions, which have developed for centuries. Romano Prodi 
expressed this concern ten years after the decision to expand in Eastern Europe:  
  
[M]ost people tend to compare the EU with the USA, which when it was 
founded had both a constitution and established public institutions. Every 
time the question arises I content myself by saying that when the time 
came for America to expand, the exhortation of the men at the top was, 
‘Young man, go west!’. That's how the country expanded to become what 
it is now. But all they encountered were bison and barren mountain 
ranges. What we are up against are settled and fully developed nation-
states, great countries that can look back on thousands of years of 
unbroken history. Some of them, among them Hungary and Poland, have 
a longer history than the founder members themselves. Hungary is in fact 
older than Italy.38
 
Despite all these concerns, by 1993-4, a decision was taken to expand eastwards. The 
formal decision and the negotiation of entry conditions for the six Eastern European 
countries which had signed Europe Agreements by that stage – Poland, Hungary, 
Czech and Slovak Republics and Bulgaria and Romania – was taken at Copenhagen 
Council in June 1993.39 The Copenhagen conditions were divided into political and 
                                                 
36 See for example S. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New 
York: Simon&Schuster, 1996. For a critique of this view with a focus on the Balkans see M. 
Todorova, Imagining the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
37 A. Smith, et al., 2001, op.cit.  
38 R.Prodi & T. Øra, 2003, op. cit.  
39 Europe Agreements were signed with Poland and Hungary in 1991, followed by the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria in 1993, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1995 
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economic requirements. The political requirements asked the candidates to achieve 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
the respect for and protection of minorities. The economic criteria were defined by 
the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to withstand 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Furthermore, other 
obligations required: fulfilling the aims of the political, economic and monetary 
union; the adoption of the EU acquis communautaire, i.e. European Communities 
law; administrative capacity to apply the acquis.40
 
The EU itself took on the responsibility to develop an ability to absorb new members 
while the actual decision to start negotiations was postponed to 1996-7. This left both 
sides in an indeterminate state as to the actual pace of enlargement considering that 
even if a date of negotiations was set, these had previously taken different length of 
time (13 months for Austria, Sweden and Finland but 7 years for less economically 
developed Spain and Portugal).41 According to some observers, such as Christoph 
Bertram, the postponing of decisions about the future of Eastern Europe in the EU 
was in the early 1990s a sign of the caution of the Western leaders against taking on 
any serious obligations and responsibilities in Eastern Europe, after the initial 
excitement caused by the fall of communism had settled.42 Furthermore, as Wallace 
notes, the EU interest in the Eastern European enlargement was mainly ideological 
and provoked by a rising feeling of duty or patronage: 
 
In the course of 1990 there was a good deal of Western political rhetoric 
about promoting democracy. This was partly honest sympathy for 
                                                                                                                                          
and Slovenia in 1996. These agreements did not break ground for East-West relations. Economic 
agreements between these countries and the EEC had already been signed before the end of 
communism – a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Hungary (signed in 1988), and Poland, the 
Czech and the Slovak Republic (1989) to remove EC quotas on imports from Eastern Europe by 1995. 
The fall of communism in these countries and German unification opened a possibility for the EU to 
go beyond liberalisation and use enlargement to secure political stability in the region. 
40 Acquis communautaire or just acquis is the status quo EC law at the moment of accession and has 
been considered a key tool for integration, used in all enlargements. It ensures that that the new 
Member States are subject to the same obligations as the original Member States. 
41 W. Wallace, 2002, op. cit. 
42 C. Bertram, Europe in the balance: securing the peace won in the Cold War, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1995. According to Bertram, the EU introduced the interim Association 
Agreements, and NATO developed its Partnership for Peace framework, in order to ‘gain time’ and 
fend off pressure for accession from more states. These agreements were based on pre-existing trade 
liberalisation plans with some central European states agreed before the end of communism. They can 
be seen as an intermediary stage between economic and political enlargement. 
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inexperienced peoples struggling to create unaccustomed representative 
systems. But it was also propaganda intended to reinforce Gorbachev’s 
attempts to liberalise Soviet politics. This then produced an ill-defined 
discussion of East European security; and the question was even raised as to 
whether enlargement would be of any assistance.43
 
From the point of view of the Eastern European states, the accession to the European 
Union was no less a political move. There were potential trade gains from 
membership, especially for weaker states that had started to lose their economic 
sovereignty due to expansion of world markets in the 1980s-90s and which perhaps 
saw the EU as a way of regaining control.44 Membership of the EU offered the 
advantage of participation in a bigger market with free movement of labour and 
capital, unified trade policy towards third countries, participation in a monetary 
union, and lastly, the immediate benefits from participation in the common policies 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with its agricultural subsidies, 
regional, industrial, social policy, with their small but attractive development 
funding, and attractiveness for more foreign investment.  
 
However, the evidence from previous ‘widening’ exposed a new set of problems as 
‘enlargement involving the accession and assimilation of dissimilar economies 
[tends] to be more problematic in terms of welfare enhancement’.45 Enlargement per 
se was not necessarily a cure for the Eastern European states but nevertheless it was 
possible that it could provide a ‘quick fix’, mainly through the flow of foreign 
investment. In the early 1990s there was no clear idea as to how the potential Eastern 
European ‘accession states’ were going to achieve the conditions for membership so 
that they would benefit from, rather than lose from, joining the much more 
economically advanced common market of the European Union. Therefore the 
‘selling’ of the accession ‘project’ to the Eastern European electorates proved a 
difficult task especially in some of the candidate counties as it involved a much more 
complicated readjustment, as well as increased burden on the state budgets.46 The 
                                                 
43 H. Wallace, 2001, op. cit. p. 7. 
44 Linterner, op.cit. 
45 Ibid, p. 175 
46 It is important to note that the EU does not explicitly require privatisation and it does not dictate 
rules on ownership and privatisation but the latter has been the main economic policy in almost all 
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existing member states also had difficulties choosing widening over deepening as 
there was opposition to abandoning the ideas of further economic and political 
integration, and the risk of taking on countries with much less developed market 
economies. Nevertheless, the mid-1990s marked the beginning of building a 
consensus on widening the EU by both sides involved in the project. The 
‘deepening’ was not entirely abandoned but reformulated in increasing emphasis on 
the development of the so-called Three Pillars of the EU after 1993. The Maastricht 
Treaty created a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and 
Home Affairs policy (JHA), though it is arguable whether these policies are actually 
examples of ‘deepening’ or ‘widening’ as the degree to which real sovereignty 
transfers are involved is contested.47  
 
The European Council conferences after Copenhagen developed further an accession 
strategy for the Eastern European candidates and Cyprus and Malta which were 
included in the process in 1994. The strategy was formally based on a structured 
dialogue, but the task of monitoring the process of the adoption of the membership 
requirements was given to the European Commission. The Commission acquired 
asymmetrical power in relation to the applicants as the leading EU institution, which 
had the task of preparing a composite paper on enlargement and opinions on the 
applications.48 The opinions of the Commission on the progress of the applicants and 
the new Agenda 2000 adopted in 1997 added new elements to the enlargement 
process: its financing and effects, and its split into two phases. The Commission 
divided the group of the 10 applicant countries into two groups: first wave countries 
including Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus, and a 
second wave included the rest.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
post-communist countries. However, the issue of state subsidies is dictated by EU rules – and public 
companies very often to not exist without state subsidies; thus public ownership is limited to those 
companies which can survive without significant state support. The need for new investment often 
requires privatisation too (or rather takeover of local national firms by larger Western ones). 
47 JHA was later changed to Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJC) with the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) which moved some of the JHA areas of cooperation into the first pillar (e.g. 
asylum and immigration). However, JHA has remained in use after 1999, especially in the 
enlargement process (e.g. Bulgaria’s negotiations on Chapter 24 JHA), and therefore this thesis uses 
the term JHA in reference to events which occurred after Amsterdam. 
48 With the exception of Slovakia all the applicant countries satisfied the political conditions for 
membership but Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania needed to make further progress in 
economic reform and the adoption and implementation of EC laws. 
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It can be argued that since the mid-1990s the EU began to define itself by the 
process of enlargement and the development of norms for ‘New Europe’ at the 
expense of other more difficult decisions. The attempts to introduce more reforms in 
the EU instructions with the new Amsterdam Treaty and intensify the ‘deepening’ of 
integration had had only limited success.49 At the same time, the decision for 
opening negotiations was taken as early as 1997 at the European Council in 
Luxembourg (with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia, which started negotiations on 31 March 1998), and new and more 
elaborate strategies for accession were developed.50 These included the so-called 
Accession Partnerships adopted in 1998 in order to increase the participation of the 
applicant countries in the process (but still dictated by the Commission), and 
reinforce the applicants’ ability to apply the EU agenda through strengthening their 
institutional and administrative capacity, i.e. a policy of ‘institution building’.51 Each 
of the ten applicants had set the priorities and intermediate objectives from the short-
term and medium-term in the fields of economic reform, reinforcement of 
institutional and administrative capacity, internal market, justice and home affairs 
and environment. This participation on the part of the applicant state was realised 
through a so-called National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), 
which every applicant country was required to set up. However, the transfer of more 
control to the applicants in formulating their specific accession needs did not create 
any qualitative transfer of real power to influence the negotiations even though the 
Partnerships created the impression of a more equal process. In effect the agenda 
was still set by the European Commission and the NPA only gave freedom to present 
what each country needs in order to comply.52  
                                                 
49 The new developments were mainly concerned with establishing a new ethical ground for 
integration, i.e. enhancing the human rights regime, and an increased focus on focus on security, 
citizenship and rights, democracy, etc. 
50 Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia were invited to accession negotiations in 2000. Bulgaria and 
Romania, were included in on condition of fulfilling the economic criteria. The accession negotiations 
were formally launched with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta on 15 
February 2000. 
51 Institution building was the new focus of the enlargement process, adopted in Agenda 2000. It is 
described as ‘developing the structures and systems, human resources and management skills needed 
to implement the acquis.’ European Commission, Twinning in Action. European Commission 
Enlargement Directorate General, October 2001 [online] http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement 
accessed 30/11/2006. 
52 The applicant countries’ agenda was in fact ‘accession agenda’ rather than development and growth 
agenda. For a commentary on this issue, see EU Conditionality in the Balkans. Background paper of 
SEE Program’s Workshop, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, November 2002; 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/conditionality.htm accessed 07/08/2008. 
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 Finally, a new approach was adopted in 1998 aimed at facilitating the institution 
building of the candidates called a ‘Twinning’ programme. The programme aimed at 
transferring technical and administrative know-how from the Member States to the 
applicant countries in four key areas: agriculture, environment, finance, justice and 
home affairs, financed through various EU programmes: PHARE (discussed earlier 
in this chapter), Leonardo, Erasmus and Socrates.53 The key element in the 
programmes was the so-called twinning strategy (linked to the idea of capacity or 
institution building) in the applicant countries. The rationale behind it was the 
identification of a new problem, namely that these countries lacked an adequate 
capacity to prepare for European integration. Around 30 percent of the PHARE 
budget was prescribed for institution building and the rest for investment support.54 
The bulk of instruments developed to manage enlargement during the 1990s is 
impressive. Apart from the initial and basic Europe Agreements it expanded to 
include Decisions of the Association Councils, the Accession Partnerships, Agenda 
2000, the White Paper of the Commission, the Regular Progress Reports of the 
Commission, the Screening Reports and the National Programmes for the Adoption 
of the Acquis, PHARE, Twinning as an Instrument for Institution building and the 
participation of the CEE countries in Community Programmes like Tempus, Socrates 
and Leonardo and the regional funds ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for 
Pre-Accession) SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development). 
 
In ideological terms the Eastern European enlargement was pictured as involving 
more than just a ‘widening’ of the EU. It was part of another 1990s process of 
constructing the Union as more than a sum of its member states and developing an 
added value to it; a superstructure with its own identity and power. At the European 
Council conference in Turin in March 1996, the Member States stressed that: 
 
                                                 
53 Many EU member states retained their own bilateral programme within eastern Europe which were 
also designed to support both bilateral ties but also EU accession process e.g. The British Know How 
Fund administered through the British Embassy in-country. Similarly UNDP operated towards EU 
accession approach attracting both EU and global funds (i.e. Japan). 
54 A. Bothorel, ‘The history and development of the PHARE programme’ in Overview of the Phare 
Programme and the New Pre-Accession Funds. Proceedings of a seminar held in September 1999 at 
the EU Information Centre in Budapest [online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/publist.htm accessed 21/12/2006. 
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[The] future enlargement, which represents a historic mission and a great 
opportunity for Europe, is also a challenge for the Union in all its 
dimensions. In this perspective, institutions, as well as their functioning, 
and procedures have to be improved in order to preserve its capacity for 
action, while maintaining the ‘acquis communautaire’ and developing it 
and also respecting the balance between the institutions. It is essential to 
sustain the very nature of European construction, which has to preserve 
and develop its features of democracy, efficiency, solidarity, cohesion, 
transparency and subsidiarity.55  
 
Although not explicitly acknowledged, the Eastern European enlargement had a 
second dimension which can be described as a ‘member-state building’ policy.56 The 
use of enlargement as a tool of re-defining the role of the Union in ‘New Europe’ and 
the so-called ‘New World Order’ has also developed as an alternative for the much 
more difficult process of ‘deepening’ the integration. In this respect, the other 
projects, which the EU engaged in during the 1990s such as CFSP and JHA, were a 
similar departure from earlier plans for organising the EU as a federal state-like 
structure, which provoked the difficult federation debate or the constitutional debate. 
What connects all these projects within the EU project itself are the efforts to 
develop a distinctive European identity, based on universal values and norms, and 
the ‘soft’, ‘civilising’ power of the EU. This idea was the key factor in the 
development of the political Union in the 1990s, although the promotion of values as 
opposed to enhancing equality has opened a new debate of the diminishing political 
value of the EU.57  
 
2.5. Political Union and the EU Pillars approach 
 
The ideas of developing a formal political dimension to the Community, and 
particularly a foreign policy aspect within the context of earlier enlargements, had 
                                                 
55 Turin European Council, 29 March 1996 Presidency Conclusions [online] 
http://www.dpt.gov.tr/abigm/abtb/Zirveler/1996%20Turin%2029%20Mart.htm accessed 8 July 2008. 
56 G. Knaus & M. Cox, ‘The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in South-eastern Europe,’ Journal of Democracy, 
2005. vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 39–53. 
57 See for example D. Chandler, 'Hollow Hegemony: Theorising the Shift from Interest-Based to 
Value-Based International Policy-Making', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 35, 
no.3, September 2007, pp. 703-723. 
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existed from the outset of European integration.58 It did not materialise in earlier 
periods although political integration was seen as the primary aim of the European 
project and indeed all treaties could be interpreted as having ‘political value’. This 
political aim was stated as early as 1956 by Walter Hallstein, the German State 
Secretary between 1956-58, and President of the European Commission between 
1958-1967:  
 
In the interest of our freedom and culture – the freedom and culture of the 
West – we must insist on and give priority to political integration and 
regard any form of economic part integration as a mere stage on the road 
to it. I do not in the least wish to deny or even underestimate the value of 
economic integration. But, the realisation that, for instance, the Common 
Market, quite apart from its political value, would constitute an economic 
advance, must not induce us to lose sight of our political goal. Strictly 
speaking, any sharp distinction between politics and economics at this 
level is quite without point. And, certainly, no such distinction was 
intended by or would be compatible with the Messina Resolutions, as the 
plan to set up a European Atomic Authority shows, a plan the 
significance of which goes far beyond the economic sphere. 59
 
There were early attempts to develop military integration during the 1950s and 
1960s. These included the project for European Defence Community (EDC) devised 
in 1950 as part of the integration process but it failed French ratification, and the 
Fouchet Plans, initiated by France with a more intergovernmental framework in mind 
which were also unsuccessful. Neither of these led to the development of a common 
policy within the EEC but led to a series of meetings on EPC with the participation 
of the Commission in the period between 1970-1981, and of EC trade and aid policy 
instruments by EPC in the 1980s (such as sanctions against the USSR and Poland).60 
On the other hand, some significant political cooperation was in fact taking place 
following routes outside of the European Community. This had a primarily military 
                                                 
58 Communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State or Government of the Member States at The Hague 
(1 and 2 December 1969) [online] http://www.ena.lu/ accessed 10 July 2008. 
59 W. Hallstein: the FRG and European integration, Bonn, 14 May 1956 [online] http://www.ena.lu/ 
accessed 10 July 2008. 
60 G. Edward & S. Nuttall, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in J. Pinder & R. Pryce eds., 
Maastricht and Beyond. Building the European Union. London: Routledge, 1994. 
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outlook due to the geopolitical conjuncture at the time. The division into East-West 
military blocs, the increased power of the US to influence European affairs after the 
Second World War, as well as the weakness of the European states internally and 
externally at the time precluded any independent moves in the direction of actual 
military or political integration. Most Western European states became members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) established in 1949 as a Western 
military defence organisation under American leadership, and the Western European 
Union (WEU) set up in 1948 which had no military capabilities but played a 
significant political role during its existence.61 There were also attempts to create a 
so-called European wing within NATO, which developed into a European Security 
and Defence Identity (ESDI) during the 1990s when some Western European states 
started to press for a more different role for Europe, distinct from American power. 
Additionally, the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) in 1973 which later transformed into Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can be seen as part of an attempt to develop forms of 
European political cooperation.  
 
A foreign policy cooperation was more difficult to formalise with the European 
Communities until the late 1980s when such cooperation was for the first time 
officially codified as part of the integration by the Single European Act (1987). 
However, it was not until a few years later that some real progress in the area of EPC 
was made considering the largely rhetorical use of EPC in the previous four decades. 
In the 1990s the French and German leaders Mitterrand and Kohl sent letters to the 
Irish presidency 1990 asking for an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to discuss 
the development of a political union.62 There were efforts in the same direction from 
the Belgian government. According to Edwards and Nuttall, the reasons for this 
diplomatic upsurge were ‘the changes in Europe and German unification, above all 
                                                 
61 It facilitated the inclusion of Germany and Italy (who became members in 1954) back into the 
European ‘family’ by decreasing the military anxieties and suspicions against those two countries 
after the war. In the post Cold war period, the WEU had an important political role in creating links 
with Eastern Europe. However, it was called the ‘sleeping beauty’ of Europe because of its lack of 
military capabilities and limited activities. It was integrated into the EU by the Amsterdam Treaty and 
charged with the execution of so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, peacekeeping and 
peacemaking tasks). It was later dissolved as the EU developed its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. 
62 F. Laursen, F. & S.Vanhoonacker eds., The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: 
Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community, 
Maastricht and Dordrecht: EIPA Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992.  
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[when] the need for greater convergence of policy was accepted and compromise 
made possible on defining a common foreign and security policy and the ways in 
which it might be implemented’.63 In this way, the ICG agreed to transform the 
political cooperation into a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as 
established by Title V of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, as the second pillar of a 
unique combination of supranational and intergovernmental structures, or a so-called 
‘three-pillar temple’: 
 
Figure 2.1. The European Union ‘Temple’ and Pillars 
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The changes in Eastern Europe have been a trigger but not the main motivation for 
the development of the political union, and according to Edwards and Nuttall the 
negotiations for the CFSP ‘were for the most part not much influenced by outside 
events’.64 The JHA pillar was particularly problematic as it had a direct effect on 
state sovereignty in sensitive internal affairs and therefore was limited only to areas 
of which the member states would agree to cooperate. Additionally, the development 
of a pillar system with combined supranational and intergovernmental areas of 
responsibility and action added further inconsistencies and made the functioning of 
all pillars more complicated, and sometimes counter-productive especially in 
overlapping areas. In the case of foreign policy, for example, the second pillar had no 
exclusive prerogative in the area of external relations. The intergovernmental 
                                                 
63 G. Edward & S. Nuttall, 1994, op. cit., p. 84. According to the authors, there was rising concern that 
the EC could not manage with the Eastern European challenges but there was a more important fear 
that after unification the German people would lose interest in integration in the West and Germany 
will resume its position of ‘an autonomous Central European power’ which it had been before the 
Second World War. Ibid, p. 87. 
64 G. Edward & S. Nuttall, 1994, op.cit., p. 88. The authors argue that there was no clarity on the 
actual implementation of the political union or the CFSP, and in fact the EU member states were split 
into pro- and against- strong common policy camps with different line-ups depending on the issue 
concerned, and issuing ‘a confusing mass of proposals and counter-proposals’. Ibid, p. 87. 
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institution of the European Council still had power in this area, and some of the third 
pillar covers external issues such as immigration policy. Furthermore, some foreign 
policy instruments were linked to the first pillar (such as use of economic sanctions, 
trade); and some developments in the third pillar were effectively a form of foreign 
policy (such as demands for anti-crime measures in third states).  
 
The pillar structure did not create a very smooth framework for common policies or a 
form of single governance as expected from a political union or federation and in fact 
increased the role of national governments in the Union through its 
intergovernmental framework of cooperation.65 The paradox of these developments, 
also known as ‘capability-expectations gap’,66 was that the EU members 
demonstrated an unprecedented enthusiasm for a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, but the actual arrangements agreed in the early 1990s created much 
ambiguity and difficulties for the actual functioning of it. However, they established 
some basis for developing an extent of convergence of positions in areas of internal 
and external affairs (often at the ‘lowest possible denominator’) which in practice 
achieved an internationally recognized status of the EU as single political entity. 
Furthermore, the developments in the area of EPC in the 1990s also laid the basis for 
a specific role for the EU on the international arena, with the status of a ‘civilian’ or 
normative power, capable of providing security through the promotion of alternative 
and more progressive approaches.  
 
2.6. Normative union 
 
One of the important aspects of the European political cooperation in the 1990s was what 
was considered as the development of ‘the civilian power’ of the Community emerging 
through EPC’s and CFSP’s ‘high politics’. This development has some relevance to the idea 
of ‘New Europe’ described in a previous section, i.e. the establishment of the EU as 
‘normalising’ factor in Europe in the post-Cold War era. According to Smith:  
 
                                                 
65 For further elaboration of the theory of strengthening the domestic actors through EU integration 
see A. Moravcsik, Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Cooperation, Centre for European Studies Working Paper Series, Harvard University, 
1994, no. 52. 
66 M. Smith, ‘The EU as an international actor’ in J. Richardson ed., European Union. Power and 
Policy Making. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 252. 
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Not only was the Community seen as ‘civilian’, it was also ‘Western’ in 
its orientation, an integral part of the transatlantic system centred on 
NATO, the GATT, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and other institutions. This set of strong 
institutional affiliations largely defined the arena of EC activity. 
Alongside it went the still strong links to former colonial possessions of 
the EC members… The EC’s arena of action, its main reference point for 
any sort of international identity, was the Western system and in 
particular the economic structure built around the North Atlantic area.67
 
 
The distinctive role of the European Union in the North Atlantic Area has been 
increasingly conceptualised as more of a ‘soft’ power or an alternative to the 
traditional ‘hard’, coercive or military power of the state. First, the Western 
European states did not manage, for various reasons, to develop independent military 
capabilities in any of their international structures, including the Western European 
Union, which was defined as a military security organisation. According to Manners, 
the introduction of the three-pillar structure of the EU was in fact an attempt to shift 
from civilian to military power and the CFSP was expected to ultimately include a 
defense policy which did not materialise in the way that it was expected.68 This can 
be interpreted as one of the reasons why the EU developed an alternative 
interpretation of its role in ‘soft’ security as a ‘soft’ power. 
 
Secondly, during the 1990s in Europe, some states felt internal and external pressure 
to have a more prominent international role, which they chose to define through the 
European Union.69 This pressure was partly linked to need to disassociate from the 
‘hard’ American policy without disengaging with the US normatively, but also from 
the problems, which emerged in Europe, namely the violent disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, which Western Europe failed to handle.70 And thirdly, the EU itself 
                                                 
67 Ibid, p. 253-4. 
68 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2002, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235–58. 
69 Germany, which was banned by its own constitution from overseas military action may have seen 
the EU as a route to expanding its foreign policy powers. 
70 Edwards and Nuttall note that it is ‘a problem inherent in the foreign policies of many Western 
liberal democracies that they inevitably fail to react to new foreign policy problems and try to treat 
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needed an identity and ability to project a post-modern power in Europe and the 
world, and the choice to go for a ‘soft’ approach to international issues was earning 
more legitimacy and popular support since the end of the military rivalry of the Cold 
War era.  
 
The normative (soft) civilising power, which the EU began to claim in the 1990s thus 
involved an aspiration that went beyond addressing the concept of the self-interest of 
the sovereign state. The EU claimed to be participating in the building of a global 
normative regime which is needed in order to meet the ‘new’ challenges, and more 
importantly – pro-active rather than reactive policies. As Manners observed, ‘the 
construction of the EU is not just a European project – it is part of a global effort to 
coordinate and reconcile human differences under conditions of globalisation.’71 In 
the introduction to a book which aims to challenge the political concepts of the past, 
the editors Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler elaborated on the need 
for re-adjusting these concepts to the new conditions due to the progress of 
globalisation and the end of the Cold War: 
 
The nuclear confrontation between West and East, between capitalist 
democracy and Soviet communism, is a thing of the past. However, that 
does not mean that war is no longer used to solve controversies or that 
states have stopped squabbling over political hegemony… There is no 
guarantee that new and stronger conflicts will not break out between rival 
areas of influence. In different historical conditions, and among different 
geographical and political areas, forms of international conflict no less 
intense than those we have seen are still possible. The end of the Cold 
War must be seen as an opportunity for creating a more progressive 
stable system of interstate relations.72
 
                                                                                                                                          
them only after they have occurred, usually amid considerable publicity and criticism that they should 
have had contingency plans for such an event’. G. Edward & S. Nuttall, op.cit. p. 101. The wars in 
Yugoslavia were the most painful example for the lack of consistency in the Western approach, which 
was much criticised in the media and academia.  
71 I. Manners, ‘The European Union as a Normative Power in the Global Polity’, Paper presented to 
the PSA Annual Conference, Leeds, 2005, p. 3. 
72 D. Archibugi, D. Held & M. Kohler eds., Re-imagining Political Community. Oxford: Polity Press, 
1998, p. 2. 
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Apart from war, the new challenges are of various natures, and often subjectively 
defined. According to Held these include: the spread of AIDS, the debt burden of 
many countries in the ‘developing world’, the flow of financial resources which 
escape national jurisdiction, the drugs trade and international crime.’73 The EU and 
its member states officially endorsed the same themes, which they saw as stemming 
from the irreversible process of globalisation and its effect on the nation-state and its 
traditional forms of self-preservation:  
 
The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in 
which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. 
Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the 
spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many 
people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and 
injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state 
groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased 
European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected 
infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.74
 
Moreover, the EU’s endorsement of global challenges was part of the development 
of a new international regime on new types of security, such as human security as 
promoted by the UN, which is seen as challenged by: unchecked population growth, 
international terrorism, migration pressures, and disparities in economic 
opportunities, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation.75
 
The use of the rhetoric of global challenges is not a new phenomenon in Europe but 
it is qualitatively different from previous claims of world interests. Traditional 
‘global challenges’ or global interests involved the clash of state interests of state 
powers – for example Britain’s global interests as opposed to America’s regional 
                                                 
73 D. Held, ‘Democracy and Globalisation’ in D. Archibugi, D. Held & M. Kohler eds., Re-imagining 
Political Community. Oxford: Polity Press, 1998, pp. 11-27. p. 12. 
74 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003 
[online] http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf accessed 20/03/2007. 
The key threats listed in the document are a combination of new and old, internal and external 
anxieties such as: terrorism (post September 11), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. 
75 United Nations, Human Development Report 1994. New dimensions of human security, 1994, p.13 
[online] http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/ accessed 13 July 2008. 
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interests or American global interests versus those of the USSR.76 However, in the 
1990s the rhetoric on global issues suggested the need to create a new normative 
regime, based on universal values and not conflicting state interests.77 Although the 
EU did not initially display the ambition for externalising its normative commitments 
in the course of the post-Cold War period, it increasingly linked its developing 
foreign policy to the promotion of global interests within the region of Europe.  
 
The debate on the ‘alternative’ role of the EC/EU in international affairs as replacing 
the role of the state can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s but in that period the 
limited political integration did not provide enough basis to claim that the civilian 
power of the EC was independent from the military power of states.78 The 
intensification of the integration process and the development of a political aspect to 
the EU in the 1990s however, resurrected the debate on soft power, i.e. the ability of 
the EU to diffuse norms internally and externally through influencing the decision-
making process and acting as a deterrent or ‘civilising’ the behavior of third states 
through enlargement and/or use of diplomacy.79 The development of this kind of 
power is linked to the identification of new threats which, it is claimed, cannot be 
dealt with by traditional, or military power but requires international, or global 
cooperation. This argument was also taken up and supported by the political leaders 
in the applicant countries. According to Hungarian Minister Janos Martonyi speaking 
on the future of Europe at the informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the 
European Union, he said (‘[there is] not much time left to create a really united, 
enlarged Europe. Global challenges do not only make this unavoidable, but urgent as 
well.’80  
 
 
                                                 
76 D. Reynolds, ‘From World War to Cold War: the wartime alliance and post-war transitions, 1941- 
1947’, The Historical Journal, 2002, vol. 45 no. 1, pp. 211-227. 
77 In the post World War 2 period the US always claimed to be fighting for global freedom and 
democracy – not just for the interests of the USA. Similarly the USSR claimed to be fighting for 
international socialism and peace. 
78 H. Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
1982, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 149–64. 
79 This has been accompanied by a bourgeoning literature on Europeanisation, or the process of state 
socialisation through the EU. 
80 Martonyi refers to the problem of terrorism post September 11, cited in J. Sedivy, P. Dunay &, J. 
Saryusz-Wolski, Enlargement and European defense after 11 September, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, 2002 [online] http://aei.pitt.edu/515/01/chai53e.pdf accessed 14 June 2007. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the emergence of new international settings during the 1990s, 
which opened possibilities for the European Union to take centre stage in the 
building of ‘New Europe’. The extent of these structural changes was surprising not 
only because the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s was unexpected but 
also because the future of the European integration and the European Community 
was unclear at the time. The process of integration had stalled by the early 1980s and 
the ideas of its ‘deepening’ or ‘widening’ in order to improve the EC prospects were 
being met with increasing Euroscepticism, and the once popular theories of European 
economic and political integration faced difficulties in explaining their object of 
study.81 Then, the sudden increase in the political support for developing the 
European Union after the Single European Act was also a subject of much 
controversy as to what lies behind the new plans for the EU. The European Union 
was seen a façade for the liberalisation projects of national governments, or a 
defence of national economies in the fast developing globalisation and external 
economic pressures, or simply a form of competing with the US – and other regional 
blocs such as China, India, Japan and the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s however 
there was limited little political will to develop the Union into a superstate, and all 
plans for developing the Union in this direction (supported by Germany and France) 
faced opposition by other member states. 
 
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989-91 created a completely different 
picture. The demise of the Soviet Bloc was greeted by the West and seen as a 
‘victory’ for Western-style capitalism and democracy. Eastern Europe was seen as 
‘New Europe’ where a transition to a market economy and democratic forms of 
government with strong institutions to support the rule of law and human rights 
would finally bring prosperity to this historically backward region, and help prevent 
future crises. In these conditions, the European Union was promoted as the new 
‘normalising’ power in Europe, capable of guiding the newly independent Eastern 
                                                 
81 Euroscepticism developed in key countries like Britain who under Thatcher were rejecting many of 
the moves towards integration and social policies in favour of free trade, privatisation, and a rejection 
of the perceived pseudo-socialist policies emanating from Brussels at the time – paradoxically the 
same right-wing policies which the EU would later endorse and hoist onto the enlargement process in 
eastern Europe in the late 1990s. 
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European states to this end. This was formulated as the new role for the EU as it 
endorsed both widening – mainly to the East – and deepening by opening new areas 
of cooperation: foreign and security policy, as well as internal security and home 
affairs with a focus on fighting organised crime. 
 
The discussion in this chapter showed the complexity of issues surrounding the 
development of the new anti-crime regime in Europe. There are two key factors 
which led this development, and these were the idea of transforming EU as a central 
political actor in Europe and the world, and the need for its member states and 
satellites (including future members) to be participating in a joint effort of promotion 
of new superior set of ‘post-modern’ policies. The convergence of these two factors 
brought about a re-energised European Union and a new form of state intervention, 
not through military roles but through anti-crime and ‘soft security’ functions.
 58
Chapter 3. From Hard Security to Soft Security and the ‘Organised Crime 
Threat’ 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
  
This aim of this chapter is to explore the debates in international relations and 
security studies in order to trace the theoretical circumstances in which organised 
crime became part of the European Union’s agenda. The chapter focuses on two 
developments: the challenges to traditional military understanding of security which 
became increasingly popular in the post-Cold War period, and the subsequent re-
invention of security through the insertion of new threats such as organised crime 
into a new and expanded version of a ‘post-national’ and ‘post-sovereignty’, or post-
modern, security theory. In the 1990s the ideas of the EU as a soft security provider 
became popular (without replacing the hard power ambitions of the EU) and led to 
the development of a number of policies, which drew from the strength of the 
challenges to both the theoretical and territorial boundaries of security and the 
blurring of the distinction between military and non-military, old and new, hard and 
soft, internal and external security. Furthermore, these new and ‘progressive’ policies 
were expected to help transform the EU into a stronger international actor by virtue 
of their added security value as we saw in chapter two. They are commonly grouped 
in two areas, or EU pillars: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) though the boundaries between these areas are also flexible 
and porous. The discussion in this chapter is concerned with the theoretical 
developments which informed the development of the JHA pillar, and especially the 
idea of organised crime as a threat to security within the EU and also to its 
international obligations affecting relations outside the EU. 
 
After the end of the ‘mutually assured destruction’ of the nuclear rivalry between the 
United States and the USSR, the issue of international security did not disappear. In 
the practice of international relations many issues which were not previously 
considered a matter of security became ‘securitised’, and this included organised 
crime. Those issues which are not directly linked to traditional military, or ‘hard’ 
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security, entered the debate as ‘soft’ or ‘new’ security. This was partly made possible 
because of the theoretical debates in the international relations circles where critiques 
of ‘hard security’ gained more intellectual recognition after the traditional realist 
theories seemed to be partly discredited by the end of the Cold War, which they had 
failed to anticipate. The new security theories became popular also because they 
undermined the centrality of the state in international relations after a process of a 
deconstruction of the security concept and its exposure as a tool of state power. 
Another set of new positivist theories grew out of this attack on the state and sought 
not to further deconstruct but re-construct security by drawing attention to previously 
ignored subjects in security theory, and placing them as core issues in a new ‘soft’ or 
non-military security agenda. It is both the challenge to a state-centred understanding 
of the world, as well as the proposing of a new and expanded security vision that has 
made these theories consistent with, and useful for, the idea of a post-Cold War New 
Europe and the construction of the EU as a ‘new form’ of post-modern and supra-
state political structure.  
 
The arguments in this chapter focus on identifying gaps and peculiarities in the 
development of the new security theories. The first part of the chapter discusses these 
new developments in security thinking and concludes that non-military or soft 
security is itself an even more difficult concept to define than the previously more 
clear-cut theory of military, state-versus-state security. The second part of this 
chapter focuses on why defining organised crime as a security threat appears 
problematic. It examines organized crime within a large body of criminological 
literature, going back at least a century, and exposes the highly controversial nature 
of the concept of organised crime itself. The process of simply transferring organised 
crime from criminology to international relations without considering these 
theoretical controversies, the chapter argues, may lead to unintended policy 
outcomes. From the perspective of international relations and power politics the most 
important of these outcomes is that soft security re-enforces rather than the 
challenges the existing power relations, which it initially set out to do. Additionally it 
poses the risk of further undermining less powerful states and their sovereignty from 
within as well as without. 
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3.2. From Hard Security to Soft Security 
 
In international relations theory, soft security is usually defined either in opposition 
to hard security, or as complimentary to hard security. In its widest sense, soft 
security is everything but military security. If hard security is a public ‘good’ 
produced by means of confrontation and/or defence via the threat of use of military 
force or some other form of coercive power, soft security claims to create stability 
and avoid war through cooperation and other non-military measures. And if security 
is to be achieved not only through the use of military force then the soft security 
agenda addresses other types of risks. In the security continuum shown below hard 
security is mainly concerned with territorial defence against an outside aggressor 
while soft security lies at the other end of the spectrum where aggression could come 
from internal as well as external, non-state sources and requires the development of 
non-military policies.  
 
Figure 3.1. The Conventional idea of a Security Spectrum 
 
 
Hard Security Soft Security 
External (military) aggressor Internal/external non-military threats 
Military response  Non-military tools
State army or military alliances   State’s or inter-state political, 
 economic, social, environmental,
  public health policies
NATO, Warsaw Pact  EU, OSCE
 
(mix) Peacekeeping, peace-enforcing roles (UN) 
 
 
This complex security structure has been the subject of the theory and practice of 
international relations since the end of the Second World War which brought about 
both the rise of nuclear superpowers and regional security alliances and the fall of 
colonial power and the emergence of a large number of independent new states. This 
in effect increased the number of security actors but also gave primacy to military or 
‘hard’ security and their respective agents.  
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Hard security and international relations 
 
The attention paid to soft security issues has been more prominent in the post-Cold 
war era but both hard and soft approaches to security existed before at the level of 
both theory and the practice of international relations although they were not 
necessarily seen as separate issues. Previous theories of war did not ignore the 
variety of issues behind the occurrence of war, and therefore they, too, have been 
concerned with the soft security problems which had lead to confrontation such as 
competition for resources, economic threats, environmental problems, and so on. 
Indeed, the division between hard and soft security had originally been constructed 
by mainstream (realist) international relations theorists who had taken states as their 
main unit of analysis and therefore equated security with war as the ultimate 
expression of the political relation between these political units.  
 
The mainstream international relations and security theory reflected the ideological 
aspect of the post-war rise of the United States as a hegemonic power in the Western 
hemisphere; the demise of the colonial powers and the decline of the previous 
hegemony of Great Britain, and the rest of the European powers. According to Buzan 
and Wæver, ‘the word security as such is old, but in the US in the 1940s “national 
security” became…the “commanding idea”, the standard label for a whole field, 
previously discussed as war, foreign policy, defence, or military policy. It arrived 
with such force, that it seemed always to have been with us’.1 After the Second 
World War security was highly militarised due to the devastating consequences of 
the war itself and the respective importance of the military circles in the high politics 
of both the US and the USSR. Therefore the military aspect dominated in the security 
thinking in the discipline and practice of international relations for a long time. 
Dominated by American scholars, security was seen to be about military threats, and 
these threats came primarily from the Soviet bloc.2
                                                 
1 B. Buzan & O.Wæver, Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan. 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper Series Columbia International Affairs Online, 
1998 [online] http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/bub02/bub02.html accessed 29/01/2003. 
2 Research into the interplay between internal-external security discourses in American politics at the 
time shows that the Soviet challenge was more political, economic and social rather than military. The 
concerns were also with the protection of American ‘values’, as well as their international promotion 
as a way of establishing the new role of the USA in world politics. As Campbell demonstrates in his 
research of American security politics, the ‘political hysteria’ linked to the Soviet threat and the 
spread of communism into American life and values helped build a particular sense of American 
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 Apart from the hegemonic, there was an additional political element of the state-
military security which applied to all states, and this was its link to their territorial 
sovereignty. In short, security was understood as ‘a condition in which the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country are guaranteed’.3 This interpretation 
of security was consolidated with the change in the international system after the end 
of the Second World War and the independence of the former colonies. Thus this 
new post-war world system continued to be based on the establishment of a world 
system of sovereign and legally equal states where the main threat was military and 
came from other states and their armies/security apparatuses. The system also aimed 
at minimizing the occurrence of military conflict between states. If states existed to 
project power over others through military actions, then since 1945 the use of power 
externally was more strictly regulated. Since 1945 war started to be seen as an 
undesirable last resort for conflicting interests and a new international system was 
put into place to control the use of military force, namely the mechanisms of the 
United Nations and the principle of non-intervention, monitored by the five members 
of the Security Council. 
 
On one hand, the new international system provided legal equality between the states 
despite their economic and military inequality. Sovereign states had the legitimate 
right to use military power to defend the people occupying the territory of the state 
and from this perspective ‘hard’ security stems from Clausewitz’s conception of war 
as ‘continuation of politics by other means’.4 According to Bull, ‘Security in 
international politics means no more than safety: either objective safety, safety which 
actually exists, or subjective safety, that which is felt or experienced. What states 
seek to make secure or safe is not merely peace, but their independence and the 
                                                                                                                                          
national unity in a post-national era. The American national security discourse linked national interest 
to collective security, and to the developing military sector. In other words, the need for internal 
legitimacy and state consolidation led to the rise of the national security discourse in America which 
was exported onto the international system. D. Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign 
Policy and the Politics of Identity, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. 
3 C. Rudolph, Globalization and Security: Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security in 
Statecraft and Scholarship, 2002, p. 3 [online] http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ruc01/ruc01.pdf accessed 
01/01/2004. 
4 C. von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. In Carl Schmitt’s view it is 
precisely war that constitutes the political: ‘for only in real combat is revealed the most extreme 
consequence of the political grouping of friend and enemy. From this most extreme possibility human 
life derives its specifically political tension’. Schmitt in J. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. 
London: Routledge, 2006, p. 134.
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continued existence of the society of states itself which that independence requires; 
and for these objectives […] they are ready to resort to war and the threat of war.’ 
Bull also points out that the phrase ‘peace and security’ in the United Nations 
Charter reflects this same view ‘that the requirements of security may conflict with 
those of peace, and that in this event the latter will not necessarily take priority.’5
 
On the other hand, even if peace was a contestable framework for the new 
international system, the new primacy given to sovereignty and non-intervention had 
a much more practical effect in ‘outlawing’ the ‘old’ states’ primary raison d’être, the 
right and ability to go to war. As a result theories of the state itself had to be adjusted 
to the new circumstances and since 1945 the state was increasingly justified as a 
provider of security from war to its population (external threats), and a provider of 
security through establishing law and order in a complex web of internal 
relationships (and internal threats). Milward points out that ‘all post 1945 historical 
study shows that what the citizen has demanded as “security” from the state has 
widened in range and complexity to the point where protection in the sense of 
physical safety has rarely been that definition of security which had the highest 
priority at critical moments of political choice… [A]llegiance since 1945 has been 
given, sold and bought within a complex pattern of relationships between 
individuals, families and government.’6  
 
The state territory and population to be defended was demarcated by state borders. 
Borders became a defining element of state-provided security as they defined 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, and were protected, in many countries, by militarised 
border police and extensive border controls up until the 1980s. This also established 
state control over the movement of people but also goods, money and information in 
and out of its territory, which created (and was justified by) some sense of internal 
security and the state’s power over its internal affairs. The internal security was 
further strengthened by the development of an extensive security apparatus, which 
operated internally, but in part was legitimised by ‘identifying’ a number of 
                                                 
5 H. Bull, Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics Macmillan Press, 1977, p. 18. 
6 A. Milward, ‘The Springs of Integration’ in P. Gowan & P. Anderson eds., The Question of Europe, 
London: Verso, 1997, pp. 5-20, p. 13. Such relations have more recently been analysed through 
Foucault’s ideas of ‘biopower’, or the governmental management of ‘population’ beyond sovereignty 
and discipline. See M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007. 
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external/internal threats (i.e. communists, spies, terrorists) and the need for 
intelligence to prevent these threats.  
 
Deconstructing Security 
 
Until the 1990s there was no attempt to undermine the central position of ‘hard’ 
security in the practice of international relations or the right of sovereign states to 
have armies and weapons.7 Criticism of the military and defence industries did exist 
but was limited to left-wing or liberal academics and pacifist movements in 
opposition and not decision-makers. The realist perspective in international politics 
maintained that peace was subordinate to the sovereignty or independence of 
individual states. The military form of security was ‘constructed’ by the powerful 
states in the post-war period but this construction was integrated into the new 
international order of equal sovereignty, which sought to accommodate and restrict 
the possibility of war in a system of a much bigger number of new sovereign 
players.8 In its construction hard security was also part of the political project of 
post-colonial sovereignty and establishment of autonomous states. From this 
perspective, realist theory and ‘hard’ security theory were normative rather than 
explanatory theories and hence, in the post-Cold War period, they became exposed to 
criticism for not reflecting the true nature of the world but the facilitation its 
construction in favour of those with power.9 Such criticisms of ‘hard’ security 
approaches began to surface in the 1980s and interpreted the status-quo in security as 
part of the problem. These criticisms grew out of the anti-nuclear, anti-war, then anti-
arms race campaigns of the 1950s to 1980s. Some of these criticisms were 
incorporated by the superpowers into policies of détente, confidence building, arms 
control, etc. and are often seen as the precursor of the end of the Cold War. At the 
same time the relative success of the European integration project in Western Europe 
and its claimed success in preventing war in Europe gave additional credence to ‘soft 
                                                 
7 Arguably, the US-led military offensive against Iraq in 2003 was the first war against a state with the 
official reason that the state had weapons. 
8 Buzan and Wæver interpret the establishment of security as mainly a military issue as part of the 
desecuritising project of liberalism. If security is about war only then all other issues are part of 
normal politics. In this way the militarisation of security can be seen as a positive restriction of high 
politics. Buzan & Wæver, 1998, op.cit.  
9 R. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, 1983, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 129-153. 
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security’ and economic integration as more effective approaches than military 
policies.  
All these developments created a favourable ground for new theories of security, 
which started to challenge more firmly the military fixation in the field of security 
studies. This process was gradual and began in the 1980s within the military area 
itself and expanded by including non-military interpretations of security such as 
economic security, ecological security, and later, broadly defined societal security 
linked to cultural-identity issues.10 In academia, these developments were addressed 
by the security-society theories developed at the Copenhagen School of Security 
Studies in the 1990s, as well as a new wave of intellectual deconstruction of security 
which examined more or less radically the different elements of traditional security 
theory.11 Most of the new theories came from the so-called ‘Critical Security’ field. 
12
 
However, it was the end of the Cold War in 1989 which posed the greatest challenge 
to the military core of security studies and practice. The fall of the Soviet bloc 
seemed to dissolve the exclusivity of the military threat to international security in a 
number of ways. First, the unexpected collapse of the communist bloc exposed a 
                                                 
10 R. Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. An Introduction to the American 
Experience. New York: Random, 1987; D. Deese & J. Nye eds., Energy and Security, Cambridge, 
MA.: Ballinger, 1980; M. Renner, National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions, 
Washington: Worldwatch 1989; B.R. Allenby, ‘Environmental Security: Concept and 
Implementation’, International Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 1, 2000, pp. 5-22; M. Renner, 
National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions, Washington: Worldwatch 1989,; 
B.R. Allenby, ‘Environmental Security: Concept and Implementation’, International Political Science 
Review vol. 21, no. 1, 2000, pp. 5-22; O.Wæver, et. al. eds. Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter 1993. 
11 Classical texts include B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983; R. Ullman, 
‘Redefining Security’, 1983, op.cit.; O. Waever et.al., 1993, op.cit.; D. Campbell, 1992, op.cit. 
12 The debate between the security ‘expansionists’ and security traditionalists from the neo-realist 
camp in international relations took place in the early 1990s when the traditional security theories 
became the subject of more rigorous attacks which transcended the academia and became part of 
official policies. This debate is often linked in the literature to Stephen Walt’s widely quoted 1991 
article, The Renaissance of Security Studies, which asserts that the focus of security studies is the 
study of war and warns against revisionism in security studies which may undermine ‘the intellectual 
coherence’ of the discipline. S. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, June 1991, pp. 211-39. Shortly after the publication it was attacked by 
Kolodziej who published a critique of Walt’s essay in the same journal. E. Kolodziej, ‘Renaissance in 
Security Studies? Caveat Lector’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 4, December 1992, pp. 
421-38. Kolodziej extended the critique from a normative position and pointed out Walt’s disregard of 
the possibility for solving conflict through non-coercive methods and use of multilateral institutions. 
This debate developed into a critique of realism from many perspectives, the most prominent of which 
became known as Critical Security Theory, a generic term for a wide range of approaches which 
sought to challenge the traditional perspective in the field. This contestation is usually referred to as 
the (neo)realism versus Critical Theory dispute in security studies. This term is usually used with 
capitals to distinguish it from criticism as a method. 
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major weakness in mainstream realist international relations and security theory 
which failed to predict the abrupt end of East-West confrontation. Secondly, the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union meant the demise of much of its military power 
and the disappearance of the threat it allegedly posed to the West. Thirdly, the defeat 
of communism without military challenge from the West demonstrated the economic 
and ideological power of the West, which now seemed more effective than its 
military capabilities; and for others, the inadequacy of the military focus in 
traditional security and international relations theory. Added to that, the opening of 
Russia to the West created opportunities for experts to visit that country and check 
the extent of its previous military might, and it proved to be much smaller than had 
been imagined – a discovery that put a question mark over the Western intelligence 
community. All of the above posed a direct threat to the Western (mainly American) 
military complex which now had to justify its existence. In the conditions of vastly 
decreased military threat from the Soviets, and especially, the end of the threat of 
mutually assured destruction, coupled with growing US superiority, which advanced 
the process of economic globalisation, the idea of a new reading of security began to 
take centre stage, and this was quickly endorsed in military circles as well.13
 
Re-constructing security 
  
In the post-Cold war period, therefore, the critical security theories became 
increasingly popular particularly because they ‘exposed’ the inadequacies of realist 
international relations theories and its inability to explain social change. However, 
although the new approaches proposed a new way of conceptualising security they 
failed to produce a consensus on the nature of this ‘new thinking on security’. Some 
of these theories maintained the traditional referent object of security, i.e. states but 
others proposed a more radical re-assessment through deepening of the study of 
security, mainly by considering other levels of analysis than the state such us moving 
                                                 
13 This trend intensified after the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 
the USA on 11 September 2001. Despite the fact that these attacks were organised and executed by a 
handful of individuals, they caused a profound change in the security thinking of the Western world 
and gave a sound backing for the expansion of the security policies of many countries, including non-
Western countries which had some terrorism problems in the past or present. The new threats of 
terrorism and organised crime cannot be faced by traditional institutions such as NATO and required 
other policies and structures. 
 67
down to society and the individual or up to regional and global security.14 Some of 
these theories sought to deconstruct the process of ‘securitisation’ (such as the 
Copenhagen School of security studies).15 Others expose the contradictions of the 
security concept but others go further in that they try to find an alternative to the 
theories they find inadequate.16 Still others, however, suggested broadening or 
widening 17 of security to include a wider range of threats – new or old but 
previously ignored threats or issues which pose a security threat but which were 
marginalized by superpower-military rivalry during the Cold War.18  
 
On the basis of this debate about security, a branch of new ‘reconstructive’ theories 
emerged which used the weakened status of hard security to advance the new 
security thinking. This came mostly from the new focus on globalisation. Since the 
end of the 1980s there has been an increased, although sometimes contested 
perception, that the scale of international linkages is growing, which has created new 
transnational sites of power above the state. As a result of these new developments, 
state capacity is alleged to have been reduced not only in the area of the economy, 
now subjected to global economic forces, but in the execution of its sovereignty 
externally, due to the growing supremacy of international law and 
                                                 
14 B. Buzan, 1991, op.cit.; O. Waever et al., 1993, op.cit.  
15 ‘Securitisation’ theory is based on the claim that security is a ‘speech act’, i.e. a political actor 
‘labels’ an issue as a matter of security. In doing so the actor engaged in the labelling of security also 
claims the right to use extraordinary measures to address the security threat. In this process, the theory 
argues, issues are moved out of the sphere of normal politics and placed in the sphere of emergency 
politics which is usually out of democratic control. One of these issues is organised crime, for 
example. See B. Buzan, O. Wæver & J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 
16 Neufeld draws a comparison of ‘transformative’ critical security theories with the World Order 
Models Project (WOMP) of the 1960s and 1970s as a precursor of critical security studies in their 
attempt to change and emancipate/educate the world. According to Neufeld the problem with this 
approach is its utopian elements ‘in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative 
order thus allowing for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the 
prevailing order... [And] utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes’; 
accordingly, critical theory ‘limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible 
transformations of the existing world’. These theories, he argues, are also ‘elitist’ as they rest on the 
assumption that ‘Specifically, with their view of people as essentially ignorant of the truths that would 
set them free’. M. Neufeld, ‘Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on 
Canada’s ‘Security with a Human Face’, International Relations, 2004, vol. 18, no.1, pp. 109-123.  
17 There are different terms describing the main thesis in the new theories of security. Jef Huysmans 
uses the term ‘thickening’ and Manners suggests: ‘vectoring’ (meaning dynamics) to describe the 
Copenhagen Schools’ typology of ‘securitisation’, and ‘being’ (meaning form and nature) to discuss 
subject/object and existential/ontological distinctions.’ I. Manners, European [security] Union: from 
existential threat to ontological security, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2001, p. 9. 
18 See K. Kraus & M. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods’, 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1996, pp. 229-254. 
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international/supranational organisations, and internally due to a decreased ability to 
protect increasingly porous borders.  
 
The expansion of security is seen as objectively conditioned by the process of 
globalisation. Paul summarizes the globalisation-security nexus by pointing out the 
shift from hard to soft geopolitics: 
 
Globalization enthusiasts have argued that ‘hard geopolitics’ has become 
obsolete, partly due to the lethality of new weapons and partly because 
states are now more interested in wealth acquisition through economic 
liberalization and trade. To them, war-making is no longer the state’s 
primary focus, given the dramatic decline of inter-state wars since the end 
of the Cold War in 1991. In the larger international arena, great power 
competition is conducted through ‘soft geopolitics,’ with less emphasis 
on overt competition, arms build-up or crisis activity.19
 
From another perspective, globalisation is seen as a source of new threats arising 
from the new conditions it created and from weakening the traditional mechanisms 
of dealing with threats, i.e. weakening the power of the state. These newly identified 
threats come from non-state actors or intra-state developments: exploding population 
growth, ethnic conflicts, illegal or uncontrollable migration and influx of refugees, 
illegal drug and human trafficking, international crime, the spread of contagious 
disease across borders and even continents, international terrorism, environmental 
degradation and climate change, etc. Apart from the identification of non-state 
threats, there was an additional shift of attention to alternative referent objects of 
security other than the state. The state itself was dethroned from its central position 
in security and was given the role of an agent of security operating between the non-
state threats, the threatened societies, and their individual members. The state has 
been treated as a source of threat in itself, especially in the developing world, where 
                                                 
19 T. V. Paul, ‘States, Security Function And The New Global Forces’ Paper presented at the REGIS 
sponsored Conference on ‘What States Can do Now’, McGill University, Montreal, November 3-4, 
2000. Paul also quotes Mann’s interpretation of the perceived weakening of sovereignty and hard 
politics: ‘Post-nuclearism undermines state sovereignty and ‘hard geopolitics,’ since mass 
mobilization warfare underpinned much of modern state expansion yet it is now irrational.’ M. Mann, 
‘Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-state?’ in T.V. Paul & John A. Hall eds., 
International Order and the Future of world Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
p. 238. 
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it has been identified as the main threat to its population in cases of internal conflicts, 
dictatorships, or failure to provide law and order and other forms of protection.20 
According to Kolodziej, for example, the traditional security agenda rules out ‘those 
security threats posed by states to groups and individuals’, as well as threats posed by 
individuals to states: 
 
The rationale, manipulative techniques, and coercive measures and 
institutionalized forms of repression of authoritarian regimes are proper 
and primary objects of study for security analyst and practitioners. Death 
squads in Central and Latin America, the totalitarian regimes of Nazi 
Germany, Stalinist Russia, and Pol Pot’s Cambodia, as well as the causes 
of the Holocaust, the Gulag, the killing fields are security issues of the 
first magnitude… Also worthy of study are the armed pursuits, strategies, 
and claims of non-state actors, like Kurds, Serbs, or Tamil Tigers. 
Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and low intensity warfare, as the arm of the 
weak and disenfranchised, are no less central to security studies. These 
forms of armed conflict…are likely to be increasingly more important as 
ethnic and nationality wars, within nation-states, and so-called 
internationalised civil wars that spill over national boundaries, such as 
Lebanon, become more frequent.21
 
In the age of globalisation, it is argued that states have moved beyond a sovereignty-
territory-military orientation.22 In these conditions, the traditional security agenda 
overlooks the issue of internal conflict as it is too focused on interstate wars, and 
‘such conflicts are now far more frequent and deadly than interstate wars.’23 The 
identification of new non-state security risks suggested that there is a need for a new 
society regime based on norms and interstate cooperation to replace the old, 
‘anachronistic’ system of state sovereignty and inter-state competition.24 In other 
                                                 
20 These have developed into theories of ‘weak’ states, ‘failed states’, ‘state capture’. See J. Hellman, 
G. Jones, & D. Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day. State Capture, Corruption and Influence in 
Transition. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444, 2000. 
21 E. Kolodziej, 1992, op.cit , p. 422. 
22 C. Rudolph, 2002 op. cit. 
23 E. Kolodziej, 1992, op.cit., p. 432. 
24 This is not a new development in international relations theory. Robert. Keohane and Joseph Nye 
developed the concept of ‘complex interdependence’ in 1977 which challenged the classical realist 
theories and their emphasis on inter-state conflict and competition and suggested that the growing 
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words, there is a need (intellectual and political) to move beyond thinking of security 
in terms of the state and particularly the nation-state, ‘as the society of states moves 
gradually toward a world society of peoples’.25
 
In the Western public domain, and especially civil society dominated by liberal 
thinking, the shifting focus to non-military security became more popular for other 
reasons. First, in liberal circles it meant moving away from narrow national interests, 
which were rendered obsolete in the new post-Cold war conditions. Secondly, the 
expansion of the security concept and the new aspirations of liberalism led to the 
idea of ‘democratising’ security.26 Non-military security theories offered what was 
seen as more ‘emancipated’ interpretations of security and world politics as it 
challenged the ‘constructions’ which sustain unequal power relations and prevent the 
international community from dealing with the ‘real’ security issues.27 
Emancipation, according to Booth and Wheeler, means ‘the freeing of humans of 
those constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do; 
such a goal implies the lifting of unacceptable legal, social, economic, moral political 
and physical constraints. People should be treated as ends not means, whereas states 
should be treated as means and not ends.’28 Thirdly, the new security ideas supported 
the emerging agenda of ‘governance’ and its export to the international arena. In this 
view, states continue to matter in the post-Cold War conditions but they need to be 
transformed from a referent object of security to one of agents of ‘people’s security’ 
governance along with other actors such as ‘civil society’ (especially in Eastern 
                                                                                                                                          
economic interdependence between states necessitates inter-state cooperation through institutions and 
norms. However, the realist camp does not accept that interdependence excludes conflict. See R. 
Keohane & Joseph Nye Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little 
Brown, 1977. 
25 E. Kolodziej, 1992, op.cit. p. 432. 
26 However, the (neo-)liberals ignored the theory of ‘hard security’ which Buzan and Weaver suggest 
is the ‘desecuritising project’ of liberalism, i.e. by limiting security to military and state affairs, 
everything else was not security therefore politics was more liberal. From this perspective, the act of 
classifying an issue as security threat is a negative (undemocratic) act and the expansion of security is 
not desirable. Buzan & Wæver, 2003, op.cit. Furthermore, security is not necessarily ‘a good thing’. 
As the conditions of social life, and particularly political representation, are a subject of change, a 
constant and inflexible concept and policy of security may prevent a given society from adjusting to 
this change. Therefore, by itself security may cause insecurity for those whose interests in the new 
conditions have remained unrepresentative. From this perspective, expanding security behind the 
rhetoric of protection of humans or their emancipation may in fact increase the power of those who 
are in a privileged position by providing an even more sophisticated justification for the status quo.  
27 See also K. Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 1991, vol. 17, pp. 
313-326.  
28 K. Booth & N. Wheeler, ‘Contending philosophies about security in Europe’ in C. McInnes ed., 
Security & Strategy in the New Europe. London: Routledge, 1992, p.8. 
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Europe where civil society was seen as the agent of peaceful change), international 
organisations and the supranational or post-national European Union.29
 
3.2. Soft Security and its limits 
 
Soft or non-military security transcended the academic field in the mid-1990s when 
it began to appear in the speeches and policies of a number of international actors. It 
did not have a clear theoretical basis but it was quickly asserted as a new and more 
advanced concept for international relations and at first found supporters amongst 
mid-level powers in search of an international political identity.30 The concept of soft 
security drew on many of the positive elements associated with Critical Security 
theories, expansionist theories, and theories of soft power as an alternative to hard 
power in international relations discussed in the previous section. However, the 
popularity of soft security in the last two decades is due not so much to philosophical 
evolution but to the new conditions in Europe during the 1990s discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The term ‘soft security’ is an ambiguous concept, which is not clearly defined in 
literature. It is usually used as an elastic term which can fill theoretical gaps. In a 
special issue of the journal European Security published in 2005 and dedicated to 
‘soft security’, the concept was promoted as a generic term that be applied to the 
security concerns of the whole continent of Europe or even Eurasia. Soft security is 
seen as particularly useful concept in dealing with state failure and non-state actors. 
According to the contributors, the soft security threats must be addressed not only 
through policing and border management but by treating them at a global level.31 But 
in reality soft security is not so universal and all regions and countries seem to have a 
different set of soft security problems. Galeotti, for example, sees soft security as a 
                                                 
29 Ibid, p. 13. 
30 Canada, for example, was particularly active in the asserting the human security concept which is 
conceptually associated with soft or non-military security. M. Neufeld, 2004, op.cit., p. 114. The term 
‘soft security’ is often associated with the Nordic states and particularly, the work of the Danish 
Commission on Security and Disarmament to demilitarise all aspects short of military combat 
operations. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, Denmark begun to conceptualize a shift to ‘soft 
security’ in its foreign policy. 
31 G. Herd & A. Aldis, Soft Security Threats & Europe, London: Routledge, 2005. This is a special 
issue of the journal European Security, which includes other Soft Security articles cited in this 
chapter. 
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more useful agenda for ‘the wide range of non-military problems facing post 
communist Europe’. 32 For him the concept is reverse in the case of Eastern Europe: 
where ‘hard’ security assets have been transformed into ‘soft security’ threats, i.e. 
the. use of military assets for internal conflict and secessionism, coups or repression, 
proliferation of weapons and force, destabilisation and transnational crime, and, 
fragmentation. Others use the concept to describe Russia’s problems in the post-
communist age such as nuclear safety, environmental problems, infectious disease, 
and illegal immigration.33 In Africa, some institutions use the soft security concept in 
the effort to eradicate endemic civil wars and encouraging support for victims of 
African humanitarian disasters and the AIDS pandemic.34 For Western Europe, ‘soft 
security’ threats arise from political or economic instability that may be caused by 
influx of refugees, problems with minorities and illegal immigrants, crime, and other 
problems of external origin. Some supporters of the soft security agenda see it as 
revolutionising the security field and the dissolving boundaries between ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ may help to built a coalition between ‘hard’ power America and ‘soft’ Europe 
over more pressing issues than the outdated problem of war.35 The concept, others 
claim, is more useful for dealing with the problems in New Europe, and especially 
the Balkans, where hard security issues go hand in hand with soft security and both 
should be dealt with in a holistic way.36  
 
However, soft security has been criticised from security expansionists, as well as 
traditional ‘hard’ security supporters. On one hand, the concept of soft security has 
been dismissed because it suggests that some security threats are not as serious as 
‘hard’ security threats which has led to less political involvement in resolving such 
                                                 
32 M. Galeotti, ‘The Challenge of ‘Soft Security’: Crime, Corruption and Chaos’ in A. Cottey, & D. 
Averre eds., New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe's East. Manchester 
University Press, 2002, p. 151.  
33 C. Pursiainen, P. Haavisto & N. Lomagin, Soft Security Problems in Northwest Russia and their 
Implications for the Outside World, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki, 2001 
[online] www.upi-fiia.fi/eng/ accessed 22/08/2008. 
34F. Vreÿ, ‘Revisiting the soft security debate: From European progress to African challenges’, 
Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, 2005 [online]  
http://academic.sun.ac.za/mil/scientia_militaria/Internet%20Vol%2033(2)/03Vrey.pdf accessed 
22/08/2008. 
35 J. Lindley-French, ‘The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st 
Century’, European Security, March 2004, vol. 13, no. 1-2, p.1-15. 
36 M. Fotios, ‘Soft Security Threats in the New Europe: The Case of the Balkan Region’, European 
Security, March 2004, vol. 13, no. 1-2, pp. 139-156. 
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issues.37 On the other hand, the value of the concept has been rejected because it 
seems to simply be replacing old with new threats, and old with new values which it 
promotes as ‘emancipated’ and superior. The ambiguity of replacing old threats with 
new ones is reflected in Galeotti’s ‘sliding scale’ of asserted rather than clearly 
defined and analysed problems, which seem to be posing more threat to weaker and 
poor states rather than being universal. In the new global settings these states would 
be a danger to themselves but also to others: 
 
Rather than a clear-cut case of peace or war, these non-traditional 
challenges need to be assessed on a sliding scale, perhaps going from 
problem through risk to outright threat. All modern sates face some 
degree of organised criminality, for example, but whereas this might be 
considered merely a problem in, say France or Canada, the ability of the 
Mafia to defy the state might merit the title risk. While there is no fear 
that the mafia could topple the Italian state or disrupt the economic or 
social system, in some parts of post communist Europe, this may be a 
very real danger, elevating it to realms of full blown threat. This is of 
course, still a crude approach, not least because it relies on vague 
semantics, but it nevertheless illustrates the continuum on which these 
challenges must be placed.38
 
Despite the claim for ‘human’ based universality, the soft security concept seems to 
include a very subjective range of issues, approached from a global, regional or local 
perspective. It can be stretched to include a number of issues seen as a potential 
threat to the people. Soft security has therefore been sharply criticised that for being 
a concept ‘about almost everything except defence proper. In this sense, it is not 
really a term of practical value.’ 39  
 
The ambiguities surrounding the soft security concept are often identified as the 
concept’s main weakness as it can be used for political manipulation. According to 
                                                 
37 A. Cottey, Security in the New Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Critics have 
pointed at the Europeans for hiding behind ‘soft security’ and engaging only in issues they can afford, 
which is often no commitment at all. J. Lindley-French, 2004, op.cit. 
38 M. Galeotti, 2002, op.cit, p.153-154. 
39 K. Becher, ‘Soft security’ with Russia after 11 September’, Russian Regional Perspectives Journal, 
2006, vol. 1, no.1.  
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Hyde-Price ‘the new security agenda is increasingly composed of more intangible 
and diffuse risks and challenges. These often involve unfocused fears, perceptions of 
insecurity, and feelings of unease and cannot always be precisely specified.’40 Even 
though soft-security issues often assume high political importance they are often 
linked to populist agendas and moral panics, particularly when it strives to resolve 
topical but poorly understood issues such as crime, terrorism, or migration.  
 
Soft or new security appeals to those who seek to develop alternatives to military 
security.41 Some critics of soft security argue that the use of the concept reflects the 
need for a new basis for justifying the continuance and sometimes expansion of the 
state security apparatus and technology, thus re-legitimising coercive state power.42 
The new security concepts adopted by states and international organisations such as 
NATO and the EU demonstrate a move to soft security. 43 Therefore soft security 
threats can also be interpreted as an argument used by security services and security 
advisors to justify their existence.44 In some cases, the old Cold war experts simply 
re-qualify and become the new soft security protagonists, and the emergence of new 
policies to counter the new threats has led to the creation of new transnational 
bureaucracies, or a new supranational Securitocracy.45 Langlais argues that 
identifying more security threats through promoting the soft security agenda, and the 
blurring of the old ‘hard’ and the new ‘soft’ security issues, as has led to ‘a total 
security’ which now operates on national and international level. It has justified the 
                                                 
40 A. Hyde-Price, ‘Beware the Jabberwock’: Security Studies in Twenty-First Century’ in H. Gärtner, 
A. Hyde-Price & E. Reiter eds., Europe's new security challenges. Boulder Col: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001. 
41 Also, as some critics point out proponents of soft security are hardly bound to find a reserved 
position on security agendas as long as hard security instruments remain an alternative. S. Huntington, 
‘No exit. The errors of endism’, The National Interest, Fall 1989. 
42 See for example P. Andreas & R. Price, ‘From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the 
American National Security State’ International Studies Review, 2001, vol. 3, no.3, pp. 31-52. 
43 NATO started to include more risks and treats in its Security Concept after the end of the Cold War. 
It became a much more active organisation compared to its previous 50 years of existence. In the 
1990s NATO favoured and engaged in ‘out-of area’ military tasks which effectively turned the 
organisation from defensive to interventionist. The EU developed a similar interventionist strategy. It 
introduced its ‘Petersberg tasks’ of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making in the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, as well as the development of a security element and an external dimension of the 
Justice and Home Affairs. 
44 This is a criticism usually addressed towards the anti-crime policies and the American war on drugs, 
as well as the increasingly external roles given to FBI (as those would previously be dealt with by 
CIA).  
45 P. Gilroy, ‘Multiculture in times of war: an inaugural lecture given at the London School of 
Economics.’ Critical Quarterly, 2006, vol. 48, no.4, pp. 27-45.
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creation of an all- pervasive intelligence gathering mechanism whose workings 
without a clearly defined set of threats, has in fact started to threaten the security of 
the individual while claiming to be ensuring individual’s security.46  
 
Finally, there are objections raised to soft security as applied in the current context of 
international relations where states are still the main political structures through 
which individuals can exercise their sovereignty, at best in conditions of democracy. 
Neo-realists for example point out that it is too early to do away with the state as ‘the 
security of ‘citizens’ [not just individuals] is identified with (and guaranteed by) that 
of the state; and, by definition, those who stand outside it represent potential or 
actual threats.’47 Therefore the identification of non-state threats as common threats 
may not translate into a workable common definition of security, and especially if 
developed from top-to-bottom and from inside to outside, as in the case of the 
European Union in the New Europe. In this respect, as Dorff points out that 
‘problems’ is not a concept ... [it] provides us with no ordering of reality that we can 
use to create a common understanding of what it is that we are talking about ... [nor 
a] range of possible policy approaches to address those problems’.48
  
3.3. The problem of organised crime 
 
Organised crime appears in almost every list of ‘soft-security’ problems – usually in 
a more rather than less prominent place as we have seen. But the argument that crime 
and organised crime pose new security threats presupposes that we have a clear 
understanding of what ‘crime’ and ‘organised crime’ is. However there is a long 
history of debate about just what these terms mean and their relationship to any 
underlying social reality. Crime is a contested concept in its own right and very much 
like security it is open to manipulation and use by those in power.  
 
                                                 
46 R. Langlais, ‘Total Security as Threat: The Blurring of Hard and Soft Security in Northern Europe’, 
Acta Borealia, vol. 16, no. 2, 1999, pp. 63-79. 
47 Ibid. 
48 R. Dorf, ‘A Commentary on Security Studies for the 1990s as a Model Core Curriculum’ 
International Studies, 1994, vol. 19, pp. 23-31.  
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From crime to organised crime 
   
Crime is a phenomenon defined by law which has made many sociologists, 
criminologists and others researching crime, feel rather uncomfortable because they 
study a phenomenon which is ‘solely the creation of law’ and therefore their science 
cannot ‘control its own basic central role’.49 This central role of the legal definition 
in the theoretical understanding of crime was first challenged in late nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century by some theorists in the Social 
Positivist school in criminology, and most notably Emile Durkheim and his anomie 
theory.50 Although the alternative view of crime that they suggested – crime as a 
pathological phenomenon in social relations, i.e. crime is caused by society – was of 
limited use in terms of understanding and clearly defining what constitutes crime, it 
was beneficial insofar as it rejected the legal definition for being unscientific and 
limited. This critical approach was advocated by others who suggested different 
alternatives of the nature of crime. In the late 1940s, Thorsten Sellin proposed the 
concept of conduct norms of social interaction as a basis for identifying criminal 
behaviour instead of using the means defined by law and thus, its political use.51 
Edwin Sutherland added another very important argument in favour of the idea that 
law or structure are far too limited in defining crime by introducing the term of 
white-collar crime which he defined as ‘a crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’.52  
 
The white-collar crime concept suggested that powerful and well-off people commit 
de facto crimes and therefore crime is not limited to the lower social classes, and is 
not defined solely by disadvantageous social conditions of the perpetrators.53 
According to Henry and Milovanovic: ‘crimes are nothing less than moments in the 
expression of power such that those who are subjected to them are denied their own 
contribution to the encounter and often to future encounters… Crime then is the 
power to deny others’.54 Therefore, at its most basic level the issue of crime cannot 
                                                 
49 W. Morrison, Theoretical Criminology, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1997, pp. 7-11. 
50 E. Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, New Work: Free Press, 1979. 
51 T. Sellin, Culture Conflict and Crime, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938. 
52 E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime' New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1949, p. 9.  
53 F. Pearce, Crimes of the powerful: Marxism, crime and deviance London: Pluto Press, 1976. 
54 Henry and Milovanovic (1996), cited in S. Henry & M. Lanier, What is Crime? Controversies Over 
the Nature of Crime and What to Do about It, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p.13. 
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be separated from the power of the state to regulate and police. But the international 
sphere operates in conditions of anarchy, i.e. there is no sovereign state to enact and 
enforce law. Dealing with crime beyond the states’ borders, therefore, becomes the 
subject of negotiation between possibly competing sovereign authorities, in condition 
of power imbalance.55 Such negotiation can be observed in the very process of 
defining organised crime. 
 
The problem of defining organised crime has existed since the concept first emerged 
in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century.56 Despite the increased 
focus of both academics and practitioners on organised crime in the last two decades 
there is no consensus on what organised crime actually is. Organised crime implies a 
contrast between the crimes of the individual and crimes involving some form of 
association. However, it is not clear how much crime is actually undertaken by 
isolated and completely atomised individuals and when an association becomes an 
organised relationship. Klaus von Lampe summarises this confusion: ‘organised 
crime would comprise all criminal acts that are not impulsive or spontaneous [and] 
would refer to all criminals that do not operate in a complete social isolation.’57 In 
most cases the use of the term ‘organised crime’ relies on an implicit notion of some 
sort of criminal conspiracy much of which comes from popular culture and media 
representations of the ways in which underground criminal groups can operate.  
 
The problems of definition arise partly because of the covert nature of any organised 
type of criminal activities which makes the phenomenon difficult to observe and the 
level of organisation can sometimes be imagined rather than based on hard facts. 
                                                 
55 One example of international controversies over the definition of crime is the case of smuggling 
opium into China by British and American traders in early 19th century. It was a direct violation of 
China’s law but was considered and called ‘essential trade’ by British and American authorities. 
Another example with clear power relation is the US policy aimed at curbing the illegal import of 
cocaine from Latin America, which impinged on local cultures where coca leaves fulfil traditional 
social, cultural, religious and medicinal roles. F. MacGregor ed., Coca and Cocaine: An Andean 
Perspective. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993; E. Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The 
Evolution of Norms in International Society’, International Organization, 1990, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 479-
526. 
56 The concept of organised crime emerged in the United States in the 1920s mainly to signify a 
particular type of crimes, also referred to as racketeering, ‘dealing in stolen property, insurance frauds, 
fraudulent bankruptcies, securities frauds, credit frauds, forgery, counterfeiting, illegal gambling, 
trafficking in drugs of liquor, or various forms of extortion.’ M. Woodiwiss, Organised Crime – The 
Dumbing of Discourse, The British Criminology Conference: Selected Proceedings, 2000, vol. 3. 
57 K. von Lampe, ‘The Concept of Organized Crime in Historical Perspective’ Paper presented at the 
international conference ‘Crime organise international: Mythe, pouvoir, profit…’, Universite de 
Lausanne, Switzerland, 1999. 
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Ultimately, organised criminal syndicates are only such by name, and in the cases of 
established criminal business enterprises such as the Medellin or Cali Drugs Cartels, 
the Ku Klux Klan, or the Provisional IRA there is no limited formalisation of rules 
and relationships through paperwork typical for any legal organisations documented. 
Worse, as criminal liability lies with the individual, it has been difficult to investigate 
criminal organisations as such rather than the individuals who are alleged to 
constitute them.58  
 
Organised crime and alien conspiracy theories: from the US to Europe 
 
A large part of research on the topic studies organised crime as a social phenomenon 
whose real nature is difficult to pinpoint because it becomes entangled in a discourse 
of the outsider, the other, the migrant, the underclass. From one end of the political 
spectrum, such research is linked to the ‘alien conspiracy concept’, that is the ethnic 
and foreign membership of the organised criminal groups. It is connected with the 
organisational approach mainly because the latter was formed under the influence of 
the organisational model of the (Sicilian) Mafia, which was considered by some to be 
responsible for committing organised crimes in the USA during the 1960-70s. It 
reflects the ambiguous status of the migrant. At one level migrants are seen as a 
threat because they are part of a disorganised flood; at another they are a threat 
because of the networks they generate as they use their traditional norms and values 
such as kinship for illicit purposes. The alien concept has had a considerable impact 
on the perception of organised crime in Western Europe like many of the American 
ideas of the phenomena.59 An example is the note in the 2000 International Crime 
Assessment, prepared by various US agencies: ‘Indigenous criminal organisations 
                                                 
58 In the height of the anti-organised crime politics in the USA in 1970, a new federal law was adopted 
in order to circumvent the problem of individual criminal liability. The Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provided for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action 
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‘Transnational Organised Crime: The Global Reach of an American Concept’, in A. Edwards & P. 
Gill eds., Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, Routledge, London, 
2003, p. 13-27, and M. Woodiwiss & D. Hobbs, ‘Organized Evil and the Atlantic Alliance. Moral 
Panics And The Rhetoric of Organized Crime Policing in America and Britain’, British Journal of 
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are less entrenched elsewhere in Western Europe but foreign-based crime groups 
have established footholds in expatriate communities in most EU countries’.60  
 
The American experience has been criticised for being irrelevant to the particular 
organised crime situation in Europe: ‘most criminal groups are not hierarchically 
organised and are not constituted out of one single ethnic group… instead the image 
of specific and opportunistic criminal networks seems more accurate’.61 Empirical 
evidence shows that organised crime in Europe, and in fact in America too, is neither 
ethnically constricted, nor heterogeneous.62 The ethnic characteristic used by some 
authors in defining organised crime shows some of the problems in conceptualising 
organised crime and the issue of subjectivity. At the same time, it may just be a 
matter of fact, for example, that certain areas of crime or certain geographical areas 
are dominated by actors of specific ethnic backgrounds but this does not translate 
into a characteristic of organised crime per se.63
  
From the more critical corner, Berki, contemplating the phenomenon of criminal 
organisation, concluded that ‘such a thing cannot exist… [It is] either purely 
instrumental or pre-existing tangential association’. When the criminal organisation 
exists for an instrumental reason, it is ‘aggregated rather than united’. It is set up for 
the perpetration of crime solely – it has the individual ends and it is usually 
dismantled after those ends are achieved. For Berki ‘the criminal are and remain 
strangers in crime, and the criminal world is not a proper world but atoms in the 
void’. Berki describes associations based on ethnic, class or minority basis, as ‘the 
twilight-zones between crime and politics’ whose outlaw activity could be seen also 
as resistance to the state, which ‘takes the form of law-breaking but in substance is 
order-defiance’. 64 He also points out that it is this type of ‘organisations’ that often 
                                                 
60 International Crime Threat Assessment [online] 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270index.html accessed 
25/03/2005. 
61 Towards a European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime, Joint report from Commission services 
and EUROPOL, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, March 2001. 
62 D. R. Liddick, ‘An Empirical, Theoretical, and Historical Overview of Organised Crime’, 
Criminology Studies, 1999, vol. 6. 
63 K. von Lampe, ‘Critical Review of Conceptual Approaches. Report for Project Assessing Organised 
Crime’ Sixth Framework Programme, 2004, p.12. 
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64 R. N. Berki, Security and society: reflections on law, order and politics London: Dent, 1986, 
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become the end target of policies of fighting crime. In an even more radical study of 
Western crime control policies Christi refers to the fight against crime as a ‘form of 
control of dangerous classes’.65 From this perspective ‘organised crime’ is not a 
definition of an activity with legal or social implications but who and why should be 
controlled and eliminated, through the criminal justice institutions.66  
 
The emphasis on policing organised crime in recent Western policies on crime has 
replaced a milder, more social view of crime as a side effect of social inequalities. 
Organised crime is seen as evidence of a conspiracy and sustainable business of 
crime, which is not a side effect but a contributor to injustices in society. Such views 
of crime evolved and migrated from more suppressive crime regimes such as the US 
war on crime/drugs to Europe and morphed into an indigenous organised crime 
theory which developed a further set of controversies and ambiguities. Theories of 
organised crime have drawn on the empirical discoveries of local crime in Europe, 
and other places, and have now formed part of a truly global conceptualisation of 
organised crime with its own criticism and valuable insights.67
 
3.5. Conceptualising organised crime 
 
The approaches to organised crime are interlinked in most theories but for the 
purpose of the discussion here they are divided in four distinct groups: organised 
crime as a structure of association and organised crime as structured activities; social 
definitions of organised crime and understandings of crime based on economic 
                                                 
65 N. Christi, Crime Control As An Industry. Gulags Western Style? London: Routledge, 1993, p. 62. 
66 The development of those institutions in the US and the UK is the subject of Garland critique of the 
culture of control and surveillance which has developed in both countries in last decades. D. Garland, 
The culture of control: crime and social order in contemporary society, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002.  
67 Concepts of crime travelled together with policies to counter crime. As Levi points out in relation to 
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theories.68 This grouping of organised crime theories and approaches brings out the 
key characteristics of our contemporary views of organised crime. These views have 
been influenced by other areas of scholarship such as organisational theory, cultural 
and sociological theories and pure economics of supply and demand, and have had 
an impact on the development of anti-crime policies.  
 
Organised crime as 'association’ 
 
In mainstream criminology, the most popular approach to organised crime has been 
the ‘organisational’ one though critics argue that linking crime and organisation 
brings together two ambiguous concepts. Definitions which use the idea of crimes 
committed by an organised body (organisation) can be found in various documents 
regardless of origin, institution or country. It is also the basis of the understanding of 
organised crime in some of the fundamental works dealing with the subject, such as 
those of Cressey and Albini. The latter argues that the ‘most primary distinguishing 
component of organized crime is found within the term itself, namely 
organization’.69 According to Cressey, ‘one who would define organized crime 
precisely… must be concerned with formal and informal structure; it is the necessity 
for this concern that puts organised crime in the scholarly domain of systems analysts 
and other organisational specialists.’70 The organisational approach has been adopted 
in some US legislation, too. For example, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act said ‘organised crime means the unlawful activities of the members of a 
highly organised, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and 
services’.71 The other concepts, connected with this type of approach, and deriving 
from it, are the ones of definable structures of the organised criminal groups.72 These 
are usually perceived as hierarchical, comprising at least two ranks. Cressey’s work 
                                                 
68 Cressey (1967) cited by M. Woodiwiss, 2000, op.cit.  
69 J. Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971.  
70 D. Cressey, Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America, 
New York: Harper, 1969, pp. 310-1 (my italics). Cressey’s work on organised crime was 
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‘Perspectives on organised crime’, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, November 1998, vol. 37, no. 
4, pp.335-345. 
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is based on the concept that organised crime is not just connected with an 
organisation of criminals but with a monolithic organisation – ‘organised criminals 
are members of the monolith; organised crime is what they do’.73 The idea of the 
hierarchy was influenced by the models of the Sicilian Mafia but also influenced by 
prevailing rational-bureaucratic ideas borrowed from the legitimate business world. 
 
However, the organisation-based approach, together with its derivative concepts of 
hierarchy, ranks, code of conduct, division of labour and professional specialisation 
of the criminals, ethnic origin, is becoming less popular in both the academic and 
official discourse on organised crime.74 Organised crime, and particularly crime 
linked to international markets, is increasingly conceived of as rather flexible, inter-
ethnic, and non-centralised.75 These views have developed on the basis of empirical 
criminological research which from the 1980s began to build an alternative picture of 
organised crime in which these types of criminal activities were seen to be carried 
through flexible criminal networks (sometimes described as a cell structure) rather 
than monolithic and concentrated establishments.76 This research did not always part 
completely with the organisational approach but found that organisation exists 
mainly on a lower, local level where criminal groups are based on families, friends or 
business connections. In the age of globalisation, these structures have become looser 
rather than rigidly organised on both lower and national-international level. Hobbs 
for example, argues that: 
 
At the dialectic between the local and the global substantiates, the indirect 
nature of the power wielded by large multinationals confirms elements of 
flexibility, autonomy and independence that were absent during previous 
eras dominated by increasingly arcane institutions such as the mob, the 
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firm or the gang. Trading relationships between coalitions of criminals of 
different national origins involves a coagulation of local interests. It is at 
the local level that organized crime manifests itself as a tangible process of 
activity.77  
 
Establishing a pattern of organisation of criminal activities, hierarchical or 
networked, on a national or transnational level is questionable, as research shows that 
crime takes different forms and seems to adjust itself to changing conditions. This 
ability to invent and re-invent itself is a characteristic of organised crime, which anti-
crime policies have persistently overlooked. It could be argued that the type of crime 
that these policies are aimed at is in fact a ‘disorganised crime’ – a point made by 
Reuter who stresses that organised crime is determined by economic forces which 
dictated small scale enterprise to avoid law enforcement impediments and therefore 
crime is disorganised with little incentive or capacity to create corporate-like 
structures.78 As Woodiwiss and Hobbs comment on Reuter’s conclusions: ‘Mafia 
gangsters participated in illegal markets but they did not control them.’79
 
The official views on organised crime have largely borrowed from these theoretical 
developments, as the EU Organised Crime Situation Report shows: ‘there is a move 
away from criminal specialisation to criminal diversification. The traditional 
hierarchical structures are being replaced by loose networks of criminals, linked to a 
quick and dirty profit-making network’.80 As a result, organised crime in the 
European perspective is now seen differently from the American concept of a 
monolithic structure, (which still is popular in the United States and other countries, 
and is particularly persistent in institutions). According to some European 
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researchers, European organised crime is ‘less well-organised, very diversified’.81 It 
is not disconnected from the rest of society and in fact exists alongside the legal 
business and ‘recruits both skilled and unskilled labour, like any other industry’.82
 
The emphasis on organisation, whether defined formally or informally, is especially 
problematic when applied in international policies. The organisational forms and 
networks vary between countries and over time reflecting different patterns of 
development, or indeed culture. It is not clear therefore that it makes sense to use the 
same concepts to analyse widely different social forms and to criminalise them. Thus 
the tribal/clan systems, of a more traditional society involve different communal 
networks to those of peasant based societies and these in turn differ from the 
networks of industrial and post-industrial societies. The focus on organisation 
therefore creates major analytical problems. The more structured the view of 
organised crime the more capable the term is of being empirically tested, the 
evidence measured and the significance of organised crime even being denied. The 
less structured the view of organised crime, the less capable it is of being tested and 
measured and its existence and seriousness subject to test. Networks can be mapped 
but not clearly limited with the result that organised crime can be made to seem as if 
it is everywhere.83
 
Organised crime as methods and activities 
 
A second popular approach towards defining organised crime concentrates on the 
methods and the activities, used by the organised criminals for achieving their goals 
(profit, power or protection). The activities/methods approach is often adopted by the 
official, and especially legal interpretations of the issue, because it provides quite a 
flexible and expandable, and more ‘observable’ concept of organised crime. This 
                                                 
81 P. van Duyne, Organized Crime in Europe, New York: Commack, 1996; C. Fijnaut et. al.., 
Organized Crime in the Netherlands, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
82 V. Ruggiero, Organized Crime in Europe: offers that can't be refused, Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1996.  
83 According to Sartori (1984) in such ‘conceptual travelling’ the connotation and extension of a 
concept could be inversely related, and concepts can become more abstract, general and more widely 
applicable as they are divorced from their local characteristics. When applied to local empirical 
research however, the concepts become narrower and less abstract. In either case, the concept seems 
to control the number and nature of cases where it can be applied. Sartori in G. Friedman & H. Starr, 
Agency, structure, and international politics: from ontology to empirical inquiry, Routledge, 1997, 
p.36. 
 85
approach stresses the nature of the crimes committed and not the level of 
organisation, which was more difficult to establish. In the USA the Task Force on 
Organised Crime of the 1967 President’s Commission spoke of organised crime as 
those ‘supplying illegal good and services – gambling, loan-sharking, narcotics, and 
other forms of vice’.84 Block and Chambliss, too, define organised crime as ‘those 
illegal activities, connected with the management and co-ordination of racketeering 
(organised extortion) and vices – particularly illegal drugs, illegal gambling, usury, 
and prostitution’.85 Contemporary views of which crimes are organised crimes agree 
on some of the traditional activities but include many others depending on level of 
social harm or danger, or just personal viewpoint.  
 
The list of organised crime activities is unlimited. One academic site describes them 
as ‘drugs trafficking, money laundering, fraud against the EU budget, arms dealing, 
international car theft, loan sharking, trafficking in art and heritage objects such as 
antiques and rare fossils, environmental crime such as black market trading in 
nuclear materials and the illegal disposal of hazardous waste, trafficking in 
endangered animals and plant species, prostitution and pornography (including 
internet porn), smuggling of illegal immigrants and trading in human organs, 
computer crime (including the communication, between groups, of planned illegal 
activities through highly complex coded messages), and coercive labour etcetera..’86 
Defining organised crime by such listings of accepted manifestations, assumes that 
organised crime acts are self-evident. This approach taken independently from views 
of structure runs the risk of making the concept meaningless and/or analytically 
unusable. Therefore it is usually accompanied by the view that for these criminal 
activities to take place, some form of coordination of people is needed, which brings 
the discussion back to the issue of structure. 
 
Most definitions that focus on the activities of organised crime (although not all of 
them) also point out the methods used by organised criminals, such as violence, 
corruption, extortion, sometimes in an attempt to delineate organised from other 
                                                 
84 Cited in G. Fiorentini & S. Peltzman, ‘Introduction’ in G. Fiorentini & S. Peltzman eds., The 
Economics of Organised Crime, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.1-30, p.3. 
85 A. Block & W. Chambliss, Organizing Crime New York: Elsevier, 1981. 
86 University of Exeter, Politics Department (no date) Organised Criminal Activities [online] 
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types of crime.87 The California Commission on Organised Crime used the issue of 
violence as central for defining organised crime itself – as a ‘technique of violence, 
intimidation and corruption’.88 The use of corruption is central for a certain number 
of understandings of organised crime. Cressey argues that ‘the position of corrupter 
is as essential to an illicit business as a position of negotiator is to a labour union’.89 
For Kenney and Finckenauer what was ‘essential to the definition of organised crime 
is the use of violence and the threat of violence’, as well as ‘corruption of public 
officials’, because ‘these factors define organised crime’.90 However, this is a 
consequence of the impossibility of regulating the illicit market, rather than 
organised crime per se.91  
 
The methods/activities approach is indeed a flexible one as it stresses what organised 
crime is in terms of its manifestations, which can be expanded or limited for the 
purpose of research or investigation. It is however attacked as a defining feature of 
organised crime exactly because of that. Lupsha, for example, argues that the 
organised criminal activity is ‘instrumental rather than an end in itself’.92 Ianni also 
criticises the focus on the nature of the crimes, especially in relation to the ethnic 
origin of the targeted perpetrators.93 Furthermore, organised crime can involve both 
legitimate and illegal activities, and equally, ‘legitimate businesses’ can also use 
illegal methods which adds more confusion as to the of organised crime concept.94 
                                                 
87 For example, H. Abadinsky, Organized Crime, Nelson Hall, 1985; J. Albanese, Organized Crime in 
America, 2nd ed., Cincinnati, 1989; Cressay, 1969, op.cit.; S. Adamoli et al., Organised Crime 
Around the World, Helsinki: HEUNI, 1998. 
88 The Special Crime Study Commission on Organized Crime, Final Report, Sacramento, California, 
1953. One can see how the views of organised crime in respect of legal/illegal activity have changed 
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89 Cressey, 1969, op.cit., p.315 
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Co, 1995. 
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Press, 1994. 
93 F. Ianni, Black Mafia, Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime, New York: Simon and Schuster, 
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against international corruption can also be seen as an effort to minimise cost and competition for 
entering developing world’s markets. The fact that these countries have started to accept those new 
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Therefore the dividing line between who is outside the law and who is not can be 
blurred if one uses the activities approach. This is a fundamental assertion of the 
white-collar or corporate crime theories and their arguments would not exclude the 
crimes of the powerful from organised crime. Labelling theory, or defining crime by 
its ‘name’, is also useful in critiquing this method as the focus on particular acts 
when defining organised crime may (intentionally or not) exclude other types of 
crimes.95 Such problems in defining organised crime which in effect conceal wider 
social issues such as the origin of perpetrators have led to expanding the theory of 
organised crime in order to accommodate the crucial social element along with, or at 
the expense of its directly observable characteristics such as organisation or methods. 
 
Organised crime as a social condition 
 
The concept of the socially determined character of organised crime or organised 
crime as part of the social system is the third approach in the conceptual discourse of 
organised crime, which has its own range of interpretations. Von Lampe summarises 
this approach where organised crime is seen ‘in essence as a social condition in 
which legitimate and criminal structures are integral parts of one corrupt socio-
political system, regardless of either the types of crime promoted or the degree of 
organisation of those supporting the system’.96 Block, for example, argues that 
‘organised crime is part of a social system in which reciprocal services are performed 
by criminals, their clients and politicians’ and therefore ‘a definition demands three 
distinct entities functioning for the same illicit purpose’.97 Ianni similarly defines 
‘organised crime as an integral part of American social system that brings together a 
public that demands certain goods and services that are defined as illegal, an 
organisation of individuals who produce or supply those goods, and corrupt public 
officials who protect such individuals for their own profit or gain’.98 Michael 
Woodiwiss extend the criticism to the influence of the American school of thought, 
for separating this phenomena from the rest of the society (the ‘otherness concept’ or 
                                                                                                                                          
anti-corruption norms also reflects their increasing ‘weakness’ vis-a-vis global companies and 
Western governments. 
95 Examples could include legal forms of extortion such as bank fees, or companies’ tax evasion, 
compared to illegal forms such as banknote forgery, or organised robbery. Activities of similar type 
and consequences seem to selectively get the label of ‘crime’ or ‘no crime’. 
96 K. von Lampe, 1999, op.cit.  
97 A. Block, 1983, op.cit.,  p. 57. 
98 F. Ianni, 1974, op.cit., p.15-15. 
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even alien conspiracy concept) instead of addressing the conditions which let it 
emerge and develop, namely the legal system.99 For Levi the ‘true social definition 
of ‘organised criminals’ [is] a set of people whom the police and other agencies of 
the State, regard or wish us to regard as “really dangerous” to its essential 
integrity.’100
 
From the perspective of identity and cultural theories organised crime can be 
interpreted as a display of cultural or identity aspirations (such as personal identity, 
e.g. masculinity, ethnic or national identity). It can be seen as a form of protection of 
the group/gang or individuals who claim to belong to a gang in order to survive in 
harsh social conditions (for example, teenager gangs, football hooligans, etc.).101 
Other empirical research on ethnic minorities and people from foreign ethnic origin 
has revealed, ‘situations where people manipulate ethnic reputations to protect, 
justify, or promote themselves’, including a false claim that they belong to an ethnic 
mafia.102 The socio-system and cultural-anthropological approach are useful 
especially because they help explain the limited success of fighting crime, but those 
approaches have difficulties explaining the internationalisation of crime. This is 
where the economic approach throws light on the durability of organised crime as it 
views the phenomenon as a driven by forces of demand and supply rather than being 
led by conspiracy, structure, or activities. To the extent that organised crime is seen 
as international, this is mainly linked to the high demand of illegal goods and 
services in the West, and the provision of some of these from the less developed 
countries. 
 
Organised crime as an economic phenomenon  
 
Economic analyses of organised crime view the phenomena as a result of pure 
economic choice. The economic analyses of organised crime have become very 
popular in recent years in both academic circles and among policy makers. The 
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 89
earliest academic studies of organised crime as an economic activity can be traced 
back to the late 1960s, in the USA, when the first assumptions were made about 
crime as business.103 The business approach to crime is appealing as it can explain 
both the activities of ‘organised crime’ as motivated simply by profit, and the nature 
of criminals as rational economic maximisers. Organised crime is perceived as an 
economic enterprise, involving all elements of the business activities such as existing 
structure, management, risk and profit evaluation, marketing, etc. Schelling argued 
that the defining feature of organised crime is the drive for exclusive management of 
the illegal markets, or monopoly. Quoting Mark Furtensberg he points out ‘it is well 
known that organised crime exists and thrives because it provides services the public 
demands. Organised crime depends not on victims, but on customers’.104 The 
economic approaches rarely make moral assessment of organised criminal behaviour 
for it perceives the organised criminal as people who rationally and normally 
calculate the risks and gains if committing crimes and thus maximise their 
‘preferences…like the rest of us’.105  
 
Some economists share the view that the existence of organised crime has a positive 
side. According to Buchanan, this is linked to the basic economic law of demand and 
supply and free competition. The imposition of monopoly in order to avoid the effect 
of competition on prices results in high prices in the provision of legal goods. But if 
we turn the argument on its head, he further argues, it would be socially desirable to 
support organised crime because: [i]f monopoly in the supply of ‘goods’ is socially 
undesirable, monopoly in the ‘bads’ should be socially desirable, precisely because 
of the output restriction’.106 Similar views are shared by other economists’ research 
on organised crime as profit-making activity. Thomas Schelling’s work for example, 
focuses on the monopolising tendencies of organised crime, and the aim of the 
criminal organisation is to acquire a rule-making role in a business or geographical 
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area, and the use of violence is dictated by the need for private protection as illegality 
of their activity prevents criminals from official protection from police and courts.107 
Schelling depicts the role of organised crime as ‘much closer to that of government 
establishing its own rules in the areas over which it extends its power’.108
 
The economic approach has been valued for many reasons but mainly because it 
encompasses all the other approaches and gives logical answers to questions raised 
by them, such as what the objectives of the organised criminal activity are, what the 
organisational features exist for, why certain individuals choose this type of 
behaviour. It also targets the inadequacies of the social and structural explanations 
for the existence of organised crime since the ‘organised crime’s objective does not 
differ from that of commercial organisations’.109 But use of economics in organised 
crime theory is limited and mainly linked to the American tradition. In Fiorentini and 
Peltzman’s view, this is because European economists are more wary of using 
rational choice models, which explain legal economic activity. If individuals’ 
behaviour in illegal activities is not ‘rational’ in the economic sense, it is more 
appropriately analysed through sociological theories of pathologies and deviance.110 
Moreover, the economic approach sits uneasily in the official views of organised 
crime. Although some of the official discussion admits the economic basis of the 
criminal behaviour it becomes problematic if organised crime is viewed as a rational 
choice inside the system. In official terms the problem has to be posed as a conflict 
of two conflicting rationales in which ‘criminal enterprises penetrate otherwise 
lawful business thus undermining and corrupting it’.111  
 
This discussion of the approaches to defining and understanding organised crime 
shows the very varied views on the nature and the extent of the phenomenon, all of 
which are open to criticism. What this means for the policy on organised crime is 
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that the simple transposition of these views into policy is problematic and often 
counterproductive, particularly if the policies target particular manifestations of 
organised crime.112 In the area of international relations such problems become more 
apparent due to the malfunctions of the simple export of policies from one legal 
sovereignty to another where the policy does not respond well to local conditions. 
 
3.5. Transnational organised crime and security  
 
The literature on new or soft security identifies organised crime, international or 
transnational, as a security threat but rarely explains the link between crime and 
security, and such a link is sometimes assumed as self-evident.113 On one hand, the 
difficulty of conceiving of crime as a cause or effect of complex socio-economic 
relations is also reflected in the attempt to rationalise international crime as a source 
of instability – a claim that is usually asserted but seldom analysed. On the other 
hand, there is a problem when theorising the international elements of crime vis-à-
vis international security as the latter is still a concept linked to relations between 
states. The threat crime poses to international security is therefore regarded as 
indirect: organised crime threatens the sovereign power of the state, weakens the 
state and this translates into ‘hard’ security issues such as civil wars.114 
Alternatively, crime can be an international problem by virtue of its existence in 
different states, i.e. states may share expertise and pull resources to fight the problem 
of crime with the need to identify links between their crime problems. Finally, crime 
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may transcend borders and pose risks to other states, which gets the theory back to 
the point where crime threatens the state internally. Such perspectives of crime as a 
threat of an international dimension but without a clear theoretical link to 
international relations is taken by a number of authors who develop an analysis of 
organised crime as a threat to state, national, and international security.115  
 
The concept of transnational organised crime however, seems to sit more 
comfortably in international relations theory and practice as it provides an alternative 
to the problematic concepts of international and national organised crimes. 
According to Jamieson ‘transnational crime is crime that violates the laws of more 
than one state. It is different from international crime – crime that is recognized as 
such under international law – and from domestic crime. Transnational crime tends 
to have its centers of operation where risks are low, and provides goods and services 
where profits are high. It exploits boundaries and jurisdictions as strategic 
advantages, unlike law enforcement, which is inhibited by them.’116 From this point 
of view, efforts to counter this ‘mobile’ crime are needed from all states in the world 
system as it poses a threat to all. Security of states and people are threatened not 
from other states, or indeed crime from other states, but by a ‘stateless’ transnational 
organised crime. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War transnational organised crime has been one of the 
central concepts replacing war on the security agenda and has even been called, on 
occasion, the ‘New Evil Empire’ which poses more danger to international security 
than anything the West had to face during the Cold War, i.e. the Soviet military and 
communism.117 At times the political and academic rhetoric has seemed 
unconstrained. Senator John Kerry stated: ‘[T]his is new. This is something that 
none of us has ever experienced before. It is not ideological. It has nothing to do 
with left or right, but it is money orientated, greed based criminal enterprise that has 
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decided to take on the lawful institutions and civilised society.’118 According to 
Shelley, ‘transnational organized crime will be one of the major problems facing 
policy makers in the 21st century. It will be a defining issue of the 21st century as 
the Cold War was for the 20th century and colonialism was for the 19th. No area of 
international affairs will remain untouched as political and economic systems and the 
social fabric of many countries will deteriorate under the increasing financial power 
of international organized crime groups.’119 Transnational organised crime is also 
one of the ten threats identified by the High Level Threat Panel of the United 
Nations; it is part of the discussion on G8/7 meetings, the Council of Europe, OSCE, 
EU, NATO and a number of regional organisations.  
 
Transnational organised crime is seen as a threat to developed countries, which often 
represent the market or the receiving side of criminal goods and services, facilitated 
by increased travel and intensified international trade in the age of globalisation. 
Furthermore, the West is seen to be ‘threatened’ by the penetration of foreign mafias, 
and individual criminals via illegal immigration. During the 1990s there was a 
growing fear linked to the spread of ‘new’ Eastern Mafias in the West, especially the 
Russian organised crime, but also traditional ethnic organised crime such as the 
Italian Mafia, Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, the Columbian cartels, and 
Nigerian criminal organisations. The international illegal activities were mainly 
trafficking of illegal drugs (mainly heroin from Asia, cocaine from Latin America 
and marihuana from Northern Africa), arms trafficking (particularly to rogue states 
in the Third World), trafficking of nuclear material, trafficking of people 
(particularly women for sexual exploitation), and sometimes cyber and financial 
crimes across borders. According to Galeotti,  
 
If organised crime is in many ways a corollary of modernisation, so 
globalisation begets transnational crime. This poses its own problems in 
policing, controlling borders and protecting national economies. 
However, it is also important to conceive this as a soft security issue. 
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Transnational crime can emerge in the form of linkages between local 
gangs, dealing across borders to maximise their profits while minimising 
their losses, just as many licit companies do. However – again, as in the 
legal, ‘upperworld’ economy – it can also involve penetration by foreign 
enterprises, whose power and effectiveness allows them to take over or 
destroy local rivals. This carries with it a series of potential dangers, 
from the destabilising influence of ‘invading’ criminal groups to the 
possible colonisation of a nation’s underworld by gangs based abroad.120  
 
However, in the light of our previous analysis it is important to consider this issue 
more calmly. The idea of transnational crime as a distinctive phenomenon and its 
interpretation as a security threat, as well the policies on international and European 
level which this view has informed, are open to more criticism.121 First, the 
difficulties of defining organised crime are ‘reproduced’ in theorising transnational 
organised crime. As the previous section discussed the further up and away from 
territory one attempts to defined organised crime (i.e. from the local to national to 
international level) the more problems one finds in establishing existing organisation. 
Labelling certain activity as ‘transnational organised crime’ could be simply a matter 
of fashion, which according to Hobbs expresses ‘both the concept's global nature and 
the redundancy of any perception of organised crime that does not embrace the 
centrality of transnationality...yet this trend persists without the hindrance of 
empirical evidence’.122 Hobbs and others even question the use of the abstract term 
‘transnational’ in defining organised crime: 
 
‘Transnational’ is especially problematic in referring to OC, as it is a term 
that normally relates to cross border activity involving the explicit 
exclusion of the state… The relationship between the State and serious 
crime is now established as so varied and indeed ambiguous that the term 
‘transnational organised crime’ has only some meaning if situated within 
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the political science inspired moral panic that have emerged as a response 
to the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc and found a home within the 
budget wars of declining western states.123
 
For Ruggiero much of the debate on transnational crime in the West is fed by 
‘conspiracy theories’ and the reinvention of the alien threat and challenges most 
assumptions made about the threat posed by transnational organised crime by 
comparing it to legal economic activities. He concludes, ‘organised crime may learn 
criminal techniques from fraudulent white collars rather than teaching them such 
techniques’.124 This type of crime is not conducted by powerful, centralised, 
coordinated organisations but dispersed and diverse social actors. Therefore, he 
argues, transnational organised crime is not more dangerous to population or state 
than other criminal activity.  
 
From the area of study of policing within criminology, Sheptycki launches an even 
stronger attack on the transnational crime agenda which he labels ‘transnational folk 
devils’, a largely exaggerated threat of an internationally manifested crime which 
does not explain the rise of international policing and security structures ‘when most 
crime is local in character…[and] most police work is grounded in relatively small 
geographical locales’.125 What transnational anti-crime policies seem to be 
concerned with is not international crime (which is ‘not the looming monster feared 
by some’) per se but ‘market crimes’, i.e. supply of illegal services and products. 
Translated onto the international economic arena, this means that anti-crime policies 
could target some more than others as ‘the only market niche open to some 
entrepreneurs in some regions is unseemly, to say the least: immigrant labour, white 
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slavery, weapons, plutonium, toxic waste, drugs, stolen cars.’126 The way organised 
crime ‘functions as a marker in the redefinition of internal and external security 
concepts’ has helped re-produce the Iron Curtain ‘between the poorer ‘source’ 
countries...and the richer ‘destination’ countries’127  
 
This theme is further explored by Edwards and Gill who point out that the post-Cold 
War policy shift to transnational organised crime was based on a ‘narrated’, populist 
threat from either the ‘criminologies of the other’ (i.e. crime coming from outside 
from ‘ethnic’ outsiders) or the ‘criminologies of the self’ (crime caused by the 
internal dynamics of market societies).128 The term ‘transnational organised crime’ 
therefore is not a distinctive phenomenon but an amalgam of different views and 
opinions of what could otherwise be termed ‘ordinary crime’ linked by a loose and 
very ad hoc based network which at some point crosses borders.129 The extent to 
which these networks are a threat to security is a subjective interpretation. Their 
containment however is very difficult because of the symbiotic nature of legal-illegal 
markets, and therefore policy is pushed to areas and methods, which do not clash 
with other concerns. This has encouraged externalisation of transnational organised 
crime policy and theory, which draws attention to ‘supply’ side, i.e. immigrant 
communities or weaker non-Western states. 
 
For the non-Western world the threat of transnational organised crime is defined 
along different lines. It is usually linked to the theory of weak or failed states and 
therefore remains state-centred and internal, i.e. crime can threaten states’ and 
therefore international stability. According to Dupont, the argument that transnational 
organised crime as a threat to international security rests on four propositions: 
 
                                                 
126 J. Sheptycki, ‘Policing, postmodernism and transnationalization’ British Journal of Criminology, 
1998, vol.3, no.3, pp.485-503, p. 494. 
127 M. Den Boer, ‘The European Union and Organized Crime: Fighting a New Enemy with Many 
Tentacles’ in E. Viano, ed., Global Organized Crime and International Security, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 1999. 
128 This has translated into a significant policy changes such as developing an external dimension to 
crime policy, and an internal shift from previous sovereign (commanding) to now regulatory (steering) 
government. A. Edwards & P. Gill, ‘The politics of ‘transnational organized crime’: discourse, 
reflexivity and the narration of ‘threat’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2002, 
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 245-270, p. 251.
129 K. Gachevska, ‘Goodfellas against Godfathers: the fictional character of European Policing and 
European Crime’ in European Studies Conference Proceedings. Rousse Bulgaria: University of 
Rousse Press, 2008. 
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1) Transnational organised crime can be a direct threat to the political 
sovereignty of the state because it can be powerful enough to 
undermine the legitimacy of governments as it may ‘challenge the 
monopoly over taxation and violence traditionally enjoyed by the state 
and work at cross purposes to the aim of good government, which is to 
protect the rights, property, welfare, and security of its citizens’.130  
 
2) It can pose a threat to state economy and economic security, especially 
in ‘developing states or so-called economies in transition…because 
individuals and elites become habituated to working outside the 
regulatory environment and the rule of law, weakening state capacity’. 
This is also linked to the problem of corruption. 
 
3) Transnational criminal enterprises can become so powerful as to pose a 
threat to global security because it can ‘subvert the norms and 
institutions that underpin global order and the society of states’.  
 
4) Transnational organised crime can have a military and strategic 
dimension: ‘revolutionary political movements and insurgent groups 
sometimes turn to crime to finance their operations.131 In the process, 
their original political goals and motivations become subordinated to 
their illicit money making activities’. 132 
 
This cause-effect link, which is made between crime and state instability, resembles 
a similar belief of crime being caused by moral deficiencies in individuals. Internal 
policy informed by this belief has aimed at ‘re-assertion of moral authority and ‘zero 
                                                 
130 Similar view is shared by Mary Kaldor who claims that crime undermines states which then leads 
to more crime. M. Kaldor, ‘Cosmopolitanism and organised violence’ Paper presented at Conference 
on ‘Conceiving Cosmopolitanism’, 2000, April 27-29, 2000, Warwick. 
131 According to Kaldor, crime is endemic to contemporary conflicts ‘characterized by a rise in crime, 
so that often it is difficult to distinguish between criminal and political violence.’ M. Kaldor, 1999, 
op.cit.,  p. vii; see also R. T. Naylor, ‘The insurgent economy: black market operations of guerrilla 
organizations’, Crime Law and Social Change, 1993, vol. 20, pp.13-51, and A. Jamieson, 2001, op.cit.  
132 A. Dupont, ‘Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia’ Asian Survey 1999, vol. 39, 
no.3, pp. 433-455. In Dupont’s opinion all these dangers associated with TOC, and particularly the 
military dimension, blurs ‘the distinction between military and law enforcement issues and changing 
the way security is conceived.’ In a similar line, Andreas and Price identify this as ‘domestication of 
international space’ by the USA. Andreas and Price, 2001, op.cit.  
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tolerance’ for those who transgress this authority’. Western policies towards such 
states range from aggression (i.e. US drugs war in Latin America) to aid 
conditionality (US and EU policies in 1990s), accession conditionality (EU towards 
Central and Eastern European candidates), institutional reform (EU in the Balkan 
protectorates).133
 
The experience from previous internalisation of anti-crime policies has not always 
been positive for the recipient or targeted countries. Burger’s study on the 
international anti-drug policy and international relations is indicative. First, the 
interpretation of illicit activities as a threat to the state can and has reinforced 
undemocratic regimes. Suppressed minorities are also deprived of a potential source 
of income, which may prevent their elimination or assimilation, and in this way anti-
drug policies have reinforced social inequality. Secondly, as far as economic security 
is concerned, the profits from the drug trade could serve as a relief from the state’s 
external debt and thus promote more autonomy and financial independence: ‘Illicit 
drug profit can be considered a new form of economic assistance from the First to the 
Third World. The transfer of wealth is neither controlled by the First world in terms 
of its use, nor has to be paid back with interest’.134 Thirdly, traffickers working for 
private profit ‘need the stability of government in order to operate smoothly’ and 
they have no interest in challenging the status quo and the state. When the traffickers 
are ‘public and political’ then their goal is legitimacy and participation in decision 
circles’ and they will not necessarily challenge the state. Fourthly, the extent to 
which an international anti-crime regime can be built is dubious as states may adopt 
certain behaviours proscribed by Western-led normative regimes because they need 
to legitimise themselves as ‘modern’ and the adoption of these norms is largely 
rhetorical.135 Additionally, as Burger points out ‘regimes regulate governments, not 
                                                 
133 In fact, the biggest militarisation of the war on drugs in Latin America came after the end of the 
Cold War, with the invasion of Panama, Plan Colombia, and increased use of US military advisors 
and aid for internal fight against drug traffickers.  
134 Some Latin American countries are heavily dependent on drug money such as Bolivia or Peru, 
where the cocaine agribusiness is the largest agricultural business. 
135 The internationalisation of the anti-drug regime by US foreign policy since the 1960s has been very 
problematic and European and Latin American state did not always comply for internal or foreign 
policy reasons. This regime has also aimed at non-western drug production and has thus caused 
protests from developing states about double standards. It has often excluded measures on production 
and export of drugs (such as amphetamines) and drug precursors produced in the West. E. A. 
Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society’ International 
Organization, 1990, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 479-526. 
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individuals’ and the effect of the international anti-crime regime may be limited 
especially compared to ‘hard security’ regulation.136 Therefore such failures may in 
fact increase inter-state antagonisms. On the other hand, if the policies disseminated 
by an international anti-crime regime are state-based and repressive, they may cause 
more damage than crime itself. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
The rise of non-traditional, or non-military and non-state based threats such as 
organised crime has been accompanied by new theoretical developments in the area 
of security studies and international relations. The main idea of the new readings of 
security is that the old and anachronistic state-based theories are inadequate to 
explain change and are therefore subjective and restrictive theoretically and 
politically. The new security theories suggest a more emancipated reading of 
security, which takes into account many other factors apart from (or even dismissing) 
states’ self-interest which used to define the views and ‘reality’ of international 
relations. Instead of viewing traditional security as a way of limiting the negative 
effect of the international system, these theories suggest that this type of security 
fails to deliver what it intends to, i.e. the security of the world or the individuals in it. 
In this way security is seen as a depoliticised concept linked to governance instead of 
sovereignty.  
 
A more emancipated view of security suggests looking at the ‘real’ threats to 
people’s security, including the issue of crime. Crime is identified as a universal 
threat, which challenges both the core referent object of security, the individual, but 
also the stability of the state, and the stability of the international system. The 
problem of crime is seen as new or increased due to the globalisation processes, and 
the demise of the war as the central obsession of international relations, has finally 
opened the possibility to deal with this danger. 
 
                                                 
136 A. Burger, ‘Conundrum: Illicit Narcotics and theoretical Approaches in International Politics’ 
Paper presented at International Studies Association 40th Annual Convention, Washington D.C., 
February 16-20 1999, Columbia International Affairs Online [online] www.ciaonet.org; accessed 
29/01/2003. 
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The merger of both views of organised crime as a localised threat and global security 
through destabilisation of states has developed into the idea of transnational 
organised crime as a threat to global security which requires the effort of all states 
and actors against these ‘sovereign-free’ criminal actors in the international arena. 
However, the organised crime threat is only ‘new’ in that it cannot be perceived 
through the traditional prism of international security as conflict between state 
entities. The long tradition of criminological literature devoted to the study of 
organised crime reveals a number of problems in perceiving this social phenomenon 
as a threat, particularly one that exists independently of a complex of social relations. 
 
This puts analysis of the role of organised crime in the development of the EU 
accession processes in a difficult situation. During the Cold War the focus on hard 
security and conventional threats to peace involved a comparatively clear perception 
of what the threat was and how it could be measured and dealt with as well as what 
its underlying causes were. There were, of course, huge debates over detail as each 
side sought to measure each others weaponry and its destructive power. Nonetheless 
in principle an armed state threat was a threat, a soldier was a soldier, a tank a tank 
and an ABM an ABM. Indeed in the calculation of mutually assured destruction the 
presumption was that threat and force could be neatly calibrated. With the shift to 
soft security concerns this relative certainty disappeared. The nature of the threat of 
organised crime, its definition, scale and causes are all much more ambiguous. 
Incorporating the ‘organised crime threat’ into the area of international relations and 
regional organisation therefore might have been expected to create new levels of 
confusion. But, as in the domestic sphere, it can be argued that this discussion 
operated at a tangent to the social reality of organised crime, which is also reflected 
in the policies developed to counter the problem. By adopting the non-military, soft 
security approach in international relations, the European Union was promoted as 
having an added value of post-modern, post-national level of policy dissemination 
but it has instead risked reproducing the nation-state’s policies of control on a 
supranational level. This, as the next chapters will show, may not have made the 
Union closer to the people but has perhaps helped to widen the gap between the 
people and the new structures of governance developing within the state. 
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Chapter 4. Organised Crime in Europe and the Emergence of the EU’s Internal 
Security Governance 
  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed how during the 1990s organised crime became an 
issue of international politics through the expansion and modification of the 
international security concept. Organised crime appeared on the agendas of many 
international organisations and forums, in the foreign, as well as domestic, policies of 
all Western and some non-Western states. For most of these actors, organised crime 
was a new area of activity although the issue of organised crime had long been 
present in the public discourse of some states, such the US, Italy, and in Latin 
America. For most of the world, however, organised crime was not something with 
which states and societies identified. Nonetheless, the history of international 
relations throughout the twentieth century was very much a history of establishing 
international rules and regulations, many of which effectively created new crimes or 
spread norms in the area of crime on a global scale.1 This chapter discusses the EU 
anti-crime policies in the context of previous attempts to address crime 
internationally. The chapter’s aim is to analyse the continuity and change in these 
international anti-crime policies and identify the novelties, which the EU has 
introduced, to counter the security risk posed by ‘organised crime’ since the end of 
the Cold War.  
 
The structure of the chapter is built around three main issues: the rise of the 
organised crime discourse in Europe in the 1990s, the subsequent rush to measure 
and define organised crime as a common European problem, and the process by 
which the EU became involved in the emerging international regime of organised 
crime fighting and developed its internal security policy through the Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) pillar and extended it beyond its borders. The argument of this 
chapter builds around the increased attention to crime in Western Europe in the 
                                                 
1 For example, the illegal drug trade, football hooliganism, terrorism, war crimes. Responses include 
the establishment of Interpol in 1923, UN anti-drug efforts, international or bi- and multi-lateral 
agreements on extradition, asylum, prohibition of torture, European initiatives against terrorist 
upsurges in the 1920s and the 1970s, to mention a few. 
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aftermath of the Cold War, the way the problem was perceived, defined and 
internationalised via the European Union and myriad European policy makers, civil 
society actors, governments and international organisations. The EU policy on crime 
built on these complex networks and but also on previously existing structures 
created by efforts to promote international cooperation in criminal matters. The 
chapter traces the peculiar evolution of these efforts, which remained separate from 
the Union’s supranational level of governance before and after 1989 due to 
restrictions of state sovereignty, but morphed into forms of EU-level law 
enforcement institutions such as Europol and Eurojust. The 1990s intensive policy of 
criminal justice cooperation within the EU motivated by perceived rise of organised 
crime did not manage to overcome problems of multiple jurisdictions, different 
interests and clash of institutional competences, and issues of national sovereignty 
and democratic accountability, all of which made the efforts to promote law 
enforcement beyond national borders very difficult. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of how the external dimension of the anti-crime agenda grew in 
importance within a complex system of internal security governance.  
 
4.2. The Rise of an Organised Crime Discourse in Europe 
 
Before the 1990s the problem of crime was on the agenda of organisations like the 
UN, or the Council of Europe but it was conceived mainly as a common social 
problem which member states faced and not an international security issue. Whereas 
terrorism and the international drug-trade became subjects of conventions and further 
regulation, they were not conceived as part of an international conspiracy in the way 
that drug trafficking and Al Qaeda are seen today. Pre-1990s international activity on 
crime involved mainly ‘reactive responses to crises’ in Western European states and 
did not lead to the formulation of any pro-active international policy.2 Furthermore, 
before the 1990s there was no specific focus or even commonly agreed concept of 
organised crime in international agreements.3 There had been some discussions of 
                                                 
2 F. Heidensohn, ‘Introduction. Convergence, diversity and change’ in F. Heidenson & M. Farrel eds., 
Organised Crime in Europe, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 3-13, p. 6. 
3 American foreign policy has been active in promoting its anti-drug agenda internationally and that 
has included using international forums such as the UN, but organised crime as the structure that 
carries out that trade has not featured in UN agreements. There were a few documents accepted by the 
UN such as the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) and Convention against the Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) but both have no mention of organised crime. 
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organised crime within the Council of Europe and the European Parliament before 
the 1990s but their reports dealt neither with the extent or nature of organised crime 
in Europe, nor with the legal arrangements concerning this type of crime.4 In the 
Eastern bloc organised crime was not considered a problem by the authorities before 
1989 either.5 Organised crime, or the Mafia, was associated with Italy and the Italian 
Diaspora in the USA and most countries did not define their underworld as organised 
crime. 
 
However, since the mid-1990s, Europe has come to be regarded as ‘a single area of 
operation of transnational criminal activity’6 and ‘a prime target for organised 
crime’.7 This increased attention to organised crime had started in the 1980s due to 
American cultural and political influence as well as some international investigations 
of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).8 Academic research on this 
kind of crime, on the other hand, was very limited and dated from the 1970s, with the 
exception of some studies on the Italian Mafia and British serious criminals 
conducted in the 1980s.9 The first attempts to conceptualise an international anti-
                                                                                                                                          
However, the UN successfully criminalized non-authorized production and trade in narcotics since the 
1960s but this in effect resulted in increase of the trade and modification of drugs. The organisation 
was also active in the pre-1990s international regime against terrorism and political violence but most 
of its documents concerning organised crime (including corruption, trafficking, etc.) were adopted in 
the 1990s and 2000s.  
4 C. Fijnaut, ‘Police Cooperation within Western Europe’ in F. Heidenson & M. Farrel eds., 
Organised Crime in Europe London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 103-120.  
5 E. Bienkowska, ‘Crime in eastern Europe’ in F. Heidenson & M. Farrel eds., Organised Crime in 
Europe, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 43-54. 
6 K. von Lampe, ‘Recent German Publications on Organised Crime’ (no date) [online] 
http://www.organized-crime.de/corevess.htm , accessed 31/08/2008. Von Lampe gives a brief review 
of the German publications on organised crime, mainly from the 1990s. According to von Lampe: 
‘Since the 1960s, the German debate on organized crime has gone through roughly three stages. 
Originally, organized crime was viewed as more or less an endemic problem in the U.S. and Italy, but 
one largely confined to those nations. From the mid 1970s to late 1980s, police officials pressed for a 
uniquely German understanding of organized crime, independent of the Mafia paradigm. Since 1990, 
the debate appears to have come full circle in that attention is once again focused upon foreign crime 
syndicates and ‘Mafias.’ Ibid. 
7 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003 
[online] 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf accessed 20/12/2008. 
8 The fascination with a ‘global mafia’ was partly triggered by Claire Sterling’s book on the 
international links of the Italian and other Mafias, which had used evidence collected by DEA. 
Sterling went on to achieve international popularity with her work on the similarly ‘global’ terrorist 
networks. C. Sterling, The Mafia. HarperCollins Publishers: London, 1990. Sterling made popular the 
notion of the ‘French connection’ and the ‘Bulgarian connection’ in the trade of heroin from the Asia 
through Europe to the US.  
9 C. Fijnaut, ‘Researching Organized Crime’ in R. Morgan ed., Policing Organised Crime and Crime 
Prevention British Criminology Conference, 1989, vol. 4, Bristol and Bath Centre for Criminal 
Justice, pp. 75-85. 
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organised crime policy in Europe in the late 1980s were very hesitant and conscious 
of the American experience. In 1989 Fijnault, warned: ‘At the moment the European 
situation is rather like the situation in the United States in the 1960s. The policy 
which is developed on a national and international level usually lacks a firm 
empirical basis. Usually it is only dictated by the strong opinions of experienced 
police officers, public rumours, sensational incidents and, of course, electoral 
interests. This would not matter if nothing is at stake.. [but] the ungovernable fight 
against organized crime will lead to radical changes in the administration of criminal 
justice and in the principles and rules of penal law.’10  
 
These concerns were raised in relation to the late 1980s ideas of criminal justice 
cooperation within the European Communities, discussed in response to negative 
public opinion regarding the integration process and the free movement of people 
with the associated removal of border checks among some of the member states.11 
This was caused by political necessity as there was no evidence to suggest that 
borders have ever effectively thwarted crime linked to international demand-supply 
networks, and crime in Europe appears in some senses to have known no frontiers 
even before these were formally abolished.12 Europe was considered a unified space 
for illegal trade for a long period of time, long before the EU embarked on building 
the single market and free movement with the Single European Act of 1986.13 On the 
other hand, as Paul Wiles points out ‘worries about order and the basis for social 
trust have also been present in most late modern societies and debates about crime 
                                                 
10 Fijnault, for example, points out that the strict border controls existed only in theory and were 
concerned with the transportation of goods, capital and services, and their enforcement was very 
limited when it came to movement of people. Border controls could not stop the movement of 
terrorists between some European countries in the 1970s, for example and their efficiency for 
prevention of this and other types of organised criminality proved insufficient to justify their 
continuation once they started to hinder the development of the (legal) common market. C. Fijnault, 
1989, ibid., p. 76. 
11 M. LeBeuf, ‘On Organized Crime and Police Cooperation in the European Union – Lessons 
Learned. An Interview with Professor Cyrille Fijnault’, Trends in Organized Crime, 2002, vol. 7, 
no.4, pp.55-72; also C. Fijnault, 1991, op.cit.  
12 C. Fijnaut, 1991, op.cit.  
13 Fijnaut argues member states were aware of the complexity of this issue: ‘[O]rganized crime…is 
always regarded as crime that is organized internationally. To the extent, however, that organized 
crime involves, above all, the supply of illegal goods (whether it be drugs or cigarettes or alcohol) 
and/or illicit services (prostitution, gambling) in black markets, it is a problem that, almost by 
definition, is international by nature. Yet this dimension relates primarily to the transportation of these 
good and services to the markets where they are distributed… Organized crime, as most member 
states know it, is, for the most part not international in nature but a local problem’. C. Fijnaut, 2001, 
op.cit, p. 279. 
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and penal policy are often used to symbolise these broader concerns.’14 The plans to 
remove border controls within the European Communities were bound to raise such 
concerns and therefore a common law enforcement policy was discussed in the late 
1980s as a compensatory measure in the Single European Act.15 A seminar on 
European Security and Transnational Organised Crime, organised by the European 
Commission acknowledged the difficulties of defining and measuring the extent of 
the problem but concluded that:  
 
No matter what the precise magnitude of the problem is in objective 
terms, EU policy-makers need to be aware that the very perception that 
illicit trade is on the rise could have serious repercussions for the EU’s 
ability to maintain its economic policy stance: The EU’s economic 
openness could be seriously undermined if trade were perceived to be 
substantially subverted by organised crime – especially if economic 
integration of transactions in goods, services, capital and the growing 
mobility of people were seen as main factors contributing to the rise of 
illicit activities of transnational criminal organisations.16
 
In a self-perpetuating fashion in the course of the 1990s organised crime started to 
feature on the pages of major European newspapers, academic and non-governmental 
research, as well as political documents of parties and governments. The emergence 
of this new interest in organised crime in the 1990s can be illustrated and measured 
using some simple bibliometric techniques. According to online data English 
language publications presented in Table 4.1, which contain the phrase ‘organised 
crime’ or the ‘mafia’ before the 1990s were mainly American (they appeared to be 
around 4 times more than British English publications).17 There was a sharp rise of 
non-US publications on organised crime in the 1980s, and all publications more than 
doubled in number by 2004 compared to the 1970s. Data from the online edition of 
the British daily newspaper The Guardian, presented in Table 4.2, shows a very low  
                                                 
14 P. Wiles, ‘Crime Control and Integration’ in K. Aromaa & S. Nevala eds., 2003, op.cit., pp. 10-17. 
15 These plans were later re-sold as forms of deepening the level of political integration within the EU. 
16 European Commission, ‘Conclusions. Summary of Main Findings of the Seminar’ in Illicit Trade 
and Organised Crime- New Threats to Economic Security, European Commission, Directorate-
General for External Relations, 2000, p. 20. 
17The distinction is made by using different spelling: American ‘organized’ and European/UK 
‘organised’. 
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 Table 4.1. Frequency of occurrence of ‘organised crime’ phrase in English 
language publications.18
 
 US ‘Organized crime’ UK ‘Organised crime’ Mafia 
1970-1974 1162 283 998 
1975-1979 1112 265 970 
1980-1984 1223 431 1010 
1985-1989 1573 445 1258 
1990-1994 1882 572 1650 
1995-1999 1950 658 2244 
2000-2004 2538 768 2228 
 
Table 4.2. Publications in the Guardian newspaper which contain the phrase 
‘organised crime’ or Mafia. 19
 
 Organised crime  Mafia 
 
 
 
 
• 1992 (1) 
• 1993 (0) 
• 1994 (2) 
• 1995 (0) 
• 1996 (0) 
• 1997 (2) 
• 1998 (10) 
• 1999 (193) 
• 2000 (173) 
• 2001 (207) 
• 2002 (184) 
• 2003 (232) 
• 2004 (296) 
• 2005 (280) 
• 2006 (383) 
• 2007 (364) 
• 1986 (1) 
• 1989 (3) 
• 1990 (2) 
• 1991 (1) 
• 1992 (3) 
• 1993 (4) 
• 1994 (6) 
• 1995 (2) 
• 1996 (1) 
• 1997 (1) 
• 1998 (15) 
• 1999 (453) 
• 2000 (379) 
• 2001 (398) 
• 2002 (346) 
• 2003 (397) 
• 2004 (308) 
• 2005 (326) 
• 2006 (380) 
• 2007 (416) 
 
                                                 
18 It includes both US and UK publications, and those published in other states in English. The data 
was collected by an online search using www.googlebooks.com. The search was performed on 20th 
August 2008. 
19 Data was gathered on 20th August 2008 from the online archive of the Guardian Unlimited at 
www.guardian.co.uk. 
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occurrence of the phrase ‘organised crime’ or the word Mafia before 1999 when 
there is a sharp increase from 1-15 publications to hundreds of articles containing the 
phrases after the New Labour government prioritised organised crime in domestic 
policy and the EU intensified its policy on organised crime after 1997/8. 
 
Once the issue of organised crime began to appear more frequently in the public 
domain, it naturally attracted the attention of policy makers who also funded 
academic research. Organised crime started to appear in academic literature and 
international conferences. Organised crime had all the attributes to become an 
international issue according to theories of ‘issue emergence’ in international 
politics. It was: 1) identified as a problem; 2) defined as an international issue; 3) its 
nature violated key social norms; 4) seen as a threat to security; 5) endorsed by pre-
existing structures and promoted by key international players.20 Added to this was 
organised crime’s ability to fill in part of the gap left by the decline of the Soviet 
threat and its merger with ‘new security’ discourse discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
From the 1990s and especially after the UN embraced organised crime as an 
international issue in 1994 and adopted its Convention against Transnational 
organised Crime in 2000, a number of international organisations have included 
organised crime or related issues in their agendas: United Nations, African Union, 
American Bar Association – rule of law and regional criminal justice (focus on 
organised crime), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – OC, Council of 
Europe, International Crisis Group, International Monetary Fund (IMF) – anti-money 
laundering and corruption, NATO, G8 Summits, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe – 
organised crime as a main area of activity (SPOC – Stability Pact on Organised 
Crime), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – arms control, 
terrorism, border management, policing, anti-trafficking (listed as ‘human 
dimension’), Organisation of American States, Council of the Baltic States, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development – fraud and corruption, Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation – organised crime as a main policy area, etc.  
 
                                                 
20 C. Carpenter, ‘Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorising Issue Emergence and Non emergence in 
Transnational Advocacy Networks’, International Studies Quarterly, 2007, vol. 51, pp. 99-120. 
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The interest in organised crime was generic rather than Europe-specific but the 
European Union became one of the main enforcers of the new anti-crime norms 
developed by this framework of agencies.21 The European Union promoted its 
unique role as a leader of a new integrated approach in the fight against organised 
crime: ‘only the use of targeted and co-ordinated strategies in the field of prevention, 
reduction and combating organised crime as a whole will achieve this goal. These 
strategies have to be built on partnerships between the criminal justice system, public 
administration, scientific community, society and private industry.’22  
 
This produced the side effect of European states redefining their internal crime 
problem through the organised crime paradigm. Before the 1990s, as Paoli and 
Fijnault note: ‘the scientific communities, political leadership and public opinions of 
virtually all European countries aside from Italy considered themselves largely 
unaffected by organised crime.’23 During the 1990s states within the EU and those 
linked to the EU through the process of accession identified an organised crime 
problem albeit of a different extent. The available collected statistical information on 
crime in Europe shows that the level of recorded (general) crime in Western 
European states had been stable in 1990s but the proportion of ‘organised crime’ 
increased as a result of the new attention this type of crime began receiving from the 
end of the 1980s.24 The crime statistics reflected a shift of focus in criminal justice 
policies in Europe to ‘more serious crime’ such as drug trafficking and other forms 
of organised crime. There was a growing fear that organised crime or organised 
criminal groups were taking advantage of barrier removal and differences in 
                                                 
21 Furthermore, there was a particular interest in organised crime and related issues in European 
organisations, and especially those linked to Eastern and South-eastern Europe which list organised 
crime as a main area of activity. 
22 European Commission Staff Working Paper: Joint report from Commission services and 
EUROPOL ‘Towards a European strategy to prevent organised crime’, Brussels, 13.03.2001, 
SEC(2001) 433. 
23 L. Paoli & C. Fijnault, ‘Organised Crime and Its Control Policies’, European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2006, vol. 14, no. 3, pp.307-327. 
24 According to the EU statistics agency Eurostat statistics on crime in Europe for 2007 the data for 
core 14 EU Members shows that crime rose with 0.6% in the period between 1995 and 2005, with a 
peak in 2002 and downward trend since that year. According the Eurostat findings, the types of crime 
on the increase were robbery, violent crime and drug trafficking. The crimes which have been on 
decrease are domestic burglary, homicide and motor vehicle theft. This was the first crime data 
published by Eurostat as the agency did not collect data on crime within the EU until the Hague 
Programme adopted by the European Council in 2004 which proposed that Eurostat should establish 
European instruments for collecting, analysing and comparing information on crime and victimisation 
using national statistics and other sources of information.  
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domestic legislation in Europe which was increasingly merging into a single market 
for legal but also illegal goods and services. To some, the very existence of the 
European Union ‘with its rules and aims, is itself a push factor to the spreading of 
organised crime’.25 In the course of the 1990s therefore the issue of organised crime 
moved from perceptions to an argued observable and measurable reality. 
 
4.3. Assessing and defining organised Crime in Europe  
 
The attempts to measure and assess organised crime in the EU exposed a number of 
practical problems for the development of a common policy. Apart from the usual 
methodological difficulties of detecting, measuring and recording organised crime, 
the first attempts to depict the organised crime situation in the whole of Europe were 
obstructed by the different types of national legislation and policing which made any 
comparative criminological survey a very complicated, if not impossible, task. The 
different EU members had different ways of recording and interpreting crime and 
organised crime in the different countries and did not even have a structure for 
national collection of intelligence on organised crime.26 The data varied depending 
on the domestic legislation, the practice of police recording or theoretical approaches 
                                                 
25 E. Savona, ‘Recent trends of organised crime in Europe: Actor, Activities and Policies Against 
Them’, Paper presented at UNAFEI 108th international seminar, Japan 1998. Savona also points at the 
direct role that the EU plays in the development of organised crime rings on its territory. He argues 
that the fraud business affecting the European Communities had led to the set up of ‘extensive 
organised crime networks… which have grown into well-established criminal trading communities’ in 
certain European countries, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy. Ibid. Fijnaut 
however who does not deny the existence of the EU fraud phenomena still doubts the extent of the 
penetration of large-scale EC fraud by organised crime and even its financial consequences for the 
EC. C. Fijnaut, ‘Transnational Organized Crime and Institutional Reform in the European Union: The 
Case of Judicial Cooperation’ in P. Williams & D. Vlassis eds., Combating Transnational Crime – 
Concepts, Activities and Responses, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 276 – 301. 
26 This problem is described by van der Heijden: ‘In Belgium, only the data of one of the three types 
of police, the Gendarmerie, were available. In Germany each State Criminal Police Office 
(Landeskriminalamt) of the sixteen federal states prepared a situation report on organised crime for 
the respective Federal state on the basis of an outline developed by a national commission which 
served as its contribution to the 1994 Situation Report in the Federal Republic of Germany… In the 
UK, information on ethnic groups involved in organised crime is available on a national level along 
with specific data on a number of core individuals, but at that point in time there was no way to 
establish the number of organised crime groups in a manner similar to other EU member states. In the 
UK and in the Netherlands the national reports were based on criminal intelligence data, which can be 
described as 'soft', while other member states use 'hard' data derived from formal protocols or crime 
statistics. Some countries included information on dismantled groups in their national reports, while 
other member states only provided information on active criminal groups’. T. van der Heijden, 
‘Measuring Organized crime in Western Europe’ in Policing In Central And Eastern Europe: 
Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Experience from the West, College of Police and Security 
Studies, Slovenia, 1996 [online] http://www.ncjrs.org/policing/mea313.htm accessed 19/10/2001. 
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and influences.27 As a result, much of the official documentation dealing with 
organised crime in Europe represents the phenomena from a national rather than a 
European perspective.28  
 
This problem became obvious with the first attempt to measure organised crime in 
Europe made in 1994. A questionnaire containing six questions about the organised 
crime situation in each respective country in 1993 was sent to the EU member states 
but quickly showed odd results, such as Italy reporting four organised crime groups, 
and the Netherlands reporting 321 organised crime groups.29 It appeared that Italy, 
traditionally associated with the Mafia had a smaller problem with organised crime 
than the Netherlands. The numbers did not reflect the same reality of organised 
criminal groups which in the Netherlands are rather smaller and loosely knit 
compared to the Italian type of criminal organisation, and they do not appropriate 
territory and use much less violence. As far as the political and economic power of 
the criminal groups is concerned this is only to be found in Italy, where it is believed 
to have ‘a grip’ on policies and public administration, and controls significant sectors 
of the economy.30  
 
                                                 
27 This is also valid for all crime statistics. According to Paul Wiles, director of Research, 
Development and Statistics at the Home Office, UK, the level of crime and criminal/penal policy 
varies significantly across Europe and it is not clear to what extent these differences occur because of 
recording practices, or they reflect different level of crime. One of the main differences in crime 
recording practices amongst the European countries is that ‘in some countries a crime is recorded at 
the point when a victim reports a crime to the police but in others at the point of arrest or charge.’ 
Furthermore, Wiles points out that not all police forces record crime in the same way and the rules of 
what crimes are to be recorded change which may change crime figures. In England and Wales for 
example, the desire to serve the public better has ironically led to a rise of recorded crime rate as the 
introduction of a new uniform standard in 2001 required the recording of all crimes (‘no matter how 
trivial’ so that the government would be aware of the crime situation in the country, and also to appear 
more victim-focused) led to a 25% increase of recorded crime. If statistics are adjusted accordingly, 
Wiles argues, then the crime rates in England and Wales are falling and this is a common European 
and North American trend. The increased crime rates however have led to increased fear of crime and 
have resulted in tougher anti-crime policy and increased prison population – a development which 
contradicts the reality of decrease of criminality. P. Wiles, 2004, op.cit.  
28 Council of Europe, ‘Report on Organised Crime Situation in Council of Europe Member States – 
1999’, European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), 2000 International Crime Assessment, Joint 
report of US Governmental Agencies [online] http://www.fas.org/irp/treat/crime.html accessed 
3/04/2003. 
29 The survey was conducted by the Working Groups Drugs and Organised Crime as instructed by the 
Council of Ministers of Justice and Interior Affairs in 1993. The Council had decided to ask for an 
annual report on the scale of and trends in international organised crime. T. van der Heijden, 1996, 
op.cit.  
30 P. Williams & D. Vlassis, 2001, op.cit , p. 278.  
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Later efforts also showed that it was difficult to find common trends in the 
composition of organised criminal groups across Europe, and their organisational 
structure, areas of criminal activity, and extent of criminal activity all differed by 
state or region.31 For example, the group of Scandinavian countries identified local 
motorcycle gangs as the major organised crime problem in their jurisdiction while 
others were concerned about criminal groups with exterritorial or external origin. 
The 1995 EU Situation Report on Organised Crime showed that organised crime 
groups active in the Union are primarily foreign and heterogeneous in composition 
although all of the countries had discovered domestic criminal organisations.32 These 
findings were contradicted by the 1999 Report on Organised Crime Situation in 
Council of Europe member states which found that the organised criminal groups in 
the Nordic countries are mostly composed of nationals and in the Netherlands half of 
the suspects had Dutch origin. The United Kingdom reported 82% of organised 
criminals were of national origin. Greece, too, reported a majority of domestic 
organised criminal groups. Spain, Germany, Switzerland and some small states 
reported high level of heterogeneity of the criminal groups whose composition 
showed a high number of domestic mixed with foreign criminals. Some of the 
Eastern European countries identified a higher percentage of foreign organised crime 
compared to domestic (Slovenia, the Czech Republic) but in general organised crime 
in Eastern Europe was identified as mainly local in origin and membership.33  
 
The identification of a ‘foreign element’ in organised crime in Europe however, was 
not in itself a particularly useful discovery as in itself ‘foreignness’ was no basis for 
similarity. The foreign links or composition of organised crime groups is usually 
related to cultural or historical connections, such as the South-American link in Spain 
and Portugal, immigration, or geographical proximity, such as the Northern African 
                                                 
31 Initially the lack of common definition of organised crime was overcome by the adoption of a 
common assessment mechanism developed on an expert level. This was driven by the aspiration to 
identify a common problem or a synthesis of similar problems, on basis of which action was to be 
taken. The member states had to collect information on organised crime according to a list of 11 
characteristics, of which at least six had to be present and three were obligatory for identifying 
organised crime. The characteristics contained both ‘organised crime’ and ‘organised criminal group’ 
approach in order to overcome differences in the situation and data collection of member states. T. van 
der Heijden, 1996, op.cit.  
32 Most of the groups identified in EU member states were of South-American, Turkish, Chinese, 
Russian origin but also Italian and Dutch origin which is also classified as ‘foreign’. 
33 Report on Organised Crime Situation in Council of Europe Member States - 1999, Council of 
Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems. 
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link in France, and Eastern European and Turkish crime in Germany, Austria and 
Greece.34 There was also some inter-EU crime mobility, such as Italian and Dutch 
links found in many EU countries.35 Although a big proportion of crime activities 
were linked to illegal trafficking of drugs or people, the methods, type of trafficking 
and routes were different in the separate EU states or regions. Other more localised 
criminal activities across Europe include forgery, robbery, extortion, property crimes, 
illegal trade in firearms, illegal gambling, etc. All of these differences and local 
specifics created problems for developing a common approach to organised crime in 
the EU, which turned out to be a time and resource consuming process.36  
 
Despite these problems, even more efforts were put into the EU anti-crime project. 
One of the main tasks of the 1997 Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime was to 
produce Organised Crime Situation Reports (OCSR) on an annual basis and with 
improved methodology for measuring organised crime. The aim of OCSR was to 
contribute to harmonisation and standardisation in qualitative data collection and to 
develop the use of a threat assessment methodology for determining the conditions 
and causes of organised crime. However, these plans were not fulfilled, and the 
emphasis in OCSR changed in 1999 and 2000 from ‘the description of current and 
past situations to assessment of threats and risks related to future developments in 
crime and their implications for law enforcement within the EU.’ 37 The report was to 
be compiled by the Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) and Europol. These 
arrangements were not straight forward and some adjustment from the participating 
agencies was needed. By 2001-3 the name of the report was changed to simply 
                                                 
34 Identification of immigrant crime was also higher in the countries which more recently became 
immigrant destinations such as Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
35 T. van der Heijden, 1996, op.cit.  
36 This was identified by the authors of a 2007 study of the normative basis developed by international 
organisations in the area of terrorism and organised crime fighting which concluded that ‘A huge 
number of legally binding and non-binding decisions relevant for terrorism and organized crime of the 
European Union exist - falling under the first, second and/or third pillar of the EU. Thus it was not 
possible to complete the comprehensive research of decisions relevant for terrorism and organized 
crime within this paper… Additionally, during the ongoing research process, it became apparent that 
the research itself was very time-consuming, complicated and confusing.’ ETC Study for the 
HUMSEC Project, 2007, op. cit. 
37 The report was to be compiled by the Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) and Europol. K. Verpoest & 
T. Vander Beken, ‘The European Union Methodology For Reporting On Organised Crime’ in The 
European Methodology for Reporting Crime, Report for Sixth Framework Project ‘Assessing 
Organised Crime: Testing the Feasibility of a Common European Approach in a Case Study of the 
Cigarette Black Market in the EU’, 2005 [online]  
http://www.sprinxdata.com/AOC/publications/AOC-DLV-EU-methodology-vF1.pdf accessed 
29/09/2008,  
 113
Organised Crime Report (OCR) which was to be ‘more threat, trend, assessment, and 
future oriented’ and ‘more ‘customer’ oriented by allowing the Heads of the National 
Units (HENUs), the PCTF and other decision-makers to have a say in its overall 
structure and orientation.’38 Since 2006 OCSR has been replaced by Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). Despite some improvements in each subsequent 
report, all of those reports have been subject to criticism, especially for being focused 
primarily on the criminals rather than the environment in which they operate. 39
 
Apart from crime reports, the EU adopted an organised crime definition to facilitate 
policy and data collection as some countries did not have such a definition prior to 
the emergence of the issue in the early 1990s. Initially a consensus was reached on 
using a definition based on the basis of a number of characteristics (11), four of 
which had to be present (in bold):  
 
1. collaboration of more than two people; 
2. each with their own appointed tasks; 
3. for a prolonged or indefinite period of time (this criterion refers to the 
stability and (potential) durability of the group); 
4. using some form of discipline and control; 
5. suspected of serious criminal offences; 
6. operating on an international level; 
7. using violence or other means suitable for intimidation; 
8. using commercial or businesslike structures; 
9. engaged in money laundering; 
10. exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial 
authorities or the economy; 
11. motivated by the pursuit of profit and/or power.40 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid .‘The data which are collected and analysed in response to the set up of the OCR, are all 
focussed on criminal groups and their activities. The list of topics to be examined is totally related to 
the definition of OC and thus directly linked to the aspect of criminal groups, their modi-operandi and 
the used counter-strategies.’ Ibid. p.6-7. 
40 T. van der Heijden, 1996, op.cit. However, this definition was not officially accepted and often 
criticised for not being straightforward and differing from state to state. K. Verpoest & T.Vander 
Beken, 2005, op.cit.  
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The definition was broad to ensure that a larger scope of crimes could be interpreted 
as ‘organised crime’ which could allow wider international cooperation. The 
discussions of an official EU definition continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s.41 
The lack of accepted definition did not, in fact, matter as in practice, the EU focused 
on particular types of crimes, which were identified as Europe-wide and of external 
origin, such as drug trafficking and people smuggling. Additionally, the activities of 
the new EU anti-crime institutions focused on the external sources of crime, and 
especially Eastern Europe. Reports on organised crime were a reflection of this 
tendency to focus on foreign and especially Eastern European crime.42 This was not 
only caused by an identification of a new threat from those regions but also due to 
the easy platform for building common policies, especially in relation to 
enlargement. Thus the ‘need’ to help transition and democratisation in Eastern 
Europe coincided with the ‘need’ to build the anti-crime policy in Europe, and these 
conditions created a strong impetus for the policy, which did not exist prior to the 
1990s.  
 
4.4. Historical context to Europe’s anti-crime policy  
 
The anti-crime agenda led to the possibility of creating what Harding called a 
‘European criminal law space’43 and the possible delegation of real regulatory power 
in the criminal law area to the EU institutions. The issues, which hampered the 
development of international policy on crime, were of different origin but usually 
defined in literature as related to issues of politico-juridical sovereignty. Nelles 
points out that within the EU, ‘criminal law and the right to punish are still regarded 
as lying within the sovereignty of nations, i.e. also of the member states of the 
European Union …[and] up to now the Union has not been formally empowered to 
                                                 
41 By 2005, another definition was agreed upon and it was similar to the UN definition. Organised 
crime was defined as ‘a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two 
persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of 
liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, as a means 
of obtaining, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefits’. European Parliament 
legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council framework decision on the fight against organised 
crime (COM(2005)0006 – C6-0061/2005 – 2005/0003(CNS)). 
42 This is a trend observed in Europol’s activities, publications on crime and their reports on threat 
assessment.  
43 C. Harding, ‘Exploring the intersection of European law and national criminal law’, European Law 
Review, 2000, vol. 25, pp. 374-390. 
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establish Criminal law as such.’44 The anti-crime policy on the EU level in fact 
remained entirely intergovernmental before and after the 1990s and a subject of 
international treaties and their ratification, or other forms of interstate cooperation, 
harmonisation or assistance in criminal matters between sovereign states. This was 
compensated for by an increasingly high number of initiatives on executive level. 
These initiatives in effect institutionalized the previously existing informal 
cooperation between the police forces of EU members by establishing and promoting 
a formal coordinating body under the name of Europol with some level of 
independence from state governments but limited powers. The JHA area of 
cooperation developed after 1992 did not create common laws or even justice policy 
under EU leadership by the EU but it remained a cooperative effort on the part of 
national justice and interior ministries to align their policies, and introduce 
commonly agreed legal amendments.45
 
The problems of expanding criminal justice beyond state borders are not new. There 
is a history of states’ efforts to prosecute crimes beyond their borders and a number 
of initiatives to develop an international framework of cooperation in criminal 
justice. Literature on recent European policy in the area usually links the 1990s 
developments to such initiatives going back to the early twentieth century. On the 
one hand, the contemporary developments in international criminal justice are a 
continuation of these initiatives but on the other hand, the recent developments are 
provoked by different concerns and have had a different and much more intense 
development. The policies before the 1990s however encountered similar political 
and judicial constraints linked to state sovereignty.  
 
Interpol 
 
The first attempt at international policing in Europe was related to the perception of a 
common problem with violent anarchist groups. This prompted the First International 
                                                 
44 U. Nelles, ‘Steps Towards Harmonisation – Steps Towards friction’ in K. Aromaa & S. Nevala eds., 
Crime and Crime Control in an Integrating Europe Plenary, Presentations held at the Third Annual 
Conference of the European Society of Criminology, 2003, HEUNI, Publication Series N44, Helsinki, 
Finland, pp.75-84 [online] http://www.heuni.fi/uploads/y4m8w9.pdf accessed 24/04/2006. 
45 Most notably the introduction of ‘membership in criminal organisation’ offence. 
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Criminal Police Congress organised in Monaco from 14th to 18th of April 1914. The 
Congress was attended by legal experts and police officers from 14 countries and 
territories who discussed the idea of establishing an international criminal records 
office and harmonising extradition procedures. The initiative did not develop much 
further, partly linked to the outbreak of the First World War. However, the period 
between the wars saw the launching of the Second International Criminal Police 
Congress held in Vienna in 1923, which set up the International Criminal Police 
Commission (ICPC) – an initiative triggered again by post-war political turmoil in 
Europe, linked to social and economic problems which were in fact leading to the 
next war in Europe. The IPIC had its own Statute and official headquarters in 
Vienna. It initially comprised 20 member states and extended to 34 in the 1930s. 
Despite its initial success the IPIC remained limited within its European foundations 
and was gradually abandoned. The failure of the IPIC was interpreted as a sign of the 
escalation of disagreements between the European powers on the eve of the Second 
World War. The members could not develop a workable agenda on their common 
problems and the ‘political’ overshadowed any productive cooperation between their 
police organizations. The attempt to resolve such complicated internal issues with 
international cooperation proved furtile. 
 
After the Second World War there was a renewed enthusiasm for re-building the 
world around the vision of cooperation and integration, which included international 
policing structures. The ICPC was re-instated at a conference in Brussels with a new 
statute and new headquarters in Paris (Vienna was still occupied by the Soviet army). 
In 1956 the ICPC became the International Criminal Police Organisation - Interpol. 
For almost a quarter of a century this was the only institutionalised means of police 
cooperation in Western Europe which also claimed a role outside the continent. 
However, Interpol was not a European organisation in the sense that Europol today 
is. It was not established under the banner of fighting a common enemy and was not 
linked to a territorial jurisdiction.46 Interpol never became an international police 
                                                 
46 Interpol was not a part of any international political structure and could not be used for tackling 
sensitive issues such as terrorism. According to Article 3 of Interpol's Constitution, the organisation is 
forbidden ‘to undertake any intervention of activities of a political, military, religious or racial 
character’. This appeared to be a problem during the 1970s when there was a wave of terrorist attacks 
in some western European countries. Terrorism, although a subject of ordinary criminal law in most 
countries, has political implications and thus was a ‘forbidden’ area for Interpol. This led to the 
creation of a separate body, the Trevi group, whose initial area of expertise was terrorism. The group 
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force with operational capabilities. Its main purpose was to enhance the exchange of 
intelligence, to serve as a databank and to promote harmonisation of operational 
practices and equipment. Moreover its input in international policing cooperation 
was riddled by Cold War antagonisms and power struggles, and state rivalry.47  
 
On the other hand, its political effect was significant and visions of creating an 
international policeman grabbed the imagination of many political leaders. There 
were ideas for the formation of a European Central Office within Interpol or even for 
the creation by the EC of a ‘supranational criminal investigation department’ 
(Europol). The latter proposal was vigorously defended by German police officials, 
and by Germany, linked to its support for a more federal Europe.48 However, most of 
the members, and Interpol itself, were satisfied with the status quo and the 
membership of the organisation grew as it continued to be based on the principle of 
sovereignty and equality. There was no support for the idea of expanding Interpol’s 
roles and especially allowing any external interference in the legal affairs of its 
member states. According to Article 2 of its Constitution, Interpol aims ‘to ensure 
and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police 
authorities, within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the 
spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights [and] [t]o establish and develop 
all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of 
ordinary law crimes’ with no intention to promote legal changes in its member 
                                                                                                                                          
was formed by the executive bodies of the member states (thus, it was incorporated into the political 
structure). Today terrorism is covered by Interpol which was made possible by a peculiar arrangement 
in a resolution adopted in 1984. According to it offences are not considered to be political when they 
are committed outside a ‘conflict area’, and when the victims are not connected with the aims or 
objectives pursued by the offenders. 
47 A central problem with Interpol was the unwillingness of some member states (especially the US) to 
give information for its database because of the fact that Interpol had (and still has) a wide 
membership (in 1997 it included 177 countries), and the fear of misuse of information between them. 
The problem was later partly settled by introducing requirements for access to Interpol’s database and 
in particular - the prior approval of the state that had issued the information before disclosing it to 
another member. This settlement by itself shows the complexity of the procedures through which 
Interpol has to operate in order to overcome the unfavourable legal conditions for mutual assistance in 
criminal matters, i.e. the asymmetry of the adjustments in two interdependent areas - policing and law. 
48 There were two ‘groups’ in Europe in terms of opinion on how to proceed with police co-operation 
within the European community. On one hand there were countries, among which Germany was most 
active, who advocated ‘deepening’ of European integration, including the establishment of a more 
coherent police and criminal justice framework of collaboration. On the other hand, France, as well as 
the United Kingdom, defended ‘national sovereignty’ in criminal matters. As a result, as we can see 
from the later development in this area, a number of structures and arrangements (formal and 
informal) were created within the Community or among its member states on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis, which shared common goals (as well as members and even staff) and none of them managed to 
really establish a supranational means of tackling the problems of crime. 
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states.49 Indeed such a task would have been impossible given the unclear status of 
Interpol, which in fact has never been established as an international organisation in 
accordance with international laws. For all those reasons Interpol has never been able 
to overcome the sensitive national issues, to impose legislation or binding 
international regulations. Perhaps for that reason in the 1980s some preferred to 
extend the role of Interpol over the idea to establish similar a structure within the 
European Communities.50
 
Council of Europe 
 
The first institutionalised interstate cooperation in crime prevention and criminal 
justice of purely European scope was within the organisation of the Council of 
Europe (CE) – which is known to be ‘the oldest ‘Europe’ in legal respect’.51 In 1956 
the Committee of Ministers of the CE adopted Resolution (56)13 on the prevention 
of crime and the treatment of offenders, which was to establish cooperation between 
the CE and the UN European Consultative Group working in the same field. The 
resolution established crime on the agenda of the CE. The function of the CE laid 
more in the field of recommendations, adoption of measures that all members agree 
on, such as extradition, but it remained very limited in its approach to organised 
crime until the 1990s.52  
                                                 
49 ICPO-INTERPOL Constitution and General Regulations [online] 
http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/legalmaterials/constitution/constitutiongenreg/constitution.asp 
accessed 30/04/2008 (my italics). 
50 Cyrille Fijnaut, for example, refers to two reports on organised crime in the EC countries produced 
by the EP and the Council of Europe in 1986: A striking detail in these two reports is that they both 
voice an explicit preference for the reinforcement of the task of Interpol within western Europe rather 
than an extension of TREVI. This makes it clear that there is a huge difference of opinion between 
individual national governments on the one hand and the members of the EP and the Council of 
Europe on the other concerning the basis on which police co-operation in western Europe might 
proceed. C. Fijnaut, 1993, op. cit., p. 114. 
51 U. Nelles, 2004, op.cit. The Council of Europe (CE) was founded in 1949 with an emphasis on 
promoting internationally legal standards in the area of human rights, democracy, rule of law and 
culture. It has traditionally had a ‘soft’ politics approach. However, the issues which it promoted were 
the ‘issues’ of the day, similar to crime in the 1990s. Human rights, democracy and rule of law were 
the so-called ‘ideological’ tools of the West for undermining the Soviet regime. 
52After the end of the Cold War the Council of Europe became a key East-West international 
organisation in Europe (as opposed to exclusively Western EU until its first Eastern enlargement in 
2004). There was an increased anti-crime and anti-terrorism activity within CE after 1990, and it was 
particularly active in linking the two issues, and lobbying for the criminalisation of terrorist activities. 
Additionally, the CE focused on harmonising legislation and facilitating international and local 
cooperation in the area of corruption, cybercrime, organized crime, economic crime, money 
laundering, trafficking in human beings. For an overview see ETC Study for the HUMSEC Project, 
2007, op.cit.  
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In 1958 a special European Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP) was set up which 
functioned through various sub-committees and working groups.53 The main task of 
ECCP was harmonisation of the member states' legislation relating to penal law, 
penal procedure and prison administration. Apart from studying the problems in 
these areas, the Committee and EC in general managed to establish international 
cooperation with practical results. Among them are a number of resolutions and 
measures in the field of extradition, mutual assistance and transfer of proceedings in 
criminal matters, international terrorism, control over firearms, drugs, etc.54  
 
In 1971 the CE also became the framework within which the first policing co-
ordination body in Europe was established, the so-called ‘European Group to 
Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffic in drugs’, also known as the Pompidou 
Group, named after its creator - the French President Georges Pompidou. The 
Group’s task was to co-ordinate its 19 member states' efforts to fight the traffic and 
consumption of illegal narcotic drugs. Despite its achievements in this particular area 
of international crime, the members of Pompidou Group did not agree on the need 
for joint action on other areas. The CE’s role in international criminal justice policies 
was later overshadowed by the European Union, which had more capacity for such 
policies. The Council remained an important international forum for anti-crime and 
anti-organised crime initiatives in the 1990s but the rising political significance of 
the EU placed the Union in the centre of the European law and order regime, dealing 
with issues ranging from terrorism and football hooliganism, to illegal immigration, 
fraud, drug trafficking, and other fights against organised crime. 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Two decades later the Trevi Group which was created to discuss issues on crime within the 
European Communities adopted a very similar structure. 
54 The key conventions adopted by the Council, which are still in force, are the CE Convention on 
Extradition (1957), the Convention on Mutual assistance in criminal matters (1959) and the 
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons (1983). According to Nelles, they are designed to 
ensure the application of the safeguards and procedures traditionally applied to international co-
operation in criminal matters. Apart from human rights protection, she suggests that the two main 
principles of the conventions are: ‘Legal assistance is only to be given, if the crime concerned is a 
crime not only in the requesting but also in the requested state (principle of dual or double 
criminality). Legal assistance must not be given, if the principle of ne bis in idem was inflicted by the 
requested state (principle of double jeopardy)’. U. Nelles, 2004, op.cit.  
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Trevi 
 
The efforts for developing some form of cooperation in home affairs within the 
European Communities began as early as the 1960s, after an initial agreement was 
reached on the Common Agricultural Policy and the potential risk of fraud was 
identified. If this was the start of home affairs cooperation, however minimal, then it 
predated foreign policy cooperation.55 At that time however, the member states did 
not manage to adopt any conventions against this possibility. The cooperation was 
only formalised in the mid-1970s after the European Council of Rome in 1975 set up 
a consultative body within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to examine 
possibilities for cooperation in the area. In June 1976 in Luxembourg the Ministers 
of Internal Affairs adopted a resolution for the formation of a set of study groups, 
established as part of a body which was to be called Trevi. 56 This project was started 
by the EU members (a German and British initiative) states in connection with 
terrorist actions in several European countries in the mid-1970s and it was originally 
set up to enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism (which fell outside the 
prerogatives of Interpol), as well as the exchange of information, equipment and 
training of police units. However, the role of Trevi was later expanded to cover not 
only terrorism but illegal immigration, border control, drugs trafficking and serious 
crime. 
 
International ‘serious crime’ - a concept which comes close to ‘organised crime’ but 
is defined by severity of sentencing - became part of Trevi's concerns in 1985 when a 
special working group was set up to deal with it (WG III). This caused the first 
significant duplication of areas of competence between international bodies since 
international crime was also the main target of Interpol. According to Fijnaut there 
were several different reasons for Trevi's broadening roles – officially, it was because 
of ‘the close relationship between terrorism...and other forms of organised crime’, 
but the broadening also reflected the inclusion of organised crime in the area of 
‘European public order’, or because ‘European politicians …[had to]… continuously 
                                                 
55 S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, London: Pearson Education Limited, 2000, p. 9. 
56 The origins of the name are not quite clear. It is commonly accepted that TREVI stands for 
‘terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence (the position of the ‘I’ comes from the 
French word order for ‘international violence’, although in some sources it is interpreted separately as 
‘internationalism’ and some sources claim the name derived from the famous fountains in Rome. C. 
Fijnault, 1991, op. cit. 
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create new stimuli to keep alive the idea of the European Community’.57 Trevi 
remained an intergovernmental body with no supranational powers, it was not 
institutionalised and had no staff, headquarters or budget and the responsibility for its 
functioning laid on the national presidency of the current six-month period, i.e. the 
respective Minister from the Member State holding the Council of Ministers 
presidency. It was also a highly secretive institution and most of the documents and 
measures were adopted outside of the EU framework (before Maastricht) and were 
neither published in the Official Journal, nor debated in the national parliaments or 
by the public. The European Parliament had no role either since Trevi was an 
intergovernmental framework, carried out exclusively by member states’ executives. 
This arrangement made monitoring, control and evaluation of Trevi’s work 
impossible. From what is known about the work of Trevi it made regular analyses, 
produced strategies and tactics and enhanced the exchange of information and know-
how. It was not dealing with regulations or common positions or interfering with 
matters ‘internal’ to the member states, including their legislation or law 
enforcement, in other words it was entirely utilitarian and reactive (i.e. following the 
events). This practical role, added to the secrecy of Trevi's activities, was probably 
the key to the relative success of the structure. Lack of accountability gave it a 
degree of freedom and flexibility. Nevertheless, Trevi reached its official end - it was 
replaced under the Maastricht treaty by the new European Council on Justice and 
Home Affairs, the so-called K4 Committee, three Steering Groups and their Working 
Parties.58  
 
The intergovernmental form of cooperation in internal affairs such as criminal justice 
and law enforcement discussed were appropriate to the stage of developing European 
integration. However the situation did not change after the adoption of the Single 
European Act in 1986 with the agenda to abolish internal frontiers by 31 December 
                                                 
57 C. Fijnault, 1991, op. cit., p. 110.  
58 Some critics pointed that this attempt to incorporate Trevi in the more accountable structures of the 
EC has only moved it ‘from the secrecy of its intergovernmental status to become ‘secret’ within the 
framework of the European Community’ as the European Parliament was to be consulted and allowed 
to ask questions but the new committee was not going be accountable to the parliament in any 
democratic sense; power remained with the 12 governments, and Europol was to be run by senior 
officials and report to the heads of states – all of which in effect continued the secrecy and exclusion 
of the parliaments and the public from the debates. 
Statewatch, Artdoc Jan 93 - Trevi, Europol&Immigration [online] http://www.statewatch.org accessed 
21/03/2003. 
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1992. But the implications for crime and policing within the territory of the common 
market were taken into consideration after SEA was completed. Thus the Act did not 
change the informal structure, i.e. Trevi that had existed before it, except in terms of 
the creation of more working groups. The reason was the anticipated need for greater 
co-ordination of immigration and asylum matters after the abolition of the internal 
borders. At the same time another initiative linked to policing and border controls 
was taken up: the Schengen Agreement. 
 
Schengen 
 
The Schengen Agreement (1985) and the subsequent Schengen Convention (1990) 
established a very successful platform for police cooperation among several EU 
states. Initially Schengen developed outside the structures of the EU and did not 
include all of the Union’s member states.59 The Agreement aimed to provide 
compensatory measures for an area without internal frontiers, to promote greater 
cooperation between the police forces of the member states and their judicial systems 
(incl. in the suppression of drugs trafficking); harmonisation of immigration, asylum 
and visa policies, as well as the creation of a Schengen Information System (SIS).60 
The purpose of the Agreement was to facilitate the removal of checks at common 
borders by replacing them with external border checks (as a compensatory measure); 
a common definition of the rules for crossing external borders and uniform rules and 
procedures for controls there; separation in air terminals and ports of people 
travelling within the Schengen area from those arriving from countries outside the 
area; harmonisation of the rules regarding conditions of entry and visas for short 
stays.61 The Schengen area was criticised for building a ‘Fortress Europe’ because of 
the tight measures taken to prevent ‘undesirable’ aliens from entering its territory. 
                                                 
59 The Agreement was initially signed only by France, Germany and the Benelux countries in 1985. 
Ten years later it was incorporated in the EU acquis through the Schengen Implementation Agreement 
(1995), signed by all EU states except for the UK and Ireland. The UK opted-out because it viewed it 
as a German agenda and another step towards federalism; Ireland followed the UK position. 
60 The Schengen Agreement provided for international prosecution, i.e. following defendants across 
borders, and setting up ‘law enforcement agencies at the boundaries where the officers in fact 
exchanged information in a very informal way’. U. Nelles, 2004. op. cit. 
61 The policies developed under Schengen and linked to organised crime are the introduction of cross-
border rights of surveillance and hot pursuit for police forces in the Schengen States; the strengthening 
of legal cooperation through a faster extradition system and faster distribution of information about 
the implementation of criminal judgments. SCADPlus (no date) ‘The Schengen acquis and its 
integration into the Union’ [online] http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33020.htm accessed 
01/12/2006. 
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The Agreement’s immigration policy was for the first time linked with criminal 
justice and policing: the Schengen Information System (SIS) which was later 
developed contained data both on criminals (convicted or suspects) and ‘aliens 
classified undesirable by one of the countries’ (not necessarily criminals), asylum 
applications and refused applications.  
 
Despite its limited number of members, the Schengen’s plans did not develop very 
smoothly at first. The proposals for harmonisation of the policies on drugs, firearms, 
terrorism and illegal organisations, as well as for improvement of international 
judicial aid, exchange of police information and border controls, were supposed to be 
ready at the beginning of 1987 but in fact took much more time and effort. Some of 
these issues caused considerable political dispute and disagreement among the 
signatory countries. For example, the idea of introducing identity cards and other 
means of identification, or adopting tougher laws on soft drugs were not accepted by 
the Dutch public. At the same time, their tolerance for soft drugs led to antagonistic 
reactions from France (which continued with the border checks) and other countries. 
Guyomarch points out one additional reason for the delay, namely the changes in 
Eastern Europe at the end of 1980s and the subsequent change in the East-West 
European relations (an immediate obstacle in that respect being the reunification of 
eastern and western Germany).62 The Schengen Agreement, similar to all the other 
previous and forthcoming initiatives concerning home affairs, was criticised for 
lacking democratic scrutiny - there were no provisions for parliamentary and very 
little for judicial control over it. Moreover, the Schengen Convention grants the main 
body - the Executive Committee (consisting, of Ministers and Secretaries of States of 
member states) the right to ‘decide its own rules of procedure and to set up any 
working groups it wishes.’63 Nevertheless, the Schengen agreements are regarded as 
‘the blueprint of cooperation between and among national authorities in the field of 
cross-border law enforcement in accordance with the (later) EU treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nizza’.64
 
The initiatives discussed in this section are usually interpreted as the predecessors of 
                                                 
62 A. Guyomarch, ‘Problems and Prospects for European Police Cooperation after Maastricht’ 
Policing and Society, 1996, vol. 5, pp.249-261. 
63 Ibid. 
64 U. Nelles, 2004, op.cit.  
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the 1990s anti-crime policy of the EU. Pre-1990s international cooperation in 
criminal matters had an ad hoc nature and was not a part of a formalised strategy of 
developing a supranational policy at the expense of national sovereignty in the area 
of criminal justice and law enforcement. They have remained intergovernmental in 
nature, and taken the form of international treaties, which according to some has 
limited their effectiveness.65 The initiatives were not specifically targeting organised 
crime and did not seek harmonisation of law or state policy against this type of 
crime. Yet the near century-long protracted history of international criminal justice 
convergence and the series of semi-successful initiatives have helped to lay the basis 
to the discourse and policies which ‘securitised’ international crime in the 1990s. 
 
4.5. The emergence of the European Union’s Governance in Justice and Home 
Affairs 
 
The idea of using the European Union structures for more effective international 
action against crime in Europe received attention in the late 1980s but did not 
automatically translate into a common policy with transfer of power to the EU 
institutions. In the course of the 1990s there was a relocation of some policy-making 
in criminal justice area (but not real authority) to the EU level. What the EU 
developed was a peculiar form of ‘governance’, which Monar defines as ‘a special 
regime within the EU, based on a novel mixture of Community and 
intergovernmental characteristics and quite distinct from EU governance in other 
policy areas.’66 As criminal justice and ‘law and order’ are special areas where the 
state exercises its sovereignty, these new ideas of governance suggested ‘a rupture 
with a state-centred approach to government which had come to dominate political 
                                                 
65 The problem with treaties and conventions is that they need to be ratified by the signatory states and 
that does not always happen. For example, the 1991 Convention on the enforcement of foreign 
criminal sentences for instance has never come into force. Ibid.  
66 J. Monar, 1999, op. cit. The term ‘governance’ has traditional meaning which refers to the process 
of management but here governance is understood in a wider context as a system of collective 
problem solving in the public sphere, which is carried out by non-authoritative actors, in conditions of 
dispersed or fragmented political or legal authority. See J. Rosenau & E. Czempiel eds., 
Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. The discourse of governance replaces previous ideas of 
government where the responsibility for policy is located in a specific body. In conditions of 
governance responsibility (although not necessarily real power) is spread amongst different actors. In 
can be seen as horizontal dispersion of policy-making and responsibilities (government, agencies, 
NGOs, different political and non-political organisations within and beyond the state) as opposed to 
vertical with government and governed.  
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thinking, policy and practice.’67 Behind the term ‘governance’, however, was a 
process of institutionalising the largely informal cooperation in criminal justice 
which had developed before the 1990s in an attempt to further ‘democratise’ and 
reinforce the political image of the European Union. This process was initiated by 
the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs 
pillar.  
 
Maastricht Treaty: Justice and Home Affairs 
 
The significance of the changes which the Maastricht Treaty (or the Treaty of the 
European Union, TEU, 1992) brought to the previously sovereign area of criminal 
justice is summarised by Peers:  
 
Pre-Maastricht, the formal role of the EU institutions in Justice and Home 
Affairs cooperation was nil. All negotiations were treated as discussions 
between the member states, and any resulting acts were classified as acts 
of the member states pure and simple. It went without saying that all 
agreements had to be reached unanimously. The Commission was invited 
to be an observer in these intergovernmental talks, but purely with the 
view to defending the interests of the Community law. The European 
Parliament was rarely asked for its opinion on specific or general 
developments, but it sometimes gave it anyway. There was no more 
extensive role for the EC political institutions in the most ambitious 
product of intergovernmental JHA cooperation – the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985, followed by the Schengen Convention of 1990s… 
As for the Court of Justice, there was no interest in using it for 
intergovernmental conventions, except for civil cooperation measures.68
 
TEU incorporated the arrangements of Trevi and some of the Schengen systems into 
the Community's framework which was now based on the three-pillar structure of the 
                                                 
67 A. Crawford, ‘Introduction: governance and security’ in A. Crawford ed., Crime and Insecurity. The 
Governance of Safety in Europe, Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002, p. 2. 
68 S. Peers, 2000, op.cit. p.15. 
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Union.69 Some aspects were included in the EC Treaty (visa policy) while others, 
under Art.VI, remained under the Third pillar called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
where they continued to be addressed intergovernmentally.70 The Third pillar 
encompassed cooperation in nine areas such as asylum policy, rules for crossing 
external borders and immigration policy, including the fight against illegal migration 
(Arts.K.1(1)-(3) TEU), judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters 
(Arts.K.1(6)-(7) TEU), and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and 
combating terrorism, drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime 
(Arts.K.1(9) TEU). The Third Pillar was therefore one of the key areas in ‘creating 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’, where ‘decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizen’ in a single institutional framework ensuring 
‘consistency and continuity’ of the Union’s policies.71
 
The pillar structure was a compromise between the member states which wished the 
area to be incorporated in the EU and those that viewed justice and home affairs as a 
matter of national sovereignty but were willing to allow an intergovernmental 
cooperation in the area with a limited role of the EU’s supranational institutions. 
These arrangements, however, did not improve cooperation but made it even more 
complicated. First, the Treaty (Art. E) recognised that the Union's institutions - EP, 
the Commission, the Council and the European Court of Justice had different powers 
in the three pillars, i.e. the Third pillar was almost exclusively dealt with by the 
Council (of JHA) and the others had very limited power in that respect.72 Secondly, 
                                                 
69 Protocol integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the European Union, OJ C 340, 
10.11.1997. 
70 The Maastricht Treaty introduced a three-pillar structure consisting of: the body of supranational 
arrangements under the treaties of the European Communities (European Coal and Steel Community; 
Euratom and the European Economic Community), and two other areas of intergovernmental 
cooperation: Common Foreign and Security Policy (Second pillar) and Justice and Home Affairs 
(Third pillar). Legislation within the First pillar is initiated by the European Commission and takes the 
form of Regulations and Directives. Regulations are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in 
all member states and the Directives are not directly applicable but are binding on the member states 
which have to adopt them in their national law within a certain period. The intergovernmental pillars’ 
instruments are co-operation and Joint Actions, Council Decisions and Framework Decisions, which 
are not directly applicable. Framework Decisions are legislative acts binding, as to the result to be 
achieved i.e. the member states have a choice of how to implement the measure as long as it achieves 
the intended result. U. Nelles, 2004, op.cit. and S. Peers, 2000, op.cit.  
71 Article A, Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992. The establishment of 
these pillars and their policies was also part of the Treaty’s institution of a Union citizenship. 
72 The problems with the intergovernmental framework are also closely connected with the decision-
making machinery provided for by the Maastricht Treaty. Not only is it exclusively carried out by the 
Council of Ministers (of Home Affairs and Justice) but in order to adopt a decision it has to act 
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it continued some elements that critics associated with the ‘democratic deficit’ in this 
area, such as holding meetings in secret, disclosing selective information to the 
public, granting limited power to the national parliaments to alter already agreed 
decisions, etc. Thirdly, as the Council was granted the power to adopt joint positions 
or joint actions (the initiative for these is shared by the Commission and the member 
states), as well as to draw up international conventions and recommend them to 
member states for adoption, these did not have a binding effect on member states. 
Most of the measures, agreed by the Council after the Maastricht Treaty entered into 
force, were recommendations, resolutions and conclusions - all of which are not 
specifically envisaged under the Third pillar.  
 
Despite their non-binding character however, many of these measures were 
incorporated in member states' policy and practice, though in a different manner. 
Schengen’s incorporation into the Community law caused some difficulties because 
of its legal complexity and size (over 3000 pages), which even its signatory states 
found problematic. According to Statewatch ‘when the 15 governments of the EU 
agreed to incorporate the Schengen acquis in the Amsterdam treaty in June 1997 
few, if any, of them knew what was actually in the Schengen acquis ’.73 As a result 
of the incorporation of Schengen in the First Pillar of the EU, the meetings of the 
JHA Council were going to have at least 10 different levels of decision-making and 
could possibly have 12 or more as the Schengen Agreement had a mixed 
membership: ‘the UK and Ireland will not participate in some decisions, Denmark 
will not participate in some decisions, the UK, Ireland and Denmark will take no part 
in others, and Norway and Iceland will have a say on Schengen issues - but as they 
are not EU members meetings with them will take place ‘outside’ EU structures’.74
  
At its Maastricht stage, JHA was criticised for its intergovernmental framework, 
which was seen as an impediment for cooperation. This framework has been 
preferred by the member states because of the sensitivity of the subject. The UK for 
                                                                                                                                          
unanimously (Article K.4(3) TEU). This arrangement led to delays and sluggishness in the decision-
making progress because of disagreements among the member states on a number of issues.   
73 Statewatch, vol. 8, no. 3&4, May-Aug 1998 EU: Schengen Acquis [online] 
http://www.statewatch.org [online] accessed 21/03/2003. The inclusion of Schengen contributed to the 
Maastricht treaty’s reinforcement of the link between immigration and crime.  
74 Statewatch, vol. 8, no. 5, Sep-Oct 1998 EU: Schengen acquis incorporation ‘mess’ [online] 
http://www.statewatch.org accessed 21/03/2003. 
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example advocated the intergovernmentability on the basis of the argument that 
policing and criminal law are a matter for national parliamentary control and 
scrutiny. However, even then the national parliaments are sometimes excluded to a 
certain extent from the discussions of JHA measures, and the European Parliament 
also has a limited role compared to its rights under the First Pillar – which again led 
to criticisms of lack of accountability and democratic deficit. This was exacerbated 
by the fact that JHA cooperation lacked openness and released limited information to 
the public; the meetings on every level were held in secret, the documents were all 
not published, and the archives were confidential (with an ambiguous rules for 
classifying them as such). Peers argued that: 
 
This results partly from addressing most JHA issues outside the 
Community legal system... and partly from the operational nature of JHA 
cooperation. Member states want to exchange information on their 
citizens, not with their citizens. This reticence makes it harder to assess 
national implementation of JHA measures and increases the risk that 
human rights and civil liberties will be adversely affected by European 
developments.75  
 
The problem of jurisdictions and differences in law and law enforcement continued 
to plague the European anti-crime policies, and fostered a focus on the executive 
rather than judicial area which was more difficult to co-ordinate from a supranational 
level. Furthermore the internal political clashes of interest added to the complexity of 
this policy area. It was supported by pro-federalist Germany and pro-policing United 
Kingdom but for different political objectives. For the UK this was an alternative 
type of EU ‘deepening’, and for Germany it was a way of turning the EU into a more 
state-like structure where it could play centre stage. From the perspective of the 
European Commission – the main true supporter of the EU’s level of policy-making 
in the area of Justice and Home Affairs – these problems were the main impediment 
to the EU anti-crime policies. According to Antonio Saccone, Head of Europol’s 
Crime Analysis Unit: ‘A specific threat to the effectiveness and efficiency of law 
                                                 
75 S. Peers, 2000, op.cit., p. 3. 
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enforcement in the fight against transnational crime is rather related to administrative 
borders than to physical borders’.76
 
Europol 
 
Europol was a key initiative in the area of European policing (i.e. executive level) 
which nevertheless had its own controversies. The concept of a common policing 
body was included in the Treaty of the European Union Art. K on the establishment 
of a European Police Office (95/C 316/01) but two years after signing the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Convention on Europol was still in dispute. A core subject of 
disagreement were the operational powers of Europol demanded by Germany, i.e. 
Europol staff to be able to cross national borders and carry out investigations, as well 
as make arrests. This idea did not meet much support although Europol later on was 
allowed to do joint investigations with national police forces and demand arrests to 
be executed by the latter. The Convention was finally agreed and signed on 26 July 
1995. It states that Europol's task is to combat ‘terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking 
and other serious forms of international crime where there are factual indications that 
an organised criminal structure is involved and two or more member states are 
affected by the forms of crime in question’ (Art. 2 of the Europol Convention). 
However, by establishing Europol, the TEU created the structure for a common 
information system similar to Interpol, but not new policies beyond those developed 
by Trevi.77 Moreover, the TEU did not explicitly subsume the Schengen Information 
System which was supposed to continue operating alongside with Europol. 
 
The usefulness of Europol was viewed in different ways by politicians and police 
officials. From the point of view of Europol’s Director Dr. Willy Bruggeman, the 
organisation had a place in the complexity which he called a 'crowded police space': 
 
European police cooperation can be viewed positively as such a space, 
with different countries and interest groups, being responsible for placing 
the emphasis on particular areas of cooperation. In fact, almost all the 
                                                 
76 A. Saccone, ‘Combating International Crime in an Enlarging European Union: What is the Role of 
Europol?’, Intervention in the International Seminar for Experts in the series Great Debates, organised 
by the Cicero Foundation held in Paris 14 and 15 December 2006. 
77 A. Guyomarch, 1996, op.cit.  
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European countries are member countries of Interpol, the WCO and the 
United Nations. Some of them are Benelux and Schengen countries, and 
15 are EU member states. With this in mind, Europe can be considered, 
in policing terms, as being made up of a series of concentric and 
overlapping circles. The 'map' shows overlapping institutional sources, 
territorial remits, functional specialisations and strategic emphasis.78
 
However, the existence of so many jurisdictions and institutions created problems of 
coordination and hierarchies of authority in decision-making. The unsettled 
relationship between Europol and the other ‘players’ led to criticism and suspicions 
that Europol would never become a ‘European police’. Europol was criticised for its 
relations with other non-European police agencies and international bodies, both in 
Europe and across the Atlantic, which ‘are still inadequate given that criminal 
networks extend beyond the bound, not only of national law enforcement, but also of 
regional law-enforcement’.79 Moreover, the establishment of Europol within the 
framework of the European Union and the legal arrangements for interaction, 
including control and supervision, with its other bodies was seen to create obstacles 
in its practical work.80 Statewatch argued that there was an institutional rivalry 
between Europol and Interpol as the EC police network was interested in making full 
use of Interpol information, but had no intention of granting Interpol access to its 
own information. Interpol, in particular its European section, tried to exert strong 
pressure in order not to be excluded from the developing EC-network of police 
cooperation. But there was a lot of opposition to Interpol’s desires. In the view of 
                                                 
78 W. Bruggeman, ‘EUROPOL - A European FBI In The Making?’, Lecture in Cicero Foundation 
Great Debate seminar "Justice and Home Affairs - How to Implement the Amsterdam Treaty?", 
PARIS, 13 - 14 April 2000. 
79 R. Godson & P. Williams, ‘Strengthening cooperation against transnational crime’, Survival, 
Autumn 1998, vol. 40, no.3, pp.66-88. 
80 The role of the European Court of Justice in the Europol Convention was another subject of 
disagreement, and more precisely whether ECJ should be given a penal competence, i.e. sentencing 
powers, or not. The UK was the only member state to oppose its jurisdiction, and it actually opposed 
the involvement of any EU institutions - ECJ and the Court of Auditors in any of the 
intergovernmental conventions. On the other hand Germany and the Benelux countries shared the 
view that the creation of EU-wide police institutions requires legal recourse to the only court with the 
necessary powers and jurisdiction, the ECJ. Another issue of disagreement among the member states 
was the level of secrecy. For example Germany and France had different opinions over whether the 
meetings of the Joint Supervisory Body comprised of data protection commissioners should be held in 
secret or in public. Germany took the view that most if not all of its meetings should be in public as 
this would be the only way Europol could be seen to be accountable, France wanted them to be secret. 
Statewatch, vol. 8, no. 6, Nov-Dec 98 JHA Council, Dec 1998 [online] http://www.statewatch.org 
accessed 21/03/2003. 
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EC-decision–makers, Interpol exists, in these terms, to benefit Europol, but not vice 
versa. In the technical-administrative agreement on Europol it clearly says that 
Europol is prohibited from communicating with other international systems.81 As the 
EU states were members of both organisations this caused problems for the level of 
cooperation and data-sharing. Replacing the informal policing with formal structure 
was not yet a creation of supranational policing and ‘it is unlikely that Europol, when 
it is finally operational in the years to come, will ever replace the informal and 
unaccountable groups, arrangements, exchange of liaison officers which has been 
built up over the last 20 years’.82 Despite these problems, Europol remained the most 
important EU institution in the fight against organised crime. Its Director described 
its advantage as: ‘Europol is NOT an FBI and not intended to become a comparable 
instrument of the EU. All cooperation is based on intergovernmental cooperation and 
its role is limited to intelligence handling, support and co-ordination, even by 
supporting joint teams, and a new right of initiative.’83 The Justice and Home Affairs 
Council agreed in June 2007 that the Europol Convention will be replaced by a 
Council Decision, to be finalised by 30 June 2008 at the latest, and that Europol 
would be funded from the Community budget as from 1 January 2010.  
 
Before the Amsterdam Treaty the anti-crime activities coordinated by the EU were 
mainly organising and co-ordinating member states’ initiatives in the area of crime 
and law enforcement in general.84 Crime, serious or organised, remained an area 
which proved difficult for developing a common policy beyond a limited 
understanding of the phenomenon, despite the increasing attention from the media 
                                                 
81 However, the JHA Council (March 2000) authorised Europol to enter into negotiations with non-
EU states and bodies on the two-way exchange of data. As drafted these countries are the EU 
applicants plus Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. The decision 
adopted also included Bolivia, Columbia, Morocco, Peru. The Latin American countries were 
included under the US pressure because of their significance for US foreign and anti-drug policy. This 
authority of Europol was criticised because of the legal basis of such negotiations and especially for 
possible use of data received by countries where torture is used in investigations. 
82 John Franks (1996) cited in Statewatch, ‘What happened to Trevi?’, February 1997 [online] 
http://www.statewatch.org accessed 21/03/2003. The police cooperation became more regular in the 
late 1980s. The first of series of bilateral exchanges of liaison officers between the UK and France 
took place in 1988. In 1992 the success of this experiment was formalised and with the posting of 
‘counter-terrorism liaison officers’ being posted from the UK to France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Belgium and the Netherlands (but strictly non-operational, providing information and advice). Ibid. 
83 W. Bruggeman, 2000, op.cit.  
84For example a seminar on police and urban criminality held in Zaragoza, February 1996; a seminar 
on European Union measures to combat the drug problem in Dublin, November 1996; the European 
Union Conferences on Crime Prevention - Stockholm, May 1996 and Noordwijk, May 1997; and the 
seminar ‘Partnerships in Reducing Crime’ held in London, June 1998.  
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and policy-makers to what was seen as a European organised crime threat emerging 
in the new conditions in 1990s Europe. This helps to explain what has been described 
as ‘an early sense that the new security dimension was mere window-dressing for a 
political community centred around a free trade agenda.’85 From the outset, the EU 
anti-organised crime policy was equally devoted to establishing the common 
denominator which allows a common policy, i.e. setting the limits of the concept of 
organised crime (specific forms of crime and definition of those) along with 
development of policy strategies and institutions within those limits. However, to-
date there is no evaluation of Europol and the other anti-crime initiatives in terms of 
their contribution to reduction of crime in the EU members’ states. 
 
4.6. Amsterdam’s Freedom, security and justice and focus on organised crime 
 
The main criticism of JHA under the Maastricht provisions was the lack of 
transparency and the unaccountability of the Third Pillar, as its intergovernmental 
nature left most of the EU institutions out of control of its work.86 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam, signed in 1997 (entered into force in 1999) was designed to correct 
some of these problems and ‘strengthen the security of the Union in all ways’ but 
also ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’.87 The Treaty made a huge step towards 
incorporation of JHA into the EU framework, although a substantial part of it 
remained intergovernmental. Asylum and migration policy were re-located in the 
new Title IV of the EC Treaty under the title ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other 
policies related to Free Movement of Persons’. Justice and home affairs cooperation 
was formally re-named as ‘Area of freedom, security and justice’. The previous Title 
VI remained in the revised TEU under the title ‘Provisions on Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ with the objective ‘to provide citizens with a high 
level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common 
action among member states in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters’ (Art. 29, para 1 EU). This objective is to be achieved by 
‘preventing crime...in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against 
                                                 
85 N. Walker, Policing and the supranational. Policing and Society, 2002, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 307-321. 
86 S. Peers, 2000, op.cit., p. 37-38. 
87 The Treaty of Amsterdam [online] at http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf accessed 
8/10/2008. 
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children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud’. 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force on 1 May 1999 Justice and Home 
Affairs/Police and Judicial Cooperation (PCJ) has been the most dynamic policy 
domain in the EU.88 In comparison to its relatively slow development before the 
1990s JHA has been one of the ‘fastest growth areas of EU activity in that period’.89  
 
However, there were a number of issues and disagreements among the member states 
related to the changes in the Amsterdam Treaty and the transfer of asylum and 
immigration to the First Pillar, which created the need to compromise but added 
further complexity. According to Peers, the dividing line between JHA cooperation 
and other types of European integration was still in place, and was even more 
important and complicated than before: ‘there is a division between: the 
‘mainstream’ of the EC Treaty, applying (usually) to all member states with a certain 
set of institutional rules applying to most issues; the new provisions of the EC Treaty 
addressing immigration, asylum and civil cooperation for some states; and the 
revised Third pillar provisions. Additionally, the Schengen aquis has been integrated 
into all three of these ‘compartments’, with a different set of rules applying’.90 The 
attempt to democratise the Third pillar changed the role of the EU institutions in a 
continuing intergovernmental framework but added a complicated set of restrictions 
to the new roles, and especially a restriction to power of the Court to rule over the 
member states actions, and the role of the European Parliament. The Third Pillar 
remained largely an area of activity of the executive institutions, i.e. Member State 
governments and the Commission.91 Monar interprets these changes as retaining 
many of the intergovernmental features even for the issues which were transferred to 
the First Pillar (unanimity, non-exclusive right of initiative of the Commission, 
limited role for the European Parliament, etc.), and increase of communitarisation of 
the remaining Third Pillar as the increase of the roles of EU institutions in it has 
                                                 
88 PJC replaced JHA as a pillar but the JHA Council continued to exist. The term JHA is used in the 
rest to refer to the fight against organised crime in the process of enlargement as it was used in the 
negotiations with the Eastern European countries. 
89 W. Rees, ‘The External Face of Internal Security’ in J. Peterson & H. Wallace, International 
Relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 205-224, p.206. 
90 S. Peers, 2000, op. cit., p. 40. 
91 On the role of the Commission in the development of JHA, as well as the use of JHA by the 
Commission for establishing itself as a political actor in the European affairs, see E. Uçarer, ‘From the 
Sidelines to Center Stage: Sidekick No More? The European Commission in Justice and Home 
Affairs’ European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 2001, vol. 5  
[online] http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-005a.htm accessed 20/10/1003. 
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made it less intergovernmental than the Second Pillar.92 However, as Apap pointed 
out the changes in JHA introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which undermined 
the divide between First and Third pillar, enhanced their future use in foreign affairs 
thus affecting the Second Pillar as well: ‘The more JHA are integrated into the 
community method, the more they will be used in relations with third countries.’93
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam reflected a new specific focus on the issue of organised 
crime. In the same year, 1997, the European Council created a High Level group to 
draw up an Action Plan to combat organised crime in the community, and the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on organised crime.94 In the next year the 
EU also completed a Pre-accession Pact on organised crime with the applicant 
countries from Eastern Europe and Cyprus.95 Since around 1997 the issues of 
internal security, criminal justice and transnational organised crime have led to an 
unprecedented level of initiatives from individual member states and the EU 
institutions. 
 
The Tampere meeting of European Council in 1999 had a specific focus on justice 
and home affairs, which was proclaimed as one of the most important EU policies 
because: 
The European Union has already put in place a single market and an 
economic and monetary union. However, it was never intended to be 
simply an economic entity, since it is made up of 375 million Europeans 
who are first and foremost people and citizens. Thus, the Tampere 
summit is another step towards the development of the EU's impact on 
the daily life of European citizens. This is achieved by ensuring that 
everybody can live and move freely and safely throughout the European 
Union, while enjoying the same legal protection as the nationals of the 
                                                 
92 J. Monar, 1999, op.cit.  
93 J. Apap ed., Reshaping Europe’s Borders: Challenges for EU Internal and External Policy, Report 
and Policy Recommendations from The Conference on New European Borders and Security 
Cooperation. Promoting Trust in an Enlarged European Union, CEPS, Brussels, 6-7 JULY 2001 
[online] www.ciaonet.org accessed 20/03/2003. 
94 European Parliament resolution on organised crime, OJ C 371, 8.12.1997. 
95 Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime Between the Member States of The European Union and 
the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus (Text approved by the JHA 
Council on 28 May 1998) (98/C 220/01). 
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EU member state in which they happen to be… In other words, the 
European Union should not only be a single market and an economic and 
monetary union but also an ‘area’ of freedom, security and justice - an 
area where everyone can enjoy his or her freedoms, can live and work 
where he/she wishes in safety, and where disagreements and disputes can 
be sorted out fairly and justly.96
 
The key policies for achieving safety and security for the EU citizens are the already 
established JHA objectives, i.e. ‘common EU asylum and migration policy, a 
genuine European area of justice, a Union–wide fight against crime, a stronger 
external action (i.e. outside the EU).’97 The Tampere European Council concluded 
that measures should be taken to combat organised crime at EU level. According to 
Monar, ‘the proposals made by individual member governments during the 
preparation of the Tampere European Council of 1999 reach well over two hundred 
different legislative measures which could be adopted over the next five to ten years. 
If agreed these would leave untouched hardly any of the areas of competence for 
justice and home affairs (JHA) of the national ministries of the interior and of 
justice.’98 Tampere also agreed new policing initiatives such as the introduction of 
joint investigative teams in cross-border areas for countering terrorism and 
people/drug trafficking, the establishment of a European police chiefs' operational 
task force, and Eurojust (a European team of national prosecutors),99 and a European 
police college ‘to make senior law enforcement officials aware of the European 
aspect of fighting crime’.100
 
                                                 
96 European Commission’s Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs (2002) Fact Sheet 
No3.1.Tampere: Kick-start to the EU’s policy for justice and home affairs [online] 
http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20040617/tampere_09_2002_en.pdf accessed 01/09/2008 
97 Ibid. 
98 J. Monar, 1999, op. cit. 
99 Eurojust was another major initiative. It is a multinational European Prosecution system set up by 
the Council’s Framework Decision (2000) with a view to Reinforcing the Fight against Serious Crime. 
It was meant to solve the problem of communication of national police authorities with Europol. 
According to Statewatch the discussions on the creation of Eurojust were hindered by its own 
disagreements: ‘certain delegations wanted a ‘light’ Eurojust while others insisted on the Tampere 
conclusions, which spoke of ‘unity’. The latter prevailed as the Eurojust unit will, ‘where appropriate’, 
‘help co-ordinate actions for investigations and prosecutions’. However, when acting within their own 
territories, the Eurojust officials will be subject to national law and procedure. When acting in another 
member states, the latter ‘shall undertake to accept and recognise the prerogatives thus conferred’. 
Statewatch, ‘Eurojust, an EU public prosecution system’, vol. 10, no. 3/4 June-Aug 2000 [online] 
http://www.statewatch.org accessed 21/03/2003. 
100 European Commission’s Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs (2002) op.cit.  
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In 1999, the Vienna Action Plan on Organised Crime required the Union to 
strengthen EU action against organised crime in response to the threat posed.101 The 
Plan envisaged an integrated approach from prevention to repression and prosecution 
of all criminal behaviour that should be the subject of minimum common rules 
relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts. The Treaty of Nice also 
confirmed the EU dedication to crime fighting. The first Eastern enlargement was 
also used as a way to promote the JHA. The applicant counties were required to 
adopt the JHA acquis as an important area of political convergence with the EU. The 
fight against organised crime became one of the ten priorities in the JHA section of 
the Hague Programme adopted in 2005. The programme envisaged the development 
of a common methodology for registering organised crime in the EU member states, 
and an EU crime statistics system which will constitute the core of ‘European 
Criminal Intelligence Model’.102 The programme also planned yet another strategic 
strategy for fighting organised crime, and strengthening the cooperation amongst 
national law enforcement services ‘in order to combat organised crime in a more 
effective way and the potential of Europol and Eurojust has to be fully exploited’.103 
Finally, the EU Reform Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007 abolished JHA. 
The cooperation in policing and criminal law was merged with Title IV of Part Three 
of the Treaty which dealt with immigration, asylum and civil law, in an attempt to 
make JHA cooperation more supranational.104  
 
4.7. The external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs 
 
After the European Council’s Tampere meeting in 1999 the EU policy on organised 
crime expanded its policy instruments, and especially the cooperation with non-EU 
countries. The external dimension of JHA was one of the four key objectives in 
Tampere (as discussed in the previous section) because:  
                                                 
101 Official Journal C 019, 23/01/1999, p.1-15. 
102 The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. A partnership for European renewal. 
Fighting organised crime: prevention, investigation and Cooperation. Organised crime. Developing a 
strategic concept [online] 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/08_organised_c
rime_en.pdf accessed 10/10/2008. 
103 There has been mounting criticism of the limited use of Europol by national police services, and 
some turf wars between international and national policing (reference) 
104 For commentary on the JHA changes introduced by this treaty, see S. Peers, ‘EU Reform Treaty: 
Analysis1: Version 3. JHA provisions’, Statewatch analysis, 2007 [online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-refrom-treaty-jha-anal-1-ver-3.pdf accessed 12/10/2008. 
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Much cross-border crime also crosses the external borders of the European 
Union and of neighboring third countries. The European Union and its law 
enforcement agencies must therefore not only play an active part in 
international bodies like the United Nations, the Council of Europe, OSCE, 
and OECD but also in co-operating with neighbouring countries, countries 
of origin (from which drugs, illegal immigrants, etc. come) and countries of 
transit (through which drugs, illegal immigrants and stolen goods are 
transported). The objective is to stop drugs, smuggled and stolen goods, 
and illegal immigrants entering the European Union, and to co-operate with 
neighbouring countries and countries of transit and origin to find and return 
cars, jewellery, objets d'art, etc. stolen within the EU and spirited out by 
organised crime for disposal on the international market, and to catch and 
punish the criminals responsible. 105
 
In 2000 at its Feira meeting, the European Council agreed a programme for 
developing this policy as an ‘external dimension of JHA’. In the next five years the 
external dimension of JHA grew in importance for both the internal security of the 
EU, and for its external or foreign relations. By adopting this external dimension, the 
Union finally legitimised its dual internal-external security governance in Europe, 
which was now seen as a collective security space where the EU has a regional and 
global security mission, and this mission was to be fulfilled first amongst its 
neighbours. According to the Commission: ‘Freedom, security and justice issues lie 
at the heart of maintaining international stability and security both outside and inside 
the European Union’ and ‘the projection of the values underpinning the area of 
freedom, security and justice is essential in order to safeguard the internal security of 
the EU. Menaces such as terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking also 
originate outside the EU. It is thus crucial that the EU develop a strategy to engage 
with third countries worldwide’.106 In this way the external dimension fulfils two 
roles: it serves internal security purposes, and it presents the EU as a structure which 
enhances third countries’ security, therefore global security - an idea developed in 
                                                 
105 European Commission’s Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs, 2002, op.cit.  
106 Communication from the Commission: A strategy on the external dimension of the area of 
freedom, security and justice COM/2005/0491 [online] http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfin
al&an_doc=2005&nu_doc=491 accessed 6/10/2008. 
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the EU’s Security Strategy adopted in 2003.107 The strategy cited organised crime as 
one of the global challenges, and threat to European security. According to the 
document, ‘this internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: 
cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for 
a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such 
criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states… Taking these 
different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the 
availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the 
state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very 
radical threat indeed.’108
 
The external dimension, addresses the external challenges amongst which ‘the ever-
growing sophistication in organised crime, including money laundering and other 
financial crimes, and cross-border trafficking in drugs, persons and arms can only be 
countered through improved law enforcement and judicial cooperation, both within 
the EU and externally, and through support for capacity-building in third 
countries.’109 By following this policy the EU is expected to ‘assist third countries in 
responding to growing challenges and thus to fulfil their expectations.’ According to 
EU’s web site on ‘Justice, freedom and security - an important element in the EU’s 
relations with third countries’, the instruments for implementing this cooperation 
with non-EU states include a wide range of external activities, with a growing 
number of third countries and regions. This was an integrated approach as the 
external dimension of JHA fostered anti-crime policies in the rest of the Union’s 
areas, including the Second Pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy. Finally, the 
process of enlargement and pre-accession negotiations and assistance became one of 
the key mechanisms and tools for delivering the goals in the JHA area in the process 
of enlargement which ‘is an effective way to align with EU standards in justice and 
home affairs in candidate countries and those with a European perspective, both 
                                                 
107 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
op.cit.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Communication from the Commission: A strategy on the external dimension of the area of 
freedom, op.cit.  
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through the adoption and implementation of the acquis and through improvements in 
operational contacts and cooperation.’110
The external dimension of JHA/crime-fighting is an area which has caused less 
disagreement among the EU member states as it did not concern sovereignty as much 
as the mainstream policy in this area. It was accepted by the non-EU states where the 
EU’s foreign aid was increasingly linked to the concept of good governance and 
action against crime and corruption, and the recipient state had no choice but to 
comply. In the accession states the fight against crime was linked to the policy of 
reform and transition, and a condition for EU membership, which made the policy 
appealing to the voters. In academic circles, however, the external dimension has 
been criticised for being contrary to its proclaimed goals both as a foreign policy 
objective and as a security strategy. According to Smith, for example, ‘[The EU] has 
tried to shape its milieu, notably by pressing third countries to adopt its standards and 
practices in this field, but this milieu goal is a way of achieving what is really a 
possession goal’.111 Furthermore, the external dimension policies have been 
criticised even by pro-EU experts for exporting democratic deficit. Although the 
arrangements under the Third Pillar were criticised for their lack of transparency, as 
Fijnault points out the intergovernmental framework provided certain means for 
democratic control through the national parliaments.112 At the same time, the 
external dimension of the anti-crime policy has been very active since the late 1990s 
and it has exported EU-designed formulas and it has largely ignored the need of a 
negotiated consensus between various domestic actors and interests, characteristic of 
democratic internal policy-making which ultimately has security consequences. 
 
4.8. Conclusion  
 
Justice and Home Affairs, and the fight against organised crime, are relatively new 
areas of cooperation for the European Union’s nearly 60 years of existence. Attempts 
to develop international cooperation on issues covered by JHA date back to the 
                                                 
110 Council of the European Union , A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA : Global Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Brussels, 14366/3/05, Rev 3, 30 November 2005 [online] 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14366-re03.en05.pdf accessed 6/10/2006. 
111 K. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, 
p.205. 
112 C. Fijnaut, ‘Introduction to the special issue on police accountability in Europe’, Policing and 
Society, 2002, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 243-248. 
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beginning of the 20th century but they have never run counter to the principle of 
national sovereignty and have not had the ambition to establish supranational 
institutions, and hence have always remained inter-governmental and very limited. 
Any attempt to encourage states to co-operate despite contrary national interests as is 
the case with Interpol, has proved unsuccessful and has imposed more restrictions on 
any such project. The initiatives before 1990s – the Trevi group, various ad hoc 
ministerial meetings, Schengen and ideas of European policing – were all motivated 
by internal security concerns, and there was no particular focus on organised crime 
until the mid-1980s.  
 
However, in the 1990s the issue of international crime became a hot topic in 
international affairs, and attracted the attention of the media, policy-makers and the 
general public as a new security threat in the post-Cold war conditions in Europe. 
The creation of Justice and Home Affairs by the Maastricht Treaty placed organised 
crime amongst the concerns of the Union and created a semi-independent agency, 
Europol, to facilitate the fight against organised crime conducted by the national 
authorities of the EU member states. However, since its formulation as an EU policy 
area in early 1990s, JHA has been constantly expanding its structures, initiatives, 
measures, and it has included a growing number of actors in and outside the Union. 
These developments have led to claims that JHA is a strong area of European 
governance, which is very important for securing the everyday life of EU citizens by 
protecting them from the new transnational risks such as organised crime, which 
became a priority in the late 1990s and after the Amsterdam Treaty and Tampere. At 
that stage, the framework of cooperation remained inter-governmental but the 
legislative changes introduced by Amsterdam, and the increasing political focus on 
security and international crime at the time led to an unprecedented rise in initiatives 
and measures within the Third Pillar.  
 
The EU security strategy of 2003 proclaimed an exclusive role for the EU in global 
security and the tackling of global challenges, including organised crime. In this way 
the issue of organised crime, which was barely known before the 1980s, and not even 
acknowledged as a problem for most of the EU states until the mid-1990s, became 
one of the key issues of foreign policy associated with issues as wide as good 
governance, democracy, rule of law, economic development, weak states, etc. The 
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EU approach towards its periphery has been increasingly guided by this new 
understanding of the security continuum, i.e. merging internal and external security 
policy as the best way to address the new transnational challenges. The anti-crime 
policy was initially focused on the actions of the EU member states but problems of 
cooperation have pushed the anti-crime agenda externally where more results could 
be yielded. This policy is promoted as a way of creating stability on the periphery in 
order to increase the security of the member states. It is also seen as a positive for the 
recipient countries that would benefit from the export of stability.  
 
On the other hand, as this chapter has also shown, Justice and Home affairs and anti-
crime policy developed on an EU-level has created a number of problems. The lack 
of clarity on issues such as the nature and level of organised crime in the EU, 
limitations imposed by national sovereignty, the complex nature of JHA between 
supranational and intergovernmental forms of cooperation with limited role of the 
EU’s institutions and the persistent problem of institutional rivalry, have all 
prevented the development of a common policy beyond the lowest possible 
denominators. JHA remained limited to issues such as immigration, asylum, 
information exchange through Europol, and a narrow understanding of organised 
crime as mainly drug and people trafficking. From this perspective, the development 
of the external dimension of JHA/crime fighting can be understood as an area which 
provided opportunities to develop a stumbling policy, and promote the EU as a 
security actor: both for its member states, and the world outside. The process of EU 
enlargement was a particularly fruitful area of testing both the external dimension 
and the ability of the Union to ensure its internal security. 
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Chapter 5. Organised Crime and EU Enlargement 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses evidence from a closer examination of how fighting organised 
crime became bound up in the process of EU enlargement to Eastern Europe. It 
builds on the argument developed in previous chapters, namely that the EU engaged 
in the escalating process of politicisation of crime and non-military security, 
resulting in the development of an external dimension of the Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) pillar and working with non-EU states on fighting organised crime 
beyond state and EU borders, in a new ‘collective’ soft-security fashion. The focus of 
the following discussion is the specific nature of this external activity and the way 
the anti-crime agenda has been rationalised in the process into a broader member-
state building project whereby crime fighting is prioritised along with issues of 
democracy and rule of law in the countries in ‘transition’. 
 
This external anti-crime policy of the EU displays two distinctive features. On one 
hand it is linked to internal security concerns and the fear of external sources of 
crime, particularly crime from the former communist states spilling-over into the 
European Union. On the other hand it enhances the international role of the EU as a 
key actor in the new global security discourse, and a key mechanism for the diffusion 
of Western norms in the Eastern European states’ democratisation. This was deemed 
necessary as the rising crime levels in these states, their growing internal inequality 
and social problems, as well as the difficulties that they were experiencing in their 
internal reform policies signified a danger of weakening state power and its 
monopoly on violence, and growth of internal conflicts and new post-communist 
Mafias.1 Therefore ensuring the ability of state institutions to fight organised crime 
was seen by the EU as part of establishing true democracy, a competitive market 
economy and security. This was translated into a policy of strengthening of the 
applicant state’s justice and law enforcement institutions as the way towards 
                                                 
1 These fears were strongest in the case of Russia where the state is seen as directly linked to oligarchs 
and mafia structures. See for example S. Handelman, Comrade Criminal. Russia’s New Mafiya, Yale 
University Press: New Haven and London, 1995. 
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reducing crime and preparing the applicant for joining the EU’s area of ‘freedom, 
security and justice’. This policy was carried out by using a variety of instruments 
such as pacts and cooperation agreements, or foreign aid for law enforcement 
purposes, along with some more rigid methods (used more rigorously in the Balkans) 
such as non-negotiable transfer of the JHA acquis, using crime fighting in the 
enlargement conditionality, direct institution building through knowledge and 
technology transfer, and pre- and post- enlargement monitoring of policy 
performance.  
 
This chapter first outlines the issue of post-communist crime and the use of foreign 
policy instruments by the EU for building a trans-European consensus on fighting 
organised crime, which focused on Eastern Europe and especially the Balkans. It 
then develops a closer empirical enquiry into the institution-building policy carried 
out through the EU’s financial aid programme PHARE – originally set up for Poland 
and Hungary’s economic reform but later expanded to more applicants and policy 
areas, including crime-fighting. The discussion of the programme covers the period 
from 1997 to 2002, when the proportion of JHA projects within the PHARE 
programme increased significantly.2 The data used for the analysis is extracted from 
so-called project fiches which were developed by the applicant countries to attract 
funding within the terms of reference of PHARE. This meant that projects’ goals, 
activities and budgets, contained in the fiches aimed at satisfying the programme’s 
and EU objectives. Furthermore, the projects content reveals a number of micro-
policy issues, which are analysed and used for broader conclusions about the nature 
of the EU’s external policy on organised crime, which appears unique in a wide 
range of bilateral and multilateral anti-crime policies.  
 
5.2. The EU’s anti-crime policy and the problem of Eastern European crime  
 
As the previous chapters discussed the emergence of the external dimension of the 
EU’s internal crime fighting policy was rationalised by the identification of new 
transnational risks to security and a role for the EU in fighting these risks under its 
Justice and Home Affairs pillar. This new and holistic approach to security seemed 
                                                 
2 K. Gachevska, ‘Exporting Anti-crime Policies: EU PHARE Projects on Fighting Organised Crime’ 
in European Studies Conference Proceedings, University of Rousse Press, 2005, pp.32-37. 
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to be merging the previously separate areas of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security and 
leading to a spill-over of the anti-crime agenda into to the EU’s foreign policy.3 In a 
justification of the external dimension, for example, Franco Frattini, Vice-President 
of the European Commission explained that the ‘external impacts the internal’: drugs 
usually come from outside, organised crime gangs inside are linked to outside by 
cultural and geographic links. Therefore, according to Frattini:  
 
To tackle organised crime all areas of policy must come together. We 
cannot have artificial borders between different policies nor between 
internal and external policy. Those who threaten the EU would be the 
only people to benefit. Rather we must see justice, freedom and security 
as interlinked to the EU's external action. 4
 
This new role of the EU is promoted in its first official security strategy documents 
adopted in 2003: ‘As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a 
quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is, like it 
or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global 
security.’5 As the security agenda was now dictated by new norms transcending the 
military sphere and state sovereignty, the mission of the EU’s foreign policy was 
rationalised not vis-à-vis other actors (states) but by the establishment of these new 
principles abroad as a platform of collective action against the new transnational 
                                                 
3 This should not be mistaken with direct transfer of JHA issues to the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (also known as the Second Pillar which included the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), which is another complex and semi-developed policy area of similar 
intergovernmental cooperation. A merger between these two areas has not yet taken place and some 
authors argue that the claims of uniting the ‘internal’ with the ‘external’ has remained more rhetorical 
than realised in practice, and that states in reality continue to separate internal and external security 
policies. See for example S. Dalferth & M. Weiss, ‘Security Re-Divided: ESDP and JHA Are Distinct’ 
Paper presented at the 49th Annual ISA Convention ‘Bridging Multiple Divides’, San Francisco/USA: 
26-29 March 2008. The current chapter is mainly concerned with the external dimension of JHA 
which uses foreign policy instruments but is ultimately internal as the states which the chapter 
examines prepared to be part of the EU and Schengen. However, the development of this policy 
should be analysed from an international relations perspective as the EU is comprised of member 
states, and JHA remains an intergovernmental policy area. 
4 How the Justice, Freedom and Security policies influence EU's external action - Address by Franco 
Frattini, Vice-President of the European Commission, July 30th 2007 [online]  
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/Missions_heads_Conference_2007/2007/How_the
_Justice_Freedom_and_Security_policies_influence_EU_s_external_action_Address_by_Franco_Frat
t.htm accessed 20/02/2008. 
5A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003 
[online] 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf accessed 20/12/2008. 
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risks for all.6 This strategy is seen as beneficial to the EU and its citizens, as well as 
to the wider world of states with different capacities for providing soft security for 
their citizens, especially the institutionally weak post-communist states in the EU’s 
immediate neighbourhood. 
 
All of the (former communist) countries from Central and Eastern Europe had a 
marked increase of the level of crime in the first few years of the 1990s when they all 
faced economic problems and loss of state legitimacy as communism collapsed. In 
the first years of transition, the levels of crime rose by an average of about 190% in 
the countries in Eastern Europe. In some cases the level of registered crime rocketed 
by nearly or more than 300% for Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic.7 These 
figures provoked a fear of post-communist crime initially amongst the local 
population, and then in Western Europe through media coverage and reports of 
Western observers and embassies, as well as links made between crime and the large 
wave of immigration from the region to Western Europe and the USA.8 Rising crime 
was seen as generated by the dramatic social, political and economic changes that 
Eastern Europe faced in late-1980s and the early 1990s, and particularly the 
combination of crisis and reform.9 In the first years of transition there was a sharp 
rise of unemployment and poverty, along with reform policies aimed at restricting 
the role of the state and particularly its spending, which were demanded by foreign 
financial institutions such as the IMF. Both factors led to widening the milieu of the 
                                                 
6 Some authors see the reverse effect of this process and argue that the endorsement of issues such as 
crime has also been used for foreign policy purposes and more specifically for the promotion of the 
EU as a regional and global actor. See for example, F. Longo, ‘The export of the fight against 
organized crime policy model and the EU’s international actorness’ in M. Knodt & S. Princen eds., 
Understanding the European Union’s External Relations, Routledge, 2003, pp. 158-172, and K. 
Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.  
7 N. Genov, ‘Managing Transformations in Eastern Europe’ in Regional and Global Development, 
UNESCO MOST Paris, Sofia, 1999, p.95. Those three countries received most attention from the 
Western media and officials and were seen as hubs of international organised crime and corruption.  
8 There were mounting publications in Western, mainly American press about the rise of the 
international Russian/Eastern European Mafia after the end of communism. Some examples include 
R. Selwyn, ‘New Groups of Russian Gangs Gains Foothold in Brooklyn’, The New York Times, 
August 23, 1994, p.1; The Times, ‘New Comrades of Crime’, The Times, (Trenton, NJ) August 14, 
1994, or J. Perlez, ‘Sofia Journal: Rogue 'Wrestlers' Have an Armlock on Bulgaria’, New York Times, 
12 January 1995. 
9 According to Łoś the fear of crime was also spread by the new commercial media, which was 
dependent on marketing ‘bad news’ as opposed to communist state-controlled media whose purpose 
was ‘good news’ propaganda. See for example M. Łoś, ‘Post-communist fear of crime and the 
commercialization of security’, Theoretical Criminology, 2002, vol. 6, vo. 2, pp. 165–188. 
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economically deprived who engaged in crime as one of their survival strategies.10 On 
the other hand, the transition caused a rise of private criminality (as opposed to state 
crime) in conditions of increased private property and expansion of the consumer 
market. This led to a rise in property crime which caused moral panic along with the 
new social and cultural shock of the explicit private pursuit of money and profit.11
 
But even with the considerable rise, the problem of crime in the post-communist 
states in the first decade of transition was not quantitatively higher than the crime in 
the West. However, it began to be rationalised as qualitatively different and linked to 
the ill-functioning state above all other criminological factors. This shift of the focus 
from the social to institutional conditions of crime gained increasing popularity, 
mainly because it seemed to explain not only the rise of crime linked to inequality 
but also the emergence of private security organisations and other forms of proto-
organised crime in some post-communist states.12 Although academic research 
points at different origins and types of organised crime in Eastern Europe, which is 
not always linked to weakening state power, the policies adopted to deal with post-
communist crime have focused on strengthening the state criminal justice institutions 
and building crime-fighting capacity. 13
                                                 
10 This was particularly common in the case of the significant Roma minorities in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans. 
11 N. Genov, 1999, op.cit. and B Gruszczynska, ‘Crime in Central and Eastern European Countries in 
the Enlarged Europe’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 2004, vol. 10, pp.123-
136. However, the actual level of crime in Eastern Europe cannot be determined with precision. The 
crime figures for Eastern Europe suffer from similar methodological deficiencies as crime measured 
in the West, and these states in transition have undergone reforms of the criminal justice systems and 
made numerous changes to the methods of crime recording. There has also been a rise in reporting 
crime to the police, as well as numerous other issues which makes a precise comparison of crime 
before and after the fall of communism difficult. In the case of Bulgaria, for example, crime figures 
had begun to rise in the 1980s, before the end of communism.  
12 See for example L. Shelley, ‘Crime and the Collapse of the Soviet State’ in J. Millar & S. Wolchik 
eds. Social Legacy of Communism, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994, pp.130-
148; L. Shelley, ‘Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism’ in P. Williams ed., 
Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat?, London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1997, pp. 122-138.  
13 Earlier accounts of organised crime in Eastern Europe mention the region as used by international 
organised crime networks, or a result of the collapse of communism and the subsequent chaos. In 
1994, for example Phil Williams who was one of the first academics to publish on Eastern European 
organised crime, argued that since the fall of the Iron Curtain Eastern Europe had started being used 
by Columbian cartels as a transit point for the illegal drug trade, or heroin trafficking from Southeast 
Asia and Turkey. P. Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security’, 
Survival, 1994, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 96–113. Eastern Europe as a ‘victim’ of international crime is a 
view shared at the time by other academics such as the Italian scholar Ernesto Savona. See E. U. 
Savona, S. Adamoli, P. Zoffi & M. De Feo, Organised Crime Across the Borders, Heuni, Helsinki, 
1995; E.U. Savona & S. Adamoli, ‘The impact of Organised Crime in central and eastern Europe’, 
paper presented at the Council of Europe ‘Multilateral Seminar on Organised Crime’, Minsk, Belarus, 
16-18 September 1996. Some authors trace the emergence of organised crime networks under 
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Therefore the issue of crime and organised crime became intertwined with the 
general agenda of transition to democracy, and this agenda was perceived to need to 
establish transparent, accountable and strong state institutions as guarantors of 
democracy against chaos, crime and corruption.14 Institution building became the 
main priority in the pre-accession policy, shared by the EU and the applicant 
countries. It was also seen as a tangible and measurable goal which could justify a 
transfer of funds under various assistance and aid programmes of the EU and other 
donors, concerned with the effect of crime and corruption on the quality of 
governance and the economy of the states in transition and especially in the Balkan 
states, which were perceived as having a serious crime problem (of a Russian 
magnitude).15 This view was summarised in the EU Security Strategy: ‘restoring 
good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities 
there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with 
organised crime within the EU.’16 Furthermore, despite the fact that the Balkans 
were seen as different and alien, crime seemed to be a basis of common action, as the 
EU CFSP’s High Representative Javier Solana stated:  
                                                                                                                                          
communism which had very strong state institutions and still developed the so-called vo- v-zakone 
(thief in law, or professional criminal) in the Soviet Union’s underworld. S. Handelman, op.cit. 
Finally some researches see the Western European conception of Eastern European organised crime as 
a media hype and exaggerated internal and external threat. See P. Rawlinson, ‘Mafia, Media and 
Myth: Representations of Russian Organized Crime’, The Howard Journal, 1998, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 
346-358; A. Kiva, ‘Criminal Revolution: Fiction or Reality’, Social Sciences, 2000, vol. 31, no. 1.  
[online] www.ciaonet.org/olj/socsci/socsci_00kia01.html accessed 3/07/2004 and J. Finckenauer & E. 
Waring, (no date) ‘Challenging the Russian Mafia Mystique’ [online] 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000247b.pdf accessed 11/10/2006. For an overall review of post-
communist crime which takes into consideration all important issues, see R. Lotspeich, ‘Crime in the 
Transition Economies’, Europe-Asia Studies, January 1995, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 555-589.
14 This is also linked to the concept of ‘state capture’ which became popular in the late 1990s and 
became a powerful critique of Eastern European transition, elite power and oligarchs. The term itself 
is linked to a World Bank endorsed publication on corruption in states in transition. See J. Hellman, 
G. Jones & D. Kaufmann ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day. State Capture, Corruption and Influence in 
Transition’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2000, no. 2444. 
15 However, a very extensive survey of crime in the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, and 
Serbia) performed by the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime confirms that the perceptions of the region 
as a crime-ridden area are in fact largely exaggerated and criminal and other statistics show that the 
region does not have higher levels of crime compared to Western Europe. The report does make the 
point that the Balkan states may not have higher levels of crime (as far as statistical data can reveal) 
but they have a specific problem with organised crime, which it finds difficulty in qualifying and 
quantifying. The main problem of the report is that the existence of illegal economic enterprises does 
not translate into a large amount of criminals in the area, as well as Western Europe. The report 
confirms the problems of theorising crime as a monolithic structure as it also shows that police actions 
on the ground have failed to round up many criminals.  
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2008) Crime and its impact on the Balkans and affected countries. At 
http://www.rcc.int/download.php?tip=docs&doc=Balkan_study.pdf&doc_url=88ac72aabc4af267910d
a4f02ca3f7c0 accessed 16/01/09. 
16 A Secure Europe in a Better World, op.cit.  
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Fighting crime in the Balkans should no longer be seen as something 
different from fighting crime at home. The criminal networks are the 
same. The crimes are the same. The best methods to fight them are the 
same. Close and effective cooperation. And if we don’t manage to take 
the fight across borders, to their home bases, into the Balkans, we have 
little hope of winning in the long run. What we need therefore is to 
develop means for the real professionals to co-operate. They need to 
exchange information, push investigations all the way, extradite suspects, 
and bring them to justice. They need to be able to rely on the full co-
operation and readiness of police and judicial structures in all countries 
concerned. And they need to feel that they have our full support. No 
criminal should be protected; no blind eye should be turned on crime.17
 
This focus on the Balkans needs to be interpreted as part of a complex and not 
particularly clear cross-insemination of JHA and foreign policy agendas.18 The 
external dimension of JHA, which was discussed in the previous chapter, is mainly 
concerned with extending the fight against organised crime abroad but the policies 
applied in relations with third states are far from standardized. According to the 
Commission’s website dedicated to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the 
EU differentiates between third countries, groups of countries and regions, and the 
‘depth of the relations varies’ according to the geographic and thematic priorities. 
The geographic priorities dictate that the EU exports the JHA agenda to its 
immediate neighbours, i.e. the accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
plus Bulgaria and Romania and the Baltic states (by providing help in pre– and post–
enlargement adoption of JHA acquis), the Western Balkans (engagement with crime 
fighting in the post-war state-building policies), Russia (implementing a Common 
Space on Freedom, Security and Justice) and the Mediterranean region and Ukraine 
(implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan) are the immediate 
addressees of the external policy, followed by the Central Asian countries 
                                                 
17 Intervention by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. London Conference on Organised Crime in South Eastern Europe. London, 25 November, 
2002 [online] http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/73343.pdf accessed 
16/11/2008. 
18 Added to that is the fact that the Balkan region has played a special role in the development of the 
EU’s common foreign policy via the Union involvement in the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s. 
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(Partnership and Cooperation Agreements), and to some extent China and India. The 
United States and Canada have a partnership status.19 The thematic priorities of the 
policy are the promotion of ‘rule of law, good governance and institution-building’,20 
which is achieved through cooperation on issues, which affect mainly the EU: 
‘migration and asylum; border management and effective control of borders; law 
enforcement cooperation on combating terrorism as well as the fight against 
organised crime, including trafficking in human beings, money laundering and the 
fight against corruption; judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters; assisting 
judiciary and judicial reform in third countries.’21 To achieve the goal of cooperation 
the EU has to resort to ‘soft power’ instruments to make third countries cooperate in 
the fight against crime. These instruments include: legal agreements with a justice, 
freedom and security chapter, common spaces, expert and ministerial meetings, sub-
committees, declarations, action plans and agendas, monitoring and evaluation, and 
not least assistance programmes.22 The assistance programmes consist of financial, 
technical and expert assistance and have been used in the post-communist countries 
undergoing Western devised reform.23
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 The issue of ‘good governance’ is one of UK and US foreign policy priorities and a condition for 
foreign aid (including demands for reforms of criminal justice systems due to human rights concerns) 
required by agencies such as the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for 
International Development (like the ‘Good Government’ initiative of the Department for International 
Development). A. Beck, M. Rowe & A. Willis, ‘Practice & Pitfalls in Providing International Policing 
Assistance’, Police Command Studies International, 2003 [online] at http://www.police-
studies.com/papers/pitfalls.pdf accessed 16/11/2008. In the 1990s the US government also increased 
foreign aid for police reform and rule of law policies in transition or post-conflict states. They spent 
almost $1 billion on rule-of-law programs in 184 countries between 1994 and 1998 (half of it was 
spent in 15 countries, most of them Latin American). D. Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: 
What To Do and How To Do It, Washington: National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs 
[online] http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188742.pdf; accessed 16/11/2008. 
21 European Commission (no date) ‘EUROPA: Justice, freedom and security - an important element in 
the EU’s relations with third countries’  
[online] http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/external/fsj_external_intro_en.htm accessed 15/10/2008. 
22 Ibid. 
23 The use of ‘stick and carrot’ approach of financial assistance is not limited to the candidate 
countries but used with those that are not yet concerned by the accession process. In a report adopted 
by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Human Rights of the European Parliament on the 
Stabilisation and Association Process in the Western Balkans in 2002, it is ‘recommended that the 
European Union refrain from passing to a further stage of the [process] and/or consider the possibility 
of suspending partially or totally the financial assistance to any of the five countries concerned, where 
they do not comply with… four basic political conditions.’ One of these conditions is ‘an active policy 
against organised crime and corruption, including the setting up of adequate intelligence, investigation 
and prosecution structures and the reform of the judicial system.’ Introductory speech by Doris Pack, 
member of the European Parliament and Chairman of the Parliamentary Delegation for Relations with 
SEE, at Working Session on ‘Fighting Corruption and Organised Crime’, Third Parliamentary 
Conference Enhancing Security and Political Stability: Progress on the Stability Pact’, Tirana, 14-16 
October 2002, Stability Pact Parliamentary Troika. 
 150
Finally, the most efficient policy instrument that the EU has for ensuring stability in 
its neighbourhood is enlargement. This instrument appears to be most controversial 
because most of the countries which have applied for membership in the 1990s were 
also perceived as sources of criminality and overall threat to the stability of the EU. 
 
The development of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs and Schengen free travel 
area made enlargement itself come to be perceived as a security threat because by 
‘taking countries which do not yet have efficient border control and judicial systems 
the EU risks internalising security problems.’24 Therefore, as ‘[the] Eastern 
Enlargement is not only a promise of economic prosperity, better life standards and 
political stability, it also represents potential threats to the security dimension of the 
EU. We are referring to problems, which are already known to the Union, such as 
organized crime (drugs, weapons and human trafficking, money laundering), illegal 
immigration and terrorism, but whose scale might become even greater with the 
shifting of the Union’s border eastward and the entrance of the new member states 
into the Schengen area.’25 From this perspective enlargement and the fight against 
organised crime became mutually re-enforcing but also contradicting policies. 
 
5.3. JHA and fighting organised crime as pre-accession requirements 
 
As we have seen, the initiatives in the field of organised crime in relation to 
enlargement were relatively limited before 1998. The underdeveloped framework of 
the JHA aqcuis did not provide enough basis for such initiatives before the JHA’s 
development was speeded up by the Amsterdam Treaty. On the other hand, during 
the first years of the Eastern European transition, the relations between Eastern 
Europe and the EU were more distant and the Western European states were more 
cautious in their dealings with the newly established democracies. The initial contact 
was done through the Association Agreements which the EU signed with some of the 
former communist states, and the issues which later fell into the Justice and Home 
                                                 
24 L. Friis, Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA and all that… Tracing the EU’s ‘Internal Security 
Policy’ towards Central and Eastern Europe, Working Papers. Columbia International Affairs (no 
date) [online] www.ciaonet.org/wps/fr102/frl102.html accessed 29/01/2003.  
25 H. Carrapiço, ‘The European Union’s Eastern Enlargement: a Guarantee of Security or a Security 
Trap?’ Fédéralisme Régionalisme, Vol. 4, 2003-2004 - Régions et sécurité [online] 
http://popups.ulg.ac.be/federalisme/document.php?id=220 accessed 22/04/09. 
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Affairs area were not included in these agreements.26 The agreements were not 
conceived as a route to enlargement at that stage when the priority of the EU was still 
the discussion on ‘deepening’ European integration and dealing with German 
reunification.27 The decision to open up membership to Eastern European members 
was taken at the Copenhagen meeting in 1993 which coined essential requirements 
for membership, and defined the areas of ‘a structured relationship with the 
institutions of the European Union…[as] Community areas, especially with a trans-
European dimension, including energy, environment, transport, science and 
technology, etc.; Common foreign and security policy; Home and judicial affairs.’28 
There was not much cooperation on JHA issues between the EU and its associates in 
the period between 1993 (Copenhagen) and 1997 (decision to open negotiations), 
and commentators even describe that phase as an EU ‘monologue’ describing the EU 
rhetoric and Eastern European reluctance to engage in deeper JHA policies.29  
 
After 1997 when the Amsterdam Treaty prioritised the fight against organised crime 
the pressure from the EU on Eastern European candidates increased under a more 
multi-institutional approach. The applicant countries, and particularly their elites 
which were increasingly legitimising power through subscribing to Western norms, 
accepted the international fight against organised crime issue as a policy area of 
mutual interest. Anti-crime and corruption policies were strong political tools in 
countries with limited political options, and they also attracted approval, funding and 
ultimately EU membership.30 This led to intensification of the activities in the area 
by both sides. This was sealed by the signing of a Pre-Accession Pact on organised 
crime between the member states of the European Union and the Applicant Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus, approved by the JHA Council in May 
                                                 
26 L. Friis, no date, op.cit. Friis also notes that the EU’s fear of Eastern European immigration was not 
properly addressed in the agreements: ‘unlike the Turkish Association Agreement, the Central and 
Eastern European version did not contain any clear provision on free movement of workers.’ 
27 At the same time however, Germany itself was seeking closer cooperation with Eastern Europe, and 
pressured the Schengen countries to lift the visa restrictions to Polish citizens. According to Ferris it 
was Germany who started to advocate enlargement after its unification in order to share the burden of 
its dealings with Eastern Europe and Eastern Europeans. L. Friis,  (no date), op.cit.  
28 Presidency Conclusions. Copenhagen European Council - 21-22 June 1993 [online] 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf accessed 23/10/2008. The meetings in 
these areas were meant to be ‘of an advisory nature’..[and] [n]o decisions would be taken’. 
29 F. Gregory, ‘Good Cops’: Issues related to EU Enlargement and the ‘Police’ requirements of the 
JHA acquis, Working Paper. One Europe or Several Project, 2001 [online] http://www.one-
europe.ac.uk/pdf/w24gregory.pdf accessed 24/10/2008. 
30 Gregory refers to this process as ‘pain for gain’. Ibid. 
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1998.31 The Pact was negotiated during the UK Presidency, whose work programme 
in JHA had an explicit focus on tackling issues such as organised crime, drugs and 
illicit drug trafficking and was linked to previous EU-wide initiatives to counter 
organised crime (some of which were discussed in chapter four), such as the Action 
Plan to combat organised crime and following the Resolution by the Council on the 
prevention of organised crime.32 It was part of a Union-wide increase of scrutiny 
over illegal practices and mismanagement on higher level, one of which resulted in 
mass resignation of the European Commission in 1999.33
 
The Pact was designed to enhance practical co-operation in the JHA areas and 
Europol, envisaging formal agreements with Europol and appointments of liaison 
officers, mutual assistance and multidisciplinary national teams, etc. The Pact 
provided for ‘regular monitoring and evaluation of developments in the field of 
combating organised crime in each of our countries and the definition, as 
appropriate, of priorities applicable to each country. This monitoring and evaluation 
will draw on collective evaluations undertaken by the experts from member states 
and the Commission in the wider framework of the justice and home affairs aspects 
of the enlargement process.’34 The only mechanism for the signatory countries from 
CEE to participate in the formulation of the policies against organised crime on EU 
level was through a group of experts that was planned to be established in connection 
with the Pact. This group would be working on a very basic level, i.e. identification 
of threats, monitoring and evaluation of actions, planning, execution and evaluation 
                                                 
31 Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime Between the Member States of The European Union and 
the Applicant Countries of Central And Eastern Europe and Cyprus (Text approved by the JHA 
Council on 28 May 1998) (98/C 220/01). As to its effects, the Pact was an ambiguous form of 
international agreement. It is a non-binding political declaration of intent by which applicant countries 
express intention to adopt and implement a number of international Conventions to fight organised 
crime (including one on terrorism), mentioned in the European Union’s action plan on organised 
crime. It also encourages the member states to ratify those international agreements mentioned in the 
Pact that have not yet been validated but sets no deadline for that. 
32 The Plan set out measures to be taken within the following two years, one of which was signing a 
pre-accession pact with the CEE countries and Cyprus, Published in OJ C 251, 15.08.1997. The 
Resolution invited the Commission and Europol to prepare a comprehensive report by the end of 
2000, which, among other things, should ‘analyse to what extent ideas and measures for the 
prevention of organised crime could be taken into account in the process of enlargement and relations 
with third States.’ Council Resolution of 21 December 1998, OJ 98/C 408/01.  
33 The resignation came as a result of an expert report which exposed fraud, nepotism and 
mismanagement demonstrated by some members and loss of political control over funds and staff 
appointments by the whole Commission. House of Commons, ‘The Resignation of the European 
Commission’, Research Paper 99/32, 16 March 1999  
[online] http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-032.pdf accessed 22/04/2009. 
34 Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime, op.cit.  
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of projects. The Pact did not envisage participation of the applicant countries in any 
of the other 12 working groups within the Policy and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters.35 Furthermore, despite being a seemingly ‘non-binding’ document 
the Pact actually bound the applicant countries to adopt the EU ‘internal security’ 
framework for which the EU agreed to assist. This assistance would be in the form of 
equipment, logistic support (particularly for cross-border cooperation), exchange of 
police officers, customs officials and judges. The financial assistance would be 
granted from the budgets of PHARE and MEDA programmes (designed for CEE and 
Mediterranean countries), as well as indirect involvement of specific Union 
programmes such as the OSIN, Grotius, Odysseus and Falcone (for training of 
enforcement and judicial officers) programmes. But according to Monar, the Pact 
had made a major step in integrating the signatory countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEECs) into the EU anti-crime agenda, and this integration 
occurred in a situation of power asymmetry, with unequal benefits for the two sides: 
 
In the context of the Pre-accession Pact the CEECs and Cyprus have 
accepted to take the EU’s 1997 Action Plan as a starting point for 
cooperation with the EU, to ‘consider’ (a notable understatement) the 
establishment of similar national bodies, to make as soon as possible the 
necessary preparations enabling them to accede to the Europol 
Convention at the time of accession, to make the ‘statements of good 
practice’ provided for by the Joint Action on good practices in mutual 
legal assistance on criminal matters and to make progress towards 
enacting the legislation enabling them to accede to the 1995 and 1996 EU 
Extradition Conventions by the time of accession. The ‘regime export’ 
could hardly have been put into more concrete terms and – with the threat 
of exclusion looming in the background – the CEECs and Cyprus 
accepted these terms without making any major difficulty. The EU added 
                                                 
35 For a graphic description of the JHA working structure see J. Monar, An Emerging Regime of 
European Governance for Freedom, Security and Justice, ESRC One Europe or Several? Programme 
Briefing Note, 1999, [online] at http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/pdf/Bn2-99.PDF accessed 12/12/2008. 
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a ‘sweetener’ in form of a promise of funding some measures through 
several existing EC programmes.36
 
The Pact, as well as subsequent policies developed with respect to organised crime 
and enlargement, was vaguely defined and sometimes ambiguous. This led to an 
uneven and unsystematic application of the JHA agenda in the whole accession 
process.37 This is a reflection of a complexity which became endemic for the JHA 
area of EU policies, and also the growing belief that the post-communist countries 
had a specific problem with organised crime and public order in general, as discussed 
in the previous section. Although the inclusion of EU requirements in the field of 
crime and immigration control had its precedents (for example, the pressure for 
strengthening of border control of Italy and Greece wishing to join the Schengen 
Agreement), in the case of the Eastern European applicants’ attention given to the 
problem of organised crime and its link to the issue of governance has been much 
more extensive. The candidates had to adopt reforms of all of their criminal justice 
institutions and, what is more, adopt a pro-active anti-crime policy which is not 
customary for institutions which deliver justice such as the court system or prisons. 
In practice this emphasis on institutional reform and institutional ‘capacity building’ 
became a key policy in EU’s relations with its future member-states, and has been 
the main goal of the EU’s policy of assistance to the Eastern European applicants 
throughout the whole path to full EU membership, going beyond the simple adoption 
of the necessary acquis. The assistance provided by the EU was not simply ‘to 
prepare the ground for the next EU enlargement, but also to develop the ability of 
countries with economies in transition to tackle organised crime, thus giving them 
the necessary legal tools and expertise to implement the UN Convention [and acquis] 
properly.’38
 
                                                 
36 J. Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion’, 
ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?, Programme Working Paper, 2000 [online] http://www.one-
europe.ac.uk/pdf/monarW7.PDF accessed 12/12/2008. 
37 According to Steve Peers this was the case even in the JHA part of the 2002 Accession Treaties. S. 
Peers, ‘Statewatch Analysis. The EU accession treaty’, (no date) [online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/feb/analysis.doc accessed 10/11/2005. 
38 European Parliament, ‘The European Union and the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime’, Directorate-General for Research Working Paper, Civil Liberties 
Series, 2001, p.93 [online] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/libe/pdf/116_en.pdf 
accessed 10/11/2007. 
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In the period between 1998 and 2002 there was a remarkable growth of initiatives on 
fighting organised crime in CEE. The modus operandi in all applicant countries was 
as follows:  
 
• Speeding up legislation on organised crime (with a focus on international 
dimensions of organised crime);  
 
• Setting up various agencies for implementation of the new legislation; 
 
• Training the personnel of these agencies, as well as previously existing 
law enforcement institutions – on very specific issues rather than 
global/transnational crime; purchasing equipment; 
 
• Creation of a system for data collection (through training and provision of 
equipment), and establishing contact points for exchange of information 
with EU law enforcement.39  
 
These tasks of the JHA relations between the EU and the applicant countries aimed 
at helping the applicant countries establish or modify their policy with regards to 
organised crime inter alia other JHA issues. However, throughout the accession 
process (1997-2004 and 1997-2007 for Bulgaria and Romania) this policy produced 
dubious results and for Bulgaria and Romania – the Balkan candidates which were 
not integrated as part of the first Eastern Enlargement in 2004 but only joined three 
years later in 2007- all the elements of JHA policy transfer were initially seen to be 
failing or unsatisfactory. 
 
The initiatives on fighting organised crime were much more intensive in the case of 
the Balkans (officially referred to as Southeast Europe, or SEE, to avoid the negative 
connotation of the word ‘Balkan’) and have been more directly linked to issues of 
governance, state-building and security in both soft and hard senses due to the 
alleged link between crime and war. Some of the initiatives have included a London 
                                                 
39 K. Gachevska, ‘Exporting Anti-crime Policies: EU Phare Projects on Fighting Organised Crime’ in 
European Studies Conference Proceedings, University of Rousse Press, 2005, pp.32-37. 
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Conference on Organised Crime in South Eastern Europe which aimed at enhancing 
the political will to fight crime in those states (significantly, the next high level 
conference after the Dayton Peace Conference in 1995); the Thessaloniki Declaration 
on the Western Balkans (June 2003); EU-Western Balkans Forum JHA Ministerial 
Meeting (December 2005); Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) joint 
statement on JHA (February 2006), the Stability Pact initiative on Organised Crime 
(SPOC) board session in Bled (October 2005); the Working Table III meeting in 
Prague (November 2005) – all of which have dealt with the problem of organised 
crime in the Balkans. Added to these are numerous other initiatives and international 
structures established to promote the fight against crime including the establishment 
of a special SECI Regional Centre for Combating Trans-Border Crime in Bucharest, 
Romania in 1999 or the endorsement of the issue of organised crime in the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPOC). However, EU conditionality and financial aid 
assistance for the fight against crime are the key instruments for building the anti-
crime regime in the New Europe. 
  
5.4. Financial assistance for fighting crime: the PHARE programme 
 
PHARE was started as a Community programme in 1989 and its initial aim was 
facilitating the transition to market economy in Poland and Hungary. It was however 
extended to the other CEE – associated, and later applicant – countries.40 In the 
period between 1990 and 1994 the programme’s aim was assistance with economic 
transition and the main areas where the funds were utilised were: ‘private sector 
development and enterprise support; education, health, training and research; 
infrastructure (energy, transport and telecommunications); environment and nuclear 
safety; agricultural restructuring; humanitarian and food aid; public institution and 
administrative reform; and social development and employment.’41 After the Essen 
EU Summit in 1994, the PHARE programme was transformed into a policy 
instrument for enlargement, and its main task was the preparation of the recipients 
                                                 
40 Some of the assistance for non-accession countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FYR 
of Macedonia was also financed by the PHARE budget. PHARE, for a time, became the world’s 
largest assistance programme. A. Pusca ed., European Union: Challenges and Promises of a New 
Enlargement. New York, NY, USA: International Debate Education Association, 2003, p. 33. 
41 G. Pridham, Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans. London, UK: 
Routledge, 1999, p.156. 
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for EU membership.42 The support provided by the programme was in most cases 
technical assistance at governmental and ministerial level whereas the investment 
support was limited. The priority setting, programming, project planning and 
supervision of the implementation were all centrally controlled at the European 
Commission Headquarters in Brussels.43  
 
This arrangement was altered by the decisions of the Luxemburg Summit in 
December 1997 which stated that PHARE would become a key structural instrument 
(similar to the EU Cohesion Fund for member states) which would ‘focus on 
accession by setting two priority aims: the reinforcement of administrative and 
judicial capacity (about 30% of the overall amount) and investments related to the 
adoption and application of the acquis [i.e. the EU’s body of treaties, laws and 
practices] (about 70%).’44 In 1998 PHARE was further re-adjusted via the so-called 
National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in order to develop 
closer relations with the relevant ministries. This change was designed to make the 
assistance more applicant-focused and respond to the individual needs of each 
candidate country, which now had the opportunity to set their own policy agenda. 
Nevertheless, the role of the EU in priority setting had not been altered in practice as 
the priorities identified by individual countries were directly linked to the need to 
comply with EU requirements.45 The EU assistance was presented as ‘demand-
driven’, but was in fact ‘accession-driven’ which put more emphasis on the role of 
the applicant country as a future member-state, rather than a state in its own right.46 
Linking the development agenda to membership also demanded priority be given to 
JHA policies as prescribed by the EU, i.e. changes of criminal law and increased law 
enforcement with a focus on fighting organised crime.47  
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 A. Bothorel, ‘The history and development of the PHARE programme’ in Overview of the PHARE 
Programme and the New Pre-Accession Funds, Proceedings of a seminar at the EU Information 
Centre in Budapest, 1999 [online] http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/PHARE/publist.htm 
accessed 30/07/2004. 
44 G. Pridham, 1999, op.cit , p.157. 
45 In these circumstances the applicant countries’ agenda was in fact an ‘accession agenda’ rather than 
a development and growth agenda.  
46 A. Bothorel, op. cit.  
47 This move to accession prioritisation was an additional complication of the CEE countries’ 
transition because of the multiplication of demands, and their various sources like the local electorate, 
the EU, other international institutions, the USA, etc. In some cases there were contradictions and 
mutual exclusion of some of those demands but the increasing politicisation of EU membership in the 
applicant countries led to increasing convergence of local and EU agendas. Local elites presented 
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 The area of Justice and Home Affairs became a key area in PHARE after 1998. The 
new element in the programme was the so-called twinning strategy meant to 
‘facilitate capacity building or institution building in the applicant countries through 
interaction with EU experts in a joint attempt at developing the structures and 
systems, human resources and management skills needed to implement the acquis’.48 
In 1998 around 30 percent of the PHARE budget was prescribed for institution 
building and the rest was for investment support, i.e. purchase and delivery of 
technical equipment.49 Missions in the JHA area had already started in Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1997, and after 1998, they expanded in nine 
applicant countries from CEE including Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic countries. 
In 1998 25 out of 110 twinning projects amounting to €75 million, were in the area 
of JHA, and the costs for them amounted to €14 million, plus €6 million support 
from the Catch-Up Facility.50 In total, for the period 1997-1999, the budget for 
projects on JHA ‘institution building’ in the applicant countries was approximately 
€50 million, and the number of projects came to approximately 47.51 Most of the 
projects focused on border control, judicial institutions, police training and the fight 
against organised crime in that order of priority.52 The most active partners were 
                                                                                                                                          
membership as panacea for the economic and social ills, not only because of increased investment but 
because of the normative power of the Union which was capable of bringing law and order – an idea 
promoted by the EU itself. 
48 European Commission Enlargement Directorate General, ‘Twinning in Action’, October 2001 
[online] http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement accessed 04/04/2004.
49 A. Bothorel, 1999, op.cit.  
50 The PHARE Programme Annual Report 1998 [online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/PHARE/ar98/index_ar98.htm accessed 30/07/2004. The 
Catch-Up Facility was an additional support programme for Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria, financing projects in areas where problems have been identified by the Commission’s 
Opinions on these countries (one of them being corruption). Ibid. 
51 Different sources give different figures, therefore the numbers mentioned in the text must be 
considered approximate but they nevertheless demonstrate the increasing emphasis on JHA in the 
provision of financial assistance from the EU to its future members. 
52 For the same period, 1998/99, out of 47 projects 18 were on strengthening of the borders and 
customs according to the Schengen requirements; 11 were on strengthening the independence and 
functioning of the judiciary; another 11 were on strengthening law enforcement/police and the rest on 
various issues such as law approximation/adoption. Fight against organised crime is included in 6 
projects only – in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Composite Paper on the 
Commission Reports, October 13, 1999, Annex 4  
[online] http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/annex4_en.pdf accessed 
04/04/2004. 
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Germany (18 projects), France (9 projects), Austria (6 projects), the UK and the 
Netherlands (5 projects each).53  
 
The number of projects in the JHA area in the following three years was 96, which in 
total made 144 projects for the period from 1997 to 2002. The JHA projects came 
second in number only to the area of Public Finance which had 162 projects.54 
Justice and Home Affairs was one of the multi-beneficiary PHARE programmes 
covering the fight against organised crime but issues, connected with a broader 
understanding of organised crime were addressed under other programmes such as 
the Catch-Up Facility (corruption, customs intelligence, the fight against drugs). 
Furthermore, in 2001 the European Commission launched a new project on co-
operation in criminal matters in seven of the candidate countries: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The project leader was 
the United Kingdom, with France and Italy as consultants, and Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Netherlands and Spain contributing expertise.55 All the projects involved 
EU partners with very few exceptions where the projects are managed exclusively by 
the applicant state. There was a disproportional involvement of some member states, 
and especially the UK, compared to other member state partners. Thus the PHARE 
project displayed a peculiar ‘division of labour’ among the EU member states where 
experts from the UK, for example, were particularly active in the measures against 
organised crime with regards to police training and identification of necessary 
technical equipment, etc. Developing law enforcement/policing and use of the latest 
                                                 
53 There was a geographical division of countries of ‘interest’ for example the Scandinavian member 
states are most active in the Baltic republics, Germany had interests in Central European candidates, 
etc. As the JHA is a territorial policy area, such regional cooperation was necessary. However, in 
cases such as transfer of know-how and expertise such considerations were not necessary but the EU 
did encourage ‘twinning’, seen as more important than the actual quality of assistance. Thus, a Joint 
Action adopted by the Council for establishing a mechanism for collective evaluation of the JHA 
acquis implementation by the applicants allows for one or more member states to ‘give particular 
assistance in preparing and maintaining for a particular candidate comprehensive reports which would 
form the basis of evaluation’, Joint Action OC 98/429/JHA. 
54 European Commission, Towards The Enlarged Union, Strategy Paper and Report of the European 
Commission on the Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 2002 
[online] http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ accessed 04/04/2004; Enlargement Strategy Paper 
Report on progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries [online] 
http://europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/strat_en.pdf accessed 04/04/2004. There is 
no detailed information on the type of the projects in the Strategy Papers (former Composite Paper) 
after 1998. Only the one published in 1998 (see note 19) provides such information. The subsequent 
reports give only the number of projects. 
55 Enlargement Weekly – 22 March 2001 [online] 
 http://europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/weekly_190301.htm accessed 16/04/2004. 
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technology in the fight against crime is a priority of the UK’s domestic criminal 
justice policy,56 which it had successfully exported to EU anti-crime policy.57  
 
The external financial regulations of the Union stipulate the rules for granting funds 
under PHARE and other programmes.58 The PHARE projects were to be carried out 
by natural or legal entities from the public or private sphere, after open or restricted 
tenders. Those entities have to be established and conduct their business in an EU 
member state or in one of the programmes’ beneficiary countries but there was no 
specific requirement regarding ownership, i.e. they could still be EU-based company 
affiliates. The individual experts to be involved in a PHARE project must also be 
nationals of a member state or PHARE country. The same rule applied to supplies, 
which had to originate in the EU or in PHARE countries. Exceptions were rare and 
these rules were even further tightened.59 The provision of expertise and supplies has 
been predominantly, if not exclusively, from the EU countries. Since the accession 
requirements oblige the applicant countries to comply with EU standards, these 
standards would subsequently require the technical supplies and expertise from EU 
countries, even in areas where no clear EU standards exist, such as policing.  
 
The PHARE aid programme was in practice funding the transfer of expertise and 
technical products from the Union to the applicant countries. The fact that there was 
no requirement of ownership of the companies involved in the projects would mean 
that even if it seemed that it was a local company from a PHARE country, it might 
well not be. Measures to increase transparency of the tenders and contracts have been 
undertaken but they did not substantially change the EU driven ‘demand – supply’ 
                                                 
56 See for example the List of UK Presidency seminars and special events, where half of the events (4 
out of 8) focus on technology in the fight against crime (originating from the EU and North America) 
at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/euro/relat.htm accessed 25 March 2004. 
57 The involvement of the UK in reforming the justice and police sectors in the applicant countries is a 
result of a very active British intelligence sector. This activity has even led to accusations against the 
UK for using its intelligence services’ assets for industrial espionage on European countries, in 
collaboration with American intelligence, which have been covering this activity with its fighting 
crime objectives, amongst other things. CORDIS News, Liikanden responds to Echelon spy network 
claims, 4 April 2003. Although the case was not proven, such suspicions amongst EU member states 
have led to problems over the transfer of data, and general distrust among EU members. 
58 EU Financial Regulation, Title IX ‘Special Provisions applicable to External Aid’; PHARE 
Regulation - Council Regulation 3906/89 and subsequent amendments. 
59 F. O’Shaughnessy, ‘PHARE tendering procedures and sources of information on PHARE’ in 
Overview of the PHARE Programme and the New Pre-Accession Funds, Proceedings of a seminar at 
the EU Information Centre in Budapest, 1999.  
[online] http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/PHARE/publist.htm accessed 30/07/2004.  
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circle. As a result, even projects that were prepared by the PHARE countries set their 
objectives according to EU requirements and activities that would receive funding by 
the Union instead of prioritising their own agenda, or alternative and/or home-based 
providers.60 Assets that did not comply with PHARE requirements are supposed to 
be provided by the applicant country and only if that country could afford funding 
from the national budget. As a result of these arrangements, the JHA projects under 
PHARE were often tailored to fit what a given institution could provide as expertise 
or equipment, with less regard to the real crime situation in the recipient country. The 
purchase of EU-made equipment has been a controversial strategy as well, since that 
created a technological dependence that had to be funded by national budgets in the 
future.  
 
It needs to be stressed that in itself, the size of the financial aid channelled through 
PHARE was not significant compared to the overall budget of the EU, and the 
budgets of the applicant countries.61 However, the amount spent on JHA within 
PHARE grew from the start of the programme, which re-enforced the clear signs to 
the applicants of how politically significant this area would be for their future 
accession. The requirements which the PHARE programme was designed to meet 
became a priority in the applicants’ internal policies, and this was valid for the area 
of crime fighting and all associated policies such as border control, immigration and 
visa policies, etc. The relevant authorities in the applicant countries established 
special bodies and departments within ministries in order to administer the financial 
aid and those bodies had substantial influence within the government structures 
despite being funded by external bodies. The PHARE-funded transfer of expertise 
and influence on the agenda-setting of the applicants has led to the new anti-crime 
policies in the applicant countries being indirectly influenced by the EU requirements 
and the activities financed by these projects.  
                                                 
60 The design of those projects, on the other hand, often involved firms and experts from the EU. The 
rule (introduced the 1997) that firms that have been engaged in the project preparation cannot 
participate in the tender does not affect the possibility of those firms being linked, for example as 
previous partners, with companies bidding for the project. 
61 The whole pre-accession aid forms around 1.7% of the EU budget which collects around 1% of its 
member states GNP. See for example T. Wynn, ‘The EU Budget - Public Perception & Fact. The 
European Union - how much does it cost, where does the money go and why is it criticised so much?’, 
Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament  
[online] http://www.terrywynn.com/Budget/EU%20Budget%20-%20Perception%20&%20Fact.htm 
accessed 21/04/2009. 
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5.5. PHARE projects in practice 
 
The PHARE programme continued to be a channel of financial ‘assistance’ for the 
CEE applicant countries after 2000. In that year two other programmes were 
introduced – ISPA (for large-scale infrastructure projects) and SAPARD (for 
adoption of the acquis in the field of agriculture and rural development). PHARE 
was entirely devoted to institution building (30% of the funding) and acquis related 
investment (70%), and apparently was seen as more important than the other two 
because it accounted for half of the financial assistance for those countries.62  
 
Agenda 2000 set up the sources of the ‘accession-driven’ priorities of PHARE: the 
Accession Partnerships (first approved in 1997) and the National Programmes of the 
individual countries. Both documents list the problem areas for each individual 
country, and the issue of organised crime is one of those areas common to all 
applicants. The Accession Partnerships give a more general description of necessary 
measures as short-term and medium-term priorities. The short-term priorities were: 
implementing policy on organised crime, corruption and economic crime 
(legislation; implementing structures; sufficiently qualified staff; better co-operation 
between institutions); and the medium-term priorities were usually: continuing the 
fight against organised crime, trafficking in women and children, drugs trafficking, 
money laundering and corruption. The National Programmes were more specific and 
formulated particular actions to be undertaken, such as adoption or 
amendment/harmonisation of concrete laws, improvement of strategies on the fight 
against organised crime; creation or restructuring of relevant institutions; training of 
law enforcement staff; improving the quality of technical equipment of units dealing 
with organised crime.  
 
Reports on enlargement frequently stress the importance of those measure and most 
cases (individual countries’ reports) identify the lack of or insufficient progress in the 
fight against organised crime. Yet, the percentage of projects and funds from 
                                                 
62 European Commission, The Enlargement Process and the Three Pre-accession Instruments: 
PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD Proceedings of conference organised by DG Enlargement and the Permanent 
Representatations of Sweden and Austria to the European Union on 5th March 2001, European 
Commission Enlargement Directorate General, February 2002 [online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/PHARE/publist.htm accessed 30/07/2004. 
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PHARE on projects directly connected with crime and law enforcement is relatively 
small compared to those allocated to other aspects of JHA. The main objectives in 
those PHARE projects that were linked, in one way or the other, with the fight 
against organised crime, were the adoption of specific legislation and 
strengthening/creation of specific institutions. The activities meant to achieve that 
were: training of personnel, preparation of plans and programmes, and purchase of 
technical equipment. There were a number of projects, whose general description, 
justification and budget were laid down in project fiches.63 These fiches describe a 
project but do not contain any analysis of the crime situation in the relevant country 
and the objectives set up are mainly stated as fulfilment of the EU requirements and 
compliance to EU standards.64 Consequently, the main sources of verification of the 
results and achievements of the project are the Commission reports on enlargement 
and other reviews and reports of international organisations and institutions (such as 
the OECD, IMF, World Bank, etc.). 65  
 
A few of those project fiches will be briefly discussed here. Although other projects 
are also concerned (mainly or partly) with the issue of organised crime, the ones 
discussed below are selected as representative of the overall assistance policy and the 
general conclusions drawn from their analysis could be applied to all projects. The 
selected examples represent the three main objectives of the PHARE funding for 
JHA: adoption or harmonisation of legislation (organised crime or forms of 
organised crime), strengthening or creation of institutions (law enforcement and 
judiciary, and intermediary agencies) and provision of equipment, which is in fact 
the main activity of most projects.  
 
Project fiche ‘BG 0103.07 Bulgaria Combating money laundering’ is one of the 
examples of an effort to exert pressure on the legislative process and re-structuring of 
                                                 
63 At the time of writing these fiches were archived on the EU website 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/index.cfm accessed 13/04/2009. 
64 The phrase ‘European standards’, as well as ‘compliance’ to these are mentioned all project fiches, 
and especially in the main goals of the projects. However, no specific reference is given in any of the 
documents. It is not clear what is meant by ‘European’ either, and if this is an EU standard or 
European as distinct from Asian for example. 
65 It should be noted that the projects identify national sources of verification (competent institutions 
and in some cases - the media), as well. However, since the overall objective of the projects is 
compliance to EU requirements, those sources would be less important. 
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institutions.66 The overall objective was strengthening the system for prevention of 
money laundering, and the main stated purpose of the activities was the 
harmonisation of legislation. This is an example of direct involvement of the PHARE 
programme in the democratic process in Bulgaria as EU experts, rather than a 
Parliamentary commission carried out the assessment of legislation. However, the 
actual activities in the Project come down to organising a seminar in which EU 
experts would help with the assessment of the anti-money laundering legislation, and 
also preparation of a set of measures (preferably by ‘legal experts’) for improvement 
of the legal capacity for prosecuting money laundering. The strengthening of the 
institutions comes down to establishing an independent Bureau of Financial 
Intelligence, or BFI (i.e. establishing this body as separate from its predecessor, the 
Directorate at the Ministry of Finance) restructuring it into an independent 
administrative body – Agency, which would function within the same ministry and 
would be gathering its information mainly from that Ministry but without being 
under its control. The justification for this lack of control from the executive power 
was the argument that BFI would not have ‘investigative power of the police and 
investigative authorities’. Its functions are ‘to store, examine, analyse and disclose’ 
information to the respective competent authorities, which include ‘competent 
authorities abroad’. Therefore, the Project’s activity in connection with the BFI was 
designing the latter by following a model from its EU partners. The general activities 
of the project are: developing plans, strategies, methodologies, as well as feasibility 
studies and consultations with EU IT experts for the purchase of equipment that is to 
be financed by subsequent PHARE projects.67
 
The budget of the project was €1.2 million, exclusively for ‘institutional 
strengthening’ and provided only by PHARE (with no national co-financing). The 
financial resources were to be allocated almost exclusively for about 30 experts from 
EU member state(s). Only one project leader from Bulgaria was envisaged and 
he/she would be responsible only for the Twinning Covenant. This would mean that 
about €40 000 would be spent on each expert (but proportions would vary). 
                                                 
66 Summary Project Fiche. Combating [sic] money laundering. Désirée number: BG 0103.07. 
Twinning code: BG/IB/2001-JH-03 Location: Sofia-Bulgaria [online] 
 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/bg0103-07-money_laundering.pdf accessed 
01/04/2005.
67 All quotes in this section are taken from the relevant project fiche.  
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Furthermore, one of those experts would be employed for 12 months and probably 
another one for the same period (project leader). The rest would be experts on short 
or medium term contracts, the duration of which were respectively 20 and 40/60 
days. Thus the lump sum of €1.2 million would be spent on EU experts, most of 
whom would spend less than two months working on the project.68 The purchase of 
equipment and the provision of training lack any justification other than compliance 
to EU requirements.  
 
The Project fiche ‘CZ01-07-07 Czech Republic Improving the Fight Against Violent 
and Organised Crime’ is directly connected with the main issue of organised crime.69 
The overall objective of this project is achieving ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities’, but the project’s purpose is focused on law enforcement institutions 
and their fight against violent and organised crime. The project envisaged an 
improvement of the fight against organised crime through the purchase of equipment 
from EU manufacturers, training from EU experts and study visits. The project fiche 
states that the Czech police were in need of two sequencers for the national DNA 
database but as these are manufactured outside the EU, the national budget is 
supposed to cover the expenses, but only if it could afford it. Otherwise, as stated in 
the fiche, the sequencers would not be purchased at all. There is no analysis of how 
these activities would improve the fight against organised crime or strengthen the 
institutions fighting against organised crime.  
 
The budget of the project amounts to €2.40 million, of which €1.8 million was 
provided by PHARE and €0.60 million from national co-financing. However, more 
than a half of the national co-financing, €0.35 million, was to be spent on the two 
sequencers that cannot be purchased through PHARE, and the rest, €0.25 million, 
was allocated for the National Headquarters against Forgery (including the 
establishment of a special technical-analytical unit of 4 experts), namely purchasing 
                                                 
68 The same project fiches mentions other PHARE funding for BFI through other projects, namely a 
significantly lower sum of €5 000 for software. It can be assumed that the software was bought from 
EU firms, according to PHARE regulations. 
69 Standard Summary Project Fiche. Improving the Fight against Violent and Organised Crime. 
Désirée Number: CZ01-07-07. Twinning Number: CZ01/IB/JH/06-TL. Location: Police Presidium, 
Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic.  
[online] http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/open_document_fp.cfm?do_id=30792 accessed 
1/04/2005. 
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a spectral comparator, colour laser printer, electronic detection system, video 
microscope, 2 notebooks, digital camera, etc. The budget for twinning was €0.15 
million, provided by PHARE, where the national contribution would be ‘in the form 
of provision of offices, working environment, etc.’ in ‘total price of more than €0.3 
million. The leader of the project for improvement of the fight against organised 
crime had to come from EU member state and was supposed to work for four weeks 
only, of which two in the Czech Republic, and two – in his home country. The 
funding for that Project Leader was €15.000 and his task was to co-ordinate and 
ensure that the short-term experts were providing training and study visits of Czech 
experts to the member states. The total of €135.000 was to be spent on training and 
study visits, €40.000 for short-term experts from EU member states.  
 
The project fiche was not very clear about exact allocation of the funds. Thus, €2.05 
million, or about 85% from the total budget of €2.40 million, was to be spent on 
equipment produced in the EU and EU experts in the field of countering organised 
crime, as well as travel expenses for visits. It must be added that 12 % of this money 
came from the Czech national budget – €250 000. This national contribution looks 
small compared to the overall size of the project but seen from a different 
perspective, it was more than half of the annual budget of the Czech Institute of 
Criminalistics for research and development projects (approx. €0.4 million as stated 
in the same project fiche).70 The insufficient funding for research on new 
technologies conducted in the Czech Republic is hinted at by the authors of the 
project fiche as a critique of the EU policy of restricting the purchase of equipment to 
EU-made products.  
 
                                                 
70 The fight against organised crime has partly or fully justified funds under other projects in the 
Czech Republic. These include: Project CZ9810-02 Strengthening of the Institutions of Law 
Enforcement/Asylum Institutions, which includes a professional training programme for police 
officers and Ministry of Interior staff in problems of combating organised crime; CZ 9904-01-03 
Strengthening Institutions in their Fight against Organised Crime - improvement on analytical 
methodology of investigation and thus strengthening the fight against organised crime and mainly 
drugs, illegal treatment of nuclear materials, protection against terrorism (it supplied technologies for 
DNA analysis and drug profiling, laboratories for investigation of banknote forgery, for identification 
of stolen vehicles, detection of radioactive materials, etc.); CZ 2000-06-01 Strengthening the Fight 
against Organised Crime - provides support for implementation of the governmental policy against 
OC, as well as some software equipment, training, witness protection, etc.  
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Another project involving activities in the legislation sphere is Project fiche 
LE01.04.03 Latvia: Preventing, combating and reducing organised crime.71 Although 
the project fiche states that ‘the activities of this project will be more concentrated to 
prevention of organised crime’ [sic], the project is exclusively focused on law 
enforcement and involves the relevant institutions of the State Police, Prosecution 
Office, State Revenue Service, and Ministry of Justice. The main objective, as stated 
in the fiche, is: ‘[the]effective reduction and combat of organized crime, including 
money laundering’, and the immediate objective is: ‘[to] increase capacity and co-
operation between involved institutions, improve training and education process of 
personnel, improve the cross-border surveillance mechanism and ensure effective 
implementation of witness protection program’. The envisaged activities are: 
 
• Development of Common long-term strategy and Action plan in the field of 
prevention and combat of organised crime inter alia introducing elements from 
EU second money laundering directive as well as determining corruption as 
predicative crime. 
• Preparation of an assessment report on present situation including analysis 
of legislation (criminalization of membership of organised-crime groups as 
defined in the acquis and the criminalization of legal persons involved in 
bribing and money laundering and legal protection for ‘whistle blowers’, clear 
rules for party financing); co-operation in Latvia; international co-operation; 
criminal activities (economic crimes, drugs, money-laundering etc.), including 
risk assessment. 
• Preparation of necessary amendments in the legislation, including 
harmonising Latvian legislation in the field of cross-border surveillance. 
• Seminars on inter-ministerial cooperation issues: workshop for high level 
policy makers and 6 seminars for officers of involved institutions in the field of 
prevention of organised crime.  
 
These activities were closely linked with the country’s accession to the EU and its 
JHA requirements, and the actual reports and assessments, as well as legislative 
                                                 
71 Standard Summary Project Fiche. Preventing, Combating And Reducing Organised Crime Désirée 
Number: Le01.04.03. Twinning Number: Lv/2001/Ib-Jh/02. Location: Latvia [online] 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/le0104-03-organisedcrime.pdf accessed 
01/04/2005. 
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proposals would be prepared in close coordination with EU experts. The project fiche 
itself states that: ‘the EU expertise is necessary to assist the Latvian law enforcement 
authorities and inter-ministerial bodies including the Crime Prevention Council to 
audit the current situation and prepare the crime prevention strategy in Latvia similar 
to the EU crime prevention strategy.’72  
 
The improvement of the training process of involved institutions was to be achieved 
through establishment of modern training classrooms for all involved institutions 
(computers, servers, projectors, screens, video cameras, TV sets, video recorders, 
overhead projectors, photocopiers).73 The effective witness protection programme 
was to be ensured through properly equipped courtrooms (conferencing software 
server, 4 video cameras, sound system, 2 video screens, voice and image 
modification programs, workstation, installation) and increased public confidence in 
the process of protection of witnesses. The only investment in equipment in that 
project was for those two objectives, namely 4 classrooms and courtrooms. It 
accounted for around 43% of the total budget (€1 397 000) – €611 000, where €153 
000 was from national co-financing. The rest of the budget was dedicated to 
institution building – €780 000 (€70 000 of which from national budget), and 
technical assistance – €6 000 (exclusively from the national budget). Essentially, the 
PHARE budget for ‘twinning’ (€650 000) was to be spent on 8 experts from EU 
states, seven of whom would be, in effect, employed for a short-term period. 
Although the fiche was not clear about the rest of the funds, they would presumably 
cover the rest of the expenses such as rooms, travel costs, one local expert, etc (€70 
000). Only the PHARE financing would be a subject of contracting according to the 
fiche: Contract1: Twinning covenant – €650 000; Contract2: Supply contract –  
                                                 
72 Ibid, p.2. 
73 The setting up of these classrooms was a key concern of the authors of the project and this was 
justified as follows: ‘All in the project involved institutions have presently no special and equipped 
training classrooms, where they could organise training and seminars for already working personnel 
on different issues of organised crime. Therefore it is necessary to establish such training classrooms, 
which will improve training conditions of personnel. The State Police has the possibility to send their 
officers to the Police Academy for qualification courses, but they are for charge. The establishment of 
training classrooms will give the possibility to improve the training process in each institution, as well 
as will be as a base for effective implementation of in the frame of this project developed training 
programmes. These classrooms will allow it to organise the training on two levels: theoretical and 
practical – officers can study theory and at the same time use their knowledge practically trough 
training on computers. These classrooms will also allow organise more practical seminars on different 
seminars on organised crime and involve in the training more working personnel of involved 
institutions. That will raise the capacity of fulfilment of functions of involved institutions and improve 
crime prevention process’ [sic]. Ibid. 
 169
€458000; Contract3: Technical assistance – €60 000, which amounted to the total 
PHARE contribution. This would effectively mean that the money from the national 
budget (the rest €229 000) was not subject to the PHARE rules, and was not going be 
granted to EU companies and EU experts (i.e. it would remain in the country). 
 
The project LT010701 Lithuania: Strengthen the Fight against Organised Crime 
through the Establishment of the National Europol Bureau and Upgrading the 
Forensic Science Service (FSS) central laboratory is another case of ambiguous 
institutional development.74 This was a project for the establishment of an institution 
that would be linked with an external body, i.e. Europol, where national control over 
its activities is weakened. After being ratified by the Seimas (the Lithuanian 
parliament) the agreement with Europol would be valid as a law. However, at the 
time of the agreement’s signing, the links with Europol fell into the category of 
‘assumptions’. As the project fiche states in its Annex 8 ‘Background and 
Justification’: 
 
Currently information on organised crime is collected, analysed and stored 
in the Organised Crime Investigation Service located within the structure 
of the Criminal Police of the Police Department at MIA. Concerning 
information possessed by Europol, up to now Lithuania has not received 
any information from it. According to the requirements of Europol 
convention, Europol was created to co-ordinate the fight against organised 
crime among member states and it is a closed organisation, which bases its 
co-operation with third countries only on signed agreements. The EU has 
made a political decision to sign agreements with the third countries only 
at the beginning of the year 2000. Though the International Co-operation 
Service and the Interpol Lithuanian National Bureau of the Police 
Department at MIA were sending information of strategic character on 
separate issues to the Central Europol Bureau, but this was done 
unilaterally.75
                                                 
74 Standard Summary Project Fiche. Strengthen the Fight against Organised Crime through the 
Establishment of the National EUROPOL Bureau and Upgrading the Forensic Science Service 
Central Laboratory. Désirée Number: LT 01.07.01.  
75 There was no expectation that this flow of information would become bilateral before accession of 
Lithuania to the EU. Given the fact that Europol has been seriously criticised for lack of democratic 
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 The project dealt primarily with the practical arrangements for the establishment of 
the national Europol Bureau. These included: preparing a ‘proposal for operational 
rules of the National Europol Bureau and their implementation methods drafted 
corresponding to the requirements of the Central Europol Bureau, and covering, inter 
alia, principles of activity, working principles according to the Europol Convention 
and other related EU documents’; and also the purchase of appropriate data 
processing and communication systems designed as required by the Central Europol 
Bureau, and the preparation of training programmes concerning the use of all new 
systems.76
 
The budget of the project was quite significant – €5.5 million in total, of which €3 
million was provided by PHARE, and the remaining €2.5 million from the national 
budget. The striking detail in the budget was the allocation of the bigger part of the 
national contribution, namely ‘investment in purchase, renovation and also adaptation 
of premises for laboratory purposes’ for FSS (€2.2 million). Additionally, the co-
financing funds relating to investment components and amounting to €2.25 million 
‘[would] be contracted separately before the Twinning and Training Package 
commences’, and presumably outside the framework of the project. Essentially, the 
establishment of the National Bureau would be financed by PHARE, which allots 
only €0.25million for hardware and software, and €0.3 million for twinning and 
training, to which €0.1 million for technical assistance could be added. The larger 
                                                                                                                                          
oversight, this case would be even greater because Lithuania, as well as all the rest of the applicant 
countries, did not have access to the decision making process in the JHA framework. Furthermore, the 
information dispatched to Europol would probably be collected from various national institutions 
because the project envisaged the establishment of communications links to ‘police sub-divisions of 
10 counties of Lithuania, and…direct links to other competent law enforcement institutions. These 
[would] include the Customs Department at Ministry of Finance, State Border Protection Service, 
Migration Department at MIA, Prosecutor General’s Office, Special Investigation Service, and in 
cases of terrorism the State Security Department’. 
76 The other part of the project contained similar arrangements for the Forensic Science Service 
Central Laboratory: a proposal for appropriate analytical equipment and modern databases; assistance 
provided for establishing working contacts to international suppliers of reagents and other operational 
material; proposals for setting up the new quality assurance unit at the FSS Central Laboratory; 
training programmes designed to instruct seventy specialists of the FSS Central Laboratory and a 
selected number of FSI specialists in operating the new equipment and using the databases acquired 
under the project; the programme for the dissemination of information on new examination methods 
targeted at some 80 judges and prosecutors and 20 representatives of law enforcement institutions. 
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portion of the funds was to be spent on analytical equipment for FSS (€1.55 million), 
as well as twinning and training of the latter (€0.8 million).77  
 
The scope of the PHARE projects, following the logic of the expansive involvement 
of the EU in building the JHA capacity of the applicant countries, covered even areas 
such as the prison service. An example was the project PL01.03.10 Poland: 
Strengthening the capacity of the Services of the Administration of Justice in Poland 
to combat organised crime and carry out international legal co-operation.78 The 
objective of the project was: improving the effectiveness of the Prosecution Service 
and Prison Service in combating organised crime; improving international co-
operation in criminal and civil matters; preparation of the Polish justice system for 
participation in the European Judicial Network that operated on the basis of the Joint 
Action of 29 July 1998 on the creation of a European Judicial Network. In practice, 
the activities would involve, apart from training and data transmission, ‘establishing 
the network of judges and prosecutors – consultants in international co-operation – 
who would afford assistance in executing foreign requests and preparing requests for 
co-operation issued by Polish judges and prosecutors, carry out subject-training for 
judges, prosecutors, and judge's and prosecutor's trainees, and serve as ‘contact 
points’. The project planned also to establish ‘the electronic database that facilitates 
access to information necessary to carry out the international co-operation and that 
contains bodies of legal acts, other documents and analyses, forms of requests for 
assistance, and practical information such as addresses of competent foreign 
institutions’.  
 
In practice, the strengthening of the Polish administration was to be achieved 
through: further training of the prosecutors involved in combating of OC – training 
and study visits, purchase and installation of hardware and computer networks; 
additionally, the project envisaged delivering training to the Prison Service staff 
                                                 
77 FSS’s role in the fight against organised crime was not particularly significant. In 1999, FSS had 
conducted 9792 examinations, more than half of which on materials, products, and mainly food 
products (the latter are more than a third - 3400).  
78 Standard Project Fiche. Justice - organized crime and international co-operation. Strengthening the 
capacity of the Services of the Administration of Justice in Poland to combat organised crime and 
carry out international legal co-operation. Number: PL01.03.10 Twinning number: PL/IB/2001/JH/02. 
Location: Poland  
[online] http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/open_document_fp.cfm?do_id=28712 accessed 
01/04/2005. 
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involved in combating organised crime and providing the units of the Prison Service 
covered by the project with an up-to-date IT system to facilitate collecting, 
processing and transferring data between the Prison Service and other relevant 
agencies (Prosecution Service, Police, Border Guard, etc.) involved in combating of 
organised crime.79 Another detail was the plan to establish ‘positions of judges- and 
prosecutors-consultants' for international co-operation and the selection of judges 
and prosecutors to take those positions. The position of judge-consultant of 
international co-operation and prosecutor-consultant of international co-operation 
would be established within the courts of justice and prosecutors offices structure, 
and appointed judges and prosecutors would receive a monthly bonus, (the costs 
mentioned above would be covered by the Beneficiary). The total budget of the 
project was €6.8 million, of which €4.9 was from PHARE, and €1.9 – national co-
financing. Twinning and TA co-financing would comprise Polish experts 
participation, lease of audio and translation equipment, international tickets, etc.) – 
€0.95 million and the same amount in total for hardware – €0,75 million and 
software – €0.2 million. In total, €4.35 million was allotted for hardware and 
software, and the rest of the budget €2.45 million – for institution building where the 
foreign experts’ expenses (€1.5million) were covered by PHARE only. 
 
The last project to be discussed is PL01.03.09 Poland: Fight against crime II, which 
had the more straightforward objective: Reaching compliance with priorities 
included in ‘Accession Partnership’ and ‘National Programme of Approaching 
Accession’ regarding Titles IV TEC and VI TEU.80 The purpose of the project 
reflected the key purpose of the EU-wide efforts in combating organised crime: 
information gathering and data exchange. The project had the following objectives: 
                                                 
79 This involvement of the Prison Service in the project is explained as follows: ‘…Inmates 
originating from structures of organised crime represent large threat, not only to the public but also to 
penitentiary establishments and other inmates and staff. Efficient contribution of the Prison Service to 
combating of organised crime depends on many various factors. However, as in case of the 
Prosecution Service, issues related to providing the Prison Service with up-to-date equipment and 
system to capture and analyse data and improving professional skills of the Prison Service staff are the 
most important.’ Ibid, p.2. In practice this would mean that suspect in pre-trial detention (i.e. not even 
convicted) would be under surveillance, and, for example, information about any potential visitor or 
contact would eventually be transferred through the information system to central authorities or even 
Europol. Even if this seems improbable, it is interesting that such a possibility has been funded by 
PHARE. 
80 Standard Project Fiche. Fight against crime II. Location: Poland. PL01.03.09  
[online] http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/open_document_fp.cfm?do_id=28711; accessed 
01/04/2005. 
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improvement of Police data transmission infrastructure and creation of conditions for 
setting up of national centres of Schengen Information System and Europol; 
extension of access to central database of Police National Information System, AFIS 
and the other IT Police databases (in particular DNA); acceleration of information 
transfer, including data sent to the criminal information centre and the Border Guard; 
creation of national network of computer crime counteracting posts and 
strengthening the structure within the Police responsible for the European integration 
process; improving efficiency in crime combat, including organised crime and drug 
trafficking through building of teletransmission networks in the area of most affected 
voivodships (regions). This project has the biggest budget of all discussed above – 
€9.1 million, of which €6.8 million from PHARE, and €2.3 million from national co-
financing. The whole budget was investment and there was no trace of institution 
building. Thus the activities are be listed a follows: carrying on tenders; purchase of 
equipment; distribution of purchased equipment between relevant police services; 
beginning of use of the equipment by officers of the Police.81
 
5.6. PHARE projects rationale and outcomes  
 
The PHARE projects provide an example of the external dimension of the anti-
organised crime policy of the European Union. In essence this policy involved the 
transfer or export of policies, know-how and equipment from existing to future 
member states. For some observers this is a variation of the policy of state-building – 
a concept developed in the 1970s which was re-interpreted in the post-Cold War era 
and used for reconstruction of post-conflict countries, usually where there had been a 
direct interference in the conflict by the West.82 In the case of the applicant countries 
this was not limited to the creation of legitimate and sustainable (i.e. strong) 
institutions for weak states but creating institutions required by a particular type of 
state, i.e. a future EU member-state. This policy is effectively a variation of state-
building which can be described as ‘member-state’ building. According to the 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 In some cases such policy was seen as successful such as the post-colonial experience of British 
experts sent to built a democratic state. For a critique of the contemporary application of such policies 
see D. Chandler, ‘International State-Building: Beyond Conditionality, Beyond Sovereignty’ Guest 
Seminar, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), Brussels, 17 November 2005 
[online] http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/CSDCHandlerInternationalState-Building180206.pdf 
accessed 11/11/2008.  
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European Stability Initiative (an NGO) for example, conceptually member-state 
building consists of three elements: ‘an administrative revolution, a process of social 
and economic convergence, and a shift in the substance and processes of democratic 
governance’, whereby:  
 
The administrative revolution begins with joint teams of national officials 
and European Commission staff gauging the country's laws, policies, and 
institutional structures against the 31 chapters of the acquis communautaire 
– the EU's legislation, policies, and standards. Adopting and implementing 
the acquis requires undertaking a comprehensive reassessment of the role 
of government, reforming old policies, and extending the state into new 
fields of activity. It entails reviewing the functions of government 
institutions, rationalizing existing structures, and creating new ones. It also 
involves drafting a great deal of new legislation to implement European 
norms and the rules of the single market. The Commission offers technical 
assistance, typically by pairing officials from EU member states with 
counterpart institutions in candidate countries. There is a rigorous annual 
review of progress, which is made public in a hard-hitting Commission 
report. 83
 
This was the policy rationale for the PHARE projects on organised crime, which 
have focused on the EU membership conditions in the area of JHA and the building 
of an EU anti-crime institutional network in which the new member states had to 
participate even before joining the Union. Moreover they went beyond simple law 
enforcement and touched areas where existing EU member states have preserved 
their national sovereignty, and particularly the legislative process and parliamentary 
control. The EU projects discussed in this chapter would go on to have direct 
consequences upon the adoption of anti-crime legislation, and the formulation of 
criminal justice policies in the recipient countries.84 In practice, however, the 
                                                 
83 European Stability Initiative (no date) Member state Building.  
[online] http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=302; accessed 11/11/2008 (italics in original).
84 In the case of the project on Combating Money Laundering in Bulgaria, for example, which was 
implemented by the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies, a full assessment of the Bulgarian money 
laundering system was conducted and a number of the recommendations made by the project were 
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organised crime/JHA projects funded under PHARE and other programmes, have 
served to extend the geographical scope of the developing EU crime and security 
governance structure. This was done by direct influence on the applicant countries’ 
criminal legislation, the restructuring of criminal justice institutions, and the creation 
of new agencies with vaguely defined responsibilities and powers and with weakened 
control from the national democratic institutions, i.e. parliamentary control. The 
transfer of expertise in the area of crime fighting, and the creation of links with 
member states or EU law enforcement structures has also served to reinforce a 
dependency on externally defined policies and priorities while undergoing a major 
institutional reform.85  
 
Although there are some positive evaluations of the policy transfer through 
Western/EU assistance in the criminal justice area,86 most analyses of the policy, 
including official enquiries, tend to find faults though usually at a micro-policy level. 
The essence of an asymmetrical relationship is that what seems a small amount to 
one side may not be to the other. Equally the power imbalance allows for possible 
casual irrationalities that the weaker party has simply to accept. The twinning 
strategy, for example, proved to be problematic as it was difficult to coordinate the 
activities of different partners. A research paper on police training in Lithuania, for 
example, mentions an incident connected with a UK course on organised crime 
policing being delivered to a Lithuanian police audience – ‘the audience was found 
to be quite knowledgeable on the subject, a similar course had been delivered by the 
French police a few weeks before the British course’.87 The policy of providing 
equipment and training was found to be insufficient in some cases: The UK’s 
                                                                                                                                          
considered in the subsequent amendments of Bulgarian legislation, i.e. its Penal Code. Ministry of 
Finance, ‘Pre-Accession Funds of the European Union. Successful Practices in Bulgaria’ Ministry of 
Finance: Management of EU Funds Directorate  
[online] www.eufunds.bg/docs/ENG_brochure_01_curves.pdf accessed 08/11/2008.
85 The state security and law enforcement services were one of the key institutions where post-
totalitarian reform was of vital importance. The nature of this reform will not be discusses in detail 
here but it suffice to say that reform’s aim was not only de-militarisation of these services but a much 
deeper change of image in order to ‘reorient the police towards the public, in other words to aim to 
provide a police service in place of the authoritarian police force that has traditionally existed by 
developing new approaches to working with the public.’ A. Robertson, ‘Criminal Justice Policy 
Transfer to Post-Soviet States: Two Case Studies of Police Reform in Russia and Ukraine’, European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 2005, vol.11, pp. 1–28.  
86 For example, T. Adams, ‘US Assistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment.’ Statement to the 
House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Washington, DC, 2004. [online] 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203.htm accessed 16/11/2008. 
87 F. Gregory, 2001, op. cit.  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office acknowledged that in the case of South Eastern 
Europe (i.e. the Balkans), where the criminal justice structures are heavily under-
resourced, the provision of equipment and training have not been sufficient because 
‘[t]he experience of the last ten years has demonstrated that equipment is frequently 
underused and training makes little difference if they are not accompanied by 
thoroughgoing reforms of the law-enforcement bodies they are provided to.’88 
Furthermore, the document states that the coordination of these projects between the 
different partners and recipients had been poor and ‘resulting in wasted efforts or 
gaps in coverage. Recipient states can help in the co-ordination of assistance, helping 
to target aid where it was likely to have the greatest impact. In essence the 
watchwords were ‘capacity building’. This requires long-term projects, co-ordinated 
throughout the criminal justice sector, taking into account local factors, and backed 
with political will. These projects would, of course, include the provision of technical 
and training support. However the short-term provision of training and technology 
are unlikely to have an effect on their own.89 Experts were not always 
knowledgeable of local situations, and especially local legislation and institutional 
environment and therefore it was naïve to presume that some short term experts 
could do all the work in developing a whole conceptual, legislative and institutional 
change in a state’s criminal justice systems.90  
 
The projects which had broader aims such as the provision of expertise and 
assistance with drafting measures and legislation were also problematic as they often 
clashed with local cultural-political or institutional problems. According to a study 
on Lithuanian experience with implementing a mix of foreign and domestic anti-
corruption policies: ‘[F]rom the outside it looked like a chaotic process rather than a 
seriously grounded national policy.’91 The Action Programme of the Government of 
the Republic of Lithuania for 1997–2000 was officially approved but failed in 
implementation. A PHARE project aimed at facilitating the process suggested a set 
                                                 
88 Central European & Eastern Adriatic Research Group, ‘Organised Crime in Southeast Europe’ 
Research and Analytical Papers, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 2002 [online] 
http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents/SoutheastEurope_Nov02.pdf accessed 16/11/2008. 
89 Ibid. 
90 For a wider development of this argument in the context of transition see J.Wedel, Collision and 
Collusion. The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
1998. 
91 A. Dobryninas, ‘Lithuania’s Anti-Corruption Policy: Between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’?’ European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 2005, vol.11, pp. 77–95, p. 80. 
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of measures but the plan was never realized.92 Adrian Beck’s extensive research on 
international assistance for police reform in transition countries also concludes that it 
is a common policy pitfall to assume ‘that good policing practice from ‘donor’ 
countries in the West can easily be transplanted to ‘recipient’ countries in need of 
development’.93 This is also valid for other EU policy transfer and this has become a 
research area which exposes not a process of EU-aided building of democracy but 
can also be argued to additionally export a democratic deficit to applicant and other 
aid-recipient countries.94  
 
Research conducted by a team of British academics on the impact of the EU 
requirements in the area of JHA on some of the applicant countries (the Baltic states) 
supports the argument of this chapter and its micro-analysis of representative project 
fiches that the outcomes of this policy on the ground were ambiguous. First, the lack 
of a clear and unified definition of organised crime, coupled with the lack of 
organised crime legislation in the applicant countries led to very chaotic institutional 
policy:  
 
Responding to the demands of the JHA acquis, and more specifically the 
Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime, law enforcement reforms have 
attempted to ‘make sense of’ the largely ambiguous perceptions of 
organised crime by creating units which reflect the ‘meaning’ of this 
term. Hence, the creation in one country of an organised crime and 
corruption unit, a drugs unit, a contraband department, and so on, all 
                                                 
92 The author concludes that ‘such a mechanical model for implementation of ‘best practice’ of 
western states was inevitably facing problems’, which was a view shared by international experts 
monitoring the country’s policy, as cited in the article: ‘that merely transposing a subset of solutions 
developed in advanced market democracies may not be very effective in States in transition – 
particularly where the solutions themselves are the subject of controversy even in the West […] These 
considerations lead to further questions concerning whether standards for measuring and combating 
corruption should be entirely universal in transition States, or whether under certain situations it is 
necessary or even productive to tolerate practices that would be found unacceptable or illegal in 
consolidated democracies.’ A. Dobryninas, 2005, op.cit., p. 83. 
93 A. Beck et. al., 2003, op.cit., p. 1; also A. Beck, ‘Crime and policing in transition: Providing 
appropriate international assistance’ in M. Shaw ed., Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies, 
Seminar Report, no. 8., Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2001. Such problems have 
sometimes led to changes in the security sector reform practices - see for example the report on how to 
conduct a police reform. D. Bayley, 2001, op.cit.  
94 For example, M. Williams, ‘Exporting the Democratic Deficit. Hungary’s experience with EU 
integration’ Problems of Post-Communism, January/February 2001, vol.48, no.1, pp.27-38. 
 178
within the state police, while establishing a separate anticorruption 
division which deals with all aspects of private and public corruption.95  
 
The research showed that the recipients were appreciative of PHARE help in 
adopting the JHA acquis but expressed ‘criticism of certain shortcomings of some of 
these initiatives, such as the duplication of training programmes, a culture of short-
termism and an inability by member states to appreciate the problems newly 
democratic countries face in the establishment of good governance’. As far as the 
financial side was concerned, the applicants had to make ‘difficult choices for 
management between resourcing crime reduction at a national level and satisfying 
those parts of the JHA acquis which provide for international-based policing. The 
burden of administration that some of these programmes engendered prompted one 
official to claim that it was almost as detrimental to good policing as was the 
dictatorial interference of the Soviet system.’96 The overall conclusion from the 
report is that the experience of the applicant countries with the anti-crime projects 
financed by the EU is highly controversial and has not resolved some very 
problematic areas and especially intra-institutional issues, and has led to duplication 
of efforts and poor coordination of the work of relevant authorities. The report’s final 
recommendation expresses concern over the actual relevance of some of the work 
performed under these projects: ‘The ability to develop further a ‘structured 
dialogue’ in JHA matters depends on a clearer understanding of the actual rather 
than imagined problems facing the Accession states like the Baltics in matters of soft 
                                                 
95 M.P. Rawlinson, Crime, Borders and Law Enforcement: A European 'Dialogue' for Improving 
Security Full research Report for One Europe or Several? The Dynamics of Change Across Europe 
Programme, 2005 [online] 
 http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/viewawardpage.aspx?awardnumber=L213252013 
accessed 22/04/2009. Furthermore, the change of emphasis on organised crime albeit poorly defined 
has led to further complications in the implementation of the penal law. The applicants’ previous 
legislation included measures against conspiracies or crimes committed by a group of individuals 
which had to be dropped in favour of the new term ‘organised crime’, which was more difficult to use 
in development of anti-crime policy. Furthermore, ‘the strategies involved in intelligence-led policing, 
such as the use of informants, technological apparatus, e.g. wiretaps, most commonly used in the 
investigation and detection of organised crime, are politically sensitive in these emergent democracies 
where the memory of totalitarian control, which routinely employed such systems, remains acutely 
fresh.’ Ibid. 
96 The report mentions ‘a ‘twinning’ project related to money laundering between the UK and a Baltic 
State that took two years to negotiate (1998-2000) and consequently had only just started. Its impact 
would not be evident for some years… Moreover, the research provided further evidence that when 
EU policies towards the Accession states depended upon the use of expertise, such as in the area of 
organised crime, from the member states, these tapped already scarce resources so that, for example, 
the UK law enforcement services could not themselves respond to all the requests for help made to 
them.  
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security, domestic policing, etc. This in turn requires a more flexible approach to 
integration which, while not directly threatening security, is prepared to be more 
realistic about the targets set within the JHA acquis.’97
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter exposed some of the practical problems linked to the external 
application of the developing anti-organised crime policy within the EU. As the 
external dimension of this policy gained momentum in the late 1990s its inclusion in 
the EU’s relations with third states became a key priority in both JHA’s policy area 
but also in the development of a unique EU foreign policy based on normative 
principles and concerns with the new security threats such as organised crime. 
However the issue of crime has been rationalised in EU foreign policy as emanating 
from poorer and weaker states, and especially the post-communist states in Eastern 
Europe. The previous fear of communism was now replaced by fear of post-
communist crime, corruption and ‘state capture’ and in these highly alarming 
conditions the European Union included its Justice and Home Affairs agenda in its 
dealings with risk countries.  
 
The development of this external dimension proved to be highly problematic. First of 
all, it displayed the lack of ability of the Union to spell out a clear policy in this area. 
As crime fighting is traditionally an internal policy matter, its external side is bound 
to meet a number of problems and inconsistencies. In the cases discussed in this 
chapter, it is not clear whether the EU developed this policy as an extension of its 
own internal security policy, or because of concern over the good governance issues 
in third states, as maintained in official statements and policy documents. Therefore 
the guiding principles of the policy were confusing and a subject of constant 
amendments and re-adjustments. Yet these ambiguous policies were spread beyond 
the EU borders and affected applicants’ internal governance structures. This was 
done by using a number of more or less coercive policy instruments, which, 
considering the power imbalance and strict membership conditionality, left very little 
room for manoeuvre for the applicants. On a practical level, the applicants simply 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
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imported anti-crime concepts and policies with some local variations to fit internal 
agendas and perhaps adjust unworkable strategies. 
 
The specific discussion of examples of PHARE anti-crime projects throws light on 
the nature of these policies in some detail. First, the projects demonstrate that this 
policy was taking place in the absence of any real standards and common EU policy 
for fighting crime which could then be successfully transplanted to any potential new 
member. The core nature of EU policy was the export of individual or institutional 
expertise from EU member states, as well as EU-made equipment for crime fighting 
without prior research of the needs and the criminological situation of the recipient 
state. On the whole, the PHARE programme was poorly coordinated and this led to 
some inconsistencies and suspicions over EU expenditures. From the point of view 
of the recipients, the projects were developed on an individual basis and supposedly 
reflected individual problems of the country concerned but these problems were 
actually linked to the wider needs to comply with EU conditions and adopt the EU 
acquis.  
 
This policy transfer has had some ambiguous outcomes for the applicant countries. 
Apart from the administrative problems which accompany any new policy, in the 
case of organised crime the change of policy did not always show tangible results 
and perhaps could not because of the problematic assumptions about organised crime 
in the first place. But failure would create additional pressures and deepen the 
internal political problems in fragile democracies. The EU policy was not concerned 
with individual conditions and the one-size fits all policy of fighting organised crime, 
despite being presented as capacity building, actually risked weakening institutional 
capacities where it might be argued to matter more. The applicant state and its 
institutions started to be increasingly reliant on external agendas and donors in 
developing a populist anti-organised crime policy rather than connecting with its 
citizens in a way that could deal with the problems experienced on a daily basis. 
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Chapter 6. Bulgaria: Post-communism and Organised Crime 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapters discussed how organised crime became an issue of increasing 
international concern, particularly for the EU and its relations with third countries. 
The fight against organised crime was an area of conditionality for the 2004 
enlargement of the EU. In the case of the Balkans, it became even more important as 
the region was perceived as institutionally weaker and prone to the spread of crime 
and corruption. In the Western Balkans organised crime was linked to the issue of 
civil war and effective lack of a state, and in the rest of the region it was linked to an 
insufficient state to guarantee the rule of law and democracy. This chapter looks at 
the significance of this view from the perspective of Bulgaria as a Balkan applicant 
country which did not have a major political problem in the transition but became a 
focus of the international anti-crime agenda. The chapter explores the conditions 
under which Bulgarian political elites adopted this agenda and linked it to the 
internal reform process. The discussion builds on the findings of the previous chapter 
concerning the key role of EU funds and experts in shaping the candidate countries’ 
policy on crime but takes a different angle and presents the arguments about 
organised crime as perceived by the Bulgarian actors. Thus the chapter forms a first 
part of the analysis of organised crime in the Bulgarian accession to the EU, which 
concludes in the next chapter. The main aim of the analysis of Bulgaria’s case is to 
test whether the fight against crime help did contribute to the building of democracy 
and the rule of law through assisting in the strengthening of the state institutions.  
 
The chapter is organised around the development of the concept of ‘organised crime’ 
in the country and the way the issue was addressed in Bulgarian politics during the 
early and later stages of post-communist transition.1 The evolution of Bulgaria’s 
anti-crime policy in the post-communist period can be divided into two major phases 
which are reflected in the structure of the chapter. The first one is between the fall of 
                                                 
1 As ‘transition’ is a contested paradigm in post-communist literature, it is used here as a broader term 
for modernisation, and the late twentieth century version of ‘Europeanisation’, or adoption of Western 
norms (‘Westernisation’). Eastern European public discourse usually takes the point of EU accession 
as the end of transition.  
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the communist regime in 1989 and the major economic crisis in 1997 which brought 
a more reformist pro-Western government. The second period is between 1997 and 
2007, the date of EU accession although crime remained an issue after Bulgaria 
became an EU member. From 1997 organised crime became one of the political 
priorities of the new government which also coincided with intensified EU pressure 
to develop anti-organised crime policies after the adoption of the pact on organised 
crime with the applicant states, discussed in previous chapters. In this period the anti-
crime policies were strongly influenced by the EU and the need to comply with 
membership requirements but Bulgaria displayed an extreme politicisation of 
organised crime compared to other applicants, and the issue spilled out to other areas 
of reform. Within this period we can distinguish three stages: 1997-2001 when the 
reformist government of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) laid the basis of the 
anti-organised crime policy; 2001-2004 when a new government conducted pre-
enlargement negotiations on Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs (which went on 
from 2001 to 2003) and successfully closed the chapter but was not allowed to join 
due to unsatisfactory fight against organised crime; and, 2004-2007 when the state 
had to engage in an extensive anti-crime campaign to be accepted as a full member 
of the European Union on 1 January 2007. The chapter uses a number of different 
sources to re-construct these developments such as official documents and strategies 
issued by the Bulgarian governmental agencies and ministries, reports in the media, 
NGOs and other agencies, online blogs, and official opinions. These sources reflect 
the complex interplay of multiple internal and external factors which had an impact 
on the anti-crime policies and expanded or limited implementation. 
 
6.2. Crime in Bulgaria: perceptions and statistics 
 
In November, 1989 Bulgaria emerged from a 45-year communist rule which had 
been established with the help of the Russian forces at the end of the World War II. 
The end of the regime came with a ‘velvet revolution’ which was initially limited to 
a low-key transfer of power within the top echelons of the ruling Communist Party. 
However the shift of power at the top triggered some public unrest and the party had 
to call for the first democratic elections in June 1990, which it won after undertaking 
minor changes and re-branding itself as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The 
BSP, commonly referred to as ‘the former communists’ stayed in power until 1992 
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when a newly formed Union of Democratic Forces took power and initiated a policy 
of mass privatisation of land and industry. This policy was chaotic and ultimately 
unpopular as it did not bring relief from the deepening economic crisis. The public 
dissatisfaction with the UDF’s policies restored the BSP back into power in 1995 but 
this government, too, failed to handle the situation and win international support, 
losing in a dramatic fashion only two years later to a reformed and strengthened UDF 
under the new leadership of the former finance minister Ivan Kostov. In summary, 
the first seven years of Bulgarian post-communism was a period of unsettled political 
sentiments and a gradual formation of a two-party political system out of the chaos 
of legitimacy and the hundreds of minor parties and political entrepreneurs which 
had sprung up between 1990 and 1991. The state did not spiral into civil conflict 
apart from some more intense anti-government demonstrations, and the political 
demands of different groups were successfully managed.2 However, the crisis of the 
state created a wide-spread perception of top-to-bottom lawlessness in the country, 
and public frustration was expressed through a new moral discourse of crime and 
corruption.3  
 
In the period after the fall of communism there was the perception of a growing post-
communist crime problem in Bulgaria and, as the previous chapter identified, this 
was common for all post-communist countries. Official data from Eastern Europe 
supports the view that crime was on the rise but post-communist states showed very 
different intensity of their crime rise. According to some sources Bulgaria had a 
particularly sharp rise of about 300% of crime during the 1990s.4 However, the rise 
of crime in the post-communist period needs some further clarification. First, there is 
a scarcity of data on crime during communism, and the available information points 
                                                 
2 For example, Bulgaria allowed the establishment and equal political participation of one of the most 
successful ethnic parties in Eastern Europe, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which 
represented the large Turkish minority in the country. MRF later transformed into an ethnic-
agricultural party reflecting the interests of the elites of Turkish minority who had developed 
successful agricultural businesses. The MRF was often used as leverage in political coalitions and was 
effectively the most stable third party in Bulgaria’s political system dominated by continuously 
morphing liberals and socialists. 
3 According to Ivan Krastev, the politicization of the issue of corruption in Bulgaria was triggered by 
political (and external) prioritization of anti-corruption policies but to Bulgarian voters it was a form 
of critique of the growing social stratification. See I. Krastev, Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on 
the Politics of Anti-corruption, Central European University Press, 2004. 
4 N. Genov, ‘Managing Transformations in Eastern Europe’ in Regional and Global Development, 
UNESCO MOST Paris, Sofia, 1999, p.95. 
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at a rise in crime before the fall of communism.5 Secondly, the official statistics on 
crime in Bulgaria are not a reliable basis of comparison of crime before and after 
1989, or the level of crime in general. Data published by the Bulgarian authorities 
shows two trends displayed in Figure 6.1. and Table 6.1. First, the levels of 
registered crime had soared in the 1990s but then declined while the number of 
sentenced crimes dropped in the period between the 1980s and 1996-7 before 
reaching higher levels than in 1989. Within that period the rise in crime had two 
major leaps – in 1991 and 1997. The two data lines reflect the problem of the 
criminal justice system which was unable to respond to the huge rise of crime, and 
some methodological issues of crime recording which had led to inflation of 
recorded crime.  
 
Figure 6.1. Crime trends in Bulgaria 6
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5 According to Ana Mantarova, the average level of crime in Bulgaria between 1980 and 1989 was 
around 567.5 recorded crimes per 100 000 inhabitants (502 in 1980 to 663 in 1989), and the first 
major increase of recorded crime was in 1985. А. Мантарова, Престъпност и социална 
трансформация (Crime and Social Transformation), Институт по Социология, БАН, 2000. The 
validity of the crime figures are questioned by Nikolay Genov: ‘the precision of registration and 
reporting crimes by the police, since this institution underwent substantial changes as well’. N. Genov, 
1999, op.cit.  
6 Based on data from the Bulgarian Prosecution Service. Анализ на регистрираната и наказаната 
престъпност през 1999 (Analysis of registered and sentenced crime in 1999), Сoфия: Съвет за 
криминологични изследвания към върховна касационна прокуратура на Р.България, 2000.  
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Table 6.1. Number of criminal cases which have ended with a conviction 7
 
Year Number of criminal cases 
1989 20720 
1990 13201 
1991 12568 
1992 10031 
1993 6535 
1994 8670 
1995 10327 
1996 14349 
1997 18066 
1998 23136 
1999 24954 
2000 26986 
2001 28322 
2002 28395 
2003 29177 
2004 31831 
 
 
The official statistics also experienced a number of changes of methodology during 
the 1990s which coincides with the leaps and decline in recorded crime.8 
Furthermore the criminal legislation introduced new forms of crime, reflecting either 
political imperatives such as organised crime, or changes in the criminological 
conditions, which also changed the crime figures and which complicates a 
comparative analysis of crime before and after 1989.9 The official statistics, for 
example, reflect a decline in state embezzlement and a rise in property crime, which 
                                                 
7 Based on data from the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute. Национален Статистически 
Институт, Престъпления и осъдени лица (Crime and Convicted Persons Report), 2005, Appendix 2. 
[online] http://www.nsi.bg/ZActual/New-convict.htm accessed 22/03/2008. 
8 The first change was in 1991. The system before that would not include crimes which had not passed 
through prosecutor or examining magistrate’s monitoring, i.e. cases which had not been approved for 
further investigation. The new system adopted in 1991 began to include all complaints made by 
citizens and detected crimes, all of which would be reflected in the crime statistics although some of 
them would not undergo investigation due to lack of evidence. Престъпността в Република 
България през 1996: Криминологически анализ на статистически данни (Crime in Republic of 
Bulgaria: Criminological Analysis of statistical data), София: СКИ при ГП на Р. България, 1997. 
According to Mantarova, more changes in the recording system were introduced in 1998 and 1999. A. 
Mantarova, 2000, op.cit. p.38.  
9 In 1989 there were 866 sentenced cases of embezzlement, which dropped to 457 in 1990 and even 
down to 61 in 1993 but stabilized around 200-250 for the period 1989-2004; white-collar crime has 
also dropped from 380 in 1989 to 42 in 2004. At the same time the number of robberies in 1989 was 
292, which rose to 959 by 2004, and larceny rose from 5359 to 9971 in the same period. Национален 
Статистически Институт, 2005, op.cit.  
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can be explained with the new economic conditions. Many state enterprises had gone 
bankrupt, whereas the population started to acquire movable property from the 
expanding consumer market, which became subject to theft.10 Even during 
communism, and especially the 1980s, Bulgaria had illegal and semi-legal markets 
for goods and services – something typical for all communist states, due to the 
limited supply of consumer goods and the restrictions over private business 
activities. These markets were serviced by a contingent of professional criminals but 
their small size did not lead to the development of a large underworld such as the 
Russian vor-v-zakone.11 Despite appearing as a safe country with low levels of 
crime, Bulgaria’s population was still conscious of everyday crime risks such a pick-
pocketing by some gypsy tribes who made living out stealing and begging, along 
with performing their low paid jobs.  
 
In the 1990s crime in Bulgaria, however, showed a sharp change as a wider 
percentage of the population became victimised.12 The fear of crime also came to 
have a new and specific moral connotation with a condemnation of the state as an 
actor as the rise in the number of crimes and victims happened in conditions of 
economic crisis which combined with a reduced social role for the state compared to 
the communist period.13 The crime statistics which subsequently marked a steady 
decline after 1997 were then met with scepticism by the public.14 The levels of 
                                                 
10 On the other hand, the murder rate did not experience major changes. 
11 J. Nikolov, ‘Crime and Corruption after Communism – Organized Crime in Bulgaria’, East 
European Constitutional Review, 1997, vol.6, no.4. ‘Vor-v-zakone’ is the Russian for ‘thieves-in-law’ 
– a contingent of professional criminals which developed in the Soviet conditions of scarcity and state 
control of economy and society. Some of them operated on the black market, which helped with 
everyday survival of sections of the population, and especially during the period of communist (and 
economic) demise in the 1980s. 
12 The rise of level of recorded crime in Bulgaria in the 1990s can be compared to the general 
European trend. The average rise in Europe for the period 1996-2000 was 1% with the largest increase 
in Belgium (17%), Austria (15%), Portugal (13%) and the Netherlands (9%). In fact, for the same 
period crime in Bulgaria dropped by the highest level in Europe – by 31%. According to data 
published by Centre for the Study of Democracy in its National Crime Survey for the period 2000-
2005: ‘Bulgaria’s crime rate remains slightly lower than the average rate for European countries. Over 
the past five years, the country’s prevalence rate has fallen by nearly 4 percentage points—from 
17.5% in 2001 to 12.9% in 2004’. Crime Trends in Bulgaria 2000-2005, op.cit.  
13 The state spending on social policies was significantly reduced, which affected important areas such 
education, public health provision, and financial support for the rising numbers of unemployed people 
made redundant by bankrupt state enterprises. The cuts in social spending were a result of policies of 
control over the state budget used in post-communist Europe during transition and advised by the 
international financial institutions.  
14 This drastic drop of recorded crime in 1998 could also be a direct effect of the change of the 
recording system (now excluding cases whose initial assessment has not been completed), or 
manipulation by the police. 
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recorded crime continued to drop and in 2007 the Director of the Bulgarian Police 
Valentin Petrov announced that crime levels now matched those prior to 1990 – a 
statement criticised in online forums of legal professionals.15 The problem of the 
rising fear of crime was further exacerbated by the emergence of a crime reporting 
commercial media which replaced communist low-crime state propaganda.16 The 
media effect was not only local but international as the foreign media began 
reporting on post-communist chaos and crime, which was widely publicised in the 
country as well. One of the first cases was a 1995 New York Times article about the 
so-called ‘wrestlers’ associations (private security companies formed by former 
policemen and athletes, which used racketeering methods) and their grip on the 
country.17 However, the media and public opinion in Bulgaria reflected the 
politicisation of crime in a new ‘law and order’ politics in conditions of liberalised 
party competition. Both of the major political parties in the 1990s engaged in a crime 
discourse though with a different emphasis. For the Bulgarian socialist party crime is 
traditionally linked to social issues and the party discussed the problem from an anti-
market and communitarian perspective.18 The liberal Union of the Democratic 
Forces however focused not so much on general crime but on organised crime which 
it saw as impediment to the market and democracy. Furthermore the UDF linked the 
issue of organised crime with the communist state and the former communists who 
were still in charge of the country. In its political debates, statements and 
publications the UDF gradually constructed the idea of the criminal state.19  
 
                                                 
15 For example, ‘Aко има миша дупка, дайте я насам’ (If you have a mouse hole, pass it on.), 
Lex.bg – Българският правен портал. Lex новини | Lex.bg  
[online] http://lex.bg/news.php?lang=bg&id=11740: accessed 22/03/2008. 
16 See M. Łoś, ‘Post-communist fear of crime and the commercialization of security’, Theoretical 
Criminology, 2002, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 165–188, and V. Popov, The Relationship Between Mass Media 
and Organised Crime in Post-Soviet Russia: A Sociological Perspective, Unpublished PhD thesis. 
City University, 2005. 
17 See J. Perlez, ‘Sofia Journal; Rogue ‘Wrestlers’ Have an Armlock on Bulgaria’, New York Times 
(US), 12 January 1995. 
18 I. Krastev, ‘Party Structure and Party Perspectives in Bulgaria’, Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, March 1997, pp.91-106. 
19 This link between crime and the state is common for the post-communist discourse. For Karstedt, 
for example, crime was first created by communism and its culture of inequality (a so-called ‘hour-
class’ society of rich nomenclature and homogenised masses), which then transformed into a wave of 
elite and violent crime. She explains the stark contrast between post-communist states with apparently 
high and low crime problems as a result of establishing strong institutions, i.e. the ‘success stories’ of 
the Central European states compared to the former Soviet republics was due to strength of 
institutions, based on civil rights and rule of law. S. Karsteadt, ‘Legacies of a culture of inequality: 
The Janus face of crime in post-communist societies’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 2003, vol. 40, 
no. 2/3, p.295-320. 
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6.3. Defining post-communist organised crime in Bulgaria  
 
Organised crime made its entry into Bulgarian politics via a crime discourse led by 
the new-right opposition in Bulgaria but it built on an existing external criticism of 
the Bulgarian state’s criminal connections during communism.20 This criticism was 
also popular amongst the Bulgarian intellectuals many of whom joined the anti-
communist liberal parties (most of which were part of the UDF) after the 1990s and 
turned the criticism into political platforms. The discussion which follows is a review 
of a sample of articles in the UDF’s newspaper Demokracia for the period of 5 
months in 1995.21 This period was marked by an increasing number of articles 
dedicated to the problem of crime, and especially organised crime and the ‘new 
mafia’.  
 
By 1995 Demokracia had started to politicise crime and attempted to build a public 
consensus on the link between crime-government and the governed. An article 
published on the day after New Year’s day, 1995, stated that ‘corruption is amongst 
the most dangerous crimes of the year [1994].. [t]ogether with organised crime, 
corruption destroys the foundations of the state, according to 78% of Bulgarian 
citizens’.22 Demokracia also launched an attack on the BSP’s newspaper Duma and 
                                                 
20 The negative image of Bulgaria then came mainly from the highly publicised murder of the émigré 
Bulgarian journalist Georgi Markov in 1978 in London with a poisonous dart fired from a gun 
concealed in an umbrella. This was followed by the alleged Bulgarian link to Pope John Paul’s 
attempted assassination in 1981, and more recently, the exposure of the Bulgarian involvement in the 
global drug and arms trade during the Cold War. The latter was popularised by Clair Sterling’s book 
on global organised crime The Mafia published in 1990. C. Sterling, The Mafia. HarperCollins 
Publishers: London, 1990, p. 332-323. Sterling claimed that the Bulgarian secret services were 
implicated in the heroin trade to Western Europe, some of which was then exported to the USA. 
However, the participation of state secret services in the drugs trade was a practice for both 
communist and Western states. The Cold War adversaries however had little sympathy for issues of 
organisation and control and selectively approached some countries’ involvement in more universally 
sanctioned illegal practices, so that Bulgaria was presented in the West as an evil criminal communist 
state. During the 1990s Bulgaria hit the headlines for illegal arms trading which involved the 
privatised successors of the state company Kintex which was selling arms to some Third World 
countries during communism. Bulgaria – Money Talks: Arms Dealing with Human Rights Abusers 
[online] www.hrw.org/reports/1999/bulgaria; accessed 14/02/2008. 
21 This review covers January, February, October, November, December 1995. As UDF were in 
opposition during 1995 they were particularly eager to use the issue of crime to attack their BSP. All 
quotations are the author’s own translation from Bulgarian. 
22 ‘През 1994 надминахме Гватемала по бедност и корупция’ (In 1994, we surpassed Guatemala in 
poverty and crime). Демокрация, no. 1, 2, 01/1995, p. 4. According to the article, this is the 
conclusion of an MDMB (Institute for Marketing and Social Research based in Sofia) sociological 
study. 
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its editor for not publishing the figures of corruption and organised crime.23 This 
criticism was made with reference to the New York Times piece about the ‘wrestlers’ 
associations. What the Demokracia chose to emphasise from the New York Times’s 
article was its reference to the former interim Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova’s 
statement that: ‘when it comes to attacking organized crime, we have not succeeded 
in breaking the bond between the state and mafia structures’.24 This theme was 
further reinforced in more articles in the same week including, an interview with 
Renta Indzhova where she claimed that the party (BSP) is ‘genetically linked with 
organised crime’ and therefore cannot fight it and the insistence that there is a 
‘marriage bond’ between Berov’s government and organised crime, in another article 
in the same issue of the paper.25  
 
Demokracia’s organised crime critique was extended to the future, as it attacked the 
political programme of the new BSP government of Zhan Videnov (which came into 
power on 25th January). According to Demokracia, the programme advantaged 
financial groups, part of which are ‘semi-financial – semi-criminal’ and as a result 
these groups ‘will grow, new parallel groups will emerge and this will expand the 
territory of organised crime.’ The latter were said to have been ‘flirting’ with the 
government in order to take positions in the country’s economic life.26 Only a couple 
of weeks later, another article in Demokracia described the country as already taken 
over by organised crime and declared a UDF anti-crime stance:  
 
A wave of terrorism and violence is flooding Bulgaria… People live in 
constant fear of mugging, kidnapping, beating, rape, murder…Using the 
weakness of state institutions and widespread corruption, organised crime 
becomes more and more powerful, its actions – more brutal, it merges 
with the state and threatens the latter’s future. With crime like that, 
                                                 
23 ‘Думи за корупция’ (Words of corruption), Демокрация, Issue 15, 18 01/1995, p.3.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Партията генетично свързана с организираната престъпност. Интервю с Ренета Инджова. 
(The party is genetically linked with organised crime. Interview with Reneta Injova, Демокрация, no. 
22, 26/01/1995, p.1, and Брак между Беров и Мултигроуп е имало (There has been a marriage bond 
between Berov and Multigup), Демокрация, no. 22, 26/01/1995, p. 3. The article claims a previous 
government had given in to some of the demands of the financial groups (such as Multigroup), which 
are viewed as organised crime groups in the country. 
26 ‘Хаотичната програма Виденов ще обслужи съмнителни групировки’ (The chaotic programme 
of Videnov will serve the shady groupings) Демокрация, no. 24, 28/01/1995. The article expressed 
the views of Ivan Kostov, a former financial minister and future prime minister of Bulgaria.  
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Bulgaria cannot develop normally and have an international standing. We 
insist that the state institutions responsible for law and order in the 
country make efforts for the quick investigation and severe punishment 
of criminals. The ruling BSP and its government must take immediate 
action to stop the crime wave […] and present in the Parliament a 
programme for securing the life, dignity and property of the citizens. The 
UDF is decisively for order and security within the limits of law in 
Bulgaria!27
 
Some in the UDF developed ideas of how to tackle organised crime and particularly 
the harm it caused to the economy. In the words of Zhelyu Zhelev, who was then the 
President of Bulgaria from the UDF (1990-1997), privatisation of state assets would 
stop the mafia as ‘the classic formula for the thriving of organised crime is state 
property – private exploitation, which is why only privatisation would restrain the 
mafia.’28 Another article interpreted organised crime from a different angle and 
claimed that the criminals performed ‘a natural selection which coincided with the 
[Communist] party line’ in that they attacked mainly small-scale business 
entrepreneurs who lost from the racketeering - because of this they were, a ‘red 
mafia’.29 Furthermore, another article published in the same month argued that, as a 
result of the ‘wrong privatisation’, Bulgaria was being subjected to a dualistic rule of 
organised crime, the mafia and corruption, in alliance with the ‘red barons’, 
businessmen and bankers.30 Another article argued that the mafia was directly 
involved in the legislative process and that it lobbied for legislation against small 
business.31 And in response to all that: 
                                                 
27 ‘Организираната престъпност става все по-брутална’ (Organised crime gets more and more 
brutal), Демокрация, no. 36, 11/02/1995. 
28 ‘Приватизацията ще спре мафията’ (Privatisation will stop the mafia), Демокрация, no. 37, 
13/02/1995. This statement refers to the development of a peculiar type of ‘enclosure’ of state-owned 
enterprises. This was done by (or with the help of) the managers of the companies who set up private 
firms to either sell supplies at overblown prices to the state company, or buy its produce at a minimal 
price, or both at the same time. In this way the state company was left with loss and the private 
companies accumulated profit. Similar schemes were allegedly used for draining state finances via 
private banks. See J. Nikolov, 1997, op.cit. The extent of this practice is, however, unknown. 
29 Престъпността стана основно средство за рекомунизация (Crime became the main tool for re-
communisation), Демокрация, no.230, 2/10/1995, p. 3. The ‘Red mafia’ is understood to be 
destroying private entrepreneurship in an anti-capitalist fashion.  
30 Рубрика ‘Мнения’ ‘Да внимават консулите’ (Rubric ‘Opinions’. The Consuls should be vigilant), 
Демокрация, no. 231, 3/10/1995, p.3. 
31 ‘Мафията се консолидира в последния рунд за разграбването на страната ни Issue’ (The mafia 
is consolidating for the last round of ripping off of the country), no. 277, 25/11/ 1995, p.1. 
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 The government are only complaining and observing apathetically the 
lawlessness… They occasionally utter a toothless warning to the 
criminals. They say nothing about the massive misappropriations, or they 
are silenced with bribes. The state is ruled by parasitic mafia groupings 
and their armed bodyguards and racketeers…The economy has to be 
freed from the control of the bureaucracy and the conviction that every 
private entrepreneur is a thief, and every bureaucrat is honest… We need 
to open the doors for real, serious foreign investment, and not for 
speculative capital of foreign mafias, linked to ours... There should be a 
free, spontaneous settlement of social relations… The syndicates need to 
be independent and democratically organised… The credit system needs 
to be protected from any political or mafia influences. This will weaken 
the bureaucracy and will remove the parasitic mafia monopolies… The 
society will be relieved from the bureaucratic tyranny and racketeering 
terror. UDF is the political force that can promise to do that.32  
 
For the UDF’s party newspaper and party activists organised crime was to be found 
in every sector of the economy but particularly in the privatisation deals and the 
emergence of new private owners with the help of the state. Peter Dertliev, the 
leader of The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (which was a member of UDF) put 
this in the most dramatic way: ‘organised crime has now taken over the state and 
party structures […] the tentacles of the Octopus are everywhere […] and the 
government cannot deal with this octopus.’33  
 
The politicisation of organised crime was a combined result of the Europeanisation 
process and the needs of party politics. Europeanisation theory holds that reformist 
liberal parties in Eastern Europe will internalise Western values, which seems to be 
the case with the UDF and the issue of organised crime.34 However, the UDF 
                                                 
32 Защо не гласуват хората? (Why the people won’t vote?),  Демокрация, no. 274, 22/11/1995, p. 3. 
33 ‘Пипалата на октопода са плъзнали навсякъде’ (The tentacles of the octopus have spread 
everywhere), Демокрация, no. 290, 11/12/1995, p.3. The reference to octopus here is inspired by the 
Italian TV drama ‘The Octopus’ about the Italian fight against the Mafia which was shown on 
Bulgarian TV and was very popular with the viewers. 
34 See for example F. Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic calculation and international socialization: 
Membership incentives, party constellations, and sustained compliance in Central and Eastern 
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developed its own interpretation of the problem. Between 1990 and 1997 UDF 
gradually linked reformist and populist ideologies, and moved from liberal to more 
statist values. According to Ivan Krastev, in the case of Bulgaria political 
representation on the basis of socio-economic interests did not exist in the first years 
of transition due to the fact that 90 per cent of the property in the country was state-
owned and such interests could not exist. Krastev interprets party formation in 
Bulgaria as elite-driven and based on ‘cultural-ideological cleavages’, a process 
typical for other post-communist transitions. Krastev refers to Carl Schmidt’s friend-
or-foe notion of politics to explain Bulgarian politics in transition as ‘conceived in 
terms not of a deliberate negotiation between competing interests but of a non-
negotiable war of existential choices’.35 In Bulgaria, these cleavages or existential 
choices formed around a red (communist, anti-fascist) BSP culture and the blue 
(anti-communist, anti-repression) UDF culture. Thus politicisation of ‘crime and the 
mafia’ in Bulgaria during the first 7-years became one of the central issues in UDF’s 
narratives in the process of its consolidation as a political party. As a side effect of 
this prioritisation of organised crime and the policies developed by UDF after 1997 
the dominant interpretations of crime moved away from the social and closer to the 
political which treated crime as an existential security issue.  
 
The liberals’ views on the problem of organised crime spilled over into the public 
debate on the issue. For example, Jovo Nikolov, an investigative journalist for the 
newspaper Capital, and one of the few ‘experts’ on Bulgarian organised crime 
elaborated on the problem in a similar way:  
 
How should we think of organized crime in today’s Bulgaria? First of all, 
it has no centuries-old tradition like the Italian Mafia. Neither are its 
origins traceable to the traditional Russian system of the ‘thief-[in]-the-
law’ (vor-v-zakone), which persisted throughout the entire Soviet period. 
It does not have the ethnic flavour common to the Chechen and Georgian 
mafias, nor is it structured around kinship networks, as is Albanian 
                                                                                                                                          
International OrganizationEurope’, , 2005 vol. 59, no.4, pp. 827–860 and M. Vachudová, Europe 
Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism , Oxford University Press, 2005.
35 I. Krastev, 1997, op.cit. 
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organized crime. What is special about organized crime in Bulgaria is the 
way it was created by the transitional state.36
 
Nikolov’s weekly reports for Capital, and the reports of the NGO Centre for the 
Study of Democracy (CDS) in Sofia are the major sources on the problem of 
organised crime in Bulgaria. They link organised crime with the spread of post-
communist illegal practices such as smuggling (linked to the embargo imposed on 
neighbouring Yugoslavia), car theft and car trafficking (from Europe), drug 
trafficking (and privatisation of drug channels from state security services), the 
emergence of the wrestlers’ racketeering groups, and the rise of semi-legal economic 
groups (mainly Multigroup and VIS) linked to the racketeering business and 
expanding in other areas.37 The wrestlers groups triggered popular discontent fuelled 
by media depictions (they were called ‘thick necks’) and the fact that they were 
easily recognisable, i.e. easily identifiable because of their appearance (similar to 
bouncers). The wrestlers and smugglers became the focus of anti-organised crime 
policies in the 1990s which later expanded with more controversial success to the 
trafficking of drugs and humans.38  
 
The growing fixation with organised crime however was difficult to back with hard 
data partly due to the secrecy of its operations, but also because the number of 
professional criminals seems actually to have been comparatively small. According 
                                                 
36 J. Nikolov, 1997, op. cit. 
37 CSD developed an interest in the issue in the late 1990s, and found generous financial support from 
foreign donors. CDS reports established that organised crime emerged in the first years of transition. 
The main source was thought to be the former wrestlers and former employees of the Ministry of the 
Interior (a large number of which were laid off by Kostov’s government) both of which started 
engaging in criminal entrepreneurship after state had lost its monopoly on violence. J.Nikolov, 1997, 
op.cit. Other sources (mainly tabloid media) explain the criminalization of the wrestlers with the 
single figure of Vasil Iliev who was a former wrestler-turned criminal in Hungary and returned to 
Bulgaria and set up a company called VIS (Vasil Iliev Securities) which employed his former friends 
from the wrestling club. VIS was a security company which allegedly employed racketeering 
methods.  
38 Smuggling had emerged as a lucrative business during the 1990s partly due to the embargo on 
neighbouring Yugoslavia, and partly due to trade liberalisation and the imposition of new duty system 
(a result of the trade and association agreements with the with the EU) which created incentives for 
smuggling and tax fraud. However, the extent of smuggling could be overstated as the country has 
increasingly removed duties and tax on trade with the EU, which comprises the largest part of its trade 
(an exception being trade with China which was taxed disproportionately highly and created 
conditions for smuggling). Financial reforms in the 1990s and the adoption of VAT tax created 
incentives to engage in VAT fraud rather than smuggling where taxation and profits from evading it 
are much higher. As VAT is a tax on consumption and borne by the buyer/consumer, this type of 
fraud is performed by legal businesses rather than organised crime.  
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to police data and independent research, even at the height of the anti-organised 
crime campaign, the numbers are quite low. A report published in 2004 suggests 
that, ‘[I]n Bulgaria there are more than 50 criminal groups, which are composed, on 
average, of less than 10 members’.39 However, the problem with organised crime in 
Bulgaria was conceived as exceptional and presenting a major impediment for the 
country’s transition and this view developed in a growing public consensus on the 
need to fight organised crime with a pro-active policy. 
 
6.4. The fight against organised crime in Bulgaria: legislation and institutional 
reform 
 
By the mid-1990s the UDF had managed to develop a powerful discourse linking 
organised crime with the former communists who resisted reform. Having displaced 
the former government, the leader of UDF, and Prime Minister from 1997 to 2001, 
Ivan Kostov, now conceived the fight against organised crime as a pre-condition of 
economic reform, i.e. reform could not take place without the decriminalisation of 
the economy. When the UDF won the elections in early 1997 after popular unrest 
triggered by an economic crash and the resignation of the previous socialist 
government, Kostov’s government received popular support for wide-ranging 
reforms, and fast privatisation, backed up by a new IMF loan.40 The government 
came into power with a programme titled Bulgaria 2001. The key policy areas in this 
programme were legislative changes and law implementation, the successful launch 
of a currency board (pegging the weak Bulgarian currency to the German Mark) and 
the fight against organised crime. The ultimate aim of the policies, according to 
Kostov himself, was to help Bulgaria enter the new millennium as ‘a modern country 
with strong institutions’.41  
 
                                                 
39 TRANSCRIME, ‘The Contribution of Data Exchange Systems to the Fight against Organised 
Crime in The SEE Countries’, Final Report, 2004  
[online] http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019080.pdf accessed 
21/01/09. 
40 UDF also received funds from other reformist liberal parties in Europe, and especially the Greek 
New Democracy. 
41 Л. Василев, ‘Костов между популярността сега и успеха утре’ (Kostov between popularity 
today and success tomorrow), Kapital, бр.35, 30/01/1997  
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=240465 accessed 12/01/2007. 
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In 1998 Bulgaria became one of the signatories of the pact on organised crime which 
the EU signed with the accession states.42 As part of the obligations under the pact, 
the country had to change its criminal law and criminal procedures to target 
organised crime and transnational crime according to the model developed by the 
EU. This required legislative and institutional changes, based on the principles of 
centralisation and specialisation of the judicial and law enforcement services and on 
the development of a model of investigation and prosecution focused on criminal 
offences defined as organised crime.43 The policy developed by the government 
followed international trends and adopted international standards in: criminal law, 
criminal procedure, data protection rules, multilateral and bilateral agreements, direct 
channels of police and judicial cooperation, international and regional organizations. 
The process developed in four main directions, as identified in the previous chapter: 
1) establishing organised crime as a matter of national security; 2) engaging in 
legislative projects linked to organised crime; 3) joining structures of international 
cooperation; 4) developing institutional reform on the executive (centralisation) and 
judicial level. 
 
Organised crime and Bulgaria’s national security 
 
In August 1997, Bulgaria’s National Security Service (NSS) published a report on 
the internal and external threats to national security. According to the report 
organised crime had become a threat to Bulgarian national security. In the same year 
the Parliament adopted a decision to create a permanent body called the Anti-mafia 
Commission, led by the Chair of the Parliament.44 The commission decided on a set 
of activities in order to create a national framework for countering the problem of 
crime. One initiative was the adoption of a new internal security concept published in 
the same year, and a strategy for countering crime also prepared in 1997.45 The 
                                                 
42 Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime between the Member States of The European Union and 
the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus (Text approved by the JHA 
Council on 28 May 1998) (98/C 220/01). 
43 F. Longo, ‘The export of the fight against organized crime policy model and the EU’s international 
actorness’ in M. Knodt & S. Princen eds., Understanding the European Union’s External Relations, 
Routledge, 2003, pp. 158-172.  
44 Н. Николов, МВР в системата на нациоалната сигурноост. Взаимодействие и координация 
(The Ministry of the Interior in the national security system. Interaction and coordination.), Албатрос, 
2000, p. 16-17. 
45 Единна национална стратегия за противодействие на престъпността, adopted 16 July 1998, at 
http://europe.bg/upload/docs/Crime_Prevention.pdf accessed 26/01/2009. 
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Commission also decided to delegate powers to the Ministry of the Interior to 
undertake institutional and personnel changes in order to improve the investigation of 
‘cases with unknown perpetrators’.46 The Parliament was urged to prioritise the 
adoption of legislation on crime and corruption, and the relevant institutions – 
Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of 
Finances presented (see Figure 6.2.), to develop a closer framework for cooperation 
in the fight against crime, and particularly a centralised system for data exchange, as 
well as procedural rules for the functioning and use of that database by the cabinet.47  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. National Security System in Bulgaria in 199748
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The new Security concept reflected international trends and interpreted organised 
crime as a major risk to the security of Bulgaria as a Balkan country: ‘The high level 
of crime systematically threatens the security of the individual citizens, it destroys 
the economic welfare and the legitimacy of the state institutions in the region.’49 The 
                                                 
46 Ibid, p. 17. The parliamentary commission is not a sign of parliamentary debate as its decisions 
follow Western advice and focus on the executive branch in the fight against crime. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Based on data from Н. Николов, 2004, op.cit.  
49 Концепция за националната сигурност на Република България (National Security Concept of 
Republic of Bulgaria), приета с Решение на 38-о НС от 16.04.1998 г., обн., ДВ, бр. 46 от 
22.04.1998г. [online] http://www.md.government.bg/bg/koncepcii/national_security_concept.html 
accessed 26/01/09. 
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concept suggested reform and modernisation of the legal process on the basis of a 
unified strategy for fighting crime and corruption. The Strategy on Countering Crime 
developed new ideas on crime reduction through further ‘maximum coordination’ of 
the legislative, executive and judiciary powers and devotes 12 sections to organised 
crime – more than other types of crime – despite the lack of definition of organised 
crime in the Bulgarian criminal legislation at the time. Both documents suggested a 
policy shift to countering the organised forms of crime seen as the more serious and 
more damaging type of crime.  
 
The Concept and the Strategy were prepared using foreign materials.50 The 
understanding of the problem of organised crime was limited at the time and the 
existing policy was underdeveloped – mainly because the tasks of dealing with this 
type of crime were new to the police, and also because of its growing international 
obligations linked to EU accession.51 Therefore the anti-organised crime policy was 
largely borrowed and was heavily influenced by foreign advisors, from the EU and 
particularly some of the more active EU member states and the USA.  
Legislative changes  
 
The scope of legislative activity was very wide and in the period 1997/9 Bulgaria 
adopted 14 laws linked to the fight against crime and corruption. In August 1997 the 
Parliament adopted a law to amend the Penal Code of Bulgaria which introduced 
criminal liability for new types of crimes such as racketeering and money laundering, 
illegal drug and arms trafficking, terrorism and copyright crime.52 The law also 
defined ‘organised crime group’ and determined sentencing for organisation of, and 
membership of, an organised crime group. In relation to the specifics of local 
                                                 
50 According to analysis published in Capital Newspaper: ‘The envisaged action shows that the team 
that has developed the strategy has used exclusively concepts borrowed from foreign consultants who 
frequently visit the country, instead of focusing on the specific acts and characteristics of organised 
crime in Bulgaria.’ ‘Стратегията за престъпността – много и добри пожелания’ (The Security 
strategy – many and good wishes), Капитал, бр. 30, 01/08/1998 [online] 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=245825: accessed 14/02/2007. 
51 During communism the regular police administration and the prosecution in Bulgaria did not 
investigate criminal conspiracies. These were dealt with the secret services under the same ministry 
but independent from the police. Ю. Георгиев, Българските спец служби с поглед към обединена 
Европа (The Bulgarian special services with a view to united Europe), София: Прива Консулт 
ЕООД, 2000. 
52 Закон за изменение и допълнение на Наказателния кодекс (Law to amend and supplement the 
Criminal Code), oбн., ДВ, бр. 62 от 5/08/1997 г. 
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organised crime, the Parliament also amended the Insurance law aimed at reducing 
the opportunities for racketeering.53 In 1999 the Parliament adopted a law on money 
laundering, a law for the control of narcotics and precursors, and a set of laws to 
counter offences in the financial and tax systems, as well as customs, and laws 
against corruption and gambling. The amendment of the criminal procedure in 1999 
aimed to introduce practices such as cross-examination, equality of the parties in 
front of the judge, the ‘passive’ function of the judge, the ‘oral proceedings’ 
principle, and alternative means of concluding the trial.54
 
Institutional reform 
 
Changes in criminal law were aimed at the criminalisation of activities as forms of 
‘organised crime’, and criminal procedure now aimed at enabling the prosecution of 
organised crime. This therefore affected institutional reform in the criminal justice 
system and had an impact on many of its branches – police, prosecution and courts, 
and data protection rules aimed at both the internal efficiency of the institutions as 
well as their international involvement in exchange of criminal data between 
Bulgarian institutions and signatories of agreements (states and institutions), and 
finally regional initiatives to facilitate the prosecution of cross-border crime. The 
institutional reform undertaken by the government aimed at the centralisation of the 
criminal justice institutions in order to improve the fight against crime.55 According 
to the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) from 1994, the judicial 
authorities are the court of law, the public prosecutor’s office and the investigative 
service – the National Investigative Office and the District Investigative Office, 
                                                 
53 The law forced the racketeering (wrestlers) groups to become legal as insurance companies. 
54 TRANSCRIME, 2004, op.cit. This was part of the reform of the criminal justice system in 
accordance with the accusatorial tradition in law. The aim of the reform was to introduce more 
protection for the defendant within the system in accordance to protection of human rights obligations. 
See G. Marinova, ‘Bulgarian Criminal Procedure: The New Philosophy and Issues of Approximation’, 
Review of Central and East European Law, 2006, vol. 31, pp.45-79. 
55 Изказване на министър-председателя Иван Костов пред Народното събрание за мерките на 
правителството за борба с организираната престъпност и корупцията – 11 юни 1999 г. (Speech 
of the Prime Minister Ivan Kostov on the measures of the government in the fight against crime and 
corruption) [online]  
http://sun450.government.bg/old/bg/prime_minister/statements/NS-Kostov_prestapnost_06_11.html 
accessed 28/01/2009. 
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judges, public prosecutors and investigators. Investigators are magistrates who 
perform preliminary investigations in criminal cases.56
  
The reform of the security services also emphasised the threat of organised crime and 
developed around police centralisation and the establishment of jurisdiction over 
organised crime investigations in the Ministry of the Interior’s Department for 
fighting organised crime (i.e. to take-over organised crime from other security 
structures).57 The new law on the security services transformed this Department into 
a Central Service for Combating Organised Crime (CSCOC) within the Ministry of 
the Interior and its chief was to be appointed by presidential decree (see Figure 
6.3.).58 The CSCOC was given investigative powers although the Bulgarian 
Constitution granted the National Investigation Service which functions outside the 
Ministry of the Interior similar powers.  
 
 
Figure 6.3. Criminal Justice System: the structure of the executive 59
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56 TRANSCRIME, 2004, op.cit.  
57 This department was created in 1991 within the Ministry of the Interior. It was not changed until 
1997. 
58 The law also transformed the national border police (still called National Border Army) into a 
specialised police service charged with guarding the national borders and management of the border – 
crossing regime, with operational and investigative powers. 
59 Based on data from Н. Николов, 2004, op.cit.  
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The new act abolished five previous laws which regulated the Ministry of the Interior 
and the other security services: the law on the National Security Service, the Central 
Service for Combating Organised Crime, the National Police, and National Fire-
fighting Service. In effect the new law centralised the authority of the director of the 
Ministry of the Interior who now had more powers not only over the work of the 
police but also the anti-mafia and counter-intelligence services too. The direct 
command of the National Security Service and Central Service for Combating 
Organised Crime (CSCOC, and later a National Service, or NSCOC) over their 
respective regional branches was reduced to methodological and controlling 
functions. In this way the new law eliminated the policing functions from the NSS 
and left it with a sole counter-intelligence, or information gathering role (i.e. no 
power to arrest). According to Interior Minister Bonev, ‘NSS will be catching spies. 
If they come across narcotics or terrorism, they will send the data to CSCOC, if they 
come upon white-collar criminal acts, they will report them to the economic police… 
This is the way it is done in the civilised countries’.60
 
However, a number of different interpretations by the opposition and the media 
suggested more political reasons behind the changes. According to reports in the 
media, this move was prompted by the desire to attack the counterintelligence 
services which were perceived as a remnant of the former State Security service from 
the communist period. Furthermore, the tactics of using legislative changes rather 
than personnel changes was preferred due to the fear that such a personnel 
confrontation might bring out scandalous information which could compromise the 
government.61 According to Jovo Nikolov, the reinforcement of the CSFOS was a 
way to end discussions amongst some political circles over the establishment of a 
Bulgarian FBI, which would be directly accountable to the president or parliament 
and hence, avoid the direct control of the government.62 A much simpler explanation 
of this change was the desire to give new meaning to the CSCOC, which had been 
created six years before but which had experienced a complete failure in fighting 
                                                 
60  М. Милев, 'Бонев централизира властта в МВР' (Bonev centralises the power at the Ministry of 
the Interior), Капитал, бр. 31, 01/08/1997 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=240005: 
accessed 12/01/2007. 
61 М. Милев, 1997, op.cit.  
62 Й. Николов, ‘Новият закон за МВР:централизация и информация’ (The new law of the 
Ministry of the Interior: centralization and information), Капитал, бр 35, 30/01/1997 [online] 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=240430 30 accessed 12/01/2007. 
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what was seen as the new mafia structures (such as the wrestlers’ associations and 
other shady economic groups). Despite the letdown, the CSCOC was perceived as a 
product of democracy whereas the NSS was a communist relic. Hence, the priority of 
fighting crime even when investigations would overlap was to be given to CSCOC.63
 
International and media activities 
 
Within the police itself the new developments meant that crime was now separated in 
two categories, ordinary crime and organised crime, and therefore it had to separate 
powers and responsibilities, as well as resources, between its departments. The 
departments tasked with the fight against organised crime prioritised crime which 
affected the EU such as drug and human trafficking, as well as international 
cooperation and activities.  
 
Bulgaria signed agreements for cooperation in the fight against crime with the US, 
Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Austria, China, India, Russia, 
Macedonia, and other countries. The problem of crime was also one of the topics of 
the official foreign policy in the region. Bulgaria signed agreements with Turkey and 
Romania, and a Protocol of tripartite cooperation for fighting organised and 
transnational crime with Greece and Romania.64 In the words of then Foreign 
Minister of Bulgaria Nadejda Mihailova, the fight against organised crime is ‘a new 
form of trust between the countries in the Balkans’.65 In 1999 it joined the Southeast 
                                                 
63 The shift of powers was carried out through changes in the Border and Territorial Army which the 
new law planned to transform into a border police and national gendarmerie, respectively. Their rank 
was also changed and they became national services while their functions were altered from ‘defence’ 
to ‘protection’. The law also envisaged a transfer of border police from the southern borders to the 
north and eastern (Danube and the Black Sea) borders. This move is linked to the new priority of the 
border police which was catching smugglers on the northern and north-eastern borders. The role of the 
newly established gendarmerie was to guard strategic sites in the country and maintain order in 
unpopulated areas (outside towns and villages). This change of mission is prompted by the fact that 
the Territorial Army had lost its purpose and its staff remained unoccupied. The gendarmerie was also 
to include special anti-terrorist branches.  
64 Although there was a growing consensus on the nature of the new threats backed by bilateral and 
trilateral agreements in the region, each country still guarded its interests. Turkey for example used 
the Agreement on the Fight Against Organised Crime, Terrorism and Drug-Trafficking signed by 
Bulgaria, Romania and itself, for promoting its main concern with terrorism and Greece’s support of 
PKK. ‘Балканският пъзел все още не може да бъде подреден’ (The Balkan puzzle is still 
unarranged), Капитал, бр.19, 16/05/1998 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=244657: 
accessed 13/02/2007. 
65 ‘България генерира сигурност в Европа не само на думи’ (Bulgaria generates security in Europe 
and not only rhetorically), Капитал, бр. 16, 25/04/1998 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=244223: accessed 13/02/2007. 
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European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) for establishing a Regional Centre for 
Combating Trans-Border Crime in Bucharest, Romania and in 2000 Sofia hosted a 
meeting which set up the Stability Pact Initiative against Organised Crime (SPOC). 
 
Although the international aspect was one of the key policy areas of Kostov’s anti-
crime agenda, it became particularly strong with the next government, which came 
into power in 2001 and which was led, in a further turn of events, by the former king, 
Simeon, as Prime Minister 2001-2005. Under the new government the Ministry of 
the Interior engaged in more extensive public relations campaigns and media 
management (many funded by the EU PHARE programme) which promoted the 
police as a crime fighter. The Minister appointed a new General Secretary, Boyko 
Borisov, a former security businessman who gained popularity from appearing as 
tough on organised crime (and was later elected as Sofia mayor).66 The new 
government was also reacting both to intensified external pressure to demonstrate 
activity against organised crime and also some internal opposition and allegations of 
links with criminal organisations. In these conditions, linking the fight against 
organised crime with international partners and international police operations, and 
developing image management of the police, was the only option for raising the 
government’s profile internally and externally. 
 
The peak of international activity (and the anti-crime policy in general) was during 
the period when Bulgaria was negotiating over Chapter 24 of the JHA (between 27 
                                                 
66 There has been some allegation that Borisov is himself a former ‘wrestler’, and member of 
organised crime. His work for the Ministry was focused on ‘hard’ organised crime, and especially 
international, cross-border crime. His appointment coincided with a gang war where many figures of 
the underground were publicly murdered. According to the UNDP Early warning Report, drawing on 
interviews with former police officers, the bombings in 2001 were ‘connected with the redistribution 
of territories as a consequence of the expected replacements in the top police echelon’, and 
particularly the appointment of Borisov for Chief Secretary of the Interior Ministry as he was 
allegedly linked to some the former insurance groups. UNDP, ‘Annual Early Warning Report’, 
USAID/Open Society Foundation, UNDP project BUL/99/0212001 [online] at 
http://www.undp.bg/uploads/documents/1188_663_en.pdf accessed 02/03/2005. Between 2001 and 
2004 Borisov engaged in almost militarised action against alleged criminals (also linked to escalating 
rivalry between Borisov and then prosecutor general and mutual accusations of failure to deal with 
crime). Some of the actions taken by the police to display their power included a three-day round-up 
of 250 individuals under investigation (unlike prosecutor mandate arrests the police do not need 
physical evidence for guilt so this list was arbitrary), a number of other mass arrest operations 
(including international actions under SECI, one of which included raiding some 20 000 sites and 
arresting 240 people), and a 28-day siege of the country house of a convicted criminal when the police 
in fact eliminated their target using anti-tank rockets when he was clearly not using any kind of 
armoury. М. Милев, Бойко Борисов и Четиредесетте разбойника’ (Boyko Borisov and the Forty 
Thieves), Капитал, бр 51, 20/12-9/01/2004. 
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June 2001 – 29 October 2003). Crime had already become one of the key internal 
problems in Bulgaria that had had a huge impact on its external relations and 
especially its accession to the EU. The country entered the negotiations on Chapter 
24 without any objections to the need to adopt the JHA acquis. Between 2001-2003 
Bulgaria adopted 12 new laws linked to the JHA, facilitating the fight against 
organised crime and international cooperation. The laws concerned the handling of 
personal and classified data of local and international sources, handling of migrants 
and refugees, people trafficking, money laundering, further amendments of the Penal 
Code with regards to organised crime, changes in the structure of the Ministry of the 
Interior creating a new Department for International Cooperation, and a Department 
dealing with Migration. It also adopted ten strategies and programmes for the 
application of these strategies, including an elaborate plan for reforming the 
judiciary, anti-corruption, the adoption of some 5000 pages of the Schengen acquis, 
anti-drug strategy, a strategy to fight financial fraud affecting the EU interests, and a 
new National strategy for counteraction crime. In 2001 Bulgaria adopted The United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, and its Protocols, on human 
trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms trafficking.67
 
By 2001 the structure of the police was mainly aimed at the fight against organised 
crime and international cooperation: five of the Chief Directorates of the Ministry of 
the Interior were dealing with aspects of organised crime, terrorism or border control, 
international cooperation, and each regional branch of the police had a specialised 
Department for the Fight Against Organised crime. Furthermore, the country had to 
set up an Agency for financial intelligence in 2001 as required by the law on Money 
Laundering. The Agency was set up as an independent body linked to the Ministry of 
Finance and had the task of collecting, analysing, investigating and transferring 
information on suspicious cases to the police, as well as exchanging information 
internationally. Since the conclusion of the negotiations on the JHA acquis, Bulgaria 
ratified all relevant conventions signed by the member states within the JHA 
                                                 
67 Bulgaria was already a signatory of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (ratified in 1992), the 1990 Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ratified in 
1993), the 1999 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ratified in 2001). Source 
TRANSCRIME, 2004, op.cit.  
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cooperation. In 2004 it adopted the European Arrest Warrant and amended its Penal 
Code once again in order to adopt EU Conventions on extradition.  
 
6.5. Some political complications of the focus on organised crime  
 
These anti-crime initiatives of the governments since 1997 were supported by the 
public. The early actions of Kostov’s government were limited but focused on the 
current public concerns and gained benefits for the new government, especially some 
actions against the so-called economic groups such as Multigroup, as well as against 
some more ‘petty’ forms of organised crime, and especially the notorious wrestlers 
groups. However, the actions against organised crime were seen as superficial and 
sometimes even ridiculed. The press increasingly targeted the gap between the 
governments’ intentions and its inability to tackle the problem of crime. The Kostov 
government’s promise to ‘fight against street and organised crime through a series of 
economic measures: speeding up the privatisation of state property, lowering the 
licensing minimum, simplifying the numerous and complex administrative 
procedures, linking the customs and taxation system in a common system of 
accountability and control, change of the system of taxation so that the taxes become 
more tolerable and their avoidance – more difficult’ did not yield results because, on 
the ground, the link between these reforms and reduction of crime was not visible.68  
 
One example of the police’s disarray was the policy against the wrestlers when the 
legislative change appeared to turn their shady racketeering business into legitimate 
insurance businesses, albeit one which still relied on their violent reputation. The 
police came up with the idea of physical removal of the insurance companies stickers 
from cars and shops and these actions were seen in the press as a display of the 
ineffectiveness of the reform policies. The removal of stickers clearly demonstrated 
the failure of widely publicised economic reform to trickle down to the everyday 
problems which concerned the wider public. Furthermore, taking the offensive 
against the wrestlers was not even popular with experienced policemen, for, as some 
of them pointed out to UNDP researchers raiding these groups left their members 
relatively less well-off, resulting in many of these now impoverished members 
                                                 
68 Л. Василев, ‘Костов между популярността сега и успеха утре’, op.cit.  
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resorting to lower levels of criminal activity, i.e. stealing and other types of low-level 
crime which increased ordinary, street crime.69 And ordinary crime, the UNDP 
report points out, ‘continues to be perceived as the greater danger in comparison with 
organised crime.’70  
 
This separation of crime into two categories, street crime and organised crime was 
one of the underlying problems of the institutional policy. It led to a separation of 
powers and responsibilities between different departments of the Ministry of the 
Interior (CSCOC and the regular police), and between the different bodies of the 
criminal justice system which created duplication of tasks and clashes of jurisdiction 
(including a clash between the prosecution and the police over investigative powers). 
The first clash within the police services took place a few months after the launch of 
the new legislative changes and set the Minister of the Interior Bogomil Bonev 
against his subordinate Chief of the National Police Administration Slavcho 
Bosilkov.71 The conflict materialised at a meeting dedicated to the problem of crime 
in October 1997 where the Chief of the Police presented a report on the situation 
with crime and the police. In his report Bosilkov opposed the changes initiated by his 
boss and criticised the weakening of the lower branches of the police administration 
and the centralisation of power on a national level, in the Ministry of the Interior. His 
criticism extended to the personnel policy of the Ministry which had changed the 
management of some regional police departments, along with dismissing many 
policemen. Bosilkov proposed, instead, a centralisation on the level of the National 
Police Administration within the Ministry and his position was shared only by the 
Police Union’s leader Emil Rashev. The head of the CSCOC Kiril Radev stood on 
the side of Minister Bonev and according to them the centralisation on the level of 
the regular police had been tried and tested and had not produced results. The attack 
turned into a general assault on the police administration which was criticised for 
                                                 
69 UNDP Bulgaria , Early Warning Report, op.cit.  
70 Ibid, p.94. There are other examples of state regulation which have affected the organised crime 
business such as the introduction of a new system of car registration which led to changes in the 
market of stolen cars and the emergence of car ransom.  
71 ‘Шефът на полицията разклати стола под краката си’ (The boss of the police rocked the chair 
underneath him), Капитал, бр. 41, 11/10/1997 [online] 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=241212: accessed 20/02/2007. 
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their work on the whole and created antagonisms against the structures tasked with 
the fight against organised crime.72  
 
The institutional reforms, and the increase of the powers of the Ministry of the 
Interior, were also strongly criticised by the Prosecutor General and later, by the 
President himself.73 The main criticism was against the increasing politicisation of 
the institutions, i.e. the appointment of political administrators linked to the party in 
power instead of experts. 74 All appointments or dismissals in the security service 
were widely publicised by the media and scrutinised by the opposition. The 
importance of the fight against organised crime for the governments in Bulgaria was 
unprecedented but it repeatedly failed to secure convictions. There were various 
reasons for this failure but the responsibility was usually transferred to the judiciary 
by other parties. 
 
The government argued that the lack of coordination between the institutions of the 
police, the preliminary investigation and the prosecution was to blame for the delay 
of trials and lack of convictions. Kostov requested a debate about the fight against 
crime in parliament and the formation of a special investigative committee (modelled 
on the Italian anti-mafia commissions). As such actions are typically undertaken by 
the opposition, the fact the governing party organised this debate was interpreted as 
the launch of the campaign against the judiciary with the ultimate aim of changing 
the constitution, in order to relax the guarantees of separation and independence of 
powers. This was seen as necessary for the fight against organised crime as it would 
allow the grant of more investigative authority to the executive and remove the 
immunity of the magistrates, i.e. impose some control over the judiciary by the 
executive power.75 The government also initiated a policy of change of the local 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 ‘Президентът поиска повече правомощия за спецслужбите’ (The President asked for more 
powers for the special services), Капитал, бр.41, 11/10/1997  
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=254281: accessed 16/02/2007. 
74 ‘Гаранцията срещу политизацията на МВР е в спазването на закона’ (Observing the law is the 
guarantee against politicization of the Ministry of the Interior), Капитал, бр. 41, 11/10/1997 [online] 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=254511: accessed 16/02/2007. 
75 Magistrates cannot be dismissed unless they have been involved in a crime and they have been 
sentenced. Hence, it is difficult to impose demands on them for more efficient work in the fight 
against crime. Another string in the new policy is the aspiration to increase the powers of the Minister 
of Justice and effectively make him/her a ‘guardian’ of the magistrates, i.e. have the ability to 
approach the Supreme Court of Justice. 
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party representatives with people who will pressure the local government and 
institutions to fight crime.76
 
The actions of the Ministry of the Interior under Kostov led to direct accusations of it 
turning Bulgaria into a police state and effectively aggravating the working 
conditions of the different branches of the criminal justice system.77 In an attempt to 
avoid such accusations the government tried to involve all political parties and public 
opinion in the debate on crime and successfully created a general consensus that 
organised crime was the most pressing problem of the country at the moment and 
required extraordinary measures. In this way, along with other legislative changes, 
discussed earlier in the chapter, such as the new law of public administration and the 
law on the Ministry of the Interior, and legislative measures against corruption, the 
changes of the laws regulating the judiciary were promoted as part of the fight 
against organised crime. 
 
The rift between institutions became deeper with the increased pressure put on the 
judiciary, which used its independence to fight back. In one case, the Minister of the 
Interior publicly warned the Supreme Judicial Council that if they supported a local 
prosecutor, with whom the Ministry had a problem, they would in fact be supporting 
the mafia: an allegation which caused an immediate reaction from the Council which 
declared this ‘an impermissible interference in objective resolution of the problem’.78 
In the so-called war of the institutions, the Ministry of the Interior used the discourse 
of corruption to discredit the judiciary and the local police departments (such as the 
police force in the city of Varna where 86 policemen were fired in 1997 for 
allegations of links with the mafia).  
 
The allegations of inefficiencies aimed at the judiciary were met by counter-
allegations that they had to work on the basis of evidence collected by the police, and 
they could not engage in a strategy against organised crime because they needed to 
                                                 
76 ‘Костов свива синия юмрук срещу престъпността’ (Kostov clenches the blue fist against crime), 
Капитал, бр.37, 13/09/1997 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=240700 accessed 
12/01/2007. 
77 Й. Николов, ‘Целта на дебата за престъпността е промяна в конституцията’ (The aim of the 
crime debate is change of the constitution), Капитал, бр. 38, 20/09/1997  
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=240864 accessed 12/01/2007. 
78 ‘Прокурорско време разделно’ (Time to divide the Prosecution), Капитал, бр. 44, 1/11/1997 
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=241479: accessed 12/02/2007. 
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respond to all types of crime and could not, as an independent institution for 
administrating justice, prioritise a certain type of crimes as a result of external 
pressure.79 This led to reinforcement of the view among civil servants and 
international observers that the problems of the fight against organised crime are to 
be found in the judicial branch, and especially the prosecution service, whose 
independence prevented control over its actions or lack of actions and opens the 
system to corruption and lack of accountability.80 The supremacy of the Prosecutor 
General’s office within the system of the judicial power was blamed for the 
inefficiencies of the judicial system as a whole. The Prosecutor General Tatarchev 
opposed the attacks from the Ministry of the Interior and in turn accused them, and 
the police, of corruption. He pointed to a case in which the CSCOC failed to act after 
a warning about a group of security services policemen who were engaged in 
racketeering. In response, the CSCOC organised a press conference and blamed the 
prosecution for disclosing information on policemen working under cover in the 
criminal underworld and ruining the police action.81 The war between the Prosecutor 
General and the different branches of the executive made the former look for support 
in the major opposition parties and, ironically, to some influential business 
organisations supposedly linked to organised crime.82
 
These mutual accusations between the institutions continued throughout the whole 
process of transition and the development of Bulgaria’s anti-crime policies. The 
problems linked to developing a policy on organised crime identified in the previous 
chapters were fully reflected in the case of Bulgaria, and these problems help to 
explain of the politicisation of institutions. The institutional wars were triggered by 
different and clashing priorities, as well as different institutional cultures. According 
to a recent study by the Sofia-based Centre for Liberal Strategies ‘Task Force and 
                                                 
79 CLS report, op.cit. p. 9. 
80 Author’s personal communication with legal experts from the Centre of the Study of Democracy in 
Sofia. 
81 ‘Татарчев срещу Бонев – играта загрубя’ (Tatarchev versus Bonev – the game got rough), 
Капитал, бр. 45, 8/11/1997 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=241686: accessed 
12/02/2007. 
82 Ibid. The article suggests that the assault on the Prosecutor general is meant to undermine the 
relations between Tatarchev and the Bulgarian Socialist party, the main opposition party because 
Tatarchev made a career of purging the former communists. However, in order to prevent changes of 
the constitution, the Prosecutor General looked for parliamentary support in the opposition and the 
BSP made it clear that they would not endorse the proposed changes. He also lobbied in the MRF, the 
second party in opposition. Tatarchev also approached some business organizations which had 
criminal links such as Multigroup. 
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Organised Crime in Bulgaria’ the various institutions have different definitions in 
dealing with organised crime as well as different, and sometimes conflicting, 
approaches to the problem:
The police understand organised crime as a network phenomenon and 
have adopted a strategy of undermining the economic base of the 
organised criminal groups. For the prosecutors, it is almost impossible to 
substantiate organised crime charges in court, and because of that their 
preferred strategy is to indict suspected members of organised groups for 
‘ordinary’ crimes. The courts, on their part, have almost no jurisprudence 
on organised criminal groups. Having in mind these differences, it is 
possible to conclude that the institutional responses of the police on the 
one hand, and the prosecutors and the courts on the other, differ in 
important ways: the former attempt to address networks, the latter address 
mainly individual crimes…Although virtually all of our respondents 
recognised the importance of the inter-institutional cooperation in the 
fight against organised crime, each of them saw not their own institution, 
but their partners as a main source of obstacles in the co-operative effort. 
Commonly, the police accuse the courts, the courts – the prosecutors, and 
the prosecutors – mainly the police and sometimes the courts. Not 
surprisingly, this leads to different understandings of the need for future 
institutional reforms.83  
Ivan Krastev argues that developments in Bulgaria showed that it was not a police 
state but a weak state where the government risked becoming a victim of such 
‘administrative mafias’.84 In 2001 the UDF lost the elections due to allegations of 
corruption, and the next government became a target of mounting accusations of 
                                                 
83 CSD, ‘The Fight against Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Review of Institutional Concepts and 
Strategies’, Summary of key findings of Project Task Force on Organised Crime in Bulgaria [online] 
http://www.cls-
sofia.org/uploads/files/Projects%20files/The%20Fight%20against%20Organised%20Crime%20in%2
0Bulgaria.doc accessed 27/04/2009. 
84 ‘Дебатът за подслушването показа, че не сме полицейска, а слаба държава. Интервю с 
политолога Иван Кръстев,’(The debate on tapping the lines shows we are not a police but a weak 
state. Interview with political scientist Ivan Krastev), Капитал, бр. 31, 4/08/2000  
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=204202: accessed 15/03/2007. Krastev points out 
that the problem is not that there is no public control over the services but there is no political control 
over them. He argues that the fight against crime can only be successful after strengthening the 
political process. 
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links with organised crime, which it largely ignored and chose to distance itself from 
the other internal actors in the policy on crime. The government even refused to 
participate in the first meeting dedicated to the problems of crime organised by the 
new President Purvanov who accused the cabinet of ‘political arrogance’.85 As 
discussed earlier this government engaged in a public relations campaign and hard 
policies on crime, and further reform of the judiciary which was by that stage 
explicitly linked with the fight against crime.86
 
6.6. Judicial reform and the fight against organised crime 
 
The general judicial reform started much earlier, in the early 1990s, with key 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure code in 1997 and 1999 – they focused on the 
overall working of the system which had to be adjusted to the process of 
democratisation and human rights protection.87 In the period between 2001 and 2007 
the Bulgarian policy on organised crime was partly linked to the reform of the 
judiciary, and particularly to that part of the reform which aimed at improving the 
efficiency of criminal procedure in order to secure more convictions. The link 
between the fight against organised crime and judicial reform became even stronger 
after the negotiations with the EU on the JHA were concluded in 2003.88 The reform 
of the judiciary in the later stages was in fact an attempt to correct some of the 
changes introduced with the earlier amendments which introduced more legal 
safeguards but slowed down and complicated the criminal procedure, and this was in 
                                                 
85 ‘Президентът разкритикува НДСВ по всички фронтове’ (The President criticised NDSV on 
every level), Капитал, бр. 35, 31/08/2002 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=217183: 
accessed 15/03/2007. 
86 There is an additional reason for this development – the new government came from a new political 
formation called New Times, united under the figure of the former Bulgarian king who came back 
from exile. The party had a high number of professionals in its ranks, many of which from the legal 
profession who became MPs. The high number of lawyers in the Parliament meant more attention to 
the judicial reform.  
87 The amendments to CCP in 1997 introduced the use of electronic surveillance and the institution of 
witness protection – both of those instruments are part of the Western practice and linked to the fight 
against organised crime. The 1999 amendments introduced plea bargaining, and a number of 
adversarial elements to the procedure and reduced the role of the court in the pre-trial procedure but 
established the requirement that a judge is present at a witness or defendant’s examination, which later 
created practical difficulties for the investigators, slowed down the investigation and problems of 
coordination between judges and the police. 
88Accession Treaty was signed on 25 April 2005 but it still held conditions for accession. Bulgaria 
was not given a confirmation that it would join on the provisional date of January 2007 until the very 
last moment, in the autumn of 2006. This delay was justified with increasing the power of 
conditionality on the fight against organised crime and judicial reform. 
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conflict with the priorities of the fight against organised crime which now sought fast 
convictions.89 The later amendments to the criminal procedure focused on a 
compromise between protection of rights on one hand and efficiency on the other, 
and compromises between the independence and incorruptibility of the judiciary.90  
 
Therefore since 2000 the judicial reform process was motivated by aims such as 
efficiency, accountability and control over the judiciary. Initially, expert analyses for 
this reform focused on the pre-trial phase of the criminal procedure where the 
problems with the fight against organised crime were identified. The EU’s official 
opinion was that ‘the implemented reforms only partially meet the requirements, 
while the reform in the pre-trial phase in Bulgaria should be continued in order to 
attain compliance with the EU efficiency criteria… The recommendation is to 
continue the reforms, which should lead to an improvement of the efficiency and the 
accountability of the judicial system’.91 The overall structure of the judicial system is 
presented in Figure 6.4. The institutions of the pre-trial phase are the Prosecution, 
and the investigative bodies – police and the specialised investigation service.92 In 
later stages the reform process focused on judges and improving their work mainly  
 
 
                                                 
89 According to some observers, the problems with the judiciary were created not by the clash or 
priorities but by the new Bulgarian constitution, which established a separation of powers and gave 
independence to the judicial branch, which opened possibilities for corruption. The reform of the 
judiciary was officially part of the state’s anti-corruption policies. Yordanova argues that ‘[t]his 
independence prompted the political parties to seek indirect channels of influence, which in the initial 
years of transition were ensured through sweeping staff replacements at all levels – from the rank-and-
file to the senior positions.’ Furthermore, the anti-corruption policies and the reform of the judiciary 
were pushed by the newly institutionalized civil society in Bulgaria in the form of NGOs such as 
Coalition 2000 through its annual Corruption Assessment Reports, the Judicial Reform Initiative 
through the Program for Judicial Reform (2000), the Center for the Study of Democracy – through the 
Judicial Anti-Corruption Program (2003), etc.’ M. Yordanova, ‘Judicial Reform – State of Play and 
Opportunities’ in M. Yordanova & D. Markov, Judicial Reform: The Prosecution Office and 
Investigation Authorities in the Context of EU Membership, Sofia: CSD, 2004, p.6-8 [online] 
http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002785/01/fileSrc_7.pdf accessed 28/01/08. 
90 See G. Marinova, 2006, op.cit.  
91 M. Yordanova, 2004, op.cit. , p 5. 
92 The pre-trial phase in the Bulgarian Criminal Procedure takes one of two alternative forms: 
preliminary investigation or police investigation (see Figure 6.3). Therefore there are two bodies that 
perform investigations: investigators (investigating magistrates, or sledovateli) and police officers. 
The judges, prosecutors and investigators are all magistrates and have the same judicial status, rights 
and immunities (the investigators are subordinate to the Prosecutor). The police officers who engage 
in investigation are part of the executive. Serious crimes were investigated by a preliminary 
investigation by the Investigation service which is more complicated as it follows a stringent set of 
legal rules (i.e. it is a judicial investigation). The police officers usually do not have juridical training 
and perform less complicated cases, or those where immediate collection of evidence is needed. 
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 Figure 6.4. Criminal Justice system: Executive – Judiciary, and the Investigation Service 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
                                                 
1 Based on data from Bulgarian legislation, Н. Николов, 2004, op.cit. and Г. Marinova, 2006, op. cit.. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court is not part of the judicial 
system as a judicial body but can be summoned to interpret acts in the Criminal Procedure as constitutional or not. 
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 through further education and tighter control.1
 
As discussed earlier, most of the criticism was directed at the Prosecution Service, 
which is part of the judicial system but is also independent from the control of either 
the judiciary or its control body the Supreme Judicial Council, or the legislative and 
executive branches. It is run on a hierarchical principle and the Chief Prosecutor is 
the sole person in charge over the whole institution, responsible for initiating 
investigations and bringing cases to trial.2 Furthermore the prosecution service had 
begun to react against the attacks on its independence and accused the institutions of 
the executive and judiciary with incompetence and inefficiency, in some cases 
provoking scandals in the media.3 The preparation of the amendments of the 
Criminal Procedure in 2002 triggered endless debates in the parliament and the 
media, and mutual accusations, propositions for further reform, attacks and 
counterattacks linked to the perceived redistribution of power and establishment of 
more direct control.4  
 
The new debate re-opened the issue of responsibility and determining which section 
of the criminal justice chain was to blame for the failure of the fight against 
                                                 
1 After limiting the powers of the Prosecution over the pre-trial phase and increasing the role of the 
judges, the Prosecutor General accused the judges of using their powers inappropriately and for being 
‘spoilt’, and ‘trying to show off’. ‘Филчев срещу Филчев’ (Filchev versus Filchev), Капитал, бр. 
11, 17/0/2001 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=207690: accessed 15/03/2007. 
2 This position of the Bulgarian Prosecutor is borrowed from the Soviet and later Russian criminal 
procedure. According to experts this was appropriate for the Soviet system where the prosecutor was 
under the control of the Communist Party but in the post-communist period the institution remained 
uncontrollable. The alternative practice (in some Western systems) is to establish the Prosecution 
under the executive branch. The EU advised to subordinate the prosecution to the courts. ‘Сини 
депутати лобират за прокуратурата’ (Blue [liberal] MPs lobby for the Prosecution), Капитал, бр.4, 
27/01/2001 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=206788: accessed 15/03/2007. 
3 For example, in 2001 the Prosecutor published a report on the use of special investigation techniques 
(electronic surveillance, phone calls monitoring) by the police which showed that in 97.33% of the 
cases they had not brought forward evidence which could be used in court. In the period 1999-2000 
the police had used such techniques 10 020 times and only 269 had produced results. The Prosecutor 
accused the police of not only making the use of such techniques the main method of collecting 
evidence but for over using it and using it in inappropriate cases, including cases of illegal fishing. 
‘Мания за преследване налегна прокуратурата’ (The Prosecution overcome by a fear of stalking ), 
Капитал, бр.4, 27/01/2001 
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=206786: accessed 15/03/2007. 
4 The Prosecutor General clashed with the Chief of the Investigations service, and the Chairman of the 
Supreme Court of Cessation. The clashes were interpreted as political or personal but the justification 
was usually the protection of the powers of the Prosecution services in the debate of which branch, 
executive or judicial, was to take control over it. ‘И преди изборите главният прокурор натиска 
политиците за повече власт’, Капитал, бр.24, 16/08/2001 [online] 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=209435: accessed 15/03/2007. 
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 organised crime. The Prosecution blamed the judges for ruling on cases too slowly, 
to which the judges replied with published statistics of the slow proceedings of the 
investigation. The police argued that they catch criminals and the judiciary sets them 
free; the judiciary blamed prosecutions based on poor evidence collected by the 
police who are not jurists and collect evidence which goes against the law.5 The 
envisaged amendments in the criminal procedure were developed under the motto of 
uniting against fighting organised crime but the plans to improve efficiency at the 
expense of rights were not readily welcome. The Prosecution united its efforts with 
the Ministry of Justice, and proposed that it should stay in the judicial system but be 
accountable to Parliament, and work with the government on a strategy to fight 
organised crime and corruption.6 The opposition from the Prosecution and its 
political allies led to a change of focus on the Investigation service (Figure 6.4), 
which the Prosecution itself suggested it should takeover via a new amendment of 
the criminal procedure. A few months later, in 2003 the Prosecution became more 
open to the ideas of reform which it previously opposed as it realised that this was 
alienating its partners and foreign donors.7
 
The compromise between the pressures to eliminate the obstacles to the investigation 
or pre-trial phase, and the opposition of the branches of the system affected by these 
plans materialised in a new amendment to the criminal procedure in 2004.8 The 
amendment reduced the competences of the investigators and expanded those of the 
police officers (so-called doznateli) who took over the investigation of many crimes 
which were previously under the jurisdiction of the Investigation service. The latter 
was given a small number of crimes which it has an obligation to investigate, e.g. 
most serious crimes, such as high treason, espionage, murder, etc. but which are in 
fact a tiny percentage of crimes. These amendments established the police and hence 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 ‘Филчев и Станков ще декларират бъдещо сътрудничество’(Filchev and Stankov will declare 
future cooperation), Капитал, бр. 43, 26/10/2002 [online] 
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=218084: accessed 15/03/2007. 
7 ‘Прокуратурата опитва нова тактика’ (The Prosecution tries new tactics), Капитал, бр. 3, 
25/02/2003 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=219606: accessed 26/03/2007. 
8 In 2001 the rules on police investigation were amended and as a result between 2001-2003 there 
were no differences between police and preliminary investigation apart from the identity of the 
investigators. In 2003 these changes were repealed and the pre-2001 system was re-introduced. As 
Marinova points out ‘[t]his highlights the instability of legislation governing police investigations and 
also suggests that amendments to CCP in this sphere are likely to continue’. G. Marinova , 2006, 
op.cit. p.69. 
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 the executive as the key investigative body in the criminal justice system.9 This led 
to further problems and an increase of the complaints from the prosecution and 
judges about the juridical quality of the investigation and collected evidence.10
 
The amendments also simplified the criminal proceedings (particularly changes 
concerning opening and closing proceedings) in order to ‘help reduce burdens upon 
the overloaded criminal court system, i.e. fewer criminal proceedings will be 
opened’.11 Needless to say these changes also added to the criticism of an inefficient 
criminal justice system. In effect the attempt to avoid the more formal and longer 
stages of the investigation which was longer because of its quality control and 
accumulation of admissible evidence, created more problems for the trial stage as 
well as more ground for appeals – both of which prolonged the proceedings and 
added to the public dissatisfaction with the judiciary.12 Therefore the next step was 
the reform of this part of the criminal justice process which became the subject of a 
new dispute in the immediate pre-accession period 2006-2007, and which involved a 
more politically intense situation, as it demanded further amendments to the 
Bulgarian constitution. 
 
The extensive and prolonged reform of the judicial system was mainly caused by the 
perceived lack of success in the fight against organised crime. An extensive study 
conducted by the Bulgarian Think Tank Centre for Liberal Strategies, found that the 
work of the Bulgarian judiciary in general is not deficient in comparison to western 
judicial systems. The study compared sentencing and duration of proceedings and 
did not find evidence to suggest that the Bulgarian system was in need of further 
reform. However the only area where the system seemed to fail was the fight against 
organised crime: 
                                                 
9 Customs officers are the other investigative institution linked to the executive. 
10 Another set of amendments were introduced in 2004 which were linked to the ratification of the 
Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters – 
The Bulgarian legislators had to adopt more investigative and trial techniques such as use of video or 
telephone conferences for witnesses and experts, cross-border observations, controlled delivery, 
covert investigations, joint investigation teams. 
11 G. Marinova, 2006, op.cit., p.63. 
12 According to Marinova, ‘[A]lthough it is a speedy procedure, police investigations have often been 
criticized in legal literature. This criticism has been directed primarily at the lack of clear rules and 
prerequisites of opening police investigations and for bringing charges against the defendant which 
could lead to unfounded acts on behalf of police officers and to violations of basic human rights’. Ibid, 
p.69. The existence of criticism from judges will be discussed in the final chapter. 
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The fact that as a whole the judicial system functions satisfactorily does 
not mean that there are no considerable problems in some specific 
spheres. These problems concern limited in size but yet very important 
spheres such as the fight against organized crime, money laundering, 
high-level corruption. In these spheres the system faces apparent 
problems. It is difficult to place the difficulties the Bulgarian judicial 
system faces in comparative perspective, because of lack of data. Yet, 
the level of unresolved contract killing cases, the lack of convictions for 
participation in organized groups, the excessive focus on petty 
corruption as opposed to high-level political corruption are sufficient 
indicators of serious problems.13
 
However, as the report indicates, there is the problem of measuring the success of the 
courts in the fight against organised crime as the statistics lump together all crimes 
defined as organised crime-related and it is therefore difficult to judge the level of 
success in this area, i.e. the level of sentencing for participation in organised crime. 
The problem of measuring this type of crime is linked to the problems of definition 
which the investigative organs come across and the almost impossible task of 
proving membership in a criminal organisation.14 Some of these issues will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
Since 1997 Bulgarian political elites have adopted an anti-organised crime agenda 
which was claimed to be necessary for the aims of overall structural and political 
reform of the country, as well as its accession to the European Union. The liberal 
                                                 
13 Centre for Liberal Strategies, ‘The Judiciary: Independent and Accountable. Indicators on the 
Efficiency of the Bulgarian Judicial System.’, Preliminary report of the Project ‘Strengthening of the 
Policy Making Capacity of the Bulgarian Judicial System’, 2006, p. 9 [online] http://www.cls-
sofia.org/download.php?id=52 accessed 27/04/2009. 
14 This was pointed out by senior officials in press conferences with the media where the journalists 
are asked to ‘remove the term ‘organised crime’ from their vocabularies’ as such a thing ‘does not 
exist’. The Bulgarian Penal code does not define organised crime, or organised criminal group, or 
mafia as such. ‘Езикови тревоги в МВР’(Linguistic troubles in the Ministry of the Interior), 
Капитал, бр. 3, 25/01/2003 [online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=212146: accessed 
15/03/2007. 
 
 217
 reformist government of Ivan Kostov and its successors developed an anti-crime 
strategy which reflected international trends and focused on institutional and 
legislative reform, and international cooperation. The logic and suitability of this 
policy was rarely a topic of considered democratic debate since the fight against 
organised crime was heavily promoted as incremental for the progress and success of 
the reform, and organised crime itself received a security issue status. These 
developments were not backed by hard data on crime and solid theorisation of the 
security risks that it posed to the country. Most of the governmental rhetoric, as well 
as programmatic and legislative texts were borrowed from foreign sources, and 
organised crime was found by analysing the criminal opportunities which arose in the 
1990s.  
 
While Bulgaria experienced a rise in recorded crime and changes in the typologies of 
crime, closer investigation into Bulgaria’s anti-crime policy presented in this chapter 
did not substantiate the claim that Bulgaria had a unique and significant (in relative 
terms) problem with organised crime which required such extensive reform policy 
priorities over other social issues. From a more general perspective, however, the 
reform was largely successful in transforming the state police into a more 
empowered institution, and the judiciary into a more efficient system. The issues of 
both institutions seem to originate from the lack of resources or smaller 
administrative deficiencies but the problems they encountered while implementing 
the organised crime strategy led to institutional and media wars provoked by shifts of 
power, and tensions between the independent executive and the judicial branch, and 
public demonstrations of personal power. Thus the ambitions of a pro-active policy 
against organised crime had to be limited to actions with dubious cost-benefit 
outcomes, and some further complications in the investigative and judicial process.  
 
All these problems seem to emerge from a backlash of the extreme politicisation of 
the anti-crime agenda, and the Kostov’s government’s priorities in its political battle 
with the socialist party. After 1997 the fight against organised crime became one of 
the hot topics of Bulgaria’s political life which intensified in the next ten years. One 
of the analytical weekly newspapers Capital published no less than 763 articles 
linked to the organised crime problem in the country for that period, and the topic 
was present in almost every edition of the daily newspapers and other electronic 
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 media. The reason for this rise of attention was three-fold – first, the UDF and 
Kostov’s government prioritised the fight against organised crime and this made the 
policy a focus of public scrutiny. Secondly, Bulgaria had started to get negative press 
abroad in connection with the emergence of organised crime groups and this 
resonated in the Bulgarian press, especially in critiques of the government. The 
negative reports of the European Commission also added to this internal criticism. 
Third, the media and the public perceived the government as incapable of solving the 
problem with crime. As a result of this, the problem of organised crime became a test 
of governance, and of each subsequent government’s abilities to govern in conditions 
of increasing loss of political control over institutions. On one hand the governments 
got trapped by the increasing demand for successful crime polices, which in the case 
of organised crime were very difficult to demonstrate, and on the other, they 
continued to engage in such policies in order to increase international and public 
support. In conditions of limited resources the authorities relied on public relations 
activities and issues, more and more press releases on actions against crime, which 
added even more press coverage of organised crime and created more demand for 
successful policies. By the start of the membership negotiation with the EU, the 
issues of crime had become so widely publicised a problem that any action of the 
government could and was interpreted in terms of success or failure depending on the 
viewpoint. To put it simply, the more the government identified and fought organised 
crime, the more the public and the EU became convinced of the magnitude of the 
problem, and demanded more action. 
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 Chapter 7. Organised Crime and Bulgaria’s Accession to the EU 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter develops the discussion of Bulgaria’s anti-crime policies from the 
perspective of its accession to the European Union. It reflects the issues identified by 
the previous chapter concerning Bulgaria’s anti-crime polices, but looks at how these 
policies were guided by external factors and mainly the European Union’s 
enlargement conditionality in the key years after 2004. The fight against organised 
crime now became a central area of monitoring for the Balkan states accessing the 
Union as this was seen as the area where member-state building through aid and 
conditionality was most needed. From an EU perspective the reform of the criminal 
justice system of Bulgaria was mainly a question of Bulgarian internal politics, and 
the role of the Union was mainly in providing expertise, technical support and 
membership incentive. But the fight against organised crime affected a growing 
number of institutions and areas of reform in Bulgaria, and this led to an even more 
intense EU monitoring of the issue in Bulgaria compared to other applicant countries. 
While internal factors have played a role in this politicisation of the organised crime 
problem, the influence of the European Union, although more indirect, was 
nevertheless crucial.  
 
As earlier chapters argued the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) acquis was an 
essential prerequisite for the process of enlargement and it became even more 
important in the second wave of Eastern enlargement to the Balkans. In the case of 
the Balkan states of Bulgaria and Romania crime and corruption became important 
areas of the membership negotiation process and problems in these policy areas 
prevented both countries from joining the EU in 2004. The EU had deliberately taken 
an ostensibly apolitical stance in its dealings with the applicant countries and their 
reform policies and had kept its influence at the level of expertise and technical 
assistance as discussed in chapters five and six. However, conditionality and 
monitoring, as well as indirect policy advice had a bigger impact beyond the 
technicalities of the anti-crime policies.  
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 The discussion in this chapter focuses on this aspect of the EU’s role in the 
development of Bulgaria’s anti-crime policy. It discusses the conditionality and 
monitoring of Bulgaria’s accession and their increasing focus on organised crime 
through a review of the European Commission’s official opinions, expert reports and 
other official documents. The chapter then focuses on the case of the city of Rousse 
which was inspected by JHA experts prior to accession and explores interview data 
from interviews with representatives of branches of the regular police, border police 
and the courts. Finally the chapter looks at the period immediately before accession 
when Bulgaria was under pressure to deliver on its anti-crime policies in order to be 
allowed to join in 2007. The chapter closes on the accession and post-accession 
conditionality regarding the continuation of Bulgaria’s fight against crime. 
 
7.2. Bulgaria, the EU and the fight against crime 
 
The following discussion is based on a comparison of the European Commission’s 
official reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession between 1997 and 2004.1 
Each of these reports contains a section on JHA and an evaluation of Bulgaria’s 
criminal justice reforms and its fight against organised crime and corruption. This 
section progressively increases in size and the issues it covers. The first report in 
1997 is very brief and identifies problems that Bulgaria has in the field, including the 
rise of local organised crime, but also acknowledges the start of criminal justice 
reform by the Kostov government. The report is rather brief on these issues but 
reveals one important controversial issue: it points out that Bulgaria has been 
included in the EU’s visa regime due to attempts of Bulgarians to immigrate for 
work in Western Europe, and the country’s territory being used for transit of other 
illegal immigrants and illegal drugs, and its demand that the state authorities do more 
to prevent this from happening despite the fact that, as the report acknowledges, the 
state suffers from ‘severe resource shortages, has little experience of judicial 
cooperation and has only limited expertise in foreign legal systems’.2  
 
                                                 
1 These reports are available online at http://www.europe.bg. This web site has also published other 
relevant documents such as the EU’s position on Chapter 24 during its negotiation (between 2001-
2004), and respectively Bulgaria’s official position on the same chapter. 
2 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Bulgaria's application for membership of the 
European Union, COM/97/2008 final. Brussels: 15.07.1997, p.91. 
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 Despite this acknowledgement of the lack of resources, EU funding for JHA related 
reform through PHARE did not start until 1999, and the process was, until then, 
exclusively funded by the Bulgarian budget. As the previous chapter identified, the 
government at the time had largely internalised the criminal justice reform and anti-
crime policy, which it presented as necessary for the general economic and political 
reform of the country. From 1997 onwards Bulgarian governments began to 
prioritise EU requirements in reform and for JHA this initially involved asylum 
legislation, border controls and the fight against organised crime and drug 
trafficking.3 The intense activity of the Kostov’s government in the JHA area in 
1997-98 was praised in the Commission’s report for 1998, which stated that: 
‘Bulgaria has made laudable progress in meeting the short-term priorities for the 
Accession Partnership (combating organised crime and border management) but 
more unremitting effort will be needed to comply with the acquis. Looking ahead, 
these efforts will have to be supplemented by determined action on two fronts to 
achieve medium-term objectives’.4 These objectives were legislation on asylum and 
foreign nationals and action on staffing and training to implement the new 
legislation. The final conclusion of the report’s section on JHA did not contain any 
specific criticism of the policy on organised crime. The next report however devoted 
more space for analysis of the JHA-related activity of the Bulgarian institutions, and 
concluded that Bulgaria had made significant progress ‘through in particular 
reinforcement of the legislative framework in the majority of sectors’ but ‘must from 
now on develop the methods and ensure the human and material resources, which are 
essential for the application of the acquis’.5 The report’s final conclusion praised the 
                                                 
3 One of the major initiatives of Kosotv’s government, which affected every adult citizen, was the 
change of the Bulgarian identification documents and other internal regulations demanded by the EU 
but presented in the country as a necessary modernisation to remove Bulgaria from Schengen’s visa 
regime. This did not happen until 2001 and even then the free travel of Bulgarians within the EU was 
policed by further regulation. 
In 1997 Bulgaria did not have a huge problem with asylum seekers (their number was only 850 in 
1995 in the height of the Yugoslav crisis), organised crime was mainly understood as small 
racketeering groups, and there were no substantial internal drug market. However, the closing down of 
the insurance/racketeering companies (discussed in previous chapter) might have led to its employees 
looking for new sources of income and some entered the illegal drug market. However, the drug 
market in Bulgaria is not big outside of the capital.  
4 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Bulgaria's application for membership of the 
European Union, COM/97/2008 final. Brussels: 15.07.1997, p. 37. 
5 The report lists the activities of the Bulgarian government regarding EU’s requirements in the JHA 
area, and these are significant. Bulgaria has introduced visa regimes with countries which the EU 
requires a visa readmission agreements with almost all EU member states, as well as Hungary, 
Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland; it has demilitarised its 
border police, introduced new passports that cannot be forged, and ‘is deploying modern technical 
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 achievements in the area and recommended additional training for all services and 
further democratisation and transparency of the law enforcement bodies, in addition 
to improvement of the communication between the Ministry of the Interior and 
Ministry of Justice (called at the time Ministry of Justice and European Legal 
Integration), and a ‘strengthening of the professional associations in order to 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary’.6  
 
The same year saw the implementation of the first (and only one for the year) 
PHARE project related to JHA, and it dedicated €9 500 000 to Institution Building 
Projects in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. These projects used the twinning 
method discussed in chapter five for enhancing the capacity of the Bulgarian Border 
Police, Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice and European Legal 
Integration for implementation of the EU requirements ‘which means in particular 
addressing the requirements and recommendations of the Accession Partnership as well 
as the conclusions of the regular report of November 1998 on the progress of Bulgaria, 
of the Justice and Home Affairs experts mission report of May 1998 and of the follow-
up mission of Mrs Jansen (January 1999).’7 The project funded secondments of 
European experts in all of the above institutions (for up to two years), which 
effectively means that EU experts influenced all subsequent legislative and 
institutional changes, personnel training and choice of technical equipment. 
 
The section on JHA in the Commission’s report for 2000 was longer and more 
critical, which was partly linked to this bigger involvement of foreign experts. As the 
EU’s acquis in the JHA area was simultaneously growing, this translated into an 
increase in the scrutiny of Bulgarian compliance. The report acknowledges the 
progress and the continuation of reform but ‘not at such a significant pace as 
                                                                                                                                          
means for investigation’ of serious crime: it has established an automated dactyloscopic identification 
system and is developing a national laboratory and data bank containing genetic information on 
criminals, it has established channels for cooperation internationally (and regionally), has set up a unit 
within the police to develop changes in the legislation, more anti-money laundering legislation, etc. 
See European Commission, 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress 
towards Accession, pp. 49-52 [online] http://europe.bg/upload/docs/Regular_Report_1999_EN.pdf 
accessed 5/03/2009. 
6 Ibid, p. 67. 
7 Summary Fiche, Institution Building Projects in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, Sub-
programme Number BG 9911 [online] 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/open_document_fp.cfm?do_id=27906 accessed 
5/03/2009. 
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 mentioned in the last report’.8 The criticisms ranged from the lack of a Personal Data 
Protection law (although an inter-ministerial working group was in process of 
drafting one) to specific aspects of the fight against organised crime, and particularly 
trafficking in human beings (and especially women, which the EU felt needed 
‘sustained attention’), the lack of a national information system in compliance with 
Schengen standards, and the level of training of the police to respect human rights 
(following reports of police brutality especially against minority groups, i.e. the 
Roma population) and countering economic crimes and money laundering, organised 
crime and corruption, inadequacies of police equipment, especially means of 
communication and motor vehicles; lack of strategy against drugs supply and 
demand reduction (important to create linkages between agencies); difficulties in 
handling incoming and outgoing requests for judicial cooperation, and the need for 
improvement of the judicial administrative capacity and cooperation between 
agencies.9 These criticisms come in between a list of achievements of previously set 
requirements (legislation, institutional, international cooperation and completion of 
international agreements). Finally, the report concluded that: ‘Whilst progress has 
been made to meet some of the JHA priorities, those on strengthening the judiciary 
and developing a national strategy to combat corruption have not been met.’10
 
The report from 2001 listed the developments since the last report and noted the 
adoption of an anti-corruption strategy, the transformation of the Bulgarian border 
police into a ‘modern agency with increasing focus on human resource policy’; the 
establishment of a Human Trafficking Task Force within the Ministry of the Interior, 
comprising representatives from different ministries and the judiciary, hence also 
addressing the criticism of the low level of cooperation between agencies; the 
negotiation of an agreement with Europol; establishing a Bureau of Financial 
Intelligence as a separate agency and enhancing the money laundering regulation 
(widening the scope of legal entities obliged to identify their clients in operations 
over €15 320); the establishment of an automated information system similar to 
                                                 
8 European Commission, 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress towards 
Accession [online] http://europe.bg/upload/docs/Regular_Report_2000_EN.pdf accessed 5/03/2009. 
9 Ibid., p.74-78. 
10 Ibid, p. 93 Strengthening the judiciary is understood as improving recruitment, training and 
equipment. With regards to the fight against organised crime, the final conclusion only mentions: 
‘Police and customs authorities reinforced their co-operation as regards the combat against drugs 
trafficking, however, in general the co-ordination between law-enforcement bodies needs 
improvement’ (italics in original). 
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 Schengen’s system; the extension of international agreements to fight organised 
crime to more countries, and a number of other steps undertaken by the Bulgarian 
authorities in the JHA area.11  
 
The report’s criticism mainly pointed at insufficient resources, outdated equipment 
and newly emerged legislative and institutional problems such as the lack of specific 
anti-trafficking law which makes the authorities use other legislative measures, 
which was apparently delaying the prosecution, and the emerging problem of 
overlapping tasks between the different branches of the police, and problems of 
perceived police corruption. According to the report, ‘the Bulgarian Police Services 
are handicapped by a complicated organisational structure which results in a 
significant overlap of responsibilities (e.g. between the Criminal Police and the 
National Service to Combat Organised crime), services with unclear roles (e.g. the 
Gendarmerie) and lack of communication between different police forces (especially 
at local and national level)’.12 The report concluded that: ‘Overall, Bulgaria is quite 
well advanced in alignment in the areas of visa policy, border control, customs co-
operation and judicial co-operation’ and ‘Whilst further progress has been made to 
meet some of the JHA priorities, that on strengthening the judiciary has not yet been 
met’ and more needed to be done to upgrade the judiciary and law enforcement 
bodies through training and equipment, and better coordination, so that they could 
continue their fight against organised crime and corruption. At the same time, the 
PHARE programme funded six JHA projects for 2000 and 2001 to meet the above 
requirements.  
 
The reports between 2001 and 2003 were published while Bulgaria was conducting 
negotiations on Chapter 24 on JHA. Bulgaria’s position at the start of the 
negotiations was that it accepted and would apply in full the acquis in the Justice and 
Home Affairs field and ‘does not consider it necessary to request any derogations 
and transitional periods’.13 Bulgaria presented its position on 33 pages listing all 
                                                 
11 European Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress towards 
Accession’, pp. 82-88 [online] http://europe.bg/upload/docs/ Regular_Report_2001_EN accessed 
5/03/2009. 
12 Ibid., p. 86. 
13 Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Chapter 24 ‘Justice and 
Home Affairs’, CONF-BG 9/01, Conference on Accession to the European Union, Negotiation 
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 legislative and institutional arrangements it had adopted to date in accordance to the 
JHA acquis based on the existing acquis as of 31 December 1999. On the basis of the 
data presented, the position concluded: ‘The Bulgarian Government proposes that the 
negotiations on this chapter be provisionally closed on the basis of the existing 
acquis. Should new elements of the acquis make it necessary, Bulgaria recognises 
the possibility of opening supplementary negotiations before the end of the 
Intergovernmental conference.’ The EU’s response was respectively of a similar size 
and reflected the EU’s acknowledgement of Bulgaria’s achievements ‘but a final 
assessment of the conformity of Bulgaria’s legislation and policies with the acquis 
and its implementation capacity can only be made at a later stage of the 
negotiations.’14 Furthermore, the EU proposed a safeguard clause (also used in the 
Central European states, Malta and Cyprus negotiations, under Article 39) which 
stated that ‘if six months prior to Bulgaria’s accession the Commission’s reports 
indicates that there are serious concerns regarding the implementation by Bulgaria of 
the commitments undertaken in this chapter, in particular judicial reform, the 
Commission shall take all necessary measures.’15
 
The EU position demanded more action in the JHA area by Bulgaria in the following 
areas: 
 
• Further reform of the Judiciary – to ensure independence, ‘checks and 
balances’, enough funding for personnel and equipment, objectivity and 
transparency in appointments, provision of regular reports on the 
implementation of the reform strategy, and of ‘regular and detailed 
information on criminal investigation, prosecution and conviction rates in the 
areas of organised crime, corruption, drugs, human trafficking, and tax and 
financial crime.’16 
                                                                                                                                          
Position of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Chapter 24 ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, 
Brussels, 20 February 2001. 
14 European Union Common Position , Replaces doc. 20896/01 CONF-BG 79/01, Conference on 
Accession to the European Union, Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of 
Bulgaria on Chapter 24 ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, Brussels, 20 February 2001. p. 46 [online] 
http://www.mfa.bg/bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13270&lang=bg&Itemid=321 
accessed 02/03/2009. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, p.43. 
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 • Pursue reform in the pre-trial phase (discussed in chapter six) – to ensure 
efficiency and transparency, and to avoid overlap, prepare a Constitutional 
change in order to avoid the annulment of the reforms, simplify the criminal 
procedure to make serious crime investigation shorter; provide reports, 
funding for equipment and training. 
• More minor amendments of JHA-related legislation on Asylum and Refugees 
Act, the Penal code, law on fraud, implementation of a National Strategy 
against Corruption and plan to implement a National Anti-Drug strategy, and 
provide funding for personnel and equipment of all relevant bodies involved. 
 
The next two Regular Reports from 2002 and 2003 reflected the activities of 
Bulgaria as advised and demanded by the EU. The 2002 report acknowledged the 
‘good progress’ on the legislative activity but identified the need for strengthening 
the implementation capacity.17 The report also noted the changes in the Penal Code 
which enhanced the definitions of serious crimes such as acts of terrorism, 
corruption, organised crime, trafficking in human beings, computer crimes, 
development, accumulation and use of chemical and biological weapons.18 As 
discussed in the previous chapter the amendments now defined the ‘organised 
criminal group’ and established penalties for the establishment, operation and 
participation in such groups, and criminalized conspiracy with regards to organised 
activities.19 The significance of this change will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
The report listed all the other activities undertaken by Bulgaria including the fight 
against terrorism, trafficking of human beings (especially women for prostitution), 
and the adoption of a national strategy against fraud and corruption, as well as a 
strategy against drugs. However, the report criticised the anti-crime strategy because 
it did not give enough attention to ‘the need to have an accountable, reliable, and 
                                                 
17 European Commission, 2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress towards 
Accession, pp.111-117 [online] http://europe.bg/upload/docs/Regular_Report_2002_EN.pdf accessed 
5/03/2009. 
18 This is the first time the issue of terrorism appears in the reports – Bulgaria had until then 
maintained that it did not have terrorist activities in its territory but has been criticised for not 
acknowledging the use of its territory by terrorists acting abroad. 
19 Article 321(1-3) of the Bulgaria’s Penal Code, State Gazette, issue 92, 2002. The penalty is 5 to 15 
years for setting up an organised crime group and 3 to 10 for participation in an organised crime 
group. 
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 fully-coordinated police organisation’.20 It suggested setting up a national Contact 
Point for police cooperation and the need to regulate the operation of foreign police 
officials in Bulgaria. It was also critical of the existing statistical instruments for 
measuring crime, as well as the lack of modern methods of investigation of technical 
crime and the low level of forensic methods of investigation. The report paid special 
attention to human trafficking and claims that: ‘Existing figures for arrests of 
traffickers are low and sanctions are weakly implemented, especially when it comes 
to court cases and sentences.’21 Furthermore, the report suggested removing the 
over-complicated organisational structures in the law enforcement services and better 
cooperation and interaction. In its final conclusion, the report states: ‘Overall, 
Accession Partnership priorities in the area of justice and home affairs have been 
partially met. With the exception of the adoption of the strategy on combating 
organised crime, implementation of the measures under the Action Plan is largely on 
track.’22
 
The following report (published in 2003) noted (amongst a long list of other JHA 
activities) the adoption of a National Strategy for Counteracting Crime 2003-2005 by 
the Council of Ministers, and the adoption of an Action Plan for its Implementation, 
both of which cover the prevention of corruption, terrorism and organised crime, 
divided into short-term, medium term and long-term actions.23 Bulgaria also adopted 
a Unified Information System for Combating Crime (including penal proceedings 
and enforcement of sentences) to facilitate the coordination between law 
enforcement bodies. Bulgaria has also a new National Drugs Strategy 2003-2008 in 
line with the EU drugs strategy 2000-2004.24 In its final conclusion the report 
acknowledges: ‘The new legislation adopted in the areas of data protection, visa, 
migration, asylum and money laundering almost completed alignment with the 
acquis. Substantial further efforts are needed to further strengthen the judicial 
                                                 
20 EC 2002 Report, op.cit., p. 114 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, p.145. 
23 European Commission, 2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress towards 
Accession’, pp.104-113 [online] http://europe.bg/upload/docs/ Regular_Report_2003_EN accessed 
5/03/2009. 
24 Ibid, p. 108. 
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 system, through a continuation of the reforms. Particular attention should be given to 
combating drugs and illegal migration.’25
 
On the eve of the first accession of former communist countries from CEE, Bulgaria 
was highly praised for its achievements. The report of the European Commission 
recognized the existence of a functioning market economy and democratic 
institutions – the two main conditions for EU membership. However Bulgaria, 
together with Romania, was then left outside because of what the European 
Commission perceived as a negative record on crime, weak criminal justice 
institutions and corruption, despite the analysis in the earlier reports. According to 
the 2004 Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession, all the areas covered by 
JHA had been developed by the Bulgarian authorities but many had ‘room for 
improvement’, and the area of crime fighting was still problematic: 
 
The fight against organised crime and all forms of trafficking, including 
of human beings, remains an area of major concern. Despite the ongoing 
implementation of a second national crime strategy, the National Service 
to Combat Organised Crime (NSCOC) is not in a position to effectively 
address the situation and does not have the means to act efficiently in the 
absence of clear rules on the possibilities to use undercover 
investigations. There is significant room for improvement as regards the 
cooperation with other law enforcement bodies. The flaws in the pre-trial 
investigation phase partly explain the relative lack of success in the fight 
against organised crime syndicates. Bulgaria should urgently put in place 
an efficient witness protection scheme. Bulgaria is party to the major 
international agreements in the area of the fight against terrorism. It has 
ratified the second additional protocol to the Council of Europe 
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, but needs to 
review its Penal Procedure Code in order to introduce the concepts of 
                                                 
25 Ibid, p.127. The Report also notes that although there are a number of files submitted to the public 
prosecutor there are still no convictions for money laundering. 
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 joint investigation teams, trans-border hot pursuit, controlled deliveries, 
audio and Video conferences, and interception of telecommunications.26
 
The report concluded that although Bulgaria had completed its negotiations on 
Chapter 24 JHA and had covered almost all areas of legislation which that chapter 
required, progress in the JHA area was delayed by the problems in the judicial 
reform and the fight against crime and corruption. Finally, the Commission advised 
that  
 
In order to be ready for membership, urgent attention should be paid to 
the capacity of the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies and to 
inter-agency cooperation in order to correctly implement the acquis in 
this area. Due attention and adequate resources should be given to the full 
and timely implementation of the main strategies and action plans in the 
area of justice and home affairs, in particular as regards judicial reform, 
including the reform of the pre-trial phase, and to the fight against 
organised crime. Their full and timely implementation, together with the 
entry into force of the planned amendments to the legislation on the penal 
procedure, legal aid, asylum, mediation and forfeiture of criminal assets 
should allow addressing the bulk of the issues covered in this chapter.27
 
In its communication to the European Parliament, the Commission pointed out that 
‘Bulgaria and Romania are an integral part of this enlargement process which was 
launched in 1997..[and] the EU’s objective is to welcome both countries in January 
2007 as members, if they are ready.’ To be ‘ready’ Bulgaria had to cover some more 
technicalities and to ‘to press ahead and dedicate adequate resources to fundamental 
reforms of the police and of the judiciary, including the reform of the pre-trial phase 
and the implementation of the strategies against crime.’28  
                                                 
26 Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards 
Accession, Brussels, 6.10.2004, SEC(2004) 1199, p.121  
[online] http://europe.bg/upload/docs/Regular_Report_2004_EN.pdf accessed 05/03/2009.  
27 Ibid, p.123. 
28 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and to the European Parliament Strategy Paper of The European Commission on Progress in the 
Enlargement Process, Brussels, 6.10.2004, COM(2004) 657 final, p.12 [online]  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0657:FIN:EN:PDF accessed 
5/03/2009. 
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 Following this report and the completion of Chapter 24 negotiations, Bulgarian law 
enforcement authorities now received another blow from a very critical JHA report 
commissioned by the EU. According to Interior Ministry’s Secretary Boyko Borisov, 
the information from which the conclusions of the report were drawn was out-of-date 
and did not cover all of the activities that the Bulgarian authorities had undertaken.29 
According to Borisov all the legislation had been adopted although not all had been 
implemented but work on this continued together with foreign experts working with 
the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior.30 According to the media reports Borisov had 
also pointed out that Bulgaria’s Interior Ministry had achieved full integration with 
the EU and NATO, and was their most reliable partner in the Balkans, and its Border 
Police had been praised by US, European and Russian special services, as well as the 
European Commission. In an ‘anti-report’ action Borisov also invited the 
ambassadors of Germany and the UK to meet and discuss the conclusions of the EU 
report and seek support in the government’s policy against crime and corruption.31 
But such claims had little impact and, after further negotiations and meetings, 
Borisov changed his mind and accepted the criticisms.32
 
The problems with the fight against organised crime and criminal justice reform was 
thus cited as one of the main reasons why Bulgaria’s accession to the EU was 
postponed until 2007. The EU also raised similar criticisms to other Balkan states. 
The other Balkan candidate Romania was criticised for problems with corruption and 
also refused accession in 2004, and Croatia was pressured to arrest a war criminal in 
                                                 
29 The JHA conclusions of the EU report are based on a commissioned inspection of JHA area in 
Bulgaria which was performed by the British reporter Byron Davis and five other experts who visited 
the country between 7-10 June 2004. His report on ‘Functioning of Police, organized crime and drugs’ 
criticises the weakness of Bulgaria in fighting these crimes due to shortage of equipment and lack of 
infrastructure. According to Borisov, it seemed that Davis had contacted lower-level officials instead 
of the chiefs and his report lacked up-to-date factual information. Sofia News Agency, ‘Bulgaria 
Objects Chastising EU Report’, Novinite.Com, 21 August 2004 [online]  
www.novinite.come/view_news.php?id-38327 accessed 6/03/2009. 
30 This includes a team from Scotland Yard who visited Bulgaria to review the EU monitoring report, 
which criticized the level of law enforcement in the country. Sofia News Agency, ‘Harsh EU Report 
Brings Scotland Yard to Bulgaria’, Novinite.Com, 23 August 2004  
[online] http://www.novinite.com/newsletter/print.php?id=38398 accessed 6/03/2009. 
31 Sofia News Agency, ‘Bulgaria Fit to Take on EU Outer Border Vigil’, Novinite.Com, 6 September 
2004 [online] www.novinite.come/view_news.php?id-38919 accessed 6/03/2009. 
32 Sofia News Agency, ‘Harsh EU Report Brings Scotland Yard to Bulgaria’, 23 August 2004 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=38398 accessed 6/03/2009. 
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 order to proceed with accession talks.33 This was not expected by the Bulgarian 
political elite which had imagined that the legislative and institutional changes met 
EU demands. Bulgaria had to comply with all requirements presented in the 
European Commission’s reports and yet find its own design of the reforms with the 
partial help of EU experts. Given the difficulties in developing and passing new laws 
and establishing new institutions and rules, the Bulgarian officials did not expect that 
such an unclear and problematic area such as JHA would be used to stop the country 
from accession.  
 
7.3. Pre-accession’s Focus on Organised Crime: 2005-2006  
 
We have seen that throughout the development of Bulgaria’s anti-crime policy the 
EU and external actors took formally an apolitical stance. The EU’s reports provided 
the general framework of development of Bulgaria’s anti-crime and criminal justice 
policy through its conditionality and explicit requirement for deepening the reform 
and adopting the JHA acquis before accession. The EU and other external actors 
were engaged not only in formulating this general framework but also its specific 
application through direct participation at an institutional level. EU policy led to a 
constant presence of Western experts in the Bulgarian institutions who were 
providing advice, support and funding. But the EU refrained from giving specific 
guidelines for the re-organisation of the institutions although in practice EU experts 
have participated in the actual formulation of legislation and institutional structures. 
The foreign involvement was not limited to EU experts only but involved a whole 
framework of interested foreign parties (embassies, NGOs, governmental officials on 
visits, etc).34 However, this framework rarely engaged directly with the political side 
of the reform. In the words of experts at a JHA conference in England, the SEE 
countries had to achieve the political will by themselves.35  
                                                 
33 General Ante Gotovina, who was captured later in 2005 but in Tenerife, in the Canary Islands and 
not in Croatia. G.Partos, ‘Long road from Krajina to captivity’, BBC News (UK), 8 December 2005 
[online]  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4510542.stm accessed 29/06/2009. 
34 One more example is the review of Bulgaria’s administrative justice system completed in 2002. 
This review was the result of a Memorandum signed by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the UNDP Democratic Governance Trust and the British Embassy in Sofia and 
has, as its main objective, the establishment of a modern and effective system of administrative 
justice. 
35 This opinion was expressed at a Wilton Park conference dedicated to JHA issues (at which the 
author was present) from a Western official who pointed out to the delegates from South-Eastern 
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This was the stance of the EU experts as well. Chapter four identified how the policy 
of the EU involved setting conditions for membership and provision of aid on a 
practical level, which was preferred to engagement with politics. In this way the EU 
remained officially not connected to the politics behind the policy and the criminal 
justice reform as a whole. However, their influence, along with the need to adopt the 
JHA acquis and the provisions of other international agreements, meant that the 
actual choices of policy in Bulgaria were limited. The most important limitation was 
the priority given by external advisors to legislative-institutional reform instead of 
the development of alternative or supplementary measures to the punitive ones 
focused on organised crime only. It must be noted that the Strategy on crime adopted 
by Kostov’s government in 1997 did provide for a wide range of other (more social) 
policies to diminish crime but the EU’s monitoring did not include these in its 
subsequent evaluations. 
 
The previous section of this chapter revealed a complex and constantly changing 
agenda for JHA for Bulgaria, which was constantly trying to catch up with the new 
demands. A big part of these policies were funded by the Bulgarian state budget and 
also took substantial resources in terms of political time, debates and drafting and re-
drafting legislation and reforms. The EU was also increasing its funding for JHA 
policies as Table 7.1 below shows. The projects related to JHA (and directly or 
indirectly linked to the fight against organised crime) used a substantial 20% of the 
PHARE funding between 1999 and 2007, which makes them the most expensive 
projects in the programme (given their more modest percentage of the overall 
number of projects). The logic and the immediate results of these projects in Bulgaria 
followed the general agenda of institution building for all applicants as discussed in 
chapter five, which mainly focused on the purchase of EU equipment, provision of 
training by EU experts and organisation of seminars and working groups with EU 
law enforcement representatives. 
                                                                                                                                          
Europe: ‘You have to take the things into your own hands and tell the international community what 
to do’. Home Affairs Agenda for South-Eastern Europe Conference, Wilton Park, 22-26 July 2002.  
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 Table 7.1. JHA-related projects in the PHARE Programme for Bulgaria 
between 1998 and 2007 36
 
Year Total 
Projects 
JHA 
related 
projects 
JHA as 
percent of 
projects 
JHA as a % of total EU 
financing for the year37
2007 39 13 33% € 8 355 000, or 26% 
2006 67 13 19% € 65 322 000 or 33.9% 
2005 49 10 20% € 39 965 000 or 22.8% 
2004 47 10 16% € 33 914 000 or 19% 
2003 45 5 11% €13 850 000 + € 7 708 000 
for customs capacity for 
financial control = 20.6% 
2002 44 9 20% €24 900 000 or 26% 
2001 32 3 9% € 4 275 000 or 5% 
2000 44 3 6.8% € 13 000 000 or 20% 
1999 11 1 9% € 9 500 000 or 23.7% 
1998 12 0 0 - 
Total 390 67 17% € 213 081 000 
21.8 % average  
 
Effectively, any criticisms of Bulgaria’s policy might therefore also be seen as an 
indirect criticism of EU policy as it was constantly involved in the development and 
funding of change in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Bulgarian authorities were 
rarely openly critical of the EU’s involvement, and contributed to and then followed 
closely the results of its monitoring process, largely internalising the failures of 
policy. The sites of conflict were mainly internal (as discussed in the previous 
Chapter 6), at the level of institutional and inter-institutional level, as well as 
occasionally political but the latter conflicts were also limited to disagreements over 
technicalities and not the overall direct of the reform – EU membership was the 
ultimate aim for all political parties. Thus Bulgaria next engaged in an even more 
                                                 
36 Data is from the PHARE fiches archived on the European Commission’s web site. Between 2002 
and 2007 these projects fall under the JHA category. In the years before that JHA-related projects are 
classified under Strengthening Public Administration (2001-2) or Strengthening Rule of Law (2000) 
Some of the projects counted as JHA-related have been placed in different categories but they 
nevertheless have a link with the fight against organised crime (for example, fraud projects under 
Public Finance). The fiches are available online at  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/index.cfm?page=15651&c=BULGARIA(ARCHIVED) 
accessed 30/01/2009. 
37 The data is taken from the PHARE financial memorandums signed between the European 
Commission and Bulgaria for each year, which are also available from the abovementioned website.  
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 extensive policy in the period after being denied entry with the Central European 
states, and between 2004 and 2007 it focused on further judicial reform and police 
reform with the view of strengthening their capacity to fight organised crime.  
 
In 2005 and 2006 the European Commission issued two Comprehensive Monitoring 
Reports on Bulgaria’s state of preparedness for EU membership instead of regular 
reports, and both had a more explicit focus on the fight against organised crime. The 
organised crime focus was also helped by a series of high profile contract killings in 
the capital in September and October 2005. These killings coincided with the 2005 
Report of the Commission, and contributed to the election of Borisov (who had 
become a symbol of the fight against organised crime) as a mayor of Sofia in 
November 2005. The contract killings were later cited as the main evidence of 
organised crime in Bulgaria.38 This focus, however, intensified pressure at the top in 
Bulgaria, and it also had continued consequences below as will now be briefly 
shown. 
 
7.4. Pre-accession Evaluation: A Case study of the city of Rousse 
 
The following short case study of the city of Rousse was chosen for several reasons. 
First, it is the author’s hometown and therefore it was easier to make connections 
with local officials. Secondly, Rousse is a city with a population of around 200 000 
(fourth largest city in Bulgaria), it is the main big city in Northern Bulgaria. It is a 
major administrative centre, situated on a border and has all of the relevant policing 
and judicial units, which have experienced the process of centralisation and re-
distribution of power in the criminal justice and security sector. Rousse has both a 
regular police service with an organised crime department and a border police 
service which also polices forms of organised criminality. The city hosts both a 
regional and a district court (in the same building). Finally, the uniqueness of the 
case of Rousse is that it is on the border between Bulgaria and Romania both of 
which joined the EU in 2007. Therefore the process of local administrative reform 
had to be coordinated with national processes such as the establishment of new forms 
                                                 
38 As the previous chapter discussed these killings are linked to territorial war between gangs and may 
be linked to Borisov’s engagement in a more hard-line policy against organised crime, which 
disturbed illegal markets and led to their re-distribution via contract killings. 
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 of contact with the Romanian side, especially in terms of the cooperation between 
the two border posts. 
 
The discussion of this case is based on interviews with local officials from the 
criminal justice system:  
1. Regular (or territorial) Police: the chief of the regional police office in 
Rousse, his secretary and the chief of the local anti organised crime cell;  
2. Border police: the chief of the border police stationed in Rousse; 
3. Court: a criminal judge from the district court based in Rousse and a judge 
from Rousse’s regional court dealing with civil cases. 
The results from these interviews give us an idea of the impact of the reforms on the 
local level and the interaction between local and national branches of the system. The 
interviews aimed to reveal more details about the pre-accession monitoring of 
Rousse. 
 
Regular Police 
 
The background information on the police was provided by a preliminary interview 
with Kalina, the secretary to the Chief of Rousse District Police Department 
(Oblastna Direkcia Policia Ruse).39 The local police administration has a regional 
department and six sub-divisions, two of which are in Rousse and police departments 
in Rousse’s residential quarters. The District Police made significant progress before 
joining the EU, including the establishment of a 24-hour information centre (tel. 
number 113) which included access to medical emergency, fire alarm, police, and 
prosecutor; the successful introduction of a new system of personal documents which 
would soon include biometric data; the introduction of logging systems and cameras. 
All of these innovations required substantial investments in security and the fight 
against crime but they have created problems due to the need to use local funding 
while awaiting European funds.40  
 
                                                 
39 The interview was conduced on 02/01/2008 in Rousse.  
40 Kalina stated that it takes a long time for the EU money to come through and yet the EU demands 
that this money is used very quickly. 
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 However, according to Kalina, the police themselves shared the view that they were 
not a protected institution in the transition, and that there was no strategy for their 
future.41 They see issues involving local corruption linked to use of public funds, 
linked to elected officials or rich businessmen but have no central backing to 
investigate. They criticise the institutional reforms and especially the newly created 
Security Service which was taken out of the control of the Ministry of the Interior, 
which leads to duplication of tasks and jurisdictions. There is some appreciation of 
the recent innovations such as the law on the use of special investigative techniques 
and the enhanced role of the prosecutor, who coordinates the investigation process, 
are also effective as they give a legal form to the process. They introduce the case to 
court and therefore give guidelines for the prior investigation process. However these 
positives are negated by fear and nihilism in the police forces. According to Kalina, 
there is even fear from some members of the municipal council who have asked the 
police to withhold information.  
 
Perhaps because of these uncertainties the police themselves have both internalised 
some of the problems and introduced tougher internal discipline, and attempted to 
overcome the criticisms by passing on the blame. Some of these issues became 
obvious during the interviews with the Chief of the District Police Sveroslav 
Parvanov and his subordinate, the Chief of the Anti-organised Crime Squad at the 
District Police, Javor Jankov.42 The information they gave was relevant to the study 
of enlargement and crime as their District Police department was one of the five (out 
of 29 District departments in the country), which was checked by EU experts in the 
pre-enlargement inspection in 2006. Parvanov’s opinion was that the EU assessors 
came unprepared – they were not familiar with the normative base (legislation) of the 
police in Bulgaria. He dismissed them as: ‘Teachers who can’t teach’. There were 
                                                 
41 Kalina compared the Bulgarian case to Romania and concluded that the problem of crime in 
Bulgaria was due to destruction of the old security services whereas Romania left their security 
services, Securitate, relatively untouched. She implied that the people who lost their jobs with the 
police joined the ranks of organised crime via the security business, and quoted: ‘A cop is cop even 
when asleep’. 
42 The interview was conducted on 10/01/2008 at the Police Department in Rousse. Coming into the 
police building for the interviews was an interesting experience: there was very strict control and the 
people on reception showed great awe of their boss, and hierarchy in the department in general – it 
looked very military. Sveroslav Parvanov, has held the position of chief of District Police Rousse for 
about two years, is an intimidating man. There was an impression that his employees were afraid of 
him. Javor Jankov was measuring his answers in the presence of his boss. Both asked for the questions 
written and sent to them in advance, and at the end of the interview they promised to send answers via 
e-mail.  
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 two assessors: one was apparently a former UN ‘blue helmet’ (i.e. a former member 
of UN peacekeeping forces) and, according to Parvanov, did not know much about 
Bulgaria, and the other had more information as he had been living in Bulgaria and 
was married to a Bulgarian. Parvanov shared the view that the Bulgarian police were 
good: he had been on two training schools organised by the FBI in Hungary and in 
Roswell, New Mexico, along with other policemen from non-EU members and he 
came back proud that he was a Bulgarian policeman. There was good, applicable, 
experience, he says, but ‘what we do they do with a lot of money’.43 Despite his 
good opinion of the Bulgarian policeman, this opinion did not extend to the central 
authorities in Sofia – he implied manipulation of crime data by them and complained 
about the new changes in the legislation, which limit his right to appoint and dismiss 
his subordinates.  
 
As far as the problem of organised crime was concerned, Javor Jankov, the Chief of 
the anti-organised crime squad asserted that: ‘There is no organised crime, there is 
group crime’ and the latest definitions adopted in law do not allow the police to 
police this group crime effectively.44 Furthermore, according to Parvanov and 
Jankov, there is no nation-wide organised crime, and not real organised crime in 
Rousse (e.g. there have been no contract killings in Rousse since 2001). The experts 
from the EU who came to Rousse were surprised and asked what the police had done 
to the town to make it look so safe and secure and if this was just to show off during 
the monitoring process. The city has fewer drugs than Sofia and is clean from heroin, 
which Jankov attributed more hesitantly to the police role.45 In Rousse there are no 
kidnappings, rackets, blackmail, hoax calls, no armed robberies (at least not ‘real 
ones’ – they explain that there is a wrong interpretation of armed robbery when the 
complainant says the criminal had a weapon when they hadn’t have one). 
 
                                                 
43 The Bulgarian policemen have the lowest salaries compared to other EU police forces.  
44 Art. 321 of the new Penal Code criminalizes organisation and membership in criminal groups in 
order to facilitate and prioritise police investigations of organised crime over ordinary crime, as 
discussed in previous chapter. 
45 The police data and conclusions come not from under cover operations but from the local 
psychiatric unit. Jankov points out that recently there were only 19 addicts in Rousse have asked for 
methadone/substitute which means their supply of heroin has been cut off.  
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 Their views of the recent legislative changes were that they did not resolve the 
problems and were mainly ‘gimmicks’.46 In order to remove the examining 
magistrates there had to be changes in the Constitution, which made the process very 
complicated and over-politicised. The introduction of investigators in the police 
while preserving the independent investigation service and its investigative 
jurisdiction over a tiny number of crimes (see previous chapter) was in fact closing 
down the latter as the effect of the change made the service useless. This was done to 
fight corruption but was in fact ‘beating about the bush’ (going around the problem). 
The laws were not the only impediment. There is a complicated procedure for 
information requests.47 The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) on 
regional anti-crime cooperation centre in Bucharest, Romania (which is only a one 
hour drive away from Rousse) was useful but in fact they have only used them in 2-3 
cases.48 There should be a unified database of the information from Ministry of the 
Interior – Courts – Prosecutors (with 24 hour access), which they think is not going 
to happen. The police are generally annoyed with the changes in the Criminal 
Procedure for ‘getting the courts in’, meaning the need to get a judge present at 
interrogations. Sometimes they need a judge in the middle of the night and can’t find 
one. Furthermore, collecting evidence is problematic as some crimes are very 
difficult to prove and the prosecutors keep an eye on the procedure.49 According to 
both interviewees there is lack of trust, it is difficult to work with the judges and 
there is strong defence for defendants: ‘There are many barristers for defendants but 
no defence for the victim.’ Finally, the positive development for the police is the fact 
that they are now there to defend these victims and ‘do good’ for the community.50  
                                                 
46 The use of the term here means that they see most activities as mainly demonstrative.  
47 For example, international requests take time and have to go through many levels. In order to get 
information about something in the local police department in Romania on other side of the river, they 
have to refer to Sofia, who then refer to Bucharest who then refer to the relevant place, etc. 
48 The interviewees shared the view that the international liaison officers know a lot and are useful. On 
the other hand, it is easy to work with some countries and not easy with others. Sometimes it is 
complicated: there was a case in Germany which was resolved via communication between Rousse-
Turkey-UK. On balance, the normative framework for cases within EU is still too complicated, e.g. 
one thing which is a piece of evidence in one country may not be in another. However, they share the 
opinion that there are too many organisations which leads to spilling of information. The informal, 
personal, connections are best, and there should be more (and more frequent) seminars; access to 
information should be eased; and the databases should be de-centralised. 
49 One example was presented by a Bulgarian lawyer on a TV programme: in some cases of captured 
lorries and other professional drivers who had crossed the border with drugs in their vehicles, the only 
evidence of guilt was the drugs found but no evidence that the drivers had put them there and hence 
their guilt was impossible to prove. 
50 Now his idea of the role of the police is to provide a public service, to secure public order. To 
exemplify this, Purvanov mentioned an example with a road policeman who now helped an old man 
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 Border Police 
 
The meeting with Chief of Border Police in Rousse, Krasimir Kornadjev was very 
different.51 There was an obvious rivalry between the two departments and the 
Border Police appears more important, having more material and financial resources 
than the district police. The Border Police had received a lot of attention and funding 
in the enlargement period as discussed in the previous chapters. There are two types 
of borders in the EU: internal EU borders and external EU borders. Since joining the 
EU, Regulation 562 of the Schengen border code is in force for Bulgaria and the 
border in Rousse had become internal (it is between Bulgaria and Romania).52 
Despite the fact that it is not an external border, it has been a subject of pre-accession 
inspections conducted under Schengen even though the Schengen agreement and 
acquis does not apply automatically upon accession but is a subject of an additional 
protocol with the EU Council. Therefore the Border Police still carries out 
identification control.53
 
Kornadjev described the current situation with the border police in Bulgaria, and his 
branch in Rousse. Bulgaria has a strategy for integrated border management of 2 
stages: pre-EU-accession and pre- Schengen-accession; it includes all borders; the 
internal borders have no customs service but obligatory border crossing control. 
Apart from customs and other types of control (e.g. veterinary control, phyto-sanitary 
control collecting taxes such as road tax, etc.), the Border Police has a policy of 
integration, building an information network, teamwork. The Border Police in 
Rousse have set up a contact bureau in Giurgiu (the Romanian town across the 
                                                                                                                                          
cross the street instead of using his truncheon to stop the traffic. He also pointed out the usefulness of 
the policemen and police cars which have been used in the clearing of roads from the snow that winter 
and helping with the emergency situation in the region due to unexpected snowfall and inability of the 
municipality to cope alone. 
51 The interview was conducted on 11/01/2007 in Rousse. 
52 Bulgaria has two internal borders: with Romania and Greece, and three external with Serbia, 
Macedonia, and the Black Sea. There are also two types of criteria for border crossing: EU citizens 
and non-EU nationals; difference is that EU-citizens don’t leave their data in the system.  
53 Ironically, as Kornadjev points out, from 1 January 2007 when Bulgaria joined the EU, there was an 
increase of the use of falsified documents mainly by citizens of Moldova who go through Romania 
and Bulgaria to Greece, and Kurds going through Bulgaria and Romania to Western Europe. They 
came in with real documents and got them falsified once inside which circumvented the external 
border’s control. Since Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, the people who were trying to cross the 
border illegally (trafficking or crossing green border) stopped using the services of traffickers. The 
crime is by consent, Kornadjev states, including women immigrating for prostitution. The use of 
forged documents has made some equipment obsolete such as gas analysers which catch trafficked 
human beings by detecting breathing. 
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 border) for coordination and exchange of information which includes executive and 
judicial powers. Both sides have joint cross-border points which work on the basis of 
one stopping (people who cross are checked only on the side they are leaving). They 
have joint patrols by land and by sea/river and police borders crossers inside the 
country by mobile patrols.54 Most of the new developments have been transposed 
mainly from Germany via twinning projects. The projects have also provided the 
latest technical equipment, including cars with off road capability, thermo-visual 
cameras, apparatus for night time vision, etc.  
 
The border police in Rousse have a few ongoing projects aimed at its further re-
structuring and compliance with Schengen. When EU experts came to monitor the 
progress they were given presentations, and they went and talked to employees. 
However, there have been some problems and lack of trust. At the time of the last 
visit the border police had not seized any heroin and the examiners thought this was 
suspicious. Kornajev’s opinion on the monitoring by EU experts was that ‘They 
don’t know anything.’ They only check factual data: the number of people employed, 
the availability of equipment, framework of cooperation with the Romanian 
neighbours. 
 
Kornadjev believed that these cross border points are important for the fight against 
organised crime and the external borders are a priority.55 The border police 
understands organised crime as people trafficking, illegal immigration, drugs, 
weapons trafficking – there is a very strict control on the external border and a lot of 
equipment has been purchased for policing the ‘green border’.56 Kornadjev pointed 
out that they have more equipment than the territorial police and, on some occasions, 
                                                 
54 Kornadjev stated that the introduction of these Mobile Groups for Control and Coordination added 
to, but also clashed with, the tasks to the policing bodies (existing territorial and border police). They 
are groups who police the external traffic internally and work both with Ministry of the Interior and 
Ministry of Finance. The introduction of these groups moves the protection of borders to the interior; 
and are part of the so-called compensatory measures diminishing border controls within the EU. 
Kornadjev pointed out that these were introduced by Germany after it was realised that the removal of 
border controls created problems and the German authorities went back to restore this type of post 
crossing control because they saw it was necessary. Kornajev pointed out that Bulgaria has had similar 
problems which showed the importance of collecting information on crossing borders. He mentioned 
a scandal when on one occasion the National Service to Combat Organised Crime, the Social Security 
services and the prosecution had no information that someone they were investigating had actually left 
the country. 
55 Their information system linked with Schengen’s Information System (SIS) will be used by border 
police, territorial police, regional police, etc. 
56 ‘Green border’ is used as a term for the frontier without border control. 
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 the District police chief had asked him to borrow some equipment for a publicity 
demonstration in town.57 On the issue of international cooperation on the fight 
against organised crime, Kornajev indicated that there is now wider cooperation with 
Romania, some with Interpol but not so much with Europol. He said that some of his 
colleagues use SECI on drug trafficking and some use of the new structure Frontex.58 
As far as the level of the Bulgarian border control is concerned, he stated: ‘We will 
be in Schengen in 2011 – everything is political’ meaning that Bulgaria had done 
everything that was required but the decision would be arbitrary.  
 
Courts59
 
From the point of view of the practitioners in the justice system in Rousse, a strong 
sense emerged that the new legislation is making the system more inefficient. 
According to the two judges from Rousse who were interviewed, the police are not 
well trained to investigate and therefore the introduction of preliminary investigators 
(doznateli) who are lawyers is a good development but their number is not enough. 
For Rousse they are only 30, and there are about 30 prosecutors too. Therefore 
preliminary investigators and the prosecution are overloaded with work, tired, and 
ineffective. Hence their work is not always of good quality and when the cases go to 
court the judge considers that the charges do not rest on enough evidence. Often the 
judge believes there could be more evidence collected, and they collect it themselves 
and even question witnesses (i.e. do the job of the police). Since the change of the 
Criminal procedure law the police investigate in almost all cases and they have not 
been very effective especially when it comes to economic crimes – they get very 
stressed themselves and, in the end, cannot perform on the job. Therefore the 
problem is in the preliminary investigation, i.e. the police: evidence could be 
collected so that a crime is proved and they can be collected in a way that makes it 
impossible to prove and there is use of illegal means by the police.  
 
                                                 
57 I asked if they worked on the basis of preliminary intelligence, i.e. signals, especially on drugs, to 
what extent this equipment is in fact used, and he did not comment. 
58 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, in Warsaw, Poland – the first agency to be based in one of the 
new member states from Eastern Europe in 2004 (operational since 2005). 
59 Interviewees: Velizar, a criminal judge at Rousse regional court and Darin, a judge on civil cases 
(surnames were kept private). The interviews were conducted on 7/01/2007 and 8/01/2007. One of the 
judges has proved further information by e-mail. 
 242
 On the other hand the data provided by one of the judges shows a very small problem 
with organised crime in Rousse. In 2005 there had been one organised crime trial of 
13 defendants, all of them from the former wrestlers association (called SIK), all of 
whom received prison sentences of 91 years in total. In 2006 there were two 
organised crime trials: one with 8 defendants who received one year in prison each, 
and the second one was against three defendants who got a prison sentence of 11 
years and 8 months in total. There were no trials for 2007, which the judge explained 
by the fact that all organised crime figures were now in prison. Those two cases put 
away the organised crime contingent which had controlled the relatively small illegal 
market in town. Interestingly, the judge believed that the delay of these sentences 
was caused by the corruption of the prosecution.  
 
The judges were critical of the reforms. The judicial reform was described as 
‘populist’ because in their opinion the judiciary was independent before but the last 
party put their people at the key places in the judicial system. That is why they are 
still ‘in government even after losing the elections’. They have their people at the key 
places, which one of the judges described as a ‘criminal privatisation of the 
institutions’. He was of opinion that the aim is to not have a strong justice system – 
there is an imitation of action and politicisation of the judicial power and subduing it 
to the government. There is no real judicial reform – they have not reformed 
anything – it is used to distract attention from other things.60
 
7.5. Evaluating Bulgaria’s Anti-Crime policy 
 
The final stage of EU’s conditionality concerning Bulgaria’s anti-crime policy was 
exercised in the last year before accession. In 2006, six months before it was due to 
give a final approval for Bulgaria’s accession, the Commission invoked the 
safeguard clause discussed earlier in this chapter, which allowed it to take necessary 
measures if it has ‘serious concerns regarding the implementation by Bulgaria of the 
commitments undertaken in this chapter, in particular judicial reform.’ The 
                                                 
60 The judges shared the opinion that there is a problem with crime although one pointed out that the 
organised crime is very ‘chaotic’. Even when it comes to contract killings it is not clear if they are 
organised crime. One of the judges mentioned an interesting case of series of killings which turned out 
to be perpetrated by a couple of young people who killed in an attempt to get noticed and hired as 
contract killers.  
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 Commission threatened to postpone accession if Bulgaria did not show more results 
in its judicial reform and the fight against organised crime.61
The decision of the European Commission was based on the process of evaluation of 
the state of Bulgarian law enforcement. The Commission posted the German police 
expert Klaus Jansen on a one-week mission in Bulgaria to investigate the state of 
organised crime in Bulgaria and report on anti-crime policy and criminal justice in 
the country.62 His report was published in February 2006 and expressed more 
criticism of the Bulgarian institutions. The basis of the report was 21 meetings with 
law enforcement officials and the prosecution, compared to media reports on the 
topic, which, according to the report, presented discrepancies between the police 
information and reality, as well public opinion. 63
On the positive side, according to the Klaus Jansen’s report, all officials interviewed 
were of the opinion that the new Criminal Code would have a great impact on the 
fight against crime such as witness protection, use of under-cover agents, controlled 
deliveries, special investigation means. Klaus Jansen was even surprised at the little 
need for training of policemen on how to use the above and the reason for this is that 
these techniques have been used since 1997 and the police were already familiar with 
them. The difference now was that the information collected by the police could be 
used in court. According to the police, whom the report cites, the problems came 
from the lawyers of criminals who may challenge the use of evidence, and also the 
fact that one cannot secure convictions only on the basis of evidence from 
anonymous witnesses or undercover agents.  
 
The report then goes into a deeper analysis of the anti-crime policy developed by 
Bulgaria. The changes in pre-trial investigation and the concentration of investigative 
                                                 
61 See for example Commission of the European Communities, Communication From The 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, Strategy Paper of the European 
Commission on Progress in the Enlargement Process, Com(2004) 657 Final, Brussels, 6.10.2004 
[online] http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/strategy-paper-en-2004_en.pdf accessed 
27/04/2009. 
62 Klaus Jansen was a chairman of German Association of Police Detectives. 
63 The quotes in the text are author’s translations from a Bulgarian version of the report published on 
the web site of the European Council of Police Syndicates. Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter Der 
Bundesvorsitzende, Партньорска проверка: Правосъдие и вътрешни работи. България, 22-24 
февруари 2006. Обект на проверката: Борбата с организираната престъпност (Partner inspection: 
Justice and home affairs. Bulgaria, 22-24 February 2006. Object of inspection: The fight against 
organised crime) [online] 
 http://www.cespolice.org/fra/docs/bulgarienbulgsachverstaendigenbericht.pdf accessed 10/02/2007.
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 powers in the police, as well as the re-structuring of the prosecution, have all been 
done to secure organised crime convictions, and have followed recommendations of 
the European Union. Furthermore, the number of investigating policemen (doznateli) 
who can engage in criminal investigation would be reduced from 10 000 to 2000, 
following EU recommendations. This, according to the report, could be a problem as, 
under existing criminal procedure, the investigative policemen have to be physically 
present at the site of investigation at all times and their small number will lead to 
work overload. Furthermore, the report found out that these vacancies are not in fact 
filled and there are 1450 only doznateli – there is an age limit of 40 years in an 
attempt to fill the positions with new people and not so many former employees of 
the investigation service who have ‘proven their inefficiency’. The low number was 
already a problem as there are 300 000 investigations per year which means 150 per 
investigator (and even more now because the vacancies have not been filled). As far 
as the judicial system is concerned the report noticed some ‘reluctance to put people 
in prison’.  
 
The report discusses some intriguing facts connected with organised crime in 
Bulgaria. From 300 000 criminal cases in 2005 only 1080 have been linked to 
organised crime, i.e. 0.47%. The National Service to Combat Organised Crime 
(NSCOC) discussed in the previous chapter employs 600 police (of which 15% 
doznateli and 15% analysts, and others are just regular full- or part- time employees). 
The service works almost exclusively with registered informers. In 2005 it uncovered 
233 criminal groups with 1074 members (meaning around 4-5 members per group). 
As the investigations of organised crime require a lot of resources over a prolonged 
period of time, the investigations are done under a separate criminal article in the 
Criminal Code. This is why the organised crime service, as the police had explained, 
does not investigate the notorious contract killings which are investigated by the 
regional homicide police departments.64  
 
On the other hand, the report points out, NSCOC investigates a widening range of 
crimes, including cyber crimes and sale of counterfeit goods using a reactive method 
                                                 
64 The report mentions an important controversy concerning these killings. According to the EU which 
used the contract killings as a key evidence that Bulgaria had not achieved success in the fight against 
organised crime, these killings are 173 for the period between 1992-2005. According to the Bulgarian 
authorities, they are only 92. 
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 of investigation (after official complaints). As far as drug crimes are concerned 
Bulgaria is used for trafficking to both Western markets and Middle-Eastern markets 
(for synthetic drugs). But according to the report the newly acquired investigative 
techniques are at risk of fast becoming obsolete as the traffickers find new ways to 
transport drugs. However, the service is well known for successful international 
operations and in 2005 they engaged in seven, in four of which they used controlled 
deliveries. The reporteur Klaus Jansen was surprised that there were no drugs/money 
laundering cases and the reason for this is the fact that in Bulgaria most transactions 
are done in cash and therefore money laundering of drug money cannot be proven. 
The response he got from the police was that the drugs could be paid for in Istanbul, 
then they pass through Bulgaria to Western Europe and in such cases the 
investigation cannot prove anything. As far as illegal arms are concerned, the police 
estimate is that there were only 80-100 illegal arms sales for 2005, and they have no 
data of the weapons used in the contract killings. The investigations of the 
production of counterfeit currency have been quite successful, according to the 
Bulgarian police and Bulgaria does not currently host any production lines, and is 
only used for trafficking of counterfeit money. 
 
The NSCOC does not consider women trafficking as a problem because the women 
are in fact taking advantage of the liberal Western regimes to make their living from 
prostitution. Most come from very poor backgrounds and most were already 
prostitutes in Bulgaria and the police are of the opinion that they voluntarily engage 
in such activity. Nevertheless the Bulgarian authorities are engaged in various 
programmes against trafficking of women although some of these have had limited 
positive result. For example, the police quoted the case of a programme to repatriate 
women (125 in 2005) that did not help because they ended up in the same situation. 
Finally, according to the data presented in the report international cooperation, which 
is one of the key activities of the police and NSCOC who were partners of many 
programmes and frameworks, had resulted in only 19 requests in 2004 and 40 in 
2005.  
 
The conclusion of the report poses an intriguing question: ‘The new structure of the 
police […] seems modern and efficient but would that help the fight against 
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 organised crime?’65 According to Klaus Jansen the fact that Bulgaria has ‘mixed and 
matched’ different good practices in its projects does not mean that the combination 
will work. The problem with the lack of convictions for any of the contract killings is 
indicative of the poor record of the police in practice because, as Jansen, points out, 
this has led to the ‘moral destabilisation of society and that of the police’. As far as 
the NSCOC is concerned, its main problem Jansen sees in the fact that it ‘acts after 
the deed and not ahead of it’, meaning that the service is not sufficiently proactive. 
He shared his disappointment with the visit of the service as he expected to find a lot 
more enthusiasm and appreciation of the new legislative reforms made to facilitate 
the fight against organised crime. In response, the police and NSCOC shared their 
doubts about the merit of these reforms, and complained: ‘The European Union asks 
us to do this.’66  
 
7.6. Accession and Post-accession monitoring 
 
Klaus Jansen’s report on the state of Bulgaria’s law enforcement and criminal justice 
system, together with the regular monitoring reports, became the basis of the EU’s 
position to require Bulgaria to do more in the fight against crime and its judicial 
reform in the period before accession. In the last twelve months before the envisaged 
(but not confirmed) date for accession of January 2007, Bulgaria was closely 
monitored and had 15 visits by EU experts monitoring JHA between January and 
March 2006 only. The EU experts required that the state intensified its crime-fighting 
and anti-corruption policies and adopted further reforms of the judiciary, including 
more constitutional changes. In this final stage the pressure was put mainly on 
judicial reform with the aim of guaranteeing judicial independence and efficiency at 
the same time.67 The EU was directly monitoring the reform and communication 
                                                 
65 Ibid, p. 27. 
66 Ibid, p.28. 
67 The reform required more legislative and constitutional changes to secure the full independence of 
the judiciary from the other branches of power and at the same time, setting limits to the immunity of 
the judicial staff and more control over appointments and dismissals. This was seen as a way of 
ensuring better service and less corruption. The efficiency was concerned with the long duration of 
investigations and trials as the current system allowed the different levels of the investigation process 
to return the case to the previous level. The proposed changes sought to shorten the duration of trials 
but risked a lower quality of the investigation and collected evidence. The changes adopted were a 
compromise and limited the practice of returning the case (mainly by the prosecutors) to a previous 
level but did not entirely remove the practice.  
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 opinions on the proposed legislative changes.68 The reaction of the media was 
critical of the weakness of Bulgaria’s institutions pointing out that it was the 
judiciary that now conducted the country’s foreign policy.69
 
Bulgaria started a process of changing the constitution and adopted a new Penal 
Code. The police engaged in series of raids on suspicious sites, and increased 
international cooperation. In addition, the prosecution created a department dealing 
with organised crime and corruption where the best professionals would work in 
order to accomplish the national priorities in this area. This was an initiative of the 
Prosecutor General, who stated: ‘I want the prosecution to be more active and this 
team will work not only on signals from the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of 
Finance but also from citizens, media, Bulgarian and foreign businessmen, and seek 
information on manifestations of organised crime and corruption’.70 This was 
presented to Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner responsible for enlargement at 
his visit in March 2006. His response was that the EU does not want a ‘witch-hunt’ 
but ‘convincing results’ and ‘not just strategies but real actions’ which can be 
achieved within one year and ‘should not waste a minute’ but get on with the 
reforms.71 In his position published in April the judicial reform was not yet 
satisfactory, and although there have been some structural reforms in the system, the 
fight against organised crime had to produce a convincing list of achievements, i.e. 
                                                 
68 These were monitored by a peer review commission of Justice and Home Affairs experts. The 
commission refused to make public comments. According to leaks in the Bulgarian media the 
commission suggested the use of safety clauses in the JHA area in the post-enlargement period even 
though they are not entitled to propose the use of safety clauses. The commission based this on its 
criticism of the proposed legislation on the judiciary, giving the right to the Ministry of Justice to 
control the order, proceeding and duration of trials which was criticised at a point when the project 
was about to be voted in the Parliament. A letter from Brussels presenting these criticisms allegedly 
interrupted the voting process. The introduction of a safety clause in the JHA area meant that 
Bulgarian courts’ decisions would not be accepted by the other member states. The main implication 
of this safety clause was lack of trust in the Bulgarian judicial system but also the possibility for EU 
companies to impose a more expensive international arbitrage for their Bulgarian partners. И. Станев, 
‘Предпазна клауза на хоризонта’ (A safety clause on the horizon), Капитал, бр. 12, 16/03/2006, 
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=237464: accessed 27/04/2007. 
69 С. Терзиев, ‘Настана време съдът да прави външната политика’ (We got the point where the 
court makes our foreign policy), Сега, 7/01/2006  
[online] http://www.segabg.com/online/new/articlenew.asp?issueid=2085&sectionId=5&id=0001001: 
accessed 25/02/2009. 
70 ‘Седмицата’ (Rubric ‘This Week’), Капитал, 11/03/2006  
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=236201 accessed 27/04/2007. 
71 ‘Интервю: Оли Рен, комисар по разширяването на ЕС / Не искаме лов на вещици, а 
убедителни резултати’ (Interview with Olli Rehn, EU Enlargement Commissioner / We don’t want a 
witch-hunt but convincing results), Капитал, бр. 6 11/02/2006 
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=235008: accessed 27/04/2007. 
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 investigations and convictions.72 As a consequence, the next report on Bulgaria’s 
progress issued in August 2006 criticised mainly the fight against organised crime 
and required that Bulgaria produced a specific strategy and a plan for this policy by 
October 2006, which would be evaluated by the Commission in December 2006.73  
 
The mechanism of evaluation of Bulgaria’s progress established six benchmarks on 
which the country had to work. These benchmarks were used by the Commission in 
the last six months of the pre-accession monitoring and in the established post-
accession mechanism for cooperation and verification of the progress of Bulgaria in 
the area of judicial reform and organised crime. These benchmarks to be addressed 
by Bulgaria included the need to:  
 
1. Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system.  
2. Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and 
implementing a new Judicial System Act and the new Civil Procedure 
Code. Report on the impact of these new laws and of the penal and 
administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase. 
3. Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, 
accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and 
publish the results annually. 
4. Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into 
allegations of high- level corruption. Report on internal inspections of 
public institutions and on the publication of assets of high- level officials. 
                                                 
72 ‘Оценката към 4 април Оли Рен пред комисията по външна политика в Европейския 
парламент’ (The assessment on 4 April. Olli Rehn presentation at the foreign policy commission of 
the European Parliament), Капитал, бр 14, 07/04/2007  
[online] http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=256162: accessed 27/04/2007. In response to the 
lack of information on investigations, the prosecutors pointed out that these are kept in secret and are 
not publicized until the prosecution decided there is enough evidence to press charges. They also 
pointed out that organized crime investigations continue for years. 
73 The August report did not suggest the use of a safety clause as predicted by experts. However in 
anticipation of the report the media and politicians in Bulgaria speculated on whether such a clause 
would be included or not. According to some media reports, the government’s opposition was hoping 
there would be a clause so they could use this to strengthen their position. ‘Хроника на един 
предизвестен доклад. Клауза няма, но има голямо недоверие’ (Chronicle of a Report Foretold. No 
clause but a lot of distrust), Капитал, бр 26, 29/06/2007 [online] 
 http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=354194: accessed 16/08/2007. 
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 5. Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the 
borders and within local government. 
6. Implement a strategy to fight organized crime, focusing on serious crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of 
criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and 
convictions in these areas.74 
 
According to Michael Humphreys, head of the European Commission Delegation in 
Sofia these benchmarks are interlinked in a global strategy against organised crime: 
the fight against organised crime required an efficient juridical system and the latter 
requires good laws, etc. However, he also pointed out the conclusion of the latest 
report on Bulgaria that there is no way of measuring the success of the policy, as 
there are no reliable statistics. According to the report the benchmark number six the 
fight against organised crime has a number of achievements but: ‘an evaluation of 
the impact of the strategy is inconclusive given the absence of a measurement 
methodology and reliable statistics. Data that would allow the evaluation of the 
judicial treatment of cases is patchy or inadequate.’75 Therefore, as Humphreys 
argued the main method of measurement would be the number of convictions.76  
 
As the Bulgarian authorities were pressured to show results on the fight against 
organised crime through criminal justice statistics, the latter were presented in a way 
which matched the priorities of the EU’s fight against organised crime. The data on 
the finalised legal proceedings linked to organised crime for the period of intensive 
anti-crime activity 01.10.2006 – 23.02.2007 which were provided for the first post-
accession report on the benchmarks showed that there are only 141 convictions for 
that period on crimes which are commonly understood (if not defined) as organized 
                                                 
74 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Decision of 13/XII/2006 establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in 
the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime’, Brussels, 
13/XII/2006, C(2006) 6570 final  
[online] http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/bulgaria/bg_accompanying_measures_1206_en.pdf 
accessed 12/01/2008. 
75 European Commission, ‘Key findings of the progress report on the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism with Bulgaria’ MEMO/07/261 Brussels, 27/06/2007 [online]  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/261&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en accessed 15/01/2008. 
76 ‘Хроника на един предизвестен доклад. Клауза няма, но има голямо недоверие’ (Chronicle of 
a Report Foretold. No clause but a lot of distrust), op.cit. 
 250
 crime thus including even possession of drugs.77 Out of this number there are only 
ten convictions of criminal organizations or of members of organized crime groups 
(Art. 321); 37 convictions on drug-related crimes (distribution); 10 for car-theft, 7 
convictions for financial crimes, 52 for economic crimes. A separate statistical annex 
was provided for illegal trafficking of drugs where the convictions number 822 but 
most of these crimes are for possession of drugs and only 36 are for distribution 
(three for production).78 The statistics show the attempt of the authorities to present 
how varied are the criminal offences that fall under the ‘organized crime’ 
benchmark.  
 
In the autumn of 2006 Bulgaria was officially allowed to join the European Union on 
1 January 2007 but on the condition that it continued with judicial reform and the 
fight against organised crime. An elaborate mechanism was set up to monitor the 
programme in this area and Bulgaria was required to report to the Commission by 31 
March of each year on the progress made on the six benchmarks listed above, and 
‘[i]f Bulgaria should fail to address the benchmarks adequately, the Commission may 
apply safeguard measures based on Articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession, 
including the suspension of member states’ obligation to recognise and execute, 
under the conditions laid down in Community law, Bulgarian judgments and judicial 
decisions, such as European arrest warrants’.79
 
7.7. Conclusion 
 
In the period between 2000 and 2007 the issue of organised crime had become the 
most important issue for Bulgaria’s internal and foreign policy to the point that 
                                                 
77 МВР, ‘Приключени досъдебни производства, свързани с организирана престъпност. Решения 
на прокурора и съда по тях. Обвиняеми и осъдени лица през периода 01.10.2006г. –  
23.02.2007г.’ (Ministry of the Interior, ‘Finalised legal proceedings linked to organised crime. 
Decisions of the Prosecutor and the courts on these cases. Accused and sentenced persons for the 
period 01.10.2006 – 23.02.2007) [online] http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/9794613C-EE70-4E60-
9246-030D38539C01/0/Prilojneie6OC.pdf accessed 15/01/2008. 
78 МВР, ‘Приключени досъдебни производства, за незаконен трафик на наркотични вещества и 
контрабанда. Решения на прокурора и съда по тях. Обвиняеми и осъдени лица през периода 
01.10.2006г. - 23.02.2007г.’ (Ministry of the Interior, ‘Finalised legal proceedings on illegal 
trafficking of narcotics and contraband. Decisions of the Prosecutor and the courts on these cases. 
Accused and sentenced persons for the period 01.10.2006 – 23.02.200) [online] 
http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/924546E0-350A-486B-A9D3 
C3A7CBA24EDA/0/Prilojenie7drugs.pdf accessed 15/01/2008. 
79 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Decision of 13/XII/2006’, op.cit.  
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 Bulgarian accession to the European Union had became equated with the fight 
against crime and the decriminalisation of the Bulgarian society. The problem of 
organised crime is usually defined as an internal issue of governance and state and 
institutional weakness and failure to impose, or be seen as attempting to impose, 
effective controls over a largely criminalised economy. However the last two 
chapters have sought to challenge this view and demonstrate the failures of the anti-
crime policy as part of a more universal problem of fighting organised crime. They 
also revealed a number of factors which led to the development and constant re-
adjustments of unworkable policies in Bulgaria. Whereas chapter six explained some 
of the policies’ deficiencies with internal issues of implementation, this chapter has 
exposed the ‘structural genesis’ of the problems of these policies. The review of the 
EU evolution in anti-crime demands imposed on Bulgaria between 1997-2007 
demonstrated a very chaotic and unclear EU policy which was developed on an ad-
hoc basis and did not reflect any EU standards on fighting organised crime (which 
previous chapters, and particularly chapter four, identified as non-existent) and 
demonstrated a number of paradoxes and sometimes even prejudices. In these 
conditions, it is not surprising that Bulgarian institutions could not follow a clear 
path and engaged in contradictory strategies which led to the problems identified in 
this and the previous chapter. 
  
The vicious circle came from public and EU pressure on the Bulgarian criminal 
justice system for results in the fight against organised crime when, in contrast, crime 
identified by the police remains organised in small groups. Furthermore, the 
Bulgarian criminal justice system worked on the basis of personal criminal liability 
and thus breaks down a crime to its constituent elements in order to prove each of 
them rather than work on an abstract organisational structure. The latter is being 
planned but is difficult to secure at this stage. It involves special investigation 
techniques in order to collect information on cases of organised crime and these 
investigations take years. Therefore the policies aiming to centralise the fight against 
organised crime have mainly led to more confusion.  
 
The case of Rousse discussed in this chapter confirm these and previous findings 
concerning the problems created by re-structuring and reforming the criminal justice 
system on the level of institutions and the attempts to centralise the power over these 
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 institutions for the purpose of a pro-active crime policy. The situation ‘on the 
ground’ shows that the police have become increasingly agitated with the constant 
attacks from media, the pressure from above, i.e. the Ministry of the Interior and the 
EU combined with diminishing possibilities to act such as the need to coordinate 
investigations with the prosecution, and judges, diminished powers of local police 
chiefs to dismiss his staff, etc. There is also rivalry between the different branches of 
the police exemplified by the competition between the regular police and the border 
police in Rousse. The overall conclusion is that the centralisation of the police 
justified by the policy on organised crime, defined as a national rather than local 
phenomenon, has created problems on local levels through decreasing the abilities of 
the local police but expanding the demands on them to fight crime pro-actively. 
These problems are then re-produced on a national level and create the impression of 
inefficiency of the whole criminal justice system. This had led to the ambiguous 
results of the monitoring process, and Klaus Jansen’s report discussed in the chapter. 
 
It might be argued that a debate of anti-crime policy in any modern society would 
produce a similar analysis of contradictions and frustrations. There will always be a 
gap between what people hope of the police and the judiciary and what that can 
deliver. Provided this gap is not too large this is part of the price of a democratic 
society. But this is not how the problem was posed in the case discussed here. The 
development of an organised crime agenda was part of the soft security agenda of 
international relations, and its incorporation into the EU accession process through 
the acquis required Bulgaria’s police and judiciary to respond to possibly unrealistic 
expectations based on a questionable analysis. Their capacity to do so satisfactorily 
then became a test of democratic fitness for membership of an expanded EU with 
some of the perverse consequences discussed here. 
 
By 2007 the ten-year fight against organised crime in Bulgaria had contributed to a 
rapidly growing distrust of the Bulgarian voters in the criminal justice institutions. 
This result was opposite to the initial intention of the international and EU-led anti-
crime policy export to weak states. The evidence from Bulgaria shows that it did not 
achieve its goal of creating good governance by strengthening the internal security 
institutions and transforming them into providers of security which people trust. A 
public opinion survey conducted by one of the main agencies in Bulgaria, Alpha 
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 Research, shows that between 2000 and 2007 the public opinion of the police, courts 
and the prosecution remained or grew more negative.80 Furthermore, despite the 
official information from the police that the level of crime is falling, there is a 
persistent conviction among the Bulgarian people that organised crime is not 
defeated but has now become endemic, linked with all levels of government and the 
judicial institutions. In 2008 the EU suspended its financial transfers to Bulgaria due 
to allegations of misuse of funds and increased corruption. Thus the wide-ranging 
and extensive anti-crime and corruption policy of three Bulgarian governments under 
EU supervision since 1997 continue to seem to have largely failed in their objectives 
of establishing strong institutions capable of providing security and justice. 
 
  
                                                 
80 The Bulgarian marketing and social research agency Alpha Research has conducted surveys (face-
to-face interviews of the country’s adult population of 18+) of the public assessment of the activities 
of the public institutions since 2000 with some interesting results. The most distrusted institution in 
Bulgaria is the Law Court, the Prosecution and the Investigation office with around 70-78 percent 
negative public opinion of those institutions between 2002 and 2008. The police were assessed 
positively between 2000 and 2006, after which the opinions became mixed and the negative feedback 
rose sharply towards the end of 2007. The negative opinion of the Parliament rose from about 45 
percent 2005 to staggering 88 percent in 2008. The Ministry of the Interior has had mixed feedback 
but the negative opinions rose towards the end of 2007. The army is the only institution that has been 
seen in a positively throughout the period although it suffered from some negative feedback in 2008. 
Alpha Research, Assessment of the Activity of the Public Institutions, 28.04.2009 
 [online] http://www.aresearch.org/institutions.html accessed 20/01/2009. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis set out to investigate the implementation of the new soft security agenda 
and international anti-organised crime policies developed by the European Union 
since the 1990s. This task led to the exploration of different fields of knowledge and 
levels of analysis. The topic was approached from the broader perspective of 
international relations and global politics but was narrowed down through the use of 
methods from security theory, criminology, history, area studies and policy analysis. 
This interdisciplinary approach was determined by the research design of the thesis 
which aimed at looking both at the global and the local conditions of the 
development of the policy on organised crime during the 1990s and establishing and 
analysing the relationships between these two levels, and their implications. As 
stated in the introductory chapter, the thesis sought to uncover the conditions and 
reasons for the development of this particular international agenda and reach 
conclusions for areas broader than organised crime and its policies.  
 
The thesis used the case of fighting organised crime in the EU’s enlargement 
conditionality focused on the case of Bulgaria, which was itself explored both at a 
national and local level. The case of Bulgaria illustrated some problems of top-down 
policy-making and power inequality which raised serious issues for the quality of 
governance and democracy in the country. As a direct consequence of increasing 
demands on Bulgaria to fight organised crime its institutions have had to deal with a 
growing gap between expectations, external and internal, and the reality of their 
limited capabilities. Given the amount of resources allocated both by the Bulgarian 
government and the European Union, the problems created by the obsession with 
organised crime fighting calls for re-consideration of the theories which inform this 
policy and its implementation. This concluding chapter explores those issues in more 
detail and in relation to their broader implications. It reviews the steps taken to deal 
with this central research question, and then considers the originality of the argument 
of the thesis and its wider significance. 
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 8.2. Summary of thesis and conclusions by chapter 
 
This thesis was developed in eight chapters, of which six chapters built the core 
arguments of this work, and the other two, the Introduction and this Conclusion 
analyse the method and outcome of the research. Chapter two of the thesis 
Development of ‘New Europe’ and the Emergence of Norm Making Accession 
discussed the historical process of European integration with a focus on the particular 
route of development the European Union took after the end of the Cold War. The 
chapter showed that after several decades of uneven enthusiasm for the European 
project, in the 1980s European integration seemed to have exhausted its 
marketability as a basis for cohesion and growth in Europe. The debates about the 
future of Europe seemed to have reached a standstill between (various) ideas of 
‘deepening’ or ‘widening’ of the European Communities to an uncertain end. 
However a number of developments at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s gave the project a new impetus. These developments were a combination of 
increasing economic globalisation and a rising demand for economic de-regulation, 
the fall of communism in Eastern Europe all of which created possibilities for the re-
integration of this region of ‘New Europe’ to the Western economic and political 
system, and the EU. As a result the Union took a particular path of development 
which included both deepening and widening. However, both of these paths soon 
parted with traditional ideas of politics as an area of contest of competing political 
interests and the EU policy makers came to emphasise new and more apolitical 
normative and ethical lines, in order to promote state cooperation above state 
competition. This gave priority to a top-down approach in building the EU 
architecture, and a norm-based accession of the new Eastern European members. 
One of the new norms for the EU was a new concept of ‘soft’ security focused on 
internal safety and regulation in the so-called ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ 
which was to be built by the Justice and Home Affairs area of cooperation. Part of 
this agenda was an international fight against organised crime, identified as one of 
the threats to ‘soft security’.  
 
Chapter three From Hard Security to Soft Security and the ‘Organised Crime Threat’ 
took a step back towards a theoretical reflection of the reasons why the EU opted for 
this particular security agenda. It discussed the developments in international 
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 relations theory since the 1980s and especially the 1990s ‘revolution’ in security 
studies which sought to deconstruct the concept of security but along with this 
process, also opened up a possibility to reconstruct security without much change to 
the concept’s core assumptions but nevertheless divorced security from its political 
project of state sovereignty. The chapter then moved on to challenge the expansion 
of this new security thinking to areas defined as ‘soft security’. It suggested that the 
replacement of ‘hard’ threats with ‘soft’ threats such as organised crime has in fact 
made the security concept more ambiguous and hence open even more to political 
manipulation, both externally and internally. In order to demonstrate the growing 
ambiguity of soft security, the second half of the chapter engaged with theories of 
organised crime drawn from a near-century-long criminological tradition. The review 
of these theories illustrated the conceptual vagueness of the idea of ‘organised 
crime’, especially if the notion of this type of crime is constructed beyond its local 
manifestations of small and often disorganised criminal associations. The discussion 
led to the conclusion that the new ideas about transnational organised crime are 
weakly supported by evidence. Nor is the evidence unambiguous in respect of 
meaning. Since global rule making is a top-down process, some forms of crime 
might even be seen as a bottom-up response to the economic imbalance between rich 
and poor countries. This creates obstacles for any international regime which seeks to 
suppress crime without addressing its structural conditions and risks worsening the 
position of the less powerful states. 
 
Chapter four Organised Crime in Europe and the Emergence of the EU’s Internal 
Security Governance looked at the case of the rise of the organised crime discourse 
in Europe in the 1990s and the EU as a case study of building an international policy 
to counter this newly identified threat. The chapter engaged with the pre- and post-
1990s processes of ‘construction’ of the threat, and discussed the role of EU 
institutions and national governments in re-defining crime as organised, international 
and European. The chapter then took a tour back to the historical precedents of 
international criminal justice cooperation to compare and contrast the 1990s 
developments with previous initiatives such as Interpol, established in the 1920s, the 
inclusion of crime in the Council of Europe’s agenda since the 1950s, the setting up 
of the TREVI group within the European Communities in the 1970s, and the 
establishment of the Schengen regime for free travel and common border controls in 
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 the 1980s. In comparison to these initiatives, the post-Cold war anti-crime regime 
built by the EU and a growing number of other international organisations is more 
impressive but it has encountered many of the problems that the previous attempts 
also encountered. From this historical perspective, the chapter argues that the anti-
crime regime has had a limited success in building formal cooperation between states 
on fighting crime. This is largely due to the sensitivity of the issue of internal 
security and its capacity to undermine a core basis of national sovereignty. On a 
more practical level, a common anti-crime policy within the EU might have entailed 
the difficult task of reforming its member states the criminal justice systems and 
bodies of law. As a result the chosen policy focused on the executive branches of the 
system and legal approximation and mutual recognition of judicial decisions taken in 
the member states. The core of the policy focused on police re-organisation on 
national and international level to fight organised and international crime, the 
development of formal cooperation mechanisms and the establishment of 
international policing structures such as Europol. The chapter concluded with a 
discussion of the launching of the external dimension of the EU’s anti crime policy, 
and the use of this policy in relations with non-EU states, and particularly its future 
members from Central Europe and the Balkans.  
 
Chapter five Organised Crime and EU Enlargement moved to the application of the 
policy outside of the European Union. This was the first of three more empirical 
chapters which explored the substance of the anti-crime policy application. It first 
discussed the use of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as both a foreign policy 
instrument, and a tool of member-state building in Eastern Europe, and particularly 
the Balkans. The chapter then discussed the essence of the policy transfer from the 
EU to its applicant countries by analysing a sample of EU funded projects on 
organised crime rated policies within the PHARE programme. The projects fiches 
described in the chapter revealed some particularities of the EU export of expertise 
and technical equipment to the applicants to facilitate the institution building around 
the new organised crime agenda. These project fiches exposed a highly problematic 
practice of policy transfer without much consideration of local conditions. The 
disproportionate expenditure on EU experts and EU-made equipment created 
controversies between donor and recipients, in which the former are bound by the 
program’s requirements and EU membership agenda, and the latter were concerned 
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 with ‘remittance’ of the EU funds, i.e. funding mainly EU-made product and short 
term but highly paid EU expert visits. In such a situation most of the projects had a 
questionable institution-building input and mainly supported the spread of the EU 
anti-crime agenda, rather than developing a genuine institutional capacity on the 
ground. 
 
Chapter six Bulgaria: Post-communism and Organised Crime followed a more 
complex line of argument and formed a first part of the discussion of the case study 
for this thesis. It traced the internal development of Bulgaria’s organised crime 
discourse and identified its origins in the political imperatives of a de-legitimised 
state in search of new ways to connect with its population. The discourse of 
organised crime was initiated within the reformist liberal parties in Bulgaria 
organised within the United Democratic Forces and it was built on an anti-
communist agenda which exposed the communist state as criminal and accused the 
post-communist socialist government of links with the new mafia. This fed into the 
rise of the organised crime discourse in Western Europe and formed part of the UDF 
government’s (1997-2001) quest for reform and modernisation of the state and its 
economy. The government engaged in an expensive criminal justice reform 
following EU guidelines of legislative changes, institution-building within the police 
and the judiciary, with a focus on centralisation and specialisation in fighting 
organised crime. As a result of this the issue of organised crime became a key topic 
of the public debates in Bulgaria fought in media and linked and the media largely 
reported information transmitted by criminal justice institutions, EU and foreign 
observers, and even foreign media. The chapter traced the outcomes of this policy 
and revealed a growing chaos in Bulgaria’s institutions, development of turf wars, 
shortage of resources, and a further politicisation of both the executive and judicial 
branches. The final conclusion of the chapter points out that these problems have 
nevertheless been largely discursive and in fact indicative of an active but often 
uncontrollable administrative sector while the democratic connection between this 
sector and the populace has thinned out.  
 
Chapter seven, Organised Crime and Bulgaria’s Accession to the EU discussed the 
issues of Bulgaria’s anti-crime policy with a focus on the external factors and sought 
to re-establish responsibility in the wider structural conditions for crime regulation. 
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 The chapter examined the details of the policy of conditionality and monitoring 
established by the EU to impose its anti-crime agenda on the applicant countries, and 
especially Bulgaria which was singled out as the applicant state with the most serious 
organised crime problem. The discussion focused on 2004 to 2006 when Bulgaria 
was dropped out of the first Eastern European enlargement and was required to 
intensify its fight against organised crime in order to attain EU compliance. The 
chapter revealed the lack of consistency in the EU’s approach, as well as its reliance 
on limited evidence and media reports about the crime situation in the country. The 
EU experts often dismissed, in an imperious fashion, data offered by the Bulgarian 
institutions, or found its actions, which earlier EU experts had advised, as 
unsatisfactory. On the other hand the Bulgarian institutions and officials were doing 
everything possible to convince the EU that Bulgaria was dealing with its organised 
crime problem. This chapter also looked into a local case of the city of Rousse which 
had an EU monitoring visit prior to Bulgaria’s accession, which demonstrated the 
gap between expectations and reality, and between the lack of local expertise of the 
examiners and their reliance for ‘hard’ data on such issues as number of computers 
or numbers of trained personnel. This case, as well as the other materials used in this 
final chapter, has led to the final conclusion about the quality of internal security 
governance which the EU had developed and exported to its future members.  
 
8.3. Synthesis of main findings 
 
The main finding of this thesis is that behind the new normative and emancipatory 
rhetoric of ‘soft security’ the power relations and imbalance between actors on the 
international but also national level have remained unchanged. Despite the aspiration 
to overcome old divisions in Europe and build a collaborative union of politically 
equal states working towards a common security in reality the development of the 
supranational structures of the EU in the 1990s have legitimised the re-establishment 
of power politics over equality through defining weak states as failed or failing states 
and a threat to their own and international security, and the strong states and the 
European Union as a guard and guardian of security, now based on new principles. 
 
It is generally accepted that the concept of soft security was born out of the efforts to 
rectify the power politics pre occupation with the strategic-military basis of security, 
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 which developed during the Cold War. The official story of the birth of soft security 
is the period of post-Cold War enlightenment when states acknowledged the 
constructed rather than ‘natural’ nature of threats and the role of interaction in 
defining identities and interests. The concept of soft security offered a different 
perspective which claimed to give priority to ‘real’ threats to human existence and 
the peaceful structures of society. These threats did not stem from states but the 
action of individuals or groups of individuals who could or could not be linked to 
state structures. At the start the nature of soft security was defined primarily in 
opposition to hard, or military security, because of the strong prevalence of this type 
of security at the time (the end of the Cold War) and the political strength of the 
military structures on both a national and international level. The loss of that strength 
with the end of the Cold War, however, opened new grounds for redefining the 
nature of security and this time distant threats proved unable to attract enough 
political support from voters and political parties disenchanted with hard security. At 
the same time, the discourse (if not the practice of) globalisation and the removal of 
certain barriers to trade and movement of people pushed the agenda of internal 
security. In other words, the more the world was becoming global, and the more the 
state appeared to be weakening as an actor, the more the issue of internal security 
gained strength.  
 
In this way, the issue of organised crime came to be recognised as a matter of 
international security in the post-Cold War paradigmatic shift to non-military threats 
and soft-security concerns. The specific problem in the case of organised crime is 
that it substitutes a vaguely defined threat for a more clearly defined ‘hard security’ 
military threat. In particular the discourse of ‘organized crime’ as a ‘security threat’ 
is hard to define: the level of the threat, the exact source of the threat, whose security 
is threatened, whether the threat is really an ‘international security threat’ in a 
meaningful sense. A central problem encountered by international relations/security 
approaches is the fact that organised crime is by definition an activity performed by 
non-state actors, and also, that it is not in all cases a necessarily negative function of 
society. On the other hand, the insufficient empirical research causes additional 
confusion as to the analysis of the origin and development of the phenomenon and its 
interpretation as a security threat. Theories of organised crime as a matter of security 
further complicate the analysis with a number of weak strands such as the ill-defined 
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 referent object of security, incomplete analytical methods that fail to grasp the 
different forms in which crime manifests itself in various (and all) countries or 
regions, or is carried out by different sub-state social groups or transnational 
organisations. The new conceptualizations of security try to avoid the ‘statist’ 
approach in traditional security studies. Whereas it is conceivable that a state’s 
capacity to protect its citizens and structure decreased since the end of the Cold War, 
this argument does not sustain the development of a new normative theory based on 
the individual and sub-state level of analysis. In reality, this theoretical paradigm is 
applied by states to justify intervention in other states, presumed to be less developed 
and less democratic. It can be argued, however, that such conceptualisations change 
the very idea of security and promote coercive methods in dealing with issues that 
may be best solved through different policies.  
 
These problems became evident in the EU’s attempt to establish a new international 
anti-crime regime which was initially limited to the territory of its member states and 
was justified by the theoretical claim that Europe has become a single area of 
operation of organised crime. However, it proved difficult to establish working 
cooperation among the EU member states for many reasons which are usually 
associated with the concept of national sovereignty. It was also difficult to establish 
more common roots to the problems of crime in the different states and regions of the 
Union. Organised crime, or organised criminals, turned out to be more disorganised 
than initially thought. One area where the EU member states did find common 
ground, however, was foreign organised crime and this is the main reason why the 
external dimension of the Justice and Home Affairs agenda could be more vigorously 
pursued from the mid-1990s. The issue of JHA and organised crime became a hot 
topic linked to the Union’s external relations and the process of enlargement. This is 
the point where the theory of soft security became even more problematic as it began 
to target subjects, which were outside the jurisdiction of the EU or its member states. 
In other words, security risked becoming aggressive and interventionist, rather than 
defensive and collaborative, and this time its subject was less powerful states. It was 
not difficult to go down that road because many of these states proved a fruitful 
ground as they were experiencing the problems of globalisation to a higher degree 
and many of them were on the brink of political crisis. The issue of internal security 
helped re-establish the authority of the state and government and gave them an even 
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 stronger validation by linking them to the international level. This was certainly the 
case for some of the Balkan countries which embraced the crime discourse but for 
different reasons. 
 
For the EU the application of the Justice and Home Affairs agenda in non-EU states 
was easy as it did not need to negotiate a consensus between various domestic actors 
and interests, characteristic of democratic internal policy-making. At times the EU 
demanded more from the candidate countries than it did from its member states, and 
these demands grew in scope and stringency. They were defended by two main 
considerations: first, the fear of possible spill over of criminality from the ‘more 
backward’ post-communist states, especially the Balkans; and second, the need to 
develop stricter enlargement requirements which went beyond the economic and 
political sphere in order to promote the EU as a new form of normative political 
organisation. It becomes clear from the empirical research however, that the EU did 
not in fact have a clear idea of what they were demanding from the applicant 
countries which opened the way for different interpretations from both sides. For 
example, a detailed examination of the PHARE projects between EU member states 
and the applicant countries for dealing with organised crime revealed an 
amalgamation of goals, purposes, policies and actions that are largely uncoordinated 
and unsupported by detailed analysis of their crime situation. As a whole, they 
display a tendency on the part of the EU to mould not only anti-organised crime 
policy in the applicant countries but also legislation and institutions that have little to 
do with organised crime but manage to justify funding and fit the overall strategy of 
democratisation and reform whose terms were defined as strengthening institutions 
and their coercive methods instead of strengthening self-rule and accountability. 
 
The general conclusion about the activities and policies dealing with organised crime 
in the applicant countries, and particularly the case of Bulgaria, explored by the 
thesis, is that they have framed and addressed organised crime mainly as a problem 
and a security issue. Organised crime was a subject of increasingly suppressive law 
and order policies in Bulgaria, which sometimes used even military tactics. The 
thesis found evidence to suggest that this type of policy has led to further 
antagonisms in society. As a result Bulgaria experienced an extreme politicisation of 
crime and its criminal justice institutions. From the perspective of the Bulgarian 
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 voters however, the problem of organised crime was a criticism of the quality of 
government that extended beyond the security and crime discourse. The perceived 
failure to manage the crime and corruption problem can be translated into a popular 
critique of the type of governance, democracy and economy developed after the fall 
of the communists. Bulgaria is now experiencing a trend of increasing the power of 
the executive branch and law enforcement at the expense of parliament and the 
judiciary, which are the traditional agencies of democracy and the rule of law. 
 
This final development serves to show one of the dangers of anti-crime rhetoric. It 
starts from the point of difficulty to define and measure a problem, securitizing it and 
excluding other options of dealing with it apart from institutional and mainly 
suppressive ones, to using it according to the specific needs of local elites. In a way 
this development in the Balkan states is not different from some Western European 
examples (such as the UK) where the fight against crime is shaped according to the 
political realities. In this way, it drifts away from its initial purpose to help strengthen 
the feeling of security (in Europe). The case of the securitizing European Union is 
particularly hazardous as it changes completely its initial reason for existence which 
was to prevent future conflicts in Europe by establishing equality, political and 
economic, among its counterparts.   
 
8.4. Originality of approach, implications and wider significance 
 
The originality of this thesis lies in its effort to bring together a wide range of 
disciplines and approaches in its study of crime and its examination of the subject of 
Bulgarian organised crime from both an internal and external position. Due to the 
wide spectrum of disciplines covered by the research the thesis’ conclusions and 
wider implications can be relevant to a number of disciplines. From the perspective 
of the study of crime and crime control, the thesis calls for a re-evaluation of theories 
which perpetuate the organised crime discourse and sees it as phenomenon which is 
to be defined and addressed separately from other types of crime. The findings of the 
thesis call into question such an approach as the policy complications discussed in 
chapters five, six and seven demonstrate the practical impossibility of defining and 
containing ‘organised crime.’ The empirical data collected through the research into 
the anti-crime policy of the EU and Bulgaria can be used for a better understanding 
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 of the subject and avoiding the opposite approach in which untested theories of crime 
inform policies. In this way our understanding of the workings of society may be 
enhanced by a deeper understanding which goes beyond simple explanations such as 
administrative incapacity. In the concrete case of the international anti-crime policy, 
the conclusions of the thesis suggest, such simple explanations have led to escalation 
of wrongly devised policies and a continuous quest for improving unworkable 
arrangements. 
 
For international relations theory, the findings of the thesis have confirmed some 
neo-realist assumptions about the continuation of the power structure of the world 
and primacy of states in the analysis of this structure. However, the thesis depicts a 
more complicated version of relations in the world system. The most important 
conclusion from the discussion of anti-crime policies is that they do not demonstrate 
a clear conception of self-interest. Therefore it is difficult to see the EU policies on 
crime as an expression of politics – their chaotic nature, lack of clear motive and 
justification beyond a ‘soft-security’ rhetoric speaks about issues which are deeper 
than just state-to-state political rivalry in mainstream international relations theory. 
This raises questions, which the thesis did not address but which may form an 
interesting line for future enquiry. Such an enquiry could use the issue of the anti-
crime policies to explore relations on levels lower than international politics. 
  
The case study of Bulgaria and the European Unions’ adoption of the new soft 
security agenda has demonstrated that this development has had little security added-
value for Bulgaria or the EU. The policies developed and implemented by the Union 
in Bulgaria have not led to more sense of security in the local population who now 
fear not a vague threat of military invasion but the weakness of its state institutions. 
The growing distrust in the criminal justice system in Bulgaria has left its population 
feeling insecure and unable to seek protection from the state or even identify with its 
elected representatives. Soft security theory has precluded the critique of security 
politics in international relations and has replaced one doctrine with another without 
consideration of the additional implication of undermining the concept of state 
sovereignty. As a result there is a growing consensus that international security is 
threatened by weak states which require both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ internal intervention. 
Political elites of such states have embraced the agenda and moved to justifying 
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 power with implementing soft security policy internally as opposed to hard security 
externally. In this way power has become even more entrenched in its societal basis 
which has diminished the opportunity for society to challenge through the 
conventional democratic process.  
 
In the case of Bulgaria, the inclusion of organised crime in the security debates 
appeared to be modernising the country by linking security with civic concerns but 
the inadequacies of policies developed under internal and external pressure have led 
to the turning of organised crime into a powerful tool of critique of post-communism. 
The implications of this part of the research concerns the study of quality of 
democracy under conditions of externally defined and devised democratisation, i.e. 
democracy being defined in a Eurocentric manner, focusing on institutions – strong 
and independent - and thus excluding and ignoring the more important issues of 
political process and the necessity of this political process to be able to control 
institutional power. Thus the controversies created by the anti-crime policies are 
indicative of wider issues with concepts of democracy and the rule of law in post-
Cold war state-building. A research agenda focusing on these issues would be of 
crucial importance for all levels of analysis which the thesis has examined, and 
would be as relevant for the quality of life of the individual, and the development of 
the local, the state-level and the international-level communities, and the New 
Europe, as the issues of security and crime. 
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